16. It is always a great pleasure for me to return to this Assembly, this centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. My pleasure today is especial, for not only will this session round out a decade of United Nations effort, but also there are welcome signs that the second decade may in fact be more harmonious than was the first. Surely we can say that it is within our power to make it so.
17. We can express such sentiments with confidence because we see that the nations are becoming more and more sensitive to the moral verdicts of this Organization. This Assembly is a hall of understanding, and thus of hope. It is also a hall of judgment. Here the nations of the world expound, explain and defend their international policies. In the process, national purposes are disclosed and oftentimes altered to meet the opinions that are reflected here. Sometimes true purposes are sought to be concealed. But this Assembly has a way of getting at the truth. The perceptions and the moral judgments of the nations meeting here endow this Assembly with genuine power. No nation lightly risks the Assembly’s moral condemnation, with all that that condemnation implies.
18. This fact that our Organization’s power derives largely from moral judgments formed here illuminates the problem of membership. It shows how essential it is that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of our Charter.
19. Today we have a wide and important membership. But about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here. Many of them meet the membership tests of our Charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter's obligations. Their Governments would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong not only to them; it is also a wrong to this Organization itself and to all its Members.
20. I hope that during this tenth session action will be taken by the Security Council and by this Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus the United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind.
21. This tenth session must deal with the question of a Charter review conference. That is mandatory under the Charter.
22. The United States believes that such a review conference should be held. One impelling reason would be to. reconsider the present veto power in relation to the admission of new Members, particularly if that veto power should continue to be abused. Also, epochal developments in the atomic and disarmament fields may make it desirable to give this Organization greater authority in these matters. These matters are vital to survival itself. We recall that, when the Charter was drafted, none of us knew of the awesome possibilities of atomic warfare. Our Charter is a pre-atomic-age Charter.
23. Our founders believed that, after ten years, the Charter should be reviewed in the light of that first decade of experience. I believe that they were right. That does not necessarily mean that drastic changes should 'be made. On the whole, the Charter has proved to be a flexible and workable instrument. But few would contend that it is a perfect instrument, not susceptible to improvement.
24. Therefore the United States believes that this session should approve, in principle, the convening of a Charter review conference and establish a preparatory commission to prepare and submit recommendations relating to the date, place, organization and procedures of that general review conference.
25. Let me turn now to review some of the events which have occurred since December 1954, when the ninth session of the General Assembly adjourned. On balance, these developments have contributed notably to the advancement of our Charter goals of international peace and security, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. I shall not try to cover the whole field, but allude only to those where United States policy has played a part, usually in partnership with others.
26. Turning first to Europe, we see that the Federal Republic of Germany has become a free and sovereign State by treaties concluded with it by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Concurrently, the Federal Republic joined the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.
27. Also, at that time, the Brussels Treaty was itself made over so that, in combination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there was developed an effective system of limitation, control and integration of armed forces, the like of which the world has never seen before. This system ensures against the use of national force in the Western European area for aggressive and nationalistic purposes. The arrangements provide security, not only for the participants, but also for the non-participants. They end the conditions which have made Western Europe a source of recurrent wars, the last two of which developed into world wars, endangering all. Never before have collective security and individual self-restraint been so resourcefully and so widely combined. The result can be hailed as a triumph by all who truly believe in the dual principle of our Charter, that security is a collective task, and that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest”.
28. As a sequence to these developments regarding Germany, Austria became free. The Austrian State Treaty, which had been pending for eight years, was signed on 15 May 1955, and now is in effect. Thus are finally fulfilled pledges given by the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 and hopes which this General Assembly expressed at its seventh session [resolution 613 (VII)]. In passing it should be noted that the Austrian State Treaty, bearing the Soviet Union’s signature, contemplates support for Austria’s admission to the United Nations,
29. Quickly following these German and Austrian developments came new efforts by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the danger of war and to solve outstanding differences by negotiation,
30. In May 1955, the three Western Powers proposed what they called a two-stage effort. The first stage was to be a meeting of the heads of Government themselves to provide a new impetus for a second stage, which would be that of detailed examination of the substance of the problems.
31. The first phase of the programme occurred at Geneva in July 1955, when the four heads of Government met. There they clearly manifested their common desire for peace and better relations. Specifically, they agreed that further efforts should be made in three fields: first, European security and Germany; secondly, disarmament; and thirdly, development of contacts between East and West.
32. Now we enter on the agreed second stage, where the spirit of Geneva will be tested. A United Nations sub-committee is already discussing the Geneva ideas about disarmament. Next month, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and. the United States will meet at Geneva. The Western Powers will associate with themselves, where appropriate, the Federal Republic of Germany and their other partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
33. At this coming meeting, agreed priority will be given to the closely linked problem of the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security. This is as it should be.
