96. During the twelve years since the United Nations was founded it has become an established tradition to hold a general debate at the opening of each session of the General Assembly to enable each delegation to review the international situation, discuss the problems of special interest to it, make any suggestions it may wish to offer and in general make its contribution to the task of objective analysis which must be undertaken by an organization responsible for promoting peace and establishing friendly relations among peoples. It is natural that such a debate should be marked by concern with the national interests of the individual countries concerned md that passions should sometimes run high, with the result that on occasion things are said that would normally be left unsaid. Nevertheless as a rule a general pattern emerges and some conclusions can be drawn by a sufficiently impartial observer. Therein lies the main value of the debate, and also its disadvantage, for in the world in revolution in which we all of us live, subjects of concern and points of friction inevitably tend to push into the background the factors that might make for optimism.
97. This year again our session opens in the shadow of two major international crises, one in the Middle East and the other in the Far East, and at a time when little progress has been made towards the settlement of the great problems that face our Governments- whether the problems arising from the last war, among the first of which is, in my country's opinion, the tragic division of Europe, or the more general problem on disarmament. Thus once again there is in theory immense scope for action by the United Nations, If the Organization wishes to seek to fulfil the mission entrusted to it by the Charter and to satisfy the anxious expectations of the peoples.
98. It is true that one of the two crises I mentioned, that of the Middle East, now seems to be entering a phase of relative stabilization. A little over two months ago, after the landing of American forces in Lebanon and British forces in Jordan, at the request of the Governments concerned, it seemed that the peace of the world was imperiled by the great Power conflict which had once again crystallized in that area. Disturbing messages were sent, serious threats were made and all the chancelleries sought means of organizing discussions that would halt the course of events. It was in those circumstances that the General Assembly met only a few weeks ago in emergency special session, with the purpose of containing the threatened conflagration.
99. Now that a report is about to be submitted to the Assembly by the Secretary-General we can make £h initial appraisal 6f what was done at that time and of the developments that may be expected. I am happy to say that, at least so far as the French delegation is 'concerned, this appraisal is relatively optimistic. It is optimistic because there is apparent a real tendency to deal with the problems as such, that is to say, to deal with them objectively as they arise, once outside interference has been eliminated. This was symbolically affirmed in August 1958 by the fact that the resolution then adopted [ resolution 1237 (ES-III)] was proposed and submitted by the countries concerned, by the Arab countries. It was clear that if progress was to be made, it was necessary to isolate the two concrete problems, the Lebanese problem and the Jordanian problem, in which the crisis originated and which really existed in themselves. That was the only way of enabling the two countries concerned to settle their internal affairs and to decide their future for themselves.
100. That, it seems to me, is the task the Assembly entrusted to the Secretary-General in making available to him all the means, with the exception of military forces, which he might deem necessary to demonstrate — in the countries directly concerned and in the neighbouring countries — the will of the United Nations to establish conditions in which Lebanon and Jordan would have the possibility of freely choosing their own course, and thus to bring to an end a crisis which threatened the very existence of the latter State.
101. We are now awaiting with great interest and hope the report of the Secretary-General, whose tireless efforts have rightly earned our gratitude. We believe that subsequent developments will meet our expectations and will in particular lead to the early withdrawal of the forces which are still in Lebanon and Jordan and which, as we well know, neither the Government of the United States nor the Government of the United Kingdom wishes to keep there any longer than is absolutely essential.
102. We also know that when this difficult stage is passed, the problems of the Middle East will not suddenly disappear. Some of these problems do not concern our Organization; I refer to those that arise from the natural evolution of the countries of the region, to the extent that this evolution is peaceful and no one wishes to resort directly or indirectly to aggressive methods. There are also relations and interference with the rest of the world, and the direct or indirect responsibilities of the countries known as the great Powers, all subjects which it seemed necessary to discuss in a special manner and which will eventually have to be settled, if the Middle East's prospects of peaceful development and economic advancement in genuine independence are not to be impaired.
103. No sooner had a measure of stabilization been achieved in the Middle East than a new crisis unexpectedly developed in another part of the world where the situation had been relatively calm for three years. The disquieting events in the Formosa Strait are cause for anxiety, if not alarm. Once again peace is jeopardized in the Far East.
