106. It is clear to my delegation, as it must be to all other delegations, that relationships among nations are becoming more, and not less, complex. If there ever was a time when simple answers could be given to international questions, that time is certainly not now. I am not thinking only of the rapid development in technology and science, of the fact that men are planning to land on the moon, that ballistic missiles can traverse the earth in the space of minutes and that instantaneous communication is possible between all points on the globe. I am thinking also of the fact that, in the last decade, a large number of new States have come upon the world scene, and that they often have ideas and purposes which are fundamentally different from those of older, established countries. They have traditions and backgrounds vastly different from those of Western civilization and they have a cultural heritage which, though often suppressed in the past, has nevertheless defied destruction and today plays an important part in their approach to world problems no lens than to domestic issues.
107. It is my delegation's opinion, the conflict between Last and West ideologically is not now as profound as the clash of ideas and intentions which has been developing over the past ten years between the newly liberated countries and the older States. Moreover, the inevitable difficulties created by this clash are increased because of a tendency on the part of the older {States, particularly those which have exerted alien rule over overseas Territories, to believe that by and large the new countries should follow in their footsteps, and should adopt their traditional ideas and patterns of behaviour, forgetting — or at least ignoring — the fact that their footsteps have not always led in the direction of peace and goodwill and that their traditional patterns of behaviour have not always enhanced the dignity of the human person.
108. It is important, therefore, that in this United Nations which is the' common meeting ground of cultures ancient and modern of countries new and old, this meeting ground of peoples of all ethnic origins, we must begin not only to recognize, but to accept, that the United Nations is no longer what it was twenty years ago, and that if it is to survive it must change to meet this changing times. Failure to do this would mean to abandon all hope of ever solving man. of the more difficult problems that trouble the world today.
109. Let us consider some of the more important of these problems, most of which have already been adequately dealt with by other speakers but which none the less can bear repetition. For the sake of emphasis may I group these problems under two headings: economic and political.
110. The economic problems are the result of the imbalance between the rich and poor countries, the developed and developing countries, the highly industrialized countries and the countries which are mainly primary producers.
111. It is well known that this is one of the greatest sources of discontent in the world today. This is what makes of developing countries fertile ground for the growth of unrest and revolution, for destructive violence rather than constructive planning and development. And unless we want to perpetuate conditions where the rich get richer, while the poor get poorer, then the United Nations must both stimulate and encourage bilateral and multilateral agreements which could provide an equitable system of world trade between those who give and those who receive; those who buy and those who sell; those who manufacture industrial goods and those who are primary producers.
112. If I may be permitted to draw attention to the situation which exists in my own country of Trinidad and Tobago and indeed in the whole Caribbean area, I would point out that our history has forced us into a sugar economy against our will, that our local agricultural and socio-economic conditions makes us high cost producers; that consequently we cannot compote in the open market with countries like Cuba; that any attempt at full scale mechanization will reduce but slightly the cost of production while increasing tremendously unemployment in the sugar industry. Already our unemployment figures, despite our efforts at industrialization, amount to 14 per cent of our labour force. Any significant increase in this figure is bound to create additional problems greater than the benefits of reduced production costs.
113. And that is why we in Trinidad and Tobago, and the whole former British Caribbean, welcomed the opportunity afforded us by the Government of Canada to revise the Canada-West Indies Agreement and why we hailed with satisfaction the offer to provide us with a quota in the Canadian market for our West Indian sugar at an economic price. In this, Canada has merely lived up to her reputation as the best and most disinterested friend we have ever had, over a long period of years.
114. The United Nations has recognized that a sound social and economic basis is a necessary concomitant, if not in fact an essential prerequisite, of the exercise of meaningful political independence. Countries in the process of strengthening their political independence' therefore attach paramount importance to the work of the United Nations in the social and economic fields. The designation of the 1960s as thee Development Decade was therefore, for developing countries, a significant recognition by the international community of the priority to be accorded to the achievement by all peoples of the basic conditions which promise them lives of useful employment and widening horizons.
115. I do not propose to repeat the doleful statistics from which many speakers before me have drawn the inescapable conclusion that it is only the developed countries themselves that show significant signs of growth; the gap between developing countries and developed countries has widened alarmingly; no single country, hovering on the brink, has been enabled to take the great leap forward to tine proud status of a developed country; the flow of resources from the developed to tine developing countries has diminished while the rapid flow between the rich countries themselves has frozen them into the posture of spectators at a tennis match, fascinated by this interplay and unwilling to divert their attention to the field of international assistance.
