18. Most speakers who have participated in the debate here have expressed their deep and well-founded concern over the war in Viet-Nam, which is steadily being intensified. This is also a concern of ours. The world is facing a serious crisis. Obviously, no discussion in the United Nations could fail to reflect this crisis, although for reasons only too obvious and well known the United Nations is not called upon to solve this problem. For precisely the same reasons it should refrain from taking any formal steps, adopting any resolutions or issuing any declarations on the matter.
19. We regret that not everything that has been uttered from this rostrum with regard to the question of Viet-Nam could be considered as a realistic — not to say fair — approach to the problem. We have heard statements which even distorted the very essence of the question. Thus the people of Viet-Nam, fighting for its legitimate rights to unity and independence, has been in fact labelled here as the guilty party in the conflict. Aggression committed by a great Power has been described as defence against aggression. Violations of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam through air bombing have been presented as actions intended to bring about negotiations; violations of the agreements which twelve years ago brought peace to Indochina, as fulfilment of international commitments; the preposition by force upon the people of South Viet-Nam of a military clique, as implementation of the principle of self-determination. The staging of mock elections is considered as a defence of democracy — the very elections which the Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang called "a real swindle ... a defeat not only for Buddhists and for me, but for the whole Vietnamese people".
20. The United States representative submitted here allegedly new peace proposals [1412th meeting]. We could not, however, perceive anything new in them. Moreover, it has become a practice that each so-called peaceful move on the part of the United States is accompanied by increased military activities. Each step increasing the extent of United States involvement in its aggression in Viet-Nam has always been claimed to be the last. However, for years, each such step has paved the way to still more dangerous ones. This, indeed, is the mechanics of escalation.
21. Such a policy cannot but meet with growing opposition; it is doing so and will continue to do so. No wonder The New York Times, on 7 October 1966, had this to say:
"Can the United States steadily escalate the war in Vietnam ... and at the same time bring about peace negotiations with Hanoi? Peace offers
with one hand; killing, burning, defoliating, destroying, bombing with the other .... The old adage that 'actions speak louder than words' applies in Vietnam today as it has [done| at all times and everywhere."
22. We submit that the policy of the United States on Viet Nam has no chance of succeeding. It will bring neither military nor political advantage. Peoples liberated from colonial domination will submit to no foreign dictate. In their struggle the Vietnamese people are receiving —and will continue to receive — evergrowing support and assistance from all those who cherish progress and peace.
23. May I further state that the policy of the United States on Viet-Nam leads nowhere, it certainly closes the door to peaceful solutions. For there can lie no question of negotiations as long as the bombing continues or as long as a threat to resume it persists. Neither is it possible to bring about genuine negotiations as long as the aggressor tries to secure in advance the assurance that he will get at the conference table what he could not achieve through military means. Finally, no negotiations would be worthy of that name if they were not conducted with the real parties to the conflict — with the National Liberation Front and the democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The National Liberation Front is indeed the only true representative of the interests of the Vietnamese people in the South. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a sovereign state which has been want only attacked by the United States. And should not the demands of those whose rights have been brutally trampled upon by the aggressor lie taken as the basis for any such talks?
24. The policy of the United States on Viet-Nam is a dangerous policy. It carries the menace of spreading the flames of war into new regions. Its moral and political consequences cannot but be harmful. A policy dictated from a position of strength, a policy conducted from the position of economic and military superiority of a great Power, sets an evil example with demoralizing and destructive effects. It encourages all over the globe cold-war and expansionist forces, all those who aim at maintaining international tension, as well as those who try to draw benefits from existing conflicts. Such policy emboldens regimes based on exploitation and racial discrimination — for example, those m South Africa and Rhodesia. It makes it possible for the racist Government of the Republic of South Africa to defy the whole civilized world on the question of South West Africa. It leads to an extension of the network of military bases in foreign territories — including Non-Self-Governing Territories — arbitrary to the clearly expressed decisions of the United Nations. Last but not least, it runs counter to the aspirations, of legitimate national liberalization movement, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations. For United State intervention in Viet Nam is nothing else but a war again the national and social liberation.
25. With all this in mind, one has to agree that the crisp in South East Asia would not have left the United Nation. It is against this background, beside all the other considerations which we appreciate late, that one can better comprehend the reason, for the attitude taken by our Secretary-General. U Thant has played a useful role in the United Nations and he could continue to do so enjoying the trust and confidence placed in him. The organization would suffer a great loss if he were to relinquish the post of Secretary-General. For its part, the Polish delegation could only rejoice should he decide to continue in his office.