104. France, for its part, has no commitments in the area. It is therefore absolutely free in its judgement of the present events and its only concern is that military situations which may have serious consequences should be brought to an end. In our opinion, resort to force is never a good way of settling political disputes and is the less justified if it may have consequences disproportionate to the objective sought. We therefore very sincerely hope that the talks which were initiated while certain military operations were in progress will result in an agreement that will, if not permit a substantive solution of the problem, at least establish a modus vivendi capable of eliminating any threat of war in the Far East.
105. If unfortunately the outcome of these talks Should not be positive, it would be for the United Nations to take cognizance of the dispute and attempt to bring it to an end in the spirit of the Charter.
106. The immediate dangers that must be averted should not blind us to the long-term problems which are the real cause of the concern and the dangers which arise as events develop. These problems, with which we are confronted in the Assembly every year and which are ever present outside these walls, are the fruit of the cold war, in other words of the division, of the world and of the armaments race which is its consequence.
107. From time to time there is talk of convening a summit conference, not so much in the hope of solving these problems as for the purpose of reducing the tension to which they subject the whole world. Nearly a year ago, the idea was again mooted and at times it seemed possible to envisage an early decision. After many vicissitudes, the prospects again seem distant for the time being, firstly, because the two major international crises mentioned have diverted attention from less immediately pressing problems and, secondly, because there has been apparent very marked disagreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union with regard to the goals pursued.
108. It was clear from the outset that a solution, or even headway towards a solution of the political problems, would be very difficult to achieve; lam thinking in particular of the reunification of Germany, one of the most important of these problems, if only from the human point of view.
109. But there were other and more serious difficulties. As far as we were concerned — and by this I mean France — we would have been willing to resign ourselves to the fact that some problems could not be solved for the, time being, to defer them until a more opportune moment and to concentrate our efforts on the points on which some agreement might have been reached. In this connexion we were thinking above all of disarmament.
110. The discussion — which was very soon interrupted — concerning the agenda unfortunately showed that on the Soviet side the approach was quite different. The USSR Government has clearly demonstrated that in its view what we consider to be problems that must be deferred if they cannot be solved corresponds in reality to a definitive situation which there can be no question of not accepting as such. The very purpose of a summit conference would thus be to sanction, formally or otherwise, a status quo which in fact is but the disastrous consequence of the notorious Yalta Conference and, by the same token, to sanction the division of the world which was the outcome of the Yalta Agreements.
111. In the field of disarmament, the same tendency was apparent from the start and has how been crystallized in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly. In all the texts there is evident the same concern not so much to settle problems as to secure a ratification of the political and military status quo.
112. In saying this I do not mean that it is possible to separate the problem of disarmament from political problems proper. Disarmament, like the armaments race preceding it, is not in itself a phenomenon, and it is clear that the more normal and expedient course, in order to make disarmament possible, would be to begin by creating a climate of confidence and a feeling of security.
113. We have not succeeded in achieving this in the ten years and more during which our Organization has endeavoured to promote a general disarmament plan. At least the efforts that have been made show us, in a concrete manner, the technical possibilities and impossibilities in this matter. They keep alive the spirit of disarmament, in particular by making international public opinion aware of the appalling threat implicit in the very existence of the nuclear weapon. They make it permissible to hope that if, reversing the usual order of things, agreements were concluded on the subject of a general plan, the consequent relief would facilitate the settlement of those political problems which are still pending and thus bring about the genuine relaxation of tension which we all desire,
114. We must admit that the results so far achieved are meagre. An over-all plan prepared during the summer of 1957 by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was approved by the General Assembly at its twelfth session by a large majority, but was not accepted by one o: the great Powers chiefly concerned, so that the deadlock persists. And now, since the attempt at a general settlement has failed, there is a trend towards a new approach and the consideration of limited agreements which would make some headway possible, despite the obstacles, and help to create a climate of confidence. Is this new trend to be welcomed?
115. My delegation has no preconceived ideas, ether than that of facilitating any agreement which may seem valuable and likely to pave the way for future progress. Moreover, it is too strongly attached to the idea of disarmament itself to tackle the question in a spirit which might be considered even slightly negative. Nevertheless we are forced to admit that the suggestions before us are not satisfactory.
116. Disarmament is a complex problem. The consequences of each measure taken separately are different for each of the countries chiefly concerned, so that a concern for equilibrium must be a primary consideration i£ some are not to be favoured while others are put at a disadvantage. Moreover, the over-all view must never be lost to sight, if we wish disarmament to be a dynamic and continuing process, the end result of which will be increased security for all. One last condition is that the proposed measures should be genuine measures of disarmament and not simply create an appearance of disarmament.
