Mr. RASMUSSEN stressed the fact that one of the factors which had helped to prevent world recovery after the war was the poverty as well as the lack of goods in large parts of Europe and Asia. That factor had affected both the vanquished — that was the former oppressors — and several of the victors. That was why Denmark had heartily welcomed the initiative taken in 1947 by Mr. Marshall, Secretary of State of the United States of America, which had led to the offer of generous American aid for the reconstruction of Europe on the condition that that reconstruction was based on the co-operation of the countries of Europe.
Denmark had hoped that all European countries would be able to take part in that work of reconstruction. Although that hope had not been realized, he looked forward very optimistically to the reconstruction of Europe and of the world which would result from the accomplishment of the Marshall Plan.
Denmark, however, did not exclude other possibilities of wider European co-operation. The Danish Government was prepared to examine with other Powers the possibility of taking part in any other form of economic co-operation for the benefit both of all countries and of each individual country.
The economic situation after the second World War differed from that which followed the first World War in that production, despite considerable destruction, had recovered much more quickly after the last war than it had after the first.
In regard to the organization of international trade, Mr. Rasmussen noted that many rays of hope had appeared. Thus, during the past year, negotiations had taken place under the auspices of the United Nations in the matter of commercial and tariff policy — negotiations which might be of considerable importance to the development of foreign trade as soon as the first transitional difficulties had been surmounted. In the first place, there were the Havana negotiations, resulting in the drafting of a series of rules of commercial policy, which Denmark hoped would succeed in preventing a repetition of the policy of trade restrictions which characterized the years 1930 to 1940. There were also the negotiations on customs tariffs, which had taken place at Geneva between the countries adhering to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade concluded a year ago.
Efforts had not been merely directed towards the creation of better conditions for foreign trade in the future. During the past year a number of European countries had worked energetically to solve the problems of the transitional period by co-ordinating the attempts made by the various countries to rebuild their own economy. The results were already noticeable.
On the whole, the various countries were agreed that it was necessary to seek an increase in foreign trade as well as a better distribution of work among countries. It was merely a question of knowing what were the best means of reaching that goal.
The representative of Denmark drew the attention of the Members of the General Assembly to two particular points. First, there was the effort made during the past year to facilitate the convertibility of currency among the nations of Europe. If that convertibility were accompanied by a rise in product on and a more liberal trade policy, there was a real chance of a greater exchange of goods and a distribution of work ensuring better results.
The second measure to be taken would be the extension of that convertibility to include the dollar. But that was only possible if the European countries as a whole succeeded in balancing their payments with the dollar area, and, as the Economic Commission for Europe had stated at Geneva, that problem would be difficult to solve unless ways of increasing commercial exchanges between Western and Eastern Europe were found, those exchanges being now much smaller than before the last war. It would therefore be very important for the United Nations to spare no effort to revive and to develop trade between East and West.
Turning to the questions which were of particular interest to Denmark, namely certain problems concerning refugees, Mr. Rasmussen said that the Danish Government had every desire to take part in the international work undertaken to solve the refugee problem. He recalled that, on 20 August 1948, Denmark had been the fifteenth signatory of the statutes of the International Refugee Organization. Those statutes had thereby received the number of signatures required to make them operative and the IRO had been able to begin its work.
Mr. Rasmussen explained that Denmark had not joined that organization earlier because of the acute nature of the refugee problem in his country. During the last months of the war, contrary to the rules of international law and despite the protests of the Danish authorities, the German Government had evacuated more than 200,000 German refugees to Denmark. Further, the Germans had transferred to his country about 24,000 refugees of other nationalities. While it had been possible quickly to repatriate the majority of the non-German refugees, it had taken a long time to repatriate German refugees in spite of the efforts of the Danish Government. During the last two years three-quarters of them, numbering more than 150,000, had been received in the four occupation zones in Germany. Nevertheless, at the present time, almost three and a half years after the capitulation of Germany, about 45,000 German refugees were still in Denmark.
