Canada

During its brief history, the United Nations has existed under a shadow of fear, the fear that the problems arising out of one great war would resolve themselves not in a peace, but in a new war. As the fifth session of the Assembly opens, this danger has been brought nearer to us by the reality of warfare in Korea. Indeed, as we debate the issues of peace and war in this Assembly, men are fighting and dying in Korea under the flag of and for the cause of the United Nations. We pay tribute to their gallantry and their devotion. 138. This war in Korea is but the continuation by armed and open aggression of the policies that communist imperialism has been pursuing by other means in other places. It is part of the theory of communism that the disruptions and dislocations of a post-war period give to a communist minority its best chance to seize power by force and maintain it by the terror and repression of the police state. Systematically, the forces of communist imperialism, in these last years, have been trying out these theories in the four corners of the world. In countries where they have been able to depend upon the direct support of the Soviet army, they have been successful. Only one country in which Soviet forces were actually present in the post-war period has been able to throw off the control of the Kremlin, and even that country now feels itself to be gravely menaced. Whether or not continental China will be brought into the orbit of this international conspiracy remains to be seen. We may hope, however, that the Chinese people, with their own age-old civilization, with their traditional wisdom and patience, will not walk into the trap. The consciousness of their own great undeveloped resources and the strength of their national feeling will make them justly apprehensive of being exploited by Soviet imperialism. 139. In Korea, where the Soviet army had been present in force and where a communist minority was established in power in part of the country, conditions seemed admirably suited for communist seizure of the whole country. This time, however, the attempt was more open and violent than usual, and this time it met with collective United Nations resistance. That is what makes the aggression in Korea stand out. Despite all propaganda camouflage, the fact that North Koreans invaded the Republic of Korea was clear. This was not a coup d’état engineered by a minority as in Czechoslovakia, nor a regime imposed by an occupying force as in Romania. This was armed invasion. As such, it came as a shock to peace-loving nations. But it also acted as a stimulus to them. A swift and sudden assault on a peaceful nation had an obvious meaning for us all. Hence the speed and determination with which many of the free democracies, my own country included, have applied themselves to the task of jointly building up our defences against aggression. The countries which have felt obliged to take these steps in self-defence and to preserve the peace will not be deflected from their purpose by any specious manoeuvres designed to weaken and divide them, or to put them once again off guard. 140. The effect of the North Korean aggression within the United Nations itself has been to give overwhelming support to the Organization in this crisis of its existence. It has, however, demonstrated that, with very few exceptions, the Members were not in a position to make that support immediately effective. They were caught by surprise and unprepared to meet at once the demands of the situation. We have, I hope, learned the lesson of this experience. But we have also learned that the United Nations can act in response to a challenge — that it is no longer remote from reality, a mere international talking shop. A new impetus has been given to our world Organization and a new atmosphere has been generated in this Assembly of which we are all, I think, conscious. 141. Events in South Korea, and United States and British soldiers fighting heroically, are rapidly demonstrating that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post-aggression period in Korea. The political and economic life of that country must be established on a basis which will enable the Korean people to fulfil the destiny that has been promised to it. As hostilities draw to a close in Korea and the Assembly takes up its new responsibilities there, it seems to my delegation that certain specific principles should govern our decisions and that we should embody these principles at once in an Assembly resolution. 142. What are these principles? In the first place, as we see it, the general objective of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies: a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people itself governs without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its Members. 143. Secondly, the United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout its territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free self-government. It is our hope that the people of North Korea, having been forced into a perilous and disastrous venture by its communist rulers, will now itself repudiate these rulers and co-operate with the United Nations in bringing to Korea the peace and unity which its people desire. This is the time for the aggressors there to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not even be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re-establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people. 144. Thirdly, the Korean people — once peace has been restored — must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage. This, of course, means a Korea without foreign bases and free of foreign military domination. It means a Korea which will be responsible for its own defence within the framework of our collective security system. Above all, it means a Korea which will not be divided and disturbed by subversive communist elements directed from outside Korea. 145. The fourth principle should be that nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united, free Korea which carries any menace to Korea’s neighbours. There has been some comment in the Press and elsewhere about the role which the Korean peninsula has historically played in invasions of the Asiatic mainland, so nothing must be done in Korea, as indeed nothing will be done, which holds the least suggestion that any Member of the United Nations has any purpose whatever in Korea other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. 