34. The German people have now been forcibly divided for over ten years. The perpetuation of this division is a crime against nature.
35. Three-quarters of the Germans are in the Federal Republic, and they are fortunate in having a great leader. Chancellor Adenauer. He stands for a united Germany that will be peaceful and that will find its mission in friendly co-operation with its neighbours. He is determined that Germany’s legitimate needs for security and sovereign equality shall be met without a revival of German militarism. It would, however, be a tragic mistake to assume that because most of the Germans now have chosen that enlightened viewpoint, the injustice of dividing Germany can be perpetuated without grave risk.
36. There are many nations which feel that their own future security and world peace urgently require that Germany should be reunited, and enabled, if it so desires, to become a party to the Western European arrangements for limitation, control and integration of armed forces, so that they can never serve an aggressive purpose. There are others which profess to feel that a united Germany within NATO would endanger them even under these conditions.
37. To bridge this difference, the Western Powers are ready to advance some over-all plan of European security which would give the Soviet Union substantial additional reassurances. The conjunction of this attitude of the Western Powers with the like mood on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany provides an unprecedented opportunity.
38. But the German mood which I describe may not always persist. Also, it cannot be assumed that the Western Powers, including the United States, will always be ready to enlarge their present commitments to meet Soviet concern about European security.
39. The present opportunity is so unusual and so full of constructive possibilities that it can be hoped that the forthcoming four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers will find a solid basis for the reunification of Germany within a framework of European security.
40. At the Geneva “summit” meeting, President Eisenhower mentioned two causes of international tension which were not accepted for inclusion in the agenda of the-Conference.
41. The first was “the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”. As to this, President Eisenhower said that “the American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a longhand proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations war-time declaration, reinforced by other war-time agreements”.
42. President Eisenhower also raised the problem of international communism. He said that for 38 years this problem had disturbed relations between other nations and the Soviet Union. It is, indeed, difficult to develop honestly cordial relations between Governments, when one is seeking by subversion to destroy the other.
43. The head of the Soviet Government took the position that these problems were not a proper subject of discussion at the Geneva Conference. Nevertheless, the eyes of much of the world will remain focused upon these two problems. What, in fact, the Soviet Union does about them will, to many, be a barometer of the Soviet’s real intentions.
44. If the spirit of Geneva is genuine and not spurious, if it is to be permanent and not fleeting, it will lead to a liquidation of abnormal extensions of national power, which crush the spirit of national independence, and to the ending of political offensives aimed at subverting free governments.
45. Turning now from Europe to this hemisphere, of the Americas, we find the Organization of American States continuing to demonstrate how the purposes and principles of the United Nations can be effectuated through regional arrangements for collective self-defence. The organization’s general meetings have promoted political understanding and economic and social co-operation. On three occasions within the last 15 months — in relation to Guatemala, to Costa Rica, and now in relation to the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute — the organization has acted promptly and effectively to maintain international order. Its activities in this field have been fully reported to the Security Council, as required by our Charter.
46. In the Near East, we see a situation which remains troubled. It has been difficult to assure the sanctity of the armistice lines established in 1948 under the auspices of the United Nations to end the fighting between Israelis and Arabs. The United States desires to pay a high tribute to those who, during these troubled days, have been serving the United Nations, particularly to General Burns of Canada and his associates.
47. On 26 August 1955, I addressed myself to certain fundamental aspects of this situation. I said that if the parties desired a stable settlement, they could, I thought, be helped from without. I had in mind financial assistance in relation to the problem of Arab refugees, and in relation to irrigation projects which would enable the people throughout the area to enjoy a better life. I also, spoke of the importance of bringing greater security to the area. I said that if nations from without the area made clear their readiness to contribute to these three essential aspects of a settlement, it might then be more possible to bring order, tranquillity and well-being to the area itself.
48. President Eisenhower authorized me to say, as I did, that he would recommend participation by the United States in these monetary and security commitments if this were desired by the Governments directly concerned, on the assumption that action, wherever feasible, should be on an international basis, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations.
49. The United Kingdom immediately associated itself with these United States suggestions. A number of other countries have also-indicated their support.
50. If there is a favourable response from the Near Eastern countries, many aspects of this problem would eventually come to the United Nations for consideration at some future session.
51. Turning now to the Far East, we see that the fabric of peace has been strengthened by the coming into force of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty An organizational meeting of the Treaty Council was held at Bangkok towards the end of February 1955 at the ministerial level.