116. I think it would be more constructive for me to concentrate on the reasons for this depressing lack of progress towards the universally endorsed development goals. The central problem, as we see it, is the high cost of financing assistance. The cumulative effect of stringent conditions and high interest rates is such that many countries today find themselves in the unhappy situation where the burden of debt prohibits them from seeking the further capital essential to the achievement of their rational development. The highest priority must therefore be accorded as follows: firstly, finding means to ease the crippling burden of debt which countries have been forced to accumulate in their search for essential capital; secondly, the development of international sources of financial assistance which can be granted on terms realistically related to the special conditions existing in developing countries — this assistance should include the extension of the activities of international bodies into the field of supplementary financing and direct investment — and, thirdly, the recognition and acceptance of the principle that the normal commercial rates of interest prevailing in the countries which are the main sources of development capital are inapplicable, and in fact, self-defeating, in the very different context of granting assistance to developing countries.
117. While considering new initiatives in the field of financial assistance, we think it imperative that we should increase our efforts to secure the maximum benefit at reasonable cost from the existing programmes and activities of all the branches of the United Nations family operating in the fields of economic and social development.
118. Despite the very welcome improvements recently brought about or envisaged as a result of the work of the Economic and Social Council and the Committee of Fourteen, it is still not yet possible for Governments to obtain a clear and comprehensive picture of the assistance at present available to them together with the procedures, criteria and actual costs involved in receiving such assistance. This essential information is obscured by the ramifications and complex interrelationships of the numerous United Nations bodies operating in the social and economic fields. It has proved impossible for Governments consistently to co-ordinate their representations between the various international forums and it has too often been the case that duplicating or even conflicting programmes have been authorized. The loss of effectiveness as a result of such dispersal of effort and the burden which structural complexity has placed on the administration and resources of developing countries has yet to be accurately measured.
119. It is because of our concern with improving the effectiveness of the activities of the United Nations family in the vital area of economic and social development that last year in association with the Government of Malta, Trinidad and Tobago took the initiative of placing on the agenda of the General Assembly the item entitled:
"General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International. Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system."
120. But it is trade which, in the long run, is the only acceptable source of development capital. Additional trade earnings can come from only two sources: intensification of agriculture and existing industries, or diversification of the economy through a programme of industrial development. Before any programme can be undertaken that is not doomed to failure from the outset, the very pertinent question of the availability of outlets for this increased production must be answered.
121. Trinidad and Tobago considers that the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] has been invaluable in isolating and identifying the problems in world trade and in suggesting and formulating the minimum measures that will enable developing countries to share equitably in the growing prosperity of the world.
122. The interval between the first and second meetings of UNCTAD has afforded sufficient time for the adjustment in national policies to accommodate the implementation of those minimum measures. We have noted with interest signs that at least some countries are beginning to realize the urgency of the problems. We urge that the time remaining be fully utilized for the finalization of the concrete and meaningful measures that will meet the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the world’s population.
123. Specifically in the field of industrial development, the need for consolidated and comprehensive assistance to developing countries has become increasingly apparent, and this is why the Government of Trinidad and Tobago welcomes the establishment of the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development [UNOID)]. We attach particular importance to the work of UNDID and would wish to see the organization fully operative at the earliest possible time. In Trinidad and Tobago 14 per cent of the labour force is unemployed, fully literate, urban-oriented and adaptable to industrial activity. The necessary infrastructure for industrial development is already in existence, and a beginning has been made on the establishment of light and medium industries. The country is accessible, and has well-developed means of communication with all parts of the world; its small size introduces at an early stage the questions of export-orientation and external markets.
124. These factors make Trinidad and Tobago the almost classic case of a country which is forced to undertake rapid and diversified industrial development in order to survive, and where a well-directed programme of industrialization would have a good chance of success. In Trinidad and Tobago, therefore, UNOID would be confronted in a concentrated form with both the problems and the possibilities which it must constantly consider if it is to find effective solutions to the problems of industrializing the underdeveloped world.
125. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago would welcome the establishment of the permanent headquarters of UNOID in Trinidad and Tobago, if it would be of benefit to that organization to be in close proximity to the problems of industrialization and the efforts to solve them, while remaining within easy access of industrialized centres and most of the developing world.
126. In the political sphere several issues have been engaging the attention of the United Nations over a number of years, and in many of them we seem no nearer solution than when they first arose. The problem of the People's Republic of China, for example, remains a cause of perennial argument with no satisfactory conclusion, largely because no Member-State here present can be satisfied to have one quarter of the human race outside the United Nations family — 700 million people — treated like pariahs and outcasts, developing hostilities and animosities which do no good to the cause of peace, and actively preparing to gain possession of those terrible instruments of destruction which could finally eliminate the human race entirely. Whatever the political creed to which they subscribe, whatever may be the state of their internal domestic affairs, the revolution in mainland China is a fait accompli, and the Peking Government is in effective control of a vast area of land with a population of 700 million. If the principle of universality of the United Nations is accepted, then no barrier should be placed by the present membership to the admission of the People's Republic of China.