146. My fifth principle — and this is a principle which has just been enunciated by my friend, Mr. Lange — is that the free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing those methods of government. The countries of Asia and of the Western Pacific have made an outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. I think we should now make sure that we gain full advantage of the judgment of these States in charting a course for the future in Korea in the difficult days ahead. 147. Meanwhile, the destruction of the homes of the Korean people and the inevitable casualties to the civilian population which occur when hand-to-hand fighting is going on in a great city, as it is today in Seoul, are bringing terrible hardships to that unhappy country. Yet at this very time the Soviet Union delegation has the effrontery to produce in the Security Council resolutions condemning the United States Government for destruction and loss of life in Korea, when the Soviet Union delegation is well aware that, at a nod from the Kremlin, the North Korean aggressors would cease fighting and the bloodshed and suffering would be brought to an end. If the USSR Government were really in the least concerned about the sufferings of the Korean people, it has all along had it in its power, as it has at this moment, to bring to an end those sufferings which were caused in the first place by this communist adventure in aggression. 148. Those who fomented the Korean aggression must know now — if they did not know before — that their actions are running counter to the deepest and strongest trends of the age in which we are living. Today the peoples of the world, above all things, long for peace and security. I know that this is true of the populations of our free democracies, and I have little doubt that it is true also of the peoples of the Soviet Union and its associated States. The rulers of the USSR are well aware of this sentiment. It is one of the ironic tragedies of the present world situation that the Soviet Union Government, while pursuing policies of aggression, should be advertising itself as the champion of peace. It has been said that hypocrisy is the tribute of vice to virtue. The present Soviet-sponsored peace propaganda is a tribute to the universal desire for peace which they would exploit for their own purposes. This is a dangerous course, dangerous even to those who hope to profit by it. For people, even the Russian people, deprived as they are of access to the truth about political events, cannot be deceived forever. The game of pinning the name of aggressor on the victims of aggression cannot continue indefinitely and the disillusionment of people who, in their political simplicity, are signing the so-called Stockholm Appeal, will, in the end, act as a boomerang against communist imperialism itself. For sooner or later it will become clear to all, as it is clear to most of us now, what kind of peace the Cominform has in mind. It is the peace that prevails in a state dominated by one party, one political faith, one group of self-perpetuating rulers, one prophet; it is the peace of the policeman and the gaol. 149. We want peace, but not that kind of peace. Nor will we be led by any number of plausible answers to manufactured questions, or by superficially impressive resolutions about the prevention of war, reduction of armaments, the banning of weapons, to put ourselves again in a position where this kind of dead peace can be imposed on us by dictators. It is for genuine peace, based on the absence of fear and the presence of friendship and co-operation, that we long. 150. Furthermore, we are anxious not only to talk about peace and to pass resolutions about it, but to do something about it. It seems to us that the first practical step that we can take for peace is to put the security factor into the disarmament equation. We can disarm if — and only if — we are sure that in doing so we are not exposing our people to dangers from others who say they are disarming but are not doing so. If we are going to disarm ourselves, we must know — by seeing for ourselves and not merely by being told — that other people are disarming as well. We have, in fact, a right to continuous reassurance that the olive branch does not conceal 175 divisions. 151. It is with these considerations in mind that we are bound to examine the draft resolution which the Soviet Union Government has placed before the General Assembly on the subject of peace and disarmament. We should, of course, approach it in a constructive spirit and with an open mind. This, I confess, would be much easier if we had not had a painfully disillusioning experience with a whole series of USSR resolutions in the past, couched in the most pacific terms, purporting to be contributions to the cause of peace which, on closer examination, have proved to be something else indeed. Nevertheless, the issues of the present time are too grave and the dangers are too acute for us to brush aside any proposal put forward in the name of peace. So we must apply to the Soviet Union proposal some touchstone which will enable us to see whether this is merely an echo of past performances or whether, within it, is to be found some firm ground for a step forward. For if we see the promise of even a short step in the direction of peace, we must not fail to take it. 152. The USSR draft resolution covers a lot of ground, a good deal of which we have been over before in previous sessions of the General Assembly. It speaks of the desirability of concluding a five-Power peace pact, of reducing the present armed forces of these five great Powers by one-third during 1950, that is, during the next three months; this is a transparently insincere and meaningless proposal. The resolution also urges the General Assembly to declare itself in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control for the unconditional implementation of this prohibition. 153. My delegation is first of all interested in establishing what precisely is meant by these far-flung proposals, and we think that there is one very simple and direct test of the sincerity of those who have made them. There is one clear question which, if it could be answered by the Soviet Union representative, would go far to resolve our doubts. What does he mean "when he says he is in favour of strict international control of atomic energy, or, indeed, of armaments generally? He used that phrase, “strict international control”, several times in the course of his statement to the General Assembly in introducing the resolution. He spoke at some length to the last session of the General Assembly on the same subject. The Canadian delegation has studied his remarks with the care which they deserve — and no doubt other delegations have also — but we are quite unable to determine whether the Soviet Union view of strict international control differs in the slightest degree from what has been previously put forward by the USSR representative, which has been shown to be quite inadequate and unsatisfactory. Therefore I suggest that before the Soviet Union draft resolution on disarmament comes to a vote at this General Assembly, we have the right to ask for a clarification of the USSR conception of international inspection and control as applied to the problem of atomic energy, and indeed to disarmament measures generally. 