27. As the General Assembly convenes in this twenty-first year of the United Nations, we of the United States of America are aware, as indeed every delegation must be, of the great responsibilities which all of us share in the work of this world Organization. No one, I am sure, feels these responsibilities more, or more keenly, than the Secretary-General, U Thant. In the past five years, he has filled his office with distinction and effectiveness. And indeed this is the most difficult office in the world. We know how much selfless dedication and energy have been exacted from him on behalf of the world community, and we can well understand how the burdens of his office led him to his decision not to offer himself for a second term as Secretary-General.
28. But the United Nations needs him. It needs him as a person. It needs him as a Secretary-General who conceives his office in the full spirit of the Charter as an important organ of the United Nations, endowed with the authority to act with initiative and effectiveness. The Members, in all their diversity and even discord, are united in their confidence in him. His departure at this crucial time in world affairs and in the life of the United Nations would be a serious loss both to the Organization itself and to the cause of peace among nations.
29. We reiterate our earnest hope that he will heed the unanimous wishes of the membership and permit his tenure of office to be extended. His affirmative decision on this question would give all of us new impetus to deal with the many great problems on our agenda.
30. The peoples of the world expect the United Nations to resolve these problems. With all their troubles and aspirations, they put great faith in our Organization. They look to us not for pious words but for solid results: agreements reached, wars ended or prevented, treaties written, co-operative programmes launched — results that will bring humanity a few steps, but giant steps, closer to the purposes of the Charter, which are our common commitment.
31. Realizing this, the United States has considered what it could say in this general debate that would improve the prospects for such fruitful results in the present session. We have concluded that, rather than attempting to review the many questions on the agenda to which we attach importance, we could make a more useful contribution by concentrating on the serious dangers to peace now existing in
Asia — particularly the war in Viet-Nam — and by treating that subject in a constructive and positive way.
32. The conflict in Viet-Nam is first of all an Asian issue, whose tragedy and suffering fall most heavily on the peoples directly involved. But its repercussions are world-wide. It diverts much of the energies of many nations, including my own, from urgent and constructive endeavours. It is, as the Secretary-General said in his statement of 1 September: "... a source of grave concern and is bound to be a source of even greater anxiety, not only to the parties directly involved and to the major Powers but also to other Members of the Organization" [A/6400].
33. My Government remains determined to exercise every restraint to limit the war and to exert every effort to bring the conflict to the earliest end. The essential facts of the Viet-Nam conflict can be stated briefly.
34. Viet-Nam today remains divided along the demarcation line agreed upon at Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Provisional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam by the process of self-determination, they are none the less political realities in the international community.
35. The Geneva Agreement which established the demarcation line is so thorough in its prohibition of the use of force that it forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other. It even forbids civilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In 1962, at the Geneva Conference, military infiltration through Laos was also forbidden. Yet, despite those provisions, South Viet-Nam is under an attack, already seven years old, by forces directed and supplied from the North and reinforced by regular units — currently some seventeen identified regiments — of the North Viet-Namese Army. A manifest purpose of this attack is to force upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system which they have not chosen by any peaceful process.
36. Let it be noted that this attack by North Viet-Nam contravenes not only the United Nations Charter, but also the terms of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), adopted unanimously only last December — the resolution entitled "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty". That resolution declares, among other things, in its operative paragraph 1, that:
"No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."
It further declares in operative paragraph 2 that:
"... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow ... of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State".
It would be hard to write a more precise description of what North Viet-Nam is doing and has been doing for years in South Viet-Nam. Certainly, the prohibition of the use of force and subversion — both by this resolution and by the Charter itself — must apply with full vigour to international demarcation lines that have been established by solemn international agreements. This is significantly true not only in Viet-Nam but also in all divided States, where the recourse to force between the divided parts can have far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, solemn international agreements, specifically the Geneva Agreements, explicitly prohibit recourse to force as a means of reunifying Viet-Nam.
37. It is because of the attempt to upset by violence the situation in Viet-Nam and its far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the United States of America and other countries have responded to appeals from South Viet-Nam for military assistance. Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited. We are not engaged in a holy war against communism. We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia. We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances and no permanent American presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam. We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment on South Viet-Nam. We do not seel; to overthrow the Government of North Viet- Nam. We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests. We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it. Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Viet-Namese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.
