Belgium

Mr. SPAAK said the speakers who had taken part in the beginning of the general debate had repeatedly stressed the atmosphere of great anxiety in which the Assembly’s work had begun. How could it be otherwise when so many hopes had been dashed and so many problems had remained unsolved? After a week of general debate, it might be permissible to ask where the Assembly stood and if it had made any progress. Some speakers had reaffirmed their unshakable faith in the principles and ideals of the Charter. Others had analysed the situation with serenity and courage. Others, lastly, had indulged in their usual accusations. Mr. Spaak said that if he had had to ask himself at that stage of the general debate what the predominant feeling was, he would have come to the unfortunate conclusion that the lack of comprehension which was dividing the United Nations more and more had only increased and deepened. He had no hesitation in stating that there could be no more painful feeling and no graver realization, because a society such as the United Nations could only be successful if its actions were based not only on tolerance but also on the possibility of understanding each other’s point of view. Who was mostly responsible for that atmosphere of incomprehension? Who was making no effort to understand the point of view of others? As Mr. Bevin had said at the 144th plenary meeting he felt that the countries belonging to Western and democratic civilization, in the classic meaning of the word, could not be blamed themselves for anything. It was they who stood for the freedom of movement of men and above all for the free circulation of ideas; it was they who were ready to submit their policy, their actions, aims and ideals to the examination and judgment of all. They did not shut themselves up behind an iron curtain — an iron curtain which they would like to breach so as to learn and understand, and on the basis of that understanding try to achieve a rapprochement and collaboration. One thing was certain, namely, that the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not understand the Western world at all, and Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech at the 143rd plenary meeting had proved that once again. Perhaps it might seem impertinent for the representative of a small country such as Belgium to wish to reply to the representative of the USSR. Perhaps, on the other hand, it was better that the reply should come from the representative of a small country, for no one would be able to find in his attitude any intention of provocation whatever. Any provocation of the USSR by Belgium would indeed be too ludicrous. But Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech could be understood in two ways only: either it was a propaganda speech or else it was a wholly sincere speech. In either case it deserved a reply. If it were a propaganda speech, others had the right to make use of the same hall for counter-propaganda. If, on the other hand, it was a wholly sincere speech it displayed such complete incomprehension of the aims, wishes and thoughts of the Western European countries that it was imperative to redress those mistakes and to enable the USSR to base its policy upon an accurate knowledge of events and thoughts in one part of the world. After Mr. Bevin, Mr. Spaak also wished to state that the Western European countries did not want to discuss the communist regime. They considered that communism was no doubt a necessary trial for many countries but they believed that the Western world could do without that trial. Without wishing to discuss any regime they wanted to state that, having fought against fascism and hitlerism in the last war, they were not going to bow to any authoritarian or totalitarian doctrine. They stood for liberal democracy, that is to say, they believed with all their strength and all their conscience in the need for building a political society based on freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of association. They stood for free elections, for governments responsible to the people, for the respect of human dignity and for a State which served man instead of man serving the State. Still less did they want man to serve a single party. Such a regime had vast advantages. It allowed all manner of progress, both economic and social. It repudiated intolerance; it rejected the use of force and violence and trusted in the common sense and the wisdom of man. Mr. Spaak realized that was perhaps the most difficult political regime to achieve, and he also admitted that it entailed certain disadvantages and perhaps even some dangers. In Western European countries, freedom of thought and writing included even freedom of thinking and writing erroneously, but they did not think that the police, the courts, exile or worse still, were the right weapons with which to fight against mistakes. Propaganda which spread the truth was the best weapon against propaganda which spread lies, and, having mighty and unshakable confidence in the common sense and wisdom of man, they believed that truth would win in the end. All that, the spirit in which they lived, the principles that were theirs, the truths they wished to defend, all that had to be realized when one wished to understand the political activities of the Western countries. Mr. Vyshinsky had spoken at great length about alleged warmongering campaigns in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and even — he had not hesitated to say so — in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As far as his own country was concerned, Mr. Spaak knew of no political