117. It is in that spirit, in our opinion, that we should consider the proposals made to us. I shall not stop to consider one of those suggestions, which calls for a percentage reduction in the military budgets of certain States, Although justifiable in itself, a suggestion of that nature immediately raises problems of control and reopens the whole debate; it can only be studied by a body with a competence similar to that of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.
118. For the rest, we have before us two categories of proposals: on the one hand, the creation of certain zones which would be specially controlled or where armaments would be reduced, on the other hand the prohibition of nuclear tests.
119. Proposals in the first category have been made very frequently in the past three years and have already been fairly thoroughly discussed. As far as wo are concerned, there is no objection in principle, provided it is understood that the consequences are slight from the standpoint of disarmament proper, that they cannot be considered in isolation but only in relation to an over-all plan and as a step towards general measures, and finally that they should not favour some to the detriment of others. I shall add one further condition, namely that the proposals must tend to promote disarmament and not to prejudge political settlement under the guise of disarmament. From this last point of view, it is clear that any zone centred on the existing line of demarcation dividing Europe would be primarily political in its implications, in other words would tend to ratify the status quo.
120. From other points of view, moreover, it is clear that the control or demilitarization of a zone extending for, say, 800 kilometres on either side of this demarcation line would cover not only Germany and Poland, but also a substantial part of French and British territory, leaving the territory of the Soviet Union virtually untouched, an inequality of treatment that would in effect control or disarm the less powerful or less heavily armed, and leave the more powerfully and more heavily armed unaffected. We shall find the same tendency when we come to the question of nuclear tests.
121. At the present time conversations are in progress with a view to the organization of a technical conference on the question of the control of surprise attacks. France for its part will gladly co-operate. In our view the problem is that of considering practical means of controlling military movements of all kinds and defence and transport installations in a given area so that preparations for aggression can be detected in advance. This in no way prejudges the creation of a specific zone in a particular region. If an effective control system can in fact be devised, the ideal solution would in any case be to extend it to cover the whole world.
122. The problem of nuclear tests is infinitely more complex because it includes scientific, psychological and military factors which are at present inextricably confused.
123. One first point, and not the least important, is to find out how far the legitimate concern expressed in many countries, particularly in Japan, concerning the danger of atomic explosions to the human race, must be taken into account. In that connexion we now have before us the remarkable report [A/3838] prepared for us by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. In so new a field it has not yet been possible to conduct the necessary research and observation over a sufficiently long period, nor to extend them to very many countries. The general conclusion which appears to emerge from the report, however, is that even if, as the popular saying has it, the watchword when in doubt should be "don’t", the continuation of tests at the present rate — a rate which will probably not be maintained — creates no serious danger of an abnormal increase in radioactivity.
124. Another point is to ascertain how far it is possible to control a possible cessation of nuclear tests for military purposes. In that connexion, the technical conference held this summer in Geneva reached the conclusion that with sufficiently extensive and appropriately distributed facilities control would be possible,
125. The prohibition of nuclear experiments, which is not demanded by concern for human health, is accordingly a specific measure that could be put into practical effect. How does it fit in with a general disarmament plan? The French delegation has no hesitation on that point. Our country is second to none in its desire for disarmament, more particularly nuclear disarmament, because our experience of war and its effects has been only too long and too painful. We have no wish, unless we are obliged to it by concern for our own defence, to possess atomic weapons, and still less to find ourselves forced to use them. Francois therefore prepared to subscribe to any serious and effective disarmament agreement and scrupulously to respect its application. But any such agreement must be based on a disarmament programme and that means, as has always been understood, a series of well defined measures, i.e., in addition to the cessation of tests, the cessation of manufacture and the progressive reconversion of stockpiles. We cannot see any other way of releasing the world from the constant threat of destruction which now overshadows it.
126. It is in this frame of mind that we shall consider any proposal made before the General Assembly or elsewhere. Any over-simplified solution would in our view be misleading, likely merely to conceal the real problems, and therefore inacceptable. If all the countries in the world today decided without further ado on a general prohibition of atomic tests, what would be the real consequences? Those who do not yet possess this devilish weapon would indeed prevent themselves from manufacturing it in the future. But the gain would be slight, as they represent a relatively weak military. potential, if we omit one very great Power which is not a Member of the United Nations and which has never to our knowledge shown any intention of considering such a renunciation.