During negotiations which took place in August 1948, however, the United States and British Military Governments in Germany had agreed to receive a total of 25,000 of those refugees in the American and British zones of occupation. Further, the French Government had just declared itself ready to receive another 15,000 German refugees in the French zone.
It was with the greatest satisfaction that the Danish Government saw that practically the total repatriation of German refugees was achieved. They had the right to return to their countries, just as the Danes had the right to be freed of them. Those refugees had so far cost the Danish State more than 100 million dollars. That was a large sum for a country like Denmark, but it was not only a financial question. It was also a matter of human beings who, through no fault of their own, had been sent into a foreign country where they had had to be interned for years.
Another aspect of the refugee problem, which was of the greatest importance for Denmark, was the presence of a great number of German refugees in the regions immediately to the south of the German-Danish frontier.
In the opinion of the Danish delegation it was extremely important to remedy the dangerous consequences of the great German migration, and to help the several millions of German refugees to find a permanent home in Germany itself in order to eliminate the dangerous pressure which those refugees exerted on the Danish frontiers. The events now taking place in the territories of South Schleswig immediately to the south of the Danish frontier, where there were whole masses of refugees with no connexion whatever with the territory, presented a great danger to Denmark. In those regions there were now almost as many refugees as inhabitants, more than ninety refugees to a hundred inhabitants. Before the war that territory had about 355,000 inhabitants, whereas at the present time it had some 685,000 inhabitants. South Schleswig had no big industries or important towns and it was not therefore in a position to support that immense increase in population. Thus, South Schleswig and Holstein, which together constituted the Land of Schleswig-Holstein, was the region of Germany which had the highest percentage of refugees.
The majority of the German refugees living in the areas directly south of the Danish frontier were not placed in camps but billeted in the houses and apartments of the population in town and country. The overcrowding of human beings in that small area was a disaster for its inhabitants as well as for the refugees themselves, and it was ruinous for the economy of the region.
As it was impossible for the masses of refugees to find work and a permanent domicile in the frontier regions, their sojourn there was causing social and political unrest. Southern Schleswig was a territory which had belonged to Denmark until 1864, when it had been conquered by the Germans; it was a territory in which there had been and still was a national rivalry between Danish and German cultures. The presence of so many refugees in that region considerably increased the proportion of the population having German sympathies, and thus completely altered its composition, to the detriment of the Danish element.
The concentration of refugees in Southern Schleswig also constituted a potential threat to the security of the Danish frontier in the future. Although for the moment that frontier was not in danger, there was reason to fear that the considerable increase in the German element of the population in the frontier regions might provide favourable ground for German propaganda and an expansionist policy in the future. A Southern Schleswig, over-populated by German refugees, would undoubtedly constitute an element of undesirable and dangerous tension. For Denmark, it was absolutely essential that such a development should be avoided.
The Danish Government fully realized the great difficulties involved in the solution of the problem, and appreciated the efforts already made by the occupying Powers in Germany to arrive at a more even distribution of the refugees within the frontiers of Germany. While stressing the vital importance of the question for the future of Denmark, the Danish delegation drew the attention of the Assembly to the fact that it was also in the common interests of Europe that new causes of tension should not be created on the frontiers of Germany.
Mr. Rasmussen added that the delegation of Denmark in no way underrated the importance of the other questions not related to refugees, included in the agenda of the Assembly. The examination of those numerous questions would not only require a considerable amount of work, but also a joint and determined effort in order to reach agreement in their solution.
The representative of Denmark then paid a tribute to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, whose untiring efforts had so often given an example to the Members of the Organization. He emphasized that the Secretary-General had given, both in his report and in the other documents submitted by the Secretariat, clear proof of the will to work and the desire for a development of international understanding which characterized the Secretariat’s activities.
In conclusion, Mr. Rasmussen expressed the hope that the General Assembly of 1948 would be enabled to maintain its course along the road of understanding, in order to find the means of resolving conflicts, settling disputes and consolidating peace: he hoped it would continue to bring encouragement to tortured minds and give back to the world hope of a better future.