154. One method of securing such clarification would be to introduce an amendment to the Soviet Union draft resolution by including at the appropriate places in that draft resolution some such words as the following: “By ‘strict international control’ is understood a system in which the inspection rights of the international control authority would include: “(a) The right of free access at all times to every atomic energy installation or plant of any kind whatever; and “(b) the right to search for undeclared atomic energy facilities wherever there can be reasonable grounds for believing, in the opinion of the international control authority, that they may exist.” 155. Such an amendment to the USSR draft resolution would, I suggest, act as the touchstone of its sincerity. If the Soviet Union delegation indicates by its readiness to accept this kind of definition, that atomic energy and disarmament negotiations might profitably be resumed, then I think that we should try once again to negotiate an agreement in this field that would be effective and would give us something more on which to base our common security than empty phrases and hypocritical gestures. If, however, the Soviet Union delegation refuses to accept some such definition of international control, then its draft resolution on peace and disarmament will be exposed for what it is — a propaganda manoeuvre designed for purposes far removed from ensuring peace and security. 156. Another important step that we can take at this Assembly has already been suggested by the United States delegation in its valuable proposal for the strengthening of the General Assembly. It has always been the view of our delegation that the General Assembly should be a second line of defence for the security of Members of the United Nations when the Security Council is unable to act. 157. Fortunately, when the crisis came in Korea, the Security Council was able to act with speed and force. This decisiveness, made possible because of the fortuitous and temporary absence of the Soviet Union member, forced the Soviet Union Government into a hasty reconsideration of its determination never to sit in the Security Council with any Chinese representative except the one of its choice. On 1 August, there was an end to dramatic walk-outs and in their place we had a “walk-back,” which was equally dramatic because it showed how the United Nations had come to be regarded as a powerful instrument for peace even by those who disliked the peace that it was enforcing. 158. Now the spectre of the irresponsible and unprincipled use of the veto hangs over us once more, together with all the other devices for delay and frustration which have been used by communists all over the world to disrupt the activities of democratic bodies. In these circumstances, the Canadian delegation warmly welcomes the United States proposals, which will make it possible, in appropriate circumstances, to fall back upon the General Assembly as an instrument to express the determination of free peoples to resist aggression. 159. We are particularly interested in that part of the United States proposal which would call upon Member States to hold forces in readiness for the use of the United Nations. Certainly the need for such forces was demonstrated by the emergency in Korea. Our own experience in Canada is a case in point. As early as 1946, the Canadian representative at the United Nations said that Canada was prepared to establish immediately its part of the forces referred to in Article 43 and that it would like the United Nations to tell it what military preparations it should make to fulfil its obligations under the Charter. But the Military Staff Committee, which was the agency in this case, was never permitted to function because of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union representative. As a result there never was any plan into which we could fit our collective security preparations. Consequently when the call came for help in Korea, my country and other countries, did not have at hand land forces earmarked and trained for United Nations use, which could be quickly thrown into that area. Canada was able, however, to send, without delay, naval and air help. We then set about determining how best we could contribute to United Nations forces on the ground. We felt that this was exactly the kind of situation for which Members of the United Nations were supposed to prepare under Article 43 of the Charter. We decided, therefore, that we would take this occasion to put ourselves in readiness not only to meet the appeal in Korea, but to fulfil similar commitments under the Charter in the future. For that purpose we have recruited in Canada a special force: a brigade group, trained and equipped by the Canadian Government for use on occasions when a United Nations appeal is made to which Canada must respond. 160. Our interest, clearly, in the United States proposal for establishing a United Nations force of national components is an obvious and immediate one. We accept that idea and we hope that it can be worked out in practice. But if this is to be done effectively, then every loyal Member of the United Nations must make its appropriate contribution to this new and great effort to put force behind peace and security. 161. The communist aggression in Korea was a blow struck at the very heart of the United Nations. That blow has been warded off primarily because of the gallantry and courage of the South Korean, United States and British forces. The aggressor has been met on his own ground and on his own terms. Even from evil, however, there may sometimes come good; and the good that has come out of this aggression is the new vitality which has been given to the United Nations. Because of the way in which the challenge has been met, we may now begin to walk the road towards collective security, a road upon which we first set our foot in 1945, a road upon which we may now for the first time advance with vigour and with confidence, the only road which can lead to peace.