Mr. C. MALIK congratulated the President on his election. There was a general hope among the President’s many friends that the United Nations might, under his leadership, set a landmark in the all important effort for the strengthening of peace.
74. Mr. Malik wished to indicate in general but precise terms the views of his delegation on those items on the agenda in which it was particularly interested.
75. The Greek question had again come up for consideration by the Assembly. Ever since the dawn of history, Lebanon had had intimate and fruitful relations with Greece. In recent years, it had endeavoured to re-establish a community of interest and intercourse with the brave Greek people; while Greece had still been under German occupation, the free Greeks had held a decisive conference in Lebanon. The delegation of Lebanon would support every measure designed to strengthen Greece against any danger from the north and to restore to the Greek people their inalienable right to unity and security.
76. The struggle of the Indonesian people for freedom and independence had naturally elicited much sympathy in Lebanon. It was generally hoped that the conference which was being held at The Hague would culminate in the final solution of that problem, and that another free Asian republic might soon be welcomed into the family of nations. The Lebanese delegation therefore hoped that the natural rights of the Indonesian people would be satisfied by mutual consent in such a manner that the Indonesian question could be struck off the agenda.
77. The Lebanese position on the question of the former Italian colonies Was the same as it had been at the third session of the Assembly. Lebanon desired that those territories should, in accordance with the wishes of their inhabitants, attain full self-government as soon as possible. With regard to Libya in particular, the Lebanese delegation was glad to note a general acceptance of the principle of granting unity and speedy independence. However, the mere political solution of that problem was not enough; Lebanon would also press for the inclusion of the former Italian colonies in any scheme of economic development under the United Nations. Political independence was a great-blessing, but it would not last where there was no sound economic organization having as its constant aim the raising of the standard of living of the people.
78. Mr. Malik did not wish to commit himself in advance to any judgment as to whether the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian Governments had or had not violated fundamental human rights in their respective countries. Indeed, he would be very happy if, as a result of the examination of the question; it became evident that no such violation had been committed. He emphasized, however, that the inclusion of that item in the agenda was a very significant fact, inasmuch as it constituted an historic precedent as far as the safeguarding of human rights was concerned.
79. The United Nations was bound by its own Charter to promote the universal and effective observance of human rights. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the individual, as far as his fundamental human rights were concerned, had been exclusively the subject of his Government. But since the adoption of the Charter, the individual had also become the concern of the United Nations in that important domain. One important way of implementing that principle, which was fully embodied in the Charter and which had received further concrete expression in the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was for the United Nations to concern itself with any alleged specific violations of human rights. The tremendous significance of the item on the agenda was that the sovereign State was no longer the sole and final judge in the treatment of its citizens in the field of human rights; it was subject to the vigilance and to the moral judgment, at least, of the organized community of nations.
80. The Palestine refugees had been heartened when they had heard Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States, declare at the 222nd meeting that, as an interim measure, the General Assembly should make the necessary provision for the maintenance of those refugees until the time when they could again become self-sustaining members of the Near Eastern communities. The Lebanese delegation would place its full knowledge of the tragic problem of Palestine refugees at the disposal of the General Assembly when the matter came up for debate and decision.
81. While continuing the temporary relief measures, it was imperative for the General Assembly to take effective measures to apply the principles it had formerly affirmed. The problem of the refugees was much more than a humanitarian problem; it could not be adequately settled by measures of relief alone. The ultimate fate of one million human beings should not remain indefinitely undecided; the dignity and self-respect of those men and women could not be preserved or regained by precarious international charity.
82. The General Assembly had already committed itself, in its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, to the principles on which the permanent settlement of .the problem must be based; namely, repatriation for those refugees who desired to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours, and compensation for those who chose not to return. There was also the implicit obligation that the General Assembly would guarantee to those who returned to their homes full observance of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
83. But those principles had not so far been put into effect. It was therefore incumbent upon the General Assembly, at the current session, not only to reaffirm those principles, but also to give them concrete content and shape, and to set up adequate machinery for their implementation. To divert attention from those principles would serve only to prolong the agony of the refugees and to intensify the tension and potential struggle in the Near East. It would also bring about a serious deterioration in the social and psychological situation in that area.