38. Let me state affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are. We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. I repeat: we want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution. We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination to decide its own political destiny, free of force, that the United Nations Charter affirms for all, and we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.
39. These then are our affirmative aims. We are well aware, as we have studied them carefully, of the stated position of Hanoi on these terms. But no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion or negotiations, For our part, we have long been — and remain today —ready to negotiate without prior conditions. We are prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points, together with any points which other parties may wish to raise. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the communique which was recently issued by the Warsaw Pact countries at Bucharest. We will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference or an Asian conference or any other generally acceptable forum. At the same time, we have also been soberly considering whether lack of agreement on peace aims has been the sole barrier to the beginning of negotiations. We are aware that some perceive other obstacles, and I wish to make here today three proposals with respect to them. First, it is said that one obstacle is the United States bombing of North Viet-Nam. Let it be recalled that there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam for five years during which there was steadily increasing infiltration from North Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva accords, during which there were no United States combat forces in Viet-Nam and during which strenuous efforts were made to achieve a peaceful settlement. Let it be further recalled that twice before we have suspended our bombing, once for thirty- seven days, without any reciprocal act of de-escalation from the other side and without any sign from them of a willingness to negotiate. Nonetheless, let me say that in this matter the United States is willing once again to take the first step. We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge before this august Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be asked the following question to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or public response: would it, in the interests of peace, and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Viet-Nam, take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Viet-Nam?
40. Another obstacle is said to be North Viet-Nam's conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in Viet-Nam. There is no basis for such a fear. The United States stands ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Viet- Nam, and favours international machinery, either of the United Nations or other machinery, to ensure effective supervision of the withdrawal. We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also; would North Viet-Nam be willing to agree to a time- schedule for supervised phased withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all external forces, those of North Viet- Nam as well as those of the United States and other countries aiding South Viet-Nam?
41. A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Viet-Cong in the negotiations. Some argue that regardless of different views on who controls the Viet-Cong, it is a combatant force and, as
such, should take part in the negotiations. Our view on this matter was stated some time ago by President Johnson, who made it clear that, as far as we are concerned, this question would not be an insurmountable problem. We therefore invite the authorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiations may not be more imaginary than real.
42. We offer these proposals today in the interests of peace in South-East Asia. There may be other proposals. We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position, but we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Viet-Nam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other. Such a position can only further delay a peace which we all desire and fervently hope for. The only workable formula for a settlement will be one which is just to the basic interests of all who are involved. In this spirit, we welcome discussion of this question either in the Security Council, where the United States itself has raised the matter, or here in the General Assembly, and we are fully prepared to take part in such discussion. We earnestly solicit the further initiative of any organ, including the Secretary-General, or any Member of the United Nations whose influence can help in this cause. Every Member has a responsibility to exercise its power and influence for peace, and the greater its power and influence, the greater is this responsibility.
43. Now I turn to another problem related in part to the first, the problem of how to foster a constructive relationship between the mainland of China, with its 700 million people, and the outside world. The misdirection of so much of the energies of this vast, industrious and gifted people into xenophobic displays, such as the extraordinary, difficult to understand and alarming activities of the Red Guards, and the official policy and doctrine of promoting revolution and subversion throughout the world — these are among the most disturbing phenomena of our age. Surely among the essentials of peace in Asia are reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies and, specifically, a peaceful mainland China.
44. Let me say to this Assembly categorically that it is not the policy of the United States to isolate Communist China from the world. On the contrary, we have sought to limit the areas of hostility and to pave the way for the restoration of our historically friendly relations with the great people of China. Our efforts to this end have taken many forms. Since 1955, United States representatives have held 131 bilateral diplomatic meetings at Geneva, and later at Warsaw, with emissaries from Peking. We have sought without success to open numerous unofficial channels of communication with mainland China. We have made it crystal clear that we do not intend to attack, invade or attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Peking. And we have expressed our hope to see representatives of Peking join us and others in meaningful negotiations on disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and a ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons.