26. May I be permitted to say that we wish the American people well. Many chapters in its past history are filled with the fight for liberation and independence. In the sixties of the last century, the American people was engaged in a struggle against retrograde forces in its own territory. But Lincoln's work has not been completed as yet; there is still a great deal to be done at home. May the United States abandon the road taken in Viet-Nam. It is not one of glory. To withdraw might become a more convincing opportunity for greatness than to get stuck in the mud of the Viet-Namese swamps.
27. Reason, which you, Mr. President, have so earnestly and rightly invoked in your opening statement [1409th meeting], implies the necessity to shed all illusions that the Viet-Namese people could he subjugated; and political realism makes it imperative that the Viet-Namese conflict should be solved in accordance with the Geneva Agreements so as to enable the people of Viet-Nam to shape their own destiny in peace, in freedom, and in independence.
28. And finally, let me say, the crisis in Viet-Nam confirms what we have In-en saying here for years: it is that today any attempts at resolving international problems by military means have In-come ineffective and self-defeating. Crises caused by the policy of acting from the position of strength cannot be solved or resolved by the methods used to pursue that same policy.
29. No less true is the principle that peace is indivisible. The crisis in Viet-Nam is an obstacle to the solution of many important political, economic and social problems of the world of today. Urgent as they are, they have, for the time being, been overshadowed by the conflict in South-Fast Asia. However, they remain weighty and important, and the responsibility for finding a proper solution for them rests with us. All the more urgent arc the efforts aimed at eliminating the sources of conflict in other regions, and in good time.
30. The primary interest of my country in the problems of Europe hardly needs justification. The socialist countries have repeatedly stated that, should the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be dissolved, the Warsaw Fact will also cease to exist. At their meeting held last July at Bucharest, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty declared their readiness to agree now to the liquidation of the military organization. of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europe's division into opposing military groupings should be replaced by an effective system of collective security. This is our aim, and we shall continue to do our best to achieve It. In this connexion it may be of interest to you here to recall the following passage from the Bucharest Declaration of the States Members of the Warsaw Part:
"The security and peace of every European nation should be truly guaranteed not through the existence of military groupings, whirls do not correspond to contemporary sound trend in international life, but through the establishment of an effective system of security in Europe."
31. Of course, such a complex problem cannot be solved in a quirk and easy way. As long, as the armaments rate in the West continues, as long as the danger brought about by the application of policies pre-cured from a position of strength persist, we in the East cannot weaken our preparedness for defence. We are therefore willing to move towards our aim patiently, by gradually implementing a series of partial, tension-reducing measures. Their importance and scope could be successively widened.
32. Hence the Polish proposals known as the Rapaeki Plan and the Gomulka Plan tor the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in Europe and for freezing nuclear armaments in that area (see 1301st meeting, paras, 63-65), and 1358th meeting, para, 172]. We maintain them; they remain fully valid today.
33. We have also been discussing recently with our friends, with our allies and with other European Governments, the possibility of reaching a regional agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons under an adequate system of control, and simultaneously considering the possibility of the reduction of troop strengths.
34. Two years ago we suggested from this rostrum the summoning of an international conference in order to dismiss problems of security and co-operation in Europe [1301st meeting, paras. 61-62], We were gratified that our proposal was greeted with interest and understanding by governmental and non-governmental quarters in many European countries.
35. In the exchanges of view s and conversations which we of Poland have had on various levels and on different occasions — particularly during many meetings of our Minister of Foreign Affairs with Foreign Ministers of other European countries, including Europium neutrals — numerous valuable and constructive suggestions have been put forward concerning a Europium conference on security and co-operation. They concerned mainly the ways and means of its preparation as well as the broad outline of issues to be discussed. One thing may be put on record now; it has become clear that certain basic ideas could crystallize and acquire concrete shape as early as in the preparatory stages of such a conference. Encouraged by the results so far obtained, we intend to hold further consultations on the subject, and we beg for a proper understanding in this regard.
36. A European conference well and carefully prepared should concentrate, first of all, on a thorough consideration of the problems of security. An agreement reached at the conference could, inter alia, take the form of a declaration on co-operation in maintaining and strengthening European security.