84. The Lebanese Government’s deep concern for the Palestine refugees did not blind it to the situation of other refugees in other parts of the world. The International Refugee Organization was to be dissolved in 1950. Mr. Malik recalled that he had taken part, both in the Economic and Social Council and in the Third Committee, during the second part of the first session, in the elaboration of the constitution of the International Refugee Organization. The Lebanese delegation believed that some organ capable of taking full care of the needs of refugees, and especially of the children among them, should be set up at the current session of the Assembly to replace the International Refugee Organization.
85. Mr. Malik then turned to the question of Jerusalem. The task facing the Assembly in regard to Jerusalem was to give effect to General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948. Both those resolutions called for the establishment of an international regime for Jerusalem and the surrounding area.
86. The current session offered what might be the last occasion to remove Jerusalem permanently from the danger of further damage or destruction, and to satisfy the deep desire of the Christian world, as expressed repeatedly in recent months by the Pope and many other Catholic spokesmen, as well as by the spiritual leaders of other denominations, for a truly international regime for the Holy City. If was also a unique occasion because, for the first time in history, the Moslem world was freely offering to share the custodianship of one of its most sacred places with the other great world religions. If at that historic moment the western Christian world were to allow itself to be overwhelmed by political considerations and, therefore, to falter in its determination to place Jerusalem above the struggle of Jew and Arab, history would one day reveal a tragic bankruptcy in Christian statesmanship. Jerusalem belonged to the whole world, not only to those who lived there. The Assembly would fail in its duty towards the international community if it did not grasp the opportunity to put into effect a regime in which the rights and interests of Christians, Moslems and Jews were made effective.
87. The past year had witnessed a war in Palestine in which Jerusalem itself had not been spared. The "City of Peace” was currently occupied by the forces of two sovereign States which only recently had been at war and which might perhaps be at war again in the near or distant future. Unless the entire city of Jerusalem with its surrounding areas were removed completely and permanently from the jurisdiction of that it would not again be damaged and perhaps altogether destroyed.
88. Any plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem must fulfil the following conditions: it must eliminate the possibility that the area might again become a battleground; it must assure the protection of, and liberty of access to, all Holy Places and religious sites, buildings and institutions; and it must allow and make possible the restoration of private property and public trusts to their rightful owners in accordance with conditions prevailing before the termination of the British Mandate.
89. In order to fulfil those conditions, the elimination of sovereign authority wielded within Jerusalem by specific States was essential. In its place, the international community must exercise full, unrestricted, and inalienable sovereignty and authority. Any plan which concerned itself only with the internationalization of specific sites within Jerusalem was inconsistent both with the intentions of the Assembly as expressed in previous resolutions and with the wishes and interests of the three world religions. There could be no safety or security for the Holy Places within Jerusalem unless the whole city were removed from the sovereignty of either party currently occupying it.
90. The Lebanese Government’s attitude to the plan presented by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/973) was governed by the extent to which that plan fulfilled those conditions. In so far as the plan was vague on the questions of the restoration of property in Jerusalem and the surrounding area to its rightful owners, and the degree of authority to be exercised by the Arabs and the Jews within their respective zones, it required further clarification and precision. The Lebanese Government would, however, be willing to take it as a basis for discussion and consideration.
91. The Conciliation Commission had held a long session in Lausanne. The French, Turkish and United States members of the Commission deserved sincere congratulations for the tact, patience and detachment with which they had carried out their difficult task. The delegation of Lebanon had played an active and constructive role at the Lausanne conversations. At a certain stage in those conversations, the Arab and Israeli delegations had agreed — it was, perhaps, the first agreement between them — to a certain definite basis for any further useful continuance of the Lausanne discussions. Certain presuppositions had been agreed upon as forming the basis for further discussion through the good offices of the Conciliation Commission. That procedural agreement, bordering also on the substance of the issue, had been one of the most important events in the recent development of the Palestine question. The Israeli delegation had later shown itself disinclined to abide. by that agreement. If the Israeli representatives were to declare themselves prepared to honour in good faith what they had accepted four and a half months previously, there would be a new significant spurt of hopeful activity in the Conciliation Commission’s work.