127. But universality cannot overrule self-determination. If Peking is in effective control of mainland China, the Chiang Kai-shek Government is in equally effective control of the island of Taiwan, with a population of some 12 million people. Those 12 million have as much right as the people of mainland China to determine their own future, and no accommodation of Peking in the United Nations can be at the expense of the rights of Taiwan.
128. As regards the argument that the Peking Government's behaviour in its international relations has often been in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, we do indeed regret this and regret as well the hostile posture which the Peking Government has adopted towards this Organization itself. Nevertheless, these considerations do not, in our opinion, constitute a sufficiently sound reason for by-passing the objective of universality. After all, an Assembly which has not sought to expel South Africa can hardly use the provisions of the Charter to exclude any other country.
129. Most of the aspects of the political situation have been comprehensively and adequately dealt with by representatives who have spoken before me. Few, however, have considered the question of the Caribbean, and in particular, the eastern Caribbean, which is of immediate concern to us as near neighbours and, we hope, political allies.
130. The new constitutional arrangements entered into between the United Kingdom and the Leeward and Windward Islands are a novel experiment in association. Since we believe in the principle of self-determination, I shall be content at this stage to say no more than that, if these several constitutions have been freely accepted by the peoples of the territories concerned, then they also must be acceptable to us. But if there should be any evidence that the population has been forced against its will to accept constitutional provisions repugnant to its nature and inimical to its interests, then we shall have no hesitation in joining with it in registering as effectively as possible our protests. The other point I desire to make in this connexion is that these new constitutional arrangements must in no way preclude the possibility of closer co-operation between the various units of the Caribbean —between those which are independent and those which have still to gain independence. According to these new constitutional arrangements, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom reserves to itself responsibility for the external affairs of those territories; and this includes trade agreements and political associations.
131. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has always been strongly in favour of Caribbean regional economic co-operation, and we would hope that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would allow to the Governments of the Leeward and Windward Islands the maximum freedom of negotiation for the purpose of achieving Caribbean economic cooperation as and when they desire it.
132. We have not lost our interest in Latin America, the Organization of American States, in the Central American Common Market, or in the Latin American Free Trade Area. Caribbean regional economic co-operation, we believe, does not preclude the possibility of other and
more beneficial trade association with countries of Latin America, and we encourage that new progress made to date by the countries of the Latin American free trade area will be achieved, where like the Central American Common Market, a complete liberalization of trade
area and a common external could soon become operative. Trinidad
and Tobago are keenly interested in such an arrangement, an to that end, my Government is earnestly proceeding with its study of the problem involved in entering the Organization of American States.
133. We note with considerable satisfaction the ending of the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia and we are happy to welcome Indonesia once more into the family of nations.
134. The United States excursion into the Dominican Republic which was the subject of considerable controversy has happily ended, and we look forward to a period of peaceful progress under democratic rule in that formerly troubled country.
135. Like all other delegations, the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago learned with great regret of the decision of the Secretary-General, U Thant, to relinquish his office at the end of the current term. We are deeply grateful that he has agreed to stay on at least until the end of the present session and we still hope that he can be persuaded to continue for an even longer period the invaluable work which he. has been performing in the cause of world peace and in which he has received so little help from those who are best able to provide it.
136. The problems involved in Viet-Nam are varied and deep-seated. Nevertheless, it would be a poor way of demonstrating our appreciation of the high qualities of our Secretary-General, and in particular of his integrity and single-minded devotion to duty, if we believed that we could persuade him to change his mind without ourselves showing any evidence of a change of heart or without making any concrete new moves in the direction of securing peace. Several suggestions have been offered from this rostrum, calculated to encourage the combatants to settle their differences around the conference table. As yet there is no clear indication that any of the proposals offered so far will receive a positive response from Hanoi. It may be that the final gesture is needed to tip the scales. Here I ask the question: would it in any way damage the Americans’ cause if they undertook to have an unconditional pause in the bombing of North Viet-Nam in the hope that this further evidence of good will would convince Hanoi of their firm desire for an honourable peace? It may be much to ask, but I am consoled by the thought of the ancient proverb which says: "The tree that is laden with fruit always bends".
137. The Secretary-General has told us that certain major dangers threaten the United Nations and the world itself. With a humility which must elicit the admiration of all of us, he has confessed that, having done all that he can, he has none the less failed and he now prefers to step aside and allow someone else to try. my delegation hopes that this Assembly, in its turn, will rise to the level of conduct represented by such simple but very impressive dignity.