52. This security arrangement is unique. It marks the first time that any considerable number of countries have banded together in Eastern Asia for collective self-defence. There are eight parties to the Treaty which, in addition, applies to Cambodia, Laos and free Viet-Nam. Also, the arrangement draws together Western and Asian countries. This would have been impossible had we not all firmly committed ourselves to the principle of political independence and self-determination. This commitment is found both in the preamble to the Treaty and in the concurrent Pacific Charter, which reflects the aspirations of men everywhere to be free.
53. The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty does not envisage the establishment of a combined military organization comparable to that which has grown up under the North Atlantic Treaty. The conditions in the area do not readily lend themselves to the creation of a treaty force, in being and in place. Primary reliance is placed on the agreement of the eight signatories to treat any armed aggression in the treaty area as a common danger to each party, calling for action on its part. That pledge will, we believe, work powerfully to deter aggression.
54. In the China area, the situation is somewhat less ominous than it was. We hope that the “Chinese People’s Republic” will respond to the manifest will of the world community that armed force should not be used to achieve national objectives.
55. The record of this communist regime has been an evil one. It fought the United Nations in Korea, for which it stands branded here as an aggressor. It took over Tibet by armed force. It became allied with the communist Viet-Minh in their effort to take over Indo-China by force. Then, following the Indo-China armistice, it turned its military attention to the Taiwan (Formosa) area. It threatened to take this area by force, and began active military assaults on its approaches, which assaults, it claimed, were a first step in its new programme of military conquest.
56. This constituted a major challenge to principles to which the United States is committed under our Charter. It was also a direct, and special challenge to the United States itself. We have a distinctive relationship to these islands, a relationship which is reinforced by a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Republic of China covering Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores).
57. At this point, on 24 January 1955, President Eisenhower asked the Congress of the United States for authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the defence of Taiwan and Penghu and related areas which the President might judge as appropriate to that defence. After full hearings in the House and the Senate of the United States, the requested authority was granted. In the House the vote was 409 to 3, and in the Senate the vote was 85 to 3. The authority thus granted terminates whenever the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.
58. I am convinced that this timely warning, given with solid, virtually unanimous, national concurrence, served to prevent what could have been a dangerous miscalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists.”
59. Thereafter, the Bandung Conference was held. There again, the peace-loving nations — many of them Members of this Organization — made clear to the Chinese Communists their adherence to our Charter principle that States should refrain in their international relations from the threat of force.
60. From the site of the Bandung Conference, Mr. Chou En-lai proposed direct discussions with the United States, a proposal which I promptly indicated was acceptable to the United States so long as we dealt only with matters of concern to the two of us, not involving the rights of third parties. That reservation applied particularly, so far as the United States was concerned, to the Republic of China, to which we are loyal as to a long-time friend and ally.
61. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communists released four — and, later, 11 — of the United States fliers of the United Nations Command whom they had been holding in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This release, you will recall, had been sought by resolution of this General Assembly adopted in December 1954 [resolution 906 (IX)]. That outcome justified the confidence which the United States had placed in the United Nations and our restraint in the use or threat of our own national power.
62. Some fifteen months ago, the United States had started talks with the “Chinese People's Republic” at Geneva with regard to getting our civilians home. As & result of the Bandung statement made by Mr. Chou En-lai and my reply, these talks were resumed m August 1955, to deal first with the topic of freeing civilians for return, and then with other practical matters of direct concern to the two of us.
63. All Chinese in the United States who desire to return to their homeland are free to do so. They have always been free to do so except for a few who were temporarily prevented by restrictions arising out of the Korean war. The “Chinese People’s Republic” has now declared that all Americans on the Chinese mainland have the right to return and will be enabled expeditiously to exercise that right.
64. For the favourable trend of events to which I refer, the United States thanks the Secretary-General for having worked so assiduously to bring about the release of United States fliers of the United Nations Command. Various Governments and other individuals were helpful in this and other matters.
65. The will of the world community may have operated to avert another war, the scope of which could not surely be limited.
66. Last year, from this rostrum, I spoke of the peaceful uses of atomic energy [475th meeting]. We had gone through a period of disappointing negotiations to secure the participation of the Soviet Union in the programme presented to the General Assembly by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 [470th meeting]. In the face of a negative Soviet attitude, we had resolved nevertheless to go ahead.
67. In September 1954 I mentioned four activities which we promised to commence immediately. Since that time we have made good progress in each, of these fields.
68. The. negotiations for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency have led to the preparation of a draft statute establishing such an agency. An International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held with outstanding success last month at Geneva. This Conference was so successful that the United States will again propose a similar conference to be held in three years, or earlier, if the increasing development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy so warrants. The first reactor training course at our Argonne National Laboratory is nearing completion, and an enlarged course is about to begin. Distinguished doctors and surgeons from other countries are visiting our hospitals and research establishments where atomic energy is used for the cure of cancer and other diseases.