party, of no responsible politician, of no man who had any influence in leading public opinion who was a warmonger. He had never seen, never heard, never read in the Press of his country or in the speeches made in his country a single sentence that could make one believe that Belgium would, of its own free will, take part in a warmongering campaign and prepare itself for an aggressive war against any country whatsoever. But he believed that it was necessary to keep a certain sense of nuances in those matters. There should be no confusion between the belief that war may break out and the will to bring it about; there should be no confusion between envisaging the possibility of a war and desiring it. Nor should there be any confusion between preparing for war and urging war. There was no doubt that the Soviet Union greatly exaggerated the importance of what was read and said in the Press. Mr. Spaak had taken care not only to listen to the speech of the USSR representative with the greatest attention and respect but also to read his speech over again, and he had noticed that Mr. Vyshinsky attached a truly extraordinary importance to facts which in a free country would pass almost unnoticed. Mr. Vyshinsky had denounced — and with what passion — certain articles, published in the American Press, which contained passages which, with cynical frankness, listed military air bases from which Soviet cities would be attacked, giving the respective distances involved. What a revelation all that was, and how much warmongering there was in giving the precise distance between London and Moscow! Mr. Spaak asked the USSR representative what was more dangerous for the peace of the world: the secret work carried out by general staffs, or the maps published by American magazines which revealed such extraordinary discoveries as distances between largo cities? In addition to warmongering propaganda there was also the Five-Power Pact, the Brussels Pact. Mr. Vyshinsky had said that those who concluded similar treaties and organized such blocs were carrying out policies that had nothing to do with the consolidation of peace and that they were encouraging the instigators and organizers of a new war. The arguments of the Soviet Union were not over-subtle. They amounted to stating that when the USSR concluded alliances with its neighbours, when it signed defence treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and so many other East European countries, that was a policy of peace, but when Belgium and the Netherlands concluded an alliance with France and the United Kingdom, that was necessarily a policy of war. Mr. Spaak had two arguments, both of them conclusive, against such propaganda. When the five Powers in question had concluded the Brussels Pact they had done nothing else but apply strictly Article 51 of the Charter which stated that: «Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence... » The Charter had been signed by the USSR and the eastern countries at the same time as by the other countries and it authorized the organization of self-defence, whether individual or collective. It was on the basis of that Article, and actuated by no other feeling, that the live Powers in question had met and concluded the Pact. That legal argument alone was sufficient, but was there really anyone in the Assembly Hall, nay, in the entire world who thought that Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium wished to take part in a war of aggression? Did anyone forget where those countries were and the two tests they had stood in twenty-five years? Did anyone forget that although they had won in the end they had been occupied for four long years, and did anyone think that although they had survived that double trial they could now be sure of surviving a third world war and then resuming bravely their forward march? No one could believe such a thing. No one — as Mr. Bevin had said previously — could believe that the alliance signed in Brussels in March last was directed against any nation. On the contrary, everyone knew that the five countries had joined forces in order to defend themselves. The Soviet Union delegation should seek no complicated explanation of their policy. Mr. Spaak was going to describe the basis of that policy; he was going to do so in terms somewhat cruel, perhaps, and which only the representative of a small nation could use. What was the foundation of their policy? It was fear, fear of the USSR, fear of its Government, fear of its policy! He used the word «fear» because the fear he had in mind was not that of a coward or of a minister representing a frightened country, a country ready to ask for mercy and beg for pity. No, it was not that kind of fear. It was the fear which should be felt by a man when he peered into the future and realized all the possible horror, tragedy and terrible responsibility held in store by that future. Did the USSR delegation know why the Western European countries were afraid? They were afraid because the USSR delegation often spoke of imperialism. What was the definition and current notion of imperialism? It was usually the notion of a nation — generally a great Power — that effected conquests and increased its influence throughout the world. What was the historic truth that emerged from the recent years? It was that one great country alone had emerged from the war having conquered other territories — and that great country was the Soviet Union. During the war, and because of the war, it had annexed the Baltic States; during the war, and because of the war, it had annexed a slice of Finland and it was during the war, and