92. Since the third session of the General Assembly, three developments had occurred which had cast new gleams of hope into the hearts of peoples of the Middle East. The first was the announcement by the President of the United States of his bold new programme for the development of the less developed areas of the world. Mr. Truman, in many of his subsequent statements, had expressly referred to the Middle East as one of the regions he had had in mind in connexion with point four of his inaugural address. Other United States leaders had also, in formal statements, associated the Middle East, among other regions, with the President’s programme. It was a principle as old as Aristotle that potentiality must depend on actuality for its own realization; what was possible could not, by itself, realize itself. Consequently, when vast areas of the world, with immense human and material resources, heard the voice of a great country such as the United States proclaim its determination to help in their development, without imperialistic motives, the peoples of those regions had every right to be heartened. A new era might thus be beginning, an era in which increasing numbers of less developed peoples — whose lack of development was partly their own fault, partly the fault of certain historical contingencies, but in no event the unalterable imposition of doom — would be creatively swept into the historical orbit of responsibility and participation. The potential significance of President Truman’s idea could not be over-emphasized.
93. The second hopeful event had been the elaboration by the Economic and Social Council of a plan (A/983) for the organization and financing of an expanded co-operative programme of technical assistance for economic development to be carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.
94. During the four years of almost continuous consideration of the question by the Economic and Social Council, the delegation of Lebanon had played a very important role in the clarification of the purposes and principles of economic development. In fact, its contribution in that field could be regarded as second only to its contribution in the field of human rights. It was the Lebanese delegation which had sponsored and defended, against much discouraging scepticism, the first resolution adopted by the Assembly on technical assistance to under-developed countries, namely, resolution 52 (I) of 14 December 1946.
95. While the plan presented to the Assembly by the Council was not, in Mr. Malik’s view, on a sufficiently large scale and lacked the boldness which the vast problem of under-development required, it was nevertheless an important step towards the practical realization of United Nations objectives in that important field. However, economic development required capital investment; without it, the productivity of the under-developed countries could not be increased and their standards of living could not be raised. No amount of technical assistance would bring about economic development if capital resources were not available for investment in productive undertakings in the under-developed countries. The United Nations had not yet fully faced the problem of the enormous gap between the capital resources of the industrialized countries on the one hand and of the under-developed countries on the other. As long as that gap existed, and as long as the flow of capital from the advanced to the under-developed countries was not properly organized, economic development would be governed by the slow evolution of economic processes, with no prospect of any appreciable rise in standards of living for decades and even centuries to come. The Lebanese delegations would pursue its policy of emphasizing that not only in technical assistance, but also in the actual financing of schemes of development, the United Nations must play an original, active and constructive role for the promotion of one of the main purposes of the Charter, that of higher standards of living for all peoples.
96. Another important development was the establishment of the Economic Survey Mission headed by Mr. Gordon Clapp of the Tennessee Valley Authority. There again, the statement by President Truman which accompanied the setting up of the Mission had been encouraging. It appeared that the United States was going to lend both its moral and material support to the conclusions of that Mission, conclusions which, it had been asserted again and again by responsible authorities, would endeavour to steer as clear of politics as possible. The Assembly would have occasion, later in the session to examine and pass on the recommendations of the Mission. Every scheme that that eminent American would devise to help the countries of the Middle East face and solve their ultimate social and economic problems would be most carefully and sympathetically examined by the Lebanese delegation.