37. At the same time, such economic problems as concern Europe as a whole could be discussed, for instance, mutual relationships and contacts among the three existing economic groupings in Europe. We of Poland remain pertained that the development and deepening of economic co-operation among European countries, as elsewhere, on the basis of mutual benefits constitutes a particularly important element in easing tension, bringing about better understanding and fostering a rapprochement. The same applies to problems of scientific, technical and cultural exchange which should also be included in the agenda of such a European conference. The strengthening of a feeling of security, the deepening of co-operation among all European States — all States, with no exception — and the resulting relaxation of tension could make it possible eventually to deal with the controversial political problems which are so far unresolved. This, however, could not be done before the final stage of the course thus envisaged.
38. As to the problem of Germany, its solution - in the light of the historical experience of European nations — must be subordinated to European security. Its solution can be reached only as a result of a historical process — through the strengthening of European security, through the lessening of tension, through a rapprochement between the two German States and the normalization of relations in Europe as a whole. A number of speakers in our debate have voiced their agreement with precisely such an approach. Indeed, it meets with an ever-increasing understanding, even among those who have opposed it so far — the United States not excluded.
39. Those determining the present policy of the Federal Republic of Germany act in a different way. A smokescreen of various diplomatic notes and declarations cannot conceal the persistent and categorical "no" which comes from Bonn whenever constructive proposals are but forward in order to undertake a serious approach to the problem of normalization in Europe. Bonn's policy of attempting, in fact, to push Europe's 'problems into channels leading to a dead-end has been echoed, regrettably, even in some statements heard from this rostrum. There have been few such statements, but they were all the more unexpected since their authors have so far never indicated any particular interest in the true essentials of European security — for which attitude the European nations have only too often paid the price in blood and in lives. Were they perhaps the result of the misleading propaganda of the Federal Republic of Germany? I prefer to leave this question unanswered.
40. It is not the existence of the two German States which constitutes the real cause of tension in Europe. The sources of this tension, as we in Poland see them, may be enumerated in the following order: first, the territorial claims of the Federal Republic of Germany against Poland and other neighbouring States, claims advanced twenty-one years after the unconditional surrender of Germany, after Potsdam, and based in the year 1966 on the pretence of tho values of the frontiers of 1937; secondly, the policy of non-recognition and the hostile attitude towards the German Democratic Republic, a State that has already won recognition in the world — and this cannot be denied — and is playing a constructive role in international relations; thirdly, the maintenance by the Federal Republic of Germany of the absurd assertion that it is the sole representative of the German nation. This leads to the nonsensical extension by the Federal Republic of Germany of its internal legislation to territories and citizens of other States, a matter well worth studying; fourthly, the persistent with which the German Federal Republic attempts to obtain access to nuclear weapons. Only recently, on 23 September 1966, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany repeated this claim and even invoked, rather cynically, in this context, the Charter of the United Nations.
41. Finally, we have the revival in Western Germany of neo-Nazi forces, which has alarmed public opinion even in those countries of the West where, so far, this threat has been ignored or passed unnoticed. May I say, however, that it was the very policy of some of those countries towards the German problem which has resulted in the encouragement of extremist tendencies in Western Germany.
42. With all this taking place, we feel, indeed we are convinced, that it is high time to encourage and assist those forces in Western Germany which are striving for peace. We of Poland duly appreciate the existence of those forces, weak as they may seem at present. We encourage, through proper political attitudes and firmness, the prevention of trends which could only lead to a recurrence of the tragic events of the past.
43. Thus the time has come, may I submit, to discard completely the application of policies conducted from a position of strength, in Europe as elsewhere. Again, only deeds count and it is deeds that we expect.
44. Every step leading to the consolidation of European security and co-operation is of importance to the development of the whole world. Our globe is a system of communicating vessels. Though a European nation, we are not and hardly can be indifferent to problems of other regions. Our particular concern with European security and co-operation is, of course, organically linked with our deep interest in the creation of proper conditions for the economic growth and development of other continents, for their own security and for their own co-operation. Indeed, we do offer our support to regional, collateral measures aiming at detente and disarmament in other parts of the world, as well as to similar measures on a global scale; needless to say, our support of the cause of general and complete disarmament remains determined and faithful.
45. For years now have we raised our voice in favour of commencing the process of nuclear disarmament. No progress has so far been made on that issue, with which every nation and every man should be deeply concerned and which is so essential to our future, if not to the very survival of mankind; indeed, the contrary is the case. The armaments race is gaining speed. While negotiations on disarmament are being held, the danger of mass extermination is increasing, be it through a deliberate use of nuclear weapons or through sheer accident. One may perhaps ponder how to qualify in this context the recent statement of a former President of the United States, that nuclear bombs should be used in Viet-Nam. And stories about hydrogen bombs accidentally lost over foreign territories have long ceased to be mere subjects for movie scriptwriters.
