78. The task of ensuring full expression of the diverse views of 121 Member States, while still bringing our deliberations to a constructive outcome, is no sinecure. Our gratitude and appreciation are due to the retiring President, Mr. Fanfani, for his notable contribution to the work of the preceding session.
79. In congratulating you, Sir, on your elevation to the Presidency of this Assembly, the New Zealand delegation pledges its co-operation with you in your demanding duty of attempting to channel in a positive direction the authority which the Assembly possesses. At a time when the problems of Asia are of such primary concern, it is altogether appropriate, as many have remarked before me, that it should be a distinguished son of Asia who presides over our deliberations.
80. We meet at a time when even the most optimistic among us must confess to a deep and growing sense of concern at the tide of events on almost every international front. The Secretary-General himself has in a number of recent statements given voice to his mounting anxiety; it is not, I believe, an exaggeration to describe his statements as expressing foreboding and despondency. I propose to describe first some aspects of the world scene and of the work of the United Nations as they seem to us; and then to look especially at the most immediately dangerous situation which confronts the international community: the war in Viet-Nam.
81. The United Nations, like its predecessor, the League of Nations, was created in order to preserve international peace. That was the prime intention of the representatives who met at San Francisco in 1945. The result was not quite what all of them had hoped for; as the then Prime Minister of New Zealand, leader of our delegation observed to the New Zealand Parliament on his return:
"Not security itself but the way to security lies in the Charter ... it will by no means resolve in advance all the problems that lie in the way of the nations of the world. It can do no more than set up the rules and procedures by which those problems may be approached."
82. The rules and procedures, the principles, the purposes and the machinery were established. But clearly the real test of their effectiveness would be the way the machinery was used and developed. In its other aspects, notably in its intensified concern with matters of economic and social development and with the right of dependent peoples to self-determination, the Charter went considerably further than the Covenant of the League had done. These were two fields in which New Zealand was able to make some positive contribution at San Francisco, a fact in which we take pride. The Charter, therefore, set the Organization on a course designed to preserve peace and to facilitate peaceful change. Peace and peaceful change — these were the twin roads by which world security was to be approached.
83. The objectives of the international community which are contained in the Charter are now taken for granted. It is, therefore, salutary to look back to the time, not too distant, when assumptions were different. Today, for example, no one would question that problems of development are international in scale and must find their place on the agenda of the world community and its various institutions. What an advance this is. Only a generation ago it was not even generally accepted that Governments should actively concern themselves with the state of their own nation’s economy, let alone with the economic health of their neighbours or of the whole family of man. Similarly, as the concurrent debate on South West Africa has reminded us, it is less than fifty years ago that the concept of the "sacred trust" was laid down in the Mandates System of the League of Nations. But that decision contributed to the process of decolonization which the United Nations has assisted so vigorously and to which its membership today bears witness. In fact, it may be held that in some ways the most effective aspect of the work of this Organization has been in the field of colonial and Trust Territories, generally in co-operation with the metropolitan Powers concerned. New Zealand has played a part in that process, in both its colonial and its trusteeship aspects, and as an administering Power we welcomed the contribution of the United Nations to our task of bringing to self- determination the dependent peoples for whose progress we had assumed, responsibility.
84. Another and related aspect of the work of the United Nations which has recently been given a new impetus is that of promoting and protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms. The adoption at the twentieth session of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [resolution 2106A (XX)] was, we believe, an achievement of very considerable significance. This Convention can be expected to do much to help combat the denial of human dignity which, in various shapes and forms, is both widespread and peculiarly persistent. I am glad to be able to announce that my Government has now authorized its signature.
85. The international community, however, is now faced with certain intractable colonial problems, intertwined with dangerous divisions based on race, which exist especially in southern Africa. I shall not speak at this stage in specific terms, since on one such issue — that of South West Africa — New Zealand's position has already been made clear and, on others, more appropriate opportunities will soon be furnished. Rather, I wish to make some general observations on the nature of these issues as they affect this Organization. I make them because, as a small country, New Zealand has valued the United Nations: support of the United Nations has been one of the main pillars of our foreign policy.