127. One other consequence would be that the nuclear bomb projectile still being the basic weapon of modem armed forces, all these countries would renounce their right to possess any true defensive weapons and would consequently be placing their defence wholly in the hands of the Nuclear Powers. The political consequences of such a move within the next five, ten or twenty years are obvious. A country like my own could not possibly consider such a step. And what would become of the United Nations itself?
128. On the other hand, the Powers now in possession of nuclear weapons which would, of course, undertake not to go on developing the armaments now in use, would not undertake to give up their manufacture. Not only would existing stocks not be destroyed — they would continue to grow.
129. Once again the status quo would be sanctioned. But the potential disarmament of certain Powers is not genuine disarmament. In this case, it would be all the more an illusion because the world would have lost the strongest incentive to nuclear disarmament, which now urges it on despite all difficulties. I am referring, (not to mention the wish of those in possession of the weapon not to increase the number of atomic Powers, to the irresistible pressure of international public opinion. Public opinion is in fact only kept awake to the nuclear problem by the announcement of tests which periodically remind them of the gravity of the danger. Once the tests had ceased, there would be no more publicity, manufacture would continue in secret and there would be no further mention of disarmament. That is why the cessation of tests can only be conceived within the framework of effective nuclear disarmament. We shall not weary of repeating this, because the welfare of mankind is at stake.
130. It is in this spirit that we envisage the conversations to be held in Geneva in a few weeks between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The immediate purpose of this conference is to reach agreement between those three Powers to enable them, through the institution of an appropriate form of control, to give up their own experiments in the future. We should of course have nothing to say against such a tripartite agreement; but it would not in our view be of any real value unless it constituted a first step towards disarmament on the part of the three countries concerned. It would in fact be normal if the chief result of the meeting was a decision to go on forthwith to the study of the truly decisive stage, by which I mean a study of methods for controlling the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear materials for military purposes. In that case it would be possible to say that real progress had been made towards disarmament and France would therefore associate itself whole-heartedly and in a most positive spirit with such a study.
131. In any case, the steps taken in recent months, however debatable in some of their possible consequences (and in that connexion I think I have made myself quite clear), show some progress because they lay stress on the real obstacle to disarmament control. The establishment of control has been treated as a necessary preliminary condition, and that is a step in the right direction, in which we should continue.
132. Although economic questions account for a large proportion of the activities of our Organization, I shall confine myself here to a brief reference. From the point Of view of the United Nations, as for each of our countries individually, the essential problem is that of assistance, particularly in the form of technical assistance, to countries which are not yet sufficiently developed. As far as we are concerned we shall continue the efforts we have already undertaken in this field through the United Nations and directly on our own initiative. Moreover we attach great importance — hence our strong advocacy of it in the past few years — to the establishment of an economic development fund. We are glad that this year, will see the establishment of the Special Fund which, while not entirely fulfilling our early hopes, will make a valuable contribution.
133. The financial assistance given by the industrialized countries to the economic development of other nations would not be fully effective if those other nations continued to be affected by excessive fluctuations in the prices of raw materials. At the twenty-sixth session of the Economic and Social Council the French delegation took an active part in the discussion on the question of the stabilization of commodity prices. We hope that our Organization will succeed in developing machinery to prevent excessive fluctuations in prices and we can but welcome the decisions recently taken to reconstitute the Commission on International Commodity Trade with wider terms of reference and a larger membership.
134. In this statement I have intentionally concentrated on a small number of particularly important questions, on which I thought that a clear statement of the French Government’s views might be of value. There are many other items on the customary lengthy agenda before the General Assembly, to which my delegation attributes importance either in the political, economic, social or trusteeship fields. The French delegation will state its views on those subjects at the appropriate time. What I particularly want to say in conclusion is that it will do so in the spirit in which I have endeavoured to speak today.
135. These problems must above all be treated objectively. That, of course, does not exclude concern for national interests; but it does mean that we must not be guided by emotion, however human. In the past, and even now, the debates in the United Nations have often been swayed by emotion. Of course no one would dream of condemning emotion in itself. But it must achieve self-discipline.
136. It is only by consenting to make the effort that we shall succeed in holding useful debates and reaching genuine, that is, political settlements, of our problems. In other words, let us try to revive that spirit of good will, tolerance and human brotherhood in which the United Nations came into existence in the spring in California in 1945, before the hopes of the postwar period had been dissipated. If we cannot restore it, how can we discharge our essential duty, which is to promote peace between men and nations?