43. The conclusion of a general treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons seems to us not only most urgent, but at the same time most capable of realization. Such a treaty should, of course, exclude proliferation in any form, and correspond fully with the requirements of the resolution adopted here last year [Assembly resolution 2028 (XX)]. There can be no loophole. The treaty cannot permit the creation, in addition to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, of a third category of States which would have, through military alliances, physical access to nuclear weapons, which could keep the finger on the nuclear trigger or influence the decision to use those weapons.
47. On behalf of my Government I should like to assure this Assembly that we, on our part, shall spare no efforts to contribute constructively to the solution of the problems of disarmament. It is in this spirit that Poland is taking part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament at Geneva and of many institutions and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, dealing with those problems.
48. Only recently the 1966 Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, at Poland's invitation, was held in our country (at Sopot, from 11-16 September 1966). There, eminent scholars from scores of countries discussed the problems of security, disarmament and peace. In our view, the voice of scientists on those questions is as important as that of statesmen and politicians. Equally, if not more important, seems to us the need to mobilize world public opinion in order to unite all efforts in the struggle against the threat of war. It is essential to make nations aware of the effects of weapons of mass destruction and strengthen their determination to achieve disarmament. We shall discuss this subject in detail in the First Committee. One of the draft resolutions which the Polish delegations plans to submit during this session, should circumstances, of course, permit it, will deal with this very question.
49. Some speakers in this debate did emphasize the need for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping machinery. Strangely enough, political shortcomings and failures of the United Nations have been ascribed by them to the lack of an institutionalized form of intervention by the United Nations in international conflicts. With all due respect, we are unable to subscribe to such views. It is rather as the frank and very interesting and outspoken annual report of the Secretary-General put it:
"The weaknesses and shortcomings of the United Nations lie not in its constitutional purposes, objectives and procedures but in world conditions at the present juncture of history .... It is in these realms, and not in the structure of the United Nations, that the roots of the troubles of the world lie." [See A/6301/Add.1, p. 12.]
50. The return to the Charter and to the full application of its principles should be therefore our greatest concern. Our efforts should first of all concentrate on that. Let us look at the situation as it is. The principle of the universality of the United Nations still awaits its implementation. The refusal to admit the representative's of a great Power — the People's Republic of China — inhabited by one quarter of the world's population, while those from Taiwan who represent nobody and nothing are seated here, only does an injustice and an offence to the great Chinese nation. That situation undermines the authority of the United Nations and reduces in fact its effectiveness.
51. In accordance with the principle of universality, we support the application submitted this year by the German Democratic Republic for admission to the United Nations. Being a State of a highly developed economic potential, of a stabilized internal situation, and a State conducting a constructive policy of peace, the German Democratic Republic is rightfully entitled to its seat in this hall as a Member. And may I say that the application of the German Democratic Republic, the contents of which we all know here, also supports the admission to the United Nations of the other German State, the Federal Republic of Germany.
52. Every State should be permitted to take part in the work of the United Nations and its organs, at least through an observer. As the Secretary-General has so rightly stated, this would be beneficial both for the States concerned and for the Organization as a whole [see A/6301/Add.l, p. 14]. It is high time to abolish limitations that make the realization of this unquestionable requirement impossible.
53. The United Nations Charter prohibits interference in the internal affairs of other States. It provides for the observance of sovereignty and national independence, as well as for respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. Incompatible with those principles is the colonial system still maintained in large areas of our globe, as are the attempts to subject newly-emerged States to economic and other kinds of neo-colonial pressure.
54. Incompatible with those principles, too, is the specific situation in South Korea, whose occupation by United States troops makes peaceful unification of that country impossible at the present time. It is high time for us to do something about this situation.
55. Once an end is put to real violations of the Charter, once its provisions are fully observed and faithfully applied, the whole discussion on peacekeeping will become pointless, or, at least, lose its impact.
56. We have set forth the views, interests and concerns of the Polish delegation. We shall speak about the details of the issues on our agenda in the debates at plenary meetings and in the Committees. We shall do so in accordance with our deep and sincere conviction of the importance of the United Nations and the historical role it can fulfil. We shall act, as we have to act, in conformity with the fundamental principles of the foreign policy of our country, Poland: to serve progress, to struggle for the better future of mankind, to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence, and to strengthen peace.