because of the war, that it had seized part of Poland. Thanks to its daring and supple policy it had become all-powerful in Warsaw, Prague, Belgrad, Bucharest and Sofia; thanks to its policy it was occupying Vienna and Berlin and did not seem prepared to leave them; thanks to its policy it was now demanding a share in the control of the Ruhr. The empire of the USSR stretched from the Far East to the Baltic Sea and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and was now also felt on the banks of the Rhine... and then the USSR wondered why the other nations felt anxious ! The truth was that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was now more daring and more ambitious than the policy of the Tsars themselves. The Western European countries were also afraid because of the policy which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics followed in the United Nations. They were afraid because of the use, and above all the abuse, the USSR had made of the right given to it in San Francisco, the use and abuse of the veto. They were afraid because, within the Assembly, the USSR had risen as the champion of the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, and they were wondering how an international organization could function and achieve its aims if that out-dated and reactionary doctrine were to triumph. An international organization could only function when all nations, whether small, medium or large, had fully realized that above their personal will there was international law. So long as any country wished to assert its own will over and above the will of the majority of nations, the United Nations would not be able to achieve all that was expected of it. But the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had not only used and abused the veto; it had not stopped at proclaiming the principle of national sovereignty against international law; it had systematically refused to co-operate with the United Nations every time the Organization had made a recommendation which was contrary to the views or feelings of the USSR. It was easy now for the Soviet Union to contend that the Special Commission on the Balkans or the Temporary Commission on Korea had not achieved any tangible results. But how could they do so when part of the Assembly had refused to co-operate before they had even begun work? Anxiety was felt because of all that, because the USSR had rendered the Organization ineffective by its conduct; because the questions raised before the Organization remained unsolved; because every time a solution was proposed by the United Nations as a whole the Soviet Union blocked it by its own will. The Western European countries were afraid and anxious because they had placed all their trust in an effective United Nations and were now forced by the policy of the USSR to seek their security not within the international and universal framework of the Assembly but within that of the regional agreements they would have preferred to renounce forever. They were also afraid of the Soviet Union because within every one of the countries represented in the United Nations it maintained a fifth column beside which the Hitlerite fifth column was nothing but a boy scout organization. There was no single place in the world, whether in Asia, Europe or Africa where any of the Governments represented in the United Nations could come across a difficulty or an obstacle without the USSR working to increase it still further. That was the way in which the Soviet Union collaborated with the Governments represented in the Assembly, and with which it should be working to ensure peace. In every one of those countries there existed at the present time a group of men who were not only the representatives and the upholders of the USSR’s foreign policy — which after all would not be a very grave matter — but who never missed an opportunity to weaken politically, morally and socially the States in which they lived. The Soviet Union and the Communist parties of the entire world had shown exactly what they could do through their opposition to the Marshall Plan. Mr. Spaak said that the position taken up by the USSR and by the Communist parties of the whole world against the Marshall Plan was the most depressing, the most serious and the most disquieting action possible, for it had been proclaimed by sixteen European nations — which needed no lessons in national dignity from anyone — that Europe would be lost without the Marshall Plan. Instead of seeking complicated explanations of the Marshall Plan; instead of picking out comments from some United States provincial papers, it would have been more normal and more logical to seek an explanation and the noble ideals of the Plan in the words of General Marshall himself. When speaking for the first time of the plan, which was to become known as the Marshall Plan, he said that it was logical that the United States should do whatever it was able to do to assist the return to normal economic health of the world, without which there could be no political stability and no assured peace. «American policy», said General Marshall, «is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose is to be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.» Whatever might happen in the future and whatever the future of the Marshall Plan, the words spoken that day would resound to the honour of the head of United States diplomacy; they were in the tradition of a policy for which the Western European countries would, despite everything, forever feel an immense gratitude. Twice within the space of twenty-five years that policy had