45. But the international community, if it is faithful to the Charter and our resolutions, cannot countenance Peking's doctrine and policy of intervening by violence and subversion in other nations, whether
under the guise of so-called wars of national liberation against independent countries, or under any other guise. Such intervention can find no place in the United Nations Charter nor in the resolution of the General Assembly. Yet dozens of nations whose representatives are seated in this hall have had direct experience of these illegal activities. It is in the light of these facts and of our ardent desire for a better atmosphere that the United States has carefully considered the issues arising from the absence of representatives of Peking from the United Nations.
46. Two facts bear on this issue and on the attitude of my country towards any attempted solution. First, the Republic of China on Taiwan is a founding Member of the United Nations and its rights are clear. The United States will vigorously oppose any effort to exclude the representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations in order to put representatives of Communist China in their place. The second fact is that Communist China, unlike anyone else in the history of this Organization, has put forward special and extraordinary terms for consenting to enter the United Nations. In addition to the expulsion of the Republic of China, there are also demands to transform and pervert this Organization from its Charter purposes — some of them put forward as recently as yesterday.
47. What can be the cause of this attitude? We cannot be sure, but we do know that it comes from a leadership whose stated programme is to transform the world by violence. It comes from a leadership which openly proclaims that it is opposed to any discussion of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. It would also seem that these leaders wish to isolate their country from a world, and from a United Nations, that they cannot transform or control. Indeed, they have brought their country to a degree of isolation that is unique in the world today, an isolation not only from the United States and its friends and allies, but from most of the non-aligned world, and even from most of the Communist nations. Many, not only the United States, have sought improved relations and have been rebuffed.
48. At this moment in history, therefore, the basic question about the relation between Communist China and the United Nations is a question to which only the leaders in Peking can give the answer. And I put the question: will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable terms; and are they prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter, in particular the basic Charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State?
49. The world — and my Government — will listen most attentively for a helpful response to these questions. We hope it will come soon — the sooner the better. Like many other Members here, the United States has the friendliest historic feelings toward the great Chinese people, and looks forward to the occasion when they will once again enrich, rather than endanger, the fabric of the world community, and, in the spirit of the Charter, "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours".
50. I have dwelt on these great and thorny issues of Asia because they are of more, far more, than regional importance. Progress towards their solution would visibly brighten the atmosphere of international relations all over the world, It would enable the United Nations to turn a new corner, to apply itself with renewed energy to the great tasks of reconciliation and peaceful construction which lie before us in every part of the globe.
51. Surely, peaceful construction is needed above all in the less developed areas. It is needed in South-East Asia, today a region of conflict but also a region of vast under-developed resources, where my country is prepared to make a most substantial contribution to the development of the whole region, including North Viet-Nam. It is needed in the Western Hemisphere, where, under the bold ideals of the Alliance for Progress, the States of Latin America are already carrying out a far-reaching, peaceful process of economic and social development.
52. Indeed, in no area are the tasks of economic development more important than on the continent of Africa — represented in this hall by the representatives of thirty-seven nations. Last May, in commemorating the anniversary of the Organization of African Unity, the President suggested ways in which the United States, as a friend of Africa, might help with some of that continent's major economic problems. Our efforts in his field are now entering a new stage as we begin to carry out the recommendations of a special committee appointed to review United States participation in African development programmes, both bilateral and multilateral.
53. But the economic side of this picture cannot stand alone. The time is past when either peace or material progress could be founded on the domination of one people, or one race or one group, by another. Yet attempts to do this, and just this, still continue in southern Africa today. As a result, the danger to peace in that area is real and substantial.
54. My Government holds strong views on these problems, We are not, and never will be, content with a minority Government in Southern Rhodesia. The objective we support for that country remains as it was stated last May: "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia — not just six per cent of them".
55. Nor can we ever be content with such a situation as that in South West Africa, where one race holds another in intolerable subjection under the false name of apartheid. The decision of the International Court of Justice, in refusing to touch the merits of the question of South West Africa, was most disappointing. But the application of law to this question does not hang on that decision alone. South Africa's conduct remains subject to obligations reaffirmed by earlier Advisory Opinions of the Court whose authority is undiminished. Under these Opinions, South Africa cannot alter the international status of the territory without the consent of the United Nations; and South Africa remains bound to accept United Nations supervision, submit annual reports to the General Assembly, and "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants".