69. The Soviet Union is now taking a more co-operative attitude, and we gladly note the recent Offer of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Bulganin, to set aside fissionable material for the work of the proposed international agency when it comes into existence.
70. Much has happened, we see, to give reality to the vista of hope which President Eisenhower portrayed when he spoke to our eighth session.
71. The United States also plans to propose at this session the establishment of an international technical body on the effects of atomic radiation upon human health. It would 'be composed of qualified scientists who would collate and give wide distribution to radiological information furnished by Member States of the United Nations, or by specialized agencies. The United States is itself giving much study to this matter. We believe that properly safeguarded nuclear testing and the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy do not threaten human health or life. But this is a subject of such transcendent Concern that we believe that all available data should be sought out and pooled tinder United Nations auspices.
72. On 21 July 1955, at the “summit” Conference in Geneva, the President of the United States took still another major initiative. Dealing with disarmament, and addressing himself for the moment principally to the representatives of the Soviet Union, he proposed that, as a beginning, each of our two nations should provide the other with information as to its military establishments and with facilities for unrestricted aerial reconnaissance of its territory.
73. The logic of this proposal is simple and clear. Major aggression is unlikely unless the aggressor can have the advantage of surprise and can hope to strike a blow which will be devastating, because it will be unexpected, But the preparation of an attack of such magnitude could hardly be concealed from aerial inspection. Aerial inspection would not, of course, detect everything; we do not think of it as a final and comprehensive answer to the whole problem of inspection. But aerial inspection would detect enough to exclude the greatest risk, and because it would do that, it would open the way to further steps towards inspection and disarmament which we all — and I emphatically include the United States — wish to see taken.
74. Long experience in these matters has made it apparent that when there is a sense of insecurity, when there is an ominous unknown, then arms seem needed and the limitation of armaments becomes virtually unattainable. Reductions of armament occur when fear is dissipated, when knowledge replaces exaggerated speculation and when, in consequence, arms seem less needed.
75. It was, I believe, immediately sensed by all that if the United States were to permit Soviet overflights of its territory, and if the Soviet Union agreed to permit the United States overflights of its territory, that would go far to show that neither had aggressive intentions against the other. Then, as President Eisenhower pointed out in his plea at Geneva, it would be easier to move on to a comprehensive, scientific system of inspection and disarmament.
76. The essence of the President’s proposal was that it would, as a beginning, do what is requited of a beginning; namely, make it more possible to take subsequent steps.
77. I hope that the sentiment of this General Assembly will make clear that this beginning should be made as simply as may be and as quickly as may be. From such a beginning can come — and, I am profoundly convinced, will come — solid advance towards Our Charter goal of reducing the “diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”. Then we can look forward realistically to fulfilling the desire close to the hearts of all our peoples - a desire voiced by President Eisenhower at the commemorative meetings of the United Nations in San Francisco — that more of this earth’s resources should be used for truly constructive purposes, which would benefit particularly the underdeveloped areas of the world.
78. It was ten years ago last month that the fighting stopped in the Second World War. We have lived through the subsequent decade without another world war. That is something for which we should be profoundly thankful. But true peace has not been enjoyed. There have been limited wars; free nations have been subverted and taken over; there has been the piling up of armaments, and there have been the rigidities of position which are imposed upon those who regard each other as potential fighting enemies. That phase may now be ending. I believe that all four of the heads of Government who met at Geneva desired that result, and that each contributed to it. In consequence, a new spirit does indeed prevail, with greater flexibility and less brittleness in international relations.
79. There are some who find it interesting to speculate as to which nations gained and which lost from this development. My answer is that if the “spirit of Geneva” is to be permanent, then all the world must be the gainer. The “summit” Conference, if it is to be historic rather than episodic, must usher in an era of peaceful change.
80. It will not be an era of placidity and stagnancy in the sense that the status quo, with all its manifold injustices, will be accepted as permanent. It will be an era of change, and it will have its strains and its stresses. But peoples and Governments will renounce the use of war and subversion to achieve their goals. They will accept orderly evolution towards the realization of legitimate national aspirations. They will develop wider economic intercourse among themselves. They will increasingly respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and human effort will be dedicated to what is creative and benign. And our United Nations, too, will change. For, given goodwill and mutual confidence, many provisions of our Charter will gain new meaning and new vitality.
81. So let us strive together to bring these things to pass, so that when this Assembly meets at its twentieth session it will look back upon the decade, which now begins and call it “the healing decade of true peace”.