138. My delegation has yet to make its contribution to the debate on South West Africa, and on that occasion I shall deal more comprehensively both with South Africa and with South West Africa. Suffice it to say at this stage that the situation in South Africa continues to provide a crude illustration of the gulf that so often separates protestations of good faith and the action necessary to implement them. Indeed South Africa is a constant reminder of the central weakness of the United Nations, of its inability to enforce its collective will, when the national interests of a few powerful States may seem, in consequence, to be adversely affected, even though the adverse effect might well be short-lived and the long-term benefits incalculably great. Further, does anyone in this Assembly really believe that a substantial African majority in South Africa will for ever submit to the ruthless oppression which is now its lot? Is it possible for common sense to cling to the hope that the southern part of the African continent will for ever escape the wave of violence which is even now threatening to erupt?
139. In that connexion, it appears to us reckless to the point of blind abandon that there should be a readiness even now to stand aside and allow the Smith rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to run a successful course. The British Government has maintained all along that Southern Rhodesia is its own particular domestic problem. Under pressure from other Commonwealth countries, tentative efforts have been made to impose voluntary sanctions and other ineffective measures against the rebel regime. The result to date has been a ghastly failure. It has now been proposed that a final chance should be given to Ian Smith, failing acceptance of which the Security Council will be approached for the imposition of limited selective mandatory sanctions against that country. Let me emphasize that that decision does not represent the collective will of the Commonwealth but merely the best that could be extracted from Her Majesty’s Government, despite the fact that the majority of Commonwealth members are pressing for sterner action, even to the use of force. We sympathize with the position of Prime Minister Wilson and his Government but, in the same way as he maintains that Southern Rhodesia is his responsibility, so too do we disclaim any responsibility for the dilemma in which he finds himself. The careless neglect of Southern Rhodesia over the past forty years under the guise of internal self-government has resulted in ruthless exploitation of the black Africans and the denial of their human rights to a degree second only to that which obtains in South Africa. At the present moment Southern Rhodesia is run like a police State, and black African prisoners incarcerated without trial have been literally tortured to death. I wonder how long the world's conscience will tolerate this
continued inhumanity by one section of the human race against another. Those who talk hopefully of the effect of limited mandatory sanctions know in their hearts that the chances of success are only slightly better than in the case of voluntary sanctions. Yet, because the United Kingdom claims that it is its responsibility and that it cannot be forced, in the words of Mr. George Brown, "into hasty and partisan solutions", those of us who are outraged by these gross injustices, being unable ourselves to take the necessary military action to bring the rebels to their knees, must of necessity support whatever action, however limited, Her Majesty’s Government can be persuaded to take, knowing quite well that even if this Assembly advocated stronger action we face the inevitable British veto in the Security Council. We are not happy; we await the outcome with acute anxiety and with such patience as we can muster in a situation which grows more intolerable every day.
140. Our interest in the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations subordinates all other considerations. Few countries today possess the means of defending themselves against all comers, and, even more to the point, each outbreak of violence between nations contains the potential of ultimate nuclear conflagration. We have followed with close attention the attempt of the Special Committee of Thirty-three to resolve differences of opinion as to how the Organization can best pursue its peace-keeping operations. It is a matter of considerable regret to my delegation that no consensus has been reached and no specific proposals agreed to for strengthening this central United Nations function.
141. Perhaps the wise course for the moment would be to accept a pause in the attempt to resolve these differences of opinion. The Committee of Thirty-three was born of a crisis that threatened the existence of our Organization, a crisis in which tempers were greatly strained and in which the arguments on all sides were largely based on interpretations of the meanings of certain clauses in the Charter. Echoes of the crisis no doubt have haunted meetings of the Committee of Thirty-three. Thus, it may well be that a fresh start, after a pause and from a different point of departure, will be more likely to yield the fruitful results which we all seek.
142. My delegation for its part would make one general observations only at this stage. We fully understand the reasons why those who drew up the Charter wrote into it the special duties of the Security Council for peace-keeping and we appreciate the realism with which, within the Security Council, the five permanent members were given their central responsibility. On the other hand, as I have already stated, the world around us is changing daily and this Organization must reflect the changes for its own salvation. We therefore wonder whether interpretations of the Charter in respect of the vital function of peace-keeping can with safety always be restricted to an exercise in semantics.
143. We must be honest with ourselves. The Security Council was perhaps the most practical instrument that could have been devised twenty years ago for keeping the peace of the world, but it was not then a democratic instrument and even its recent enlargement still leaves it far short of full democracy. There is today, however, more democracy around the world than there was twenty years ago. Should not this welcome development be taken into consideration as we think about the future of the United Nations, which is our future and which depends so much on the effective use of its central functions?
144. I make these remarks tentatively, even hesitantly. As representative of a small country my delegation has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and we feel that every chance should be taken, however slim, to achieve that most desirable of all objectives, "Peace on Earth, goodwill to all men".