56. This is no time for South Africa to take refuge in an overly technical finding of the International Court, which did not deal with the substantive merits of the case. The time is overdue, the time is long overdue, for South Africa to accept its obligations to the international community in regard to South West Africa. Continued violation by South Africa of its plain obligations to the international community would necessarily require all nations, including my own, to take such an attitude into account in their relationships with South Africa.
57. Many other questions of significance will engage our attention during this session of the General Assembly. Foremost among them are questions of disarmament and arms control, of which the most urgent are the completion of a treaty to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the extension of the limited test-ban treaty. Remaining differences on this issue can and must be resolved on the basis of mutual compromise.
58. Finally, I wish to speak of one further matter of great concern both to the United Nations and to my country, and that is the draft treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Major progress has been made in the negotiation of this important treaty, but several issues remain. One of these concerns the question of reporting by space Powers on their activities on celestial bodies. A second issue concerns access by space Powers to one another's installations on celestial bodies, On both of these points the United States of America, at the most recent meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space made significant compromise proposals — again reaffirmed in the present Committee — in the interest of early agreement.
59. Unfortunately, and regrettably, the USSR has not responded constructively to these proposals. Instead, it has insisted on still another matter: a provision requiring States which grant tracking facilities to one country to make the same facilities available to all others, without reciprocity and without regard to the wishes of the granting State. The obligation proposed by the USSR, as was apparent in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, was unacceptable to many countries participating in our negotiations, and was supported indeed only by a very small number of Eastern European States. Tracking facilities, our discussions demonstrated, are a matter for bilateral negotiation and agreement. The United States has held such discussions and reached such agreements with a number of countries on a basis of mutual commitment and common advantage. France and the European Space Research Organization have also established widespread tracking networks on a similar basis. It is, of course, open to the USSR and any other space Power, without objection from my Government, to proceed in exactly the same way.
60. I should like to state today my Government's interest in bilateral co-operation in the tracking of space vehicles on the basis of mutual benefits, and I should like now to make an offer to help resolve this dispute. If the Soviet Union desires to provide for tracking coverage from United States territory, we, on our part, are prepared to discuss with Soviet representatives the technical and other requirements involved, with a view to reaching some mutually beneficial agreement; and our scientists and technical representatives can meet without delay to explore the possibilities to this end.
61. For indeed, the outer-space treaty is too important and too urgent to be delayed. This treaty offers us the opportunity to establish, in the unlimited realm of space beyond this planet, a rule of peace and
law — before the arms race has been extended into that realm. It is all the more urgent because of man's recent strides towards landing on the moon. By far the greater part of the work on the treaty is now behind us. We have agreed on important provisions, including major obligations in the area of arms control. We should proceed to settle the remaining subsidiary issues in a spirit of conciliation and understanding, so that this General Assembly may give its approval to a completed treaty before the Assembly adjourns.
62. I conclude by expressing our earnest hope that the words of the United States today on all these issues may contribute to concrete steps toward peace and a better world.
63. We know the difficulties but we are not discouraged. In the twenty-one turbulent years since the Charter went into effect, we of the United Nations have faced conflicts at least as great and as difficult as any that confront us today. The failure of this Organization has been prophesied many times. But all these prophecies have been disproved, Even the most formidable issues have not killed our Organization — and none will. Indeed, it has grown great and respected by facing the hardest issues and dealing forthrightly with them.
64. There is no magic in the United Nations save what we, its Members, bring to it. And that magic is a simple thing: our irreducible awareness of our common humanity, and our consequent will to peace. Without that awareness and that will, these great buildings would be an empty shell. With them, we have here the greatest instrument ever devised by man for the reconciliation of conflicts and the building of the better future for which all mankind yearns.
65. The United Nations will live. We, its Members, must and will make it live and flourish, and whatever the troubles we face, we must and will make its purposes of peace more and more come true.