brought United States soldiers to contribute to victory which gave back to those European countries their independence. That policy, inspired by Wilson and by Roosevelt, had been the mainspring of the United States war effort, and of lend-lease and was now giving Europe its greatest and even its sole hope of salvation. That was why the Western European countries were anxious; that was why they were afraid. During the war President Roosevelt, in a great speech, had listed the four freedoms which he thought could bring back confidence and prosperity to the world. One of those freedoms was the freedom from fear. Several years had gone by and now that the third session of the General Assembly was opening he knew what tremendous service would be rendered to the world if one succeeded in freeing it from fear. He wished to add that the USSR would have to play a great and decisive role in that liberation from fear. Categorical statements proclaiming that one was in favour of peace and against imperialism and that one upheld the Charter of the United Nations were not enough. Those words had to be followed by deeds and he wanted to see the advent within the Assembly of true co-operation based upon mutual understanding and esteem. Could Mr. Spaak’s speech be considered pessimistic and did he think that all was lost? Certainly not. He had noted that whatever the difference in meaning lent to the same words, a similar language had on the whole been spoken in the general debate of the Assembly. All sides had upheld the same principles; all sides had stated that they wanted to ensure peace and that they wanted to co-operate. In spite of the rude frankness of his words, he wanted to state quite sincerely that he believed those peaceful speeches to be genuine. He believed that nations were still too close to the war; too close to the joint suffering they had endured; too close to their ruins and to their dead to talk of peace and collaboration without sincerity. What frightened him was the realization that the world knew what to do to be saved and wanted to do it, but seemed doomed to a tragic fate, in that it was incapable of doing it. And yet, at the beginning of that third session, at a time when nations had lost all their illusions, they should try to do something. Of course, they should not be too ambitious; they should not try now to reverse completely a situation they had allowed to deteriorate for years. But they should, within the framework of their everyday task, within the framework of the third session, do their best to solve certain questions. They should start with a spectacular gesture; they should start with a compromise. He knew full well that compromises were not very much liked in certain quarters. But what other way was there to achieve agreement? How could one build amidst all the differences if- one did not try to find some ground for unity? Mr. Spaak said lie had noted the agenda was abominably overloaded. In this connexion, to his mind, the Organization was giving attention to too many things and trying to solve too many secondary problems. Would it not be better to devote itself to solving the essential and immediate problems? No doubt he was too naive and yet there might be something reasonable in what he was going to propose. Part of the Assembly loathed anything connected with the revision of the Charter; it hated all discussions on the veto, and seemed to fear that all those who upheld other systems than the existing one were trying to create a situation in which some countries would always be in the minority. He wanted to say quite frankly that he did not think that was true; he thought the fear was exaggerated and he knew of many delegations in the Assembly which would like to agree at times with the views of certain countries when they thought them truly reasonable and justified. But even though he thought the fear was unjustified, he understood that it could exist. How would the USSR react if those countries said that although they were fully convinced that the Organization could work only when its Charter had been revised and when the abuse of the veto had been remedied, they were going to make yet another effort with the Soviet Union to try to apply the Charter as it had emerged from San Francisco; that they were going to renounce something they considered essential on one condition only, namely, that the USSR should promise to collaborate in the implementation of the Charter, in the implementation of the letter of the Charter and above all of its spirit. That meant that the USSR would no longer systematically and unreasonably object to the admission of new Members; that meant that it would no longer repulse countries which were entitled to join the family of the United Nations; it meant that when a recommendation was made to Members of the Organization, after careful and thorough discussion, the Soviet Union would agree to co-operate. The United Nations needed the USSR to succeed in its task and asked it not to sabotage its work. Mr. Spaak urged that the effort be made. He asked the Soviet Union to accept the sacrifice and meet it with the promise of loyal collaboration. The United Nations should make a new start and if it did so, each nation striving to understand one another and to come closer to one another, the flame that burned at San Francisco would shine clear and bright again. Then it would be possible to have faith anew in the destiny of the world. The representative of Belgium appealed to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make that new start together with the others. It was not too late, but it was high time.