97. The Arab world had a positive approach to those problems. It did not want to be isolated from responsible currents of opinion and action. The presence of genuine good will in many, quarters was fully recognized. But the Arab.States did require, and rightly, that no scheme, no matter how alluring, should be offered to them at a political price. It was one thing to attack economic and social problems on their own merits, without preconceived ideas and in a spirit of detachment, in the hope that once they began to yield to expert treatment, a favourable psychological climate would be created for tackling the formidable outstanding political issues. But it was an entirely different thing to proceed on the assumption that the economic and social approach could be substituted for the political, or that the basic political rights of the Arabs could be bought off by economic expedients. The Economic Survey Mission would make an historic contribution of the first magnitude to the cause of peace, progress and concord in the Middle East, and the injustice done to the Arab people would be partially redressed, if the former of those two approaches were strictly, understandingly and farsightedly adhered to.
98. The implementation of immediate and long-range schemes of economic development throughout the Middle East was undoubtedly one of the conditions of permanent peace in that part of the world. But economic development alone was not enough. Two other fundamental conditions were necessary for real peace. Those conditions were possible of attainment if only all the Powers concerned could come together and concentrate on their problems. Those problems would be perfectly manageable if they were not constantly put in the background by other more important matters.
99. Apart from economic development, the sense of deep injustice which rankled in the people’s hearts had to be removed. When that sense found expression in literature, poetry, folksongs and tales of horror handed down from parents to children, and when the situation was viewed as a world conspiracy between the great Powers and the Jews against the Arabs, the problem was clearly a very difficult one. Something had to be done to restore the balance of justice in the minds of the people affected and to convince them that the whole world was not against them. Mere economics, no matter how brilliant, would not restore the sense of justice, nor would prosperity alone remove a deep sense of loneliness.
100. The second condition was the removal of the deep sense of fear. Nothing was more obvious than that Israel, left to itself and to the dynamic forces it had set in motion, would tend to expand and to dominate the Arab world. It could be extensively shown that that was precisely the desire of Israeli visionaries. The great Powers might well wash their hands and tell the Arabs that they must agree with the Israelis, that that was their problem, that they would not interfere. But the whole affair, from beginning to end, had been one long series of interferences. To interfere up to a certain point and then, at the crucial moment, to withdraw, was in itself a most cynical form of interference. Peace could not endure in the Near East in the absence of effective international guarantees against aggression. It was the responsibility of the great Powers, with their vast and vital interests in that part of the world, to provide the necessary and sufficient external political conditions which would make lasting peace possible.
101. But all those issues really belonged to the periphery of the contemporary world situation. The heart of the matter was the great ideological conflict. A world that had amazingly shrunk was endeavouring to house at the same time two radically contradictory conceptions of reality. There was no agreement whatsoever, not even a distant hope of agreement, with regard to the ultimate categories. Man, matter, the individual, the soul, government, democracy, history, truth, God — all those ultimate things had utterly different meanings as between the East and the West. There were only three possibilities. The radical conflict would persist; or a reconciliation would be effected; or the difference of ideologies would break out into armed conflict. It was the function of the United Nations to promote the second possibility or at least to prevent the third.
102. Reconciliation was impossible without genuine interaction, meeting, debate, humility of spirit, openness of mind, belief in reason and objective truth, and a certain sense of humour. But one side in the existing ideological conflict had hermetically sealed itself from every outside influence, physical or intellectual. There was thus no genuine interaction, no real meeting ground, and the necessary objective conditions for the modification of fundamental positions were therefore lacking. True, the General Assembly was a meeting ground; but did one system really confront the other there, was it really challenged by the other, was there a genuine interpenetration between the two orders? It was hardly possible to assert that that was the case.
103. It was inevitable that, so long as one side was completely closed to the outside world, both in space, and in time — and in a sense the self closure against history and tradition was the most grievous — the great ideological conflict could not be resolved. That meant that, in a crowded world, peace was precarious. Unless something happened to alter that whole situation and to render possible real communication between tire two opposing concepts, the despairing feeling would remain that the world was, for the most part, at grips with shadows and not realities.