86. That the persistence of colonialism and of racial discrimination in Africa is felt as an affront to all independent African States of the continent we fully appreciate. That the aid of the international community should be sought as a means of expressing disapproval of this colonial condition and of bringing weight to bear to help to change it is also entirely understandable. We may soon face another and fateful question: whether this weight ought to be fully mobilized immediately at undefined, but virtually limitless, cost. The Charter has provisions which make it possible to bring to bear, if ultimately necessary, an unlimited degree of force to defeat a major breach of peace. The question now looming is whether these provisions are to be interpreted as authority for the institution to make similar sacrifices for the righting of wrongs.
87. There is a protective as well as a positive element in the original doctrines of this Organization. Protection from aggression was provided for; standards for political evolution were set. There was no provision for punitive crusades. The range of activities of this Organization and of the specialized agencies can, and should, be expanded by broad agreement and within the terms of the Charter to meet new needs or old needs as they come to be more keenly felt. They have in fact been so expanded. The Charter has been constantly interpreted and developed. But, in respect of the ultimate weapon in our armoury, mandatory enforcement measures and especially the mandatory use of force, we should be well advised to think very carefully before we distort or relax the limitations imposed in the Charter; for these represent today, as heretofore, the maximum that Governments are prepared to accept. Confronted with objectionable behaviour or seemingly intransigent situations, it may be tempting to enlarge the scope of the definition of a threat to peace and thus to commit the international community to the use of force in a widening circle of international problems. It may be tempting; but it would represent a distortion of the Charter and a transformation of the United Nations, not only far beyond what we believe was ever intended or even conceived by the countries which drafted and signed the Charter at San Francisco, but far beyond what we believe would be acceptable if a new Charter were being negotiated at some fresh conference at this time. Even apart from that consideration, the practical consequences of the courses of action sometimes proposed must always be thought through and their potential cost — not only in terms of money but also in terms of lives — reflected upon. We can understand the pressure some Members feel to designate situations that are repugnant to them as threats to the peace. We can understand, but we cannot necessarily accept; for to enlarge the scope of the Charter provisions designed to meet a threat to the peace may also be to dilute them. We should all then be the poorer and the less secure.
88. At this point I should like to dwell for a moment on a general trend which is, I believe, causing concern in many quarters: that is, the increasing tendency of Assembly resolutions to be declamatory rather than considered statements, crammed with sweeping and often unsubstantiated assertions, loaded with emotion-charged and often questionable judgements — and sometimes obscure or even meaningless language — and containing virtually no serious regard for the means, the cost or the consequences of their implementation. Already the significance of General Assembly pronouncements has been eroded. This process of devaluation diminishes the standing of the Assembly and diminishes us, its Members, too.
89. We have indeed come some distance in the twenty-one years since San Francisco in developing genuinely international attitudes and in devising international responses to the challenges which face all peoples. It would, I know, be unjust to underestimate the extent of that achievement. We have taken many strides forward; but the substance and even the shape of some of the most crucial problems of our time, it must be admitted, still elude us and in fact dance on even faster ahead of us. Nowhere is that sense of frustration, of grappling with phantoms, greater than in the principal questions of peace and security and of disarmament.
90. True, the fabric of world peace, while torn, has so far held together. Why? Largely, it must be said, because of the restraint of the great Powers, in sober awareness of the nature of the weapons available in their own and in each other's nuclear armouries. The role which the United Nations has been able or has been permitted to play in their conflicts of interest, although on occasion useful, has necessarily been limited. In one recent and major instance, that of the fighting last year between India and Pakistan, the Security Council was able to act as its founders intended, because the great Powers discovered a common interest in peace higher than any of their otherwise divergent national interests. In many other circumstances, however, even relatively minor ones, the powers of the Council have been frustrated and its standing diminished. Early this year there was resistance even to the proposal to place the question of Viet-Nam on the Council's agenda for discussion; and in recent days we have been treated to the spectacle of an obstructive filibuster to delay consideration of an urgent complaint. Moreover, the expanded Council this year, widely accepted as being in its structure more truly representative of the United Nations membership than its recent predecessors, has not been able to do better than they: and it has, indeed, on occasion done worse and often been unable to reach even simple practical decisions in circumstances in which they were plainly warranted. That is not a reassuring phenomenon in the world of today.
91. The armaments of the contemporary world are, in fact, a measure of the extent of present international distrust. Admittedly, it is a two-way process — armaments in turn feed the fires in which they are forged. But until political relationships ease, major steps of real disarmament are not likely to be taken. What we must try to do, therefore, is to prevent the situation from becoming more dangerous and more complicated, perhaps beyond remedy, and to take the limited
measures of progress that are possible, in the hope that by so doing we enlarge the realm of what is possible.
92. Already, there has been some success in this limited field in the shape of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. My Government welcomed that Treaty. We believe that it has been vindicated, despite the difficulties which have attended all efforts to extend its scope; and despite the fact that two Powers which possess some nuclear weapons have chosen to ignore it.
93. New Zealand has repeatedly made clear its opposition to continued nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We have objected to the tests conducted ty Communist China; and we have protested, so far unavailingly, against the series of tests in the South Pacific which France has now began to conduct, albeit with as much care for the interests of those situated in the area as the present state of this terrible art permits. We object to continued atmospheric testing, both because of the potential hazards, however slight, to the natural environment and because of the graver dangers to the political environment.
94. I do not intend to dwell on these issues, since there are appropriate items on our agenda under which they should be discussed. At this point it is sufficient to say that New Zealand fully shares the widely endorsed view that a nonproliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban are the urgent problems in this field — the first, and perhaps the easiest, hurdles which we should seek to clear.
95. Some maintain that progress is impossible unless and until every militarily significant State is both a participant and a party. We do not share this view. Such universality is a desirable goal — one for which we were prepared to support the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference — but it cannot be conceded to be an absolute prerequisite. Otherwise, in all realism, defeat must be conceded. At least, therefore, we must search for agreements of limited scope and possibly even of defined duration.
96. We are also attracted by the Secretary-General’s suggestion [A/6301/Add.1, p. 4] that an authoritative study might be undertaken of all that is involved, in effort and cost, in a decision to make nuclear weapons; it seems reasonable to assume that the publication of such an analysis would be a salutary discouragement to potential proliferators.
97. If the United Nations has so often been handicapped in the major issues affecting peace and security and in the negotiations on disarmament, it has, as we all know, had some success in the secondary role of interposition: that is, of peace-keeping. Yet even here we face serious difficulties. It would, however, be well not to exaggerate the difficulties or to press prematurely for abstract remedies; failure to achieve theoretical agreement may do concrete damage. The Organization can still undertake peace-keeping functions in an emergency by the ad hoc methods to which it is obliged to resort. There has been proof of that, most recently in the case of the fighting between India and Pakistan last year.
98. We are only too well aware, from practical experience, of the difficulties inherent in the present situation which make the financing of peace-keeping operations uncertain and unfair, and which prevent or inhibit the proper planning of their logistics and common services. We deplore this unsatisfactory situation. Nevertheless, it is a situation we may have to live with, the facts of international life being what they are. In the meantime we, for our part, shall preserve the hope that continuing differences on issues of principle and continuing uncertainty as to financial backing will be overcome should a specific situation arise.
99. A related question, that of peaceful settlement of disputes, also deserves exploration but, again, has been set back, this time with aid from an unexpected quarter. In many ways it is a more important question than the mechanics of peace-keeping, for here we come to the core of peaceful change.
100. A domestic political and legal system, by analogy, preserves and enforces law and order the more effectively because it is buttressed by provision for redress of grievances through either the courts or the legislature. There is a need for some alternative to the all too common contemporary sequence: ceasefire, then political stalemate. Should we not at least be seeking to give greater practical reality to the principles which are contained in the Charter? Would it, as one great Power so speciously maintains, be superfluous or involve a violation of the Charter to fill out in more detail the means of peaceful settlement which are sketched in summary form in the Charter? Surely not. Even the conduct of this Assembly, an organ established by the Charter with prescribed powers, needs rules of procedure to permit it to function effectively. Why then should we not at least consider what scope there is for providing agreed procedures to carry out in practice the principles of political behaviour to which our signature of the Charter committed us?
101. In fact, the question of the peaceful settlement of disputes is, in New Zealand's view, an essential part of the whole structure for international cooperation built at San Francisco. No one, so it seems to us, who genuinely subscribes to the ideals of the Charter could object to it. Yet there is objection, on the one hand from those who claim that for us to get to grips with procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes would circumvent the Charter; and on the other hand from those who conceive it to be a manoeuvre to divert attention from one specific need for a non-peaceful settlement of a dispute. We cannot but be concerned at the implications of both objections.
102. This whole question of the preservation of peace and security, of interposition by international peacekeeping missions, and of the development of peaceful settlement procedures is vital to this Organization and to the world community. Let us not delude ourselves. In this respect the Organization is not working as it should. We shall all have to live, or try to live, with the consequences.
103. Increasingly, it must be noted, a practice of injury by stealth is being followed. This tendency is not confined either to one continent or region or to one kind of power struggle or ideological conflict. Those so injured, if they cannot get redress here, will tend to reply as best they can. It must be said frankly, too, that this tendency favours the clandestine, the attack launched but publicly denied; and those nations whose systems of government do not easily lend themselves to such surreptitious implementation of policy may find themselves condemned if they frankly acknowledge their own inevitable response. This sort of dual standard, of which there are signs already, is scarcely a prescription for international peace; it is, rather, a prescription for the comity of nations to become, in practice, the comity of hard knocks, a comity of reprisals.
104. The authority of international law is being steadily eroded as national policies are pressed in defiance of its slowly developed rules. We have gone several steps back to the jungle, despite the existence of the United Nations. Let us not disguise it: it would be too great an irony if the United Nations itself were to be used to pioneer a return to the anarchy of what we believed was a by-gone age.
105. The lesson is clear: either we are going to develop our procedures and practices to apply the principles of the Charter to new forms of aggression which have been proclaimed and practised in recent years; or this Organization, and international law, will become less and less relevant to the realities of international life. Those realities, unless we are more successful, may well see a world with many more nuclear States adding to regional insecurity in many areas, in circumstances in which political stability may continue to be undermined — shaken by the stresses of inadequate responses to real needs. Need I mention, for example, the losing battle between population growth and the expansion of food production.
106. These reflections bring me directly to the question of the conflict in Viet-Nam. Great as may be the other issues that confront the world, and this Assembly, the situation in Viet-Nam carries the most immediate threat to peace and the gravest implications for us all. This Organization — and more especially this body — may not be the forum in which the problem can be resolved. But this Organization and this Assembly are certainly a fitting place, indeed the only place, for all of us to voice our concern at the situation and our common desire to see negotiations begin for a just settlement.
107. The situation in Viet-Nam is not simple, though some of the issues it raises are. Some features of the situation are particular to Viet-Nam; others are shared with other countries which, in the post-war years, became divided into communist and noncommunist zones. The fact of such division is regrettable. But it exists: in Germany, in Korea, in Viet-Nam. The people of all these divided States will, we hope, be able to achieve reunification, if they so wish, by their own decision, through a democratic process, through self-determination. But, pending these decisions, an attempt by one part of such a State to impose reunification under its own political system by force — whether by direct invasion, as in Korea in 1950, or by a war of terror and subversion, a so-called war of national liberation, as in Viet- Nam today — is not an act of self-determination: it is an act of aggression. There are those who deny that an attempt by North Viet-Nam to impose a government and political system on South Viet-Nam by force can be an act of aggression. To their eyes it can be only a civil war. One must ask whether this Organization should have stood aside when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950; on the grounds that to assist would have been to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Korean people. One must ask whether some of those who put forward this notion would have stood aside had the Federal Republic of Germany attacked East Germany. Would they then have argued that an attempt to achieve the unity and independence of the German people by force could not be regarded as aggression because the Germany people could not possibly commit aggression against themselves?
108. Others have said that this war is, in essence, or was, in origin, a civil war within South Viet-Nam. There is no doubt that political and social weaknesses in the Republic of Viet-Nam have contributed to the success of communist military tactics. But we believe the evidence of the direction and support of the Viet-Cong forces from North Viet-Nam to be undeniable. We believe further that the extent of this direction and support is such that the war cannot be regarded simply as a civil war within the South: there is also clear aggression from the North. Countries such as New Zealand do not seek to become involved in a civil war, but we cannot disregard an act of aggression,
109. My country lies remote from Viet-Nam, more than five thousand miles distant from that unhappy country. In the 1930's we were farther still from Manchuria; from Ethiopia; and from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Yet we found then that developments in those places carried implications for our own safety and for the world's safety. We were further still from Korea in 1950 than from Viet-Nam today; but we recognized then that armed attack, even though it might be across the demarcation line of a politically divided country, was nonetheless aggression, and a threat to us along with others. Whether the seeds of conflict appear in Europe, as in Berlin in 1948, or in Africa, as in the Congo in 1960, or in Latin America, as in Cuba in 1962, we have seen that our fate can be involved in the outcome of events in many places, places more distant from us than Viet-Nam. That is why the Charter is founded on the notion that a threat to the peace anywhere is a matter of general concern. That is why this Organization exists. That is why none of us here in this Assembly can stand aloof from what is happening in Viet-Nam today, whether or not the matter appears formally on our agenda. That is why New Zealand has responded to the request for military assistance from the Republic of Viet-Nam.
110. The effort in which New Zealand has joined is not designed to impose a government or a regime upon the people of Viet-Nam, whether North or South. We do not believe that the people of South Viet-Nam want a communist government or a communist front government. Through all the difficulties and vicissitudes of recent years we have seen no major group or political figure rally to the National Front; but we have seen many struggle against it at great cost and risk. We do not believe that victory for a so-called National Liberation Front would be a victory for national liberation or for the future of the nation. We have seen, in the north of Viet-Nam and elsewhere, by what means and at what price such a regime would impose its will and deal with those who oppose it. If the people of South Viet-Nam were to choose a National Liberation Front government, we would accept that decision, however great our regret and our concern for them and for ourselves. But when an attempt is made to impose a National Liberation Front government by force, and our assistance has been asked, the principles that have long governed our policy demand that we give it.
111. None of us can fail to be moved by the material and human tragedy of this war. It is a war not fought upon a narrow and defined front, but in the midst of the people themselves, day by day, month by month, year by year. The grenade thrown into the restaurant, the airstrike from the sky, the mortar attack upon a village, the operation to clear a road, the assassination of local officials and their families: all take their toll, and the toll, we know, is heavy. It is horrifying. It must be stopped. The only question that can divide us can be: how to stop it.
112. Unfortunately not everyone regards such a war with horror. Mao Tse-tung says that:
"The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries."
Mao Tse-tung lays down: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". Lin Piao, his prophet, proclaims that "fighting is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics" and that "war of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of our military operations". This, we are told, is the inevitable future course of events for Asia, Africa and Latin America. "Protracted war" in these areas will come, must come, and must be promoted and supported. Viet-Nam, we are clearly and expressly told, is the example before the world of what will occur — of what will be promoted — elsewhere.
113. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America already know from experience what this means. Guerrilla wars were seen in several countries of Asia in the forties and fifties. In South-East Asia the people of the Philippines, Malaysia, Laos, Indonesia and Burma do not need to look at Viet-Nam today to see what such a war would mean, as the Prime Minister of Laos pointed out from this rostrum a few minutes ago. The newly independent States of Africa have been told that they are ripe for revolution. The nations of Latin America have been similarly advised by a recent conference held in their region.
114. Those who urge this "cause" as a necessity of some supposed "objective laws" know too what it involves: "The sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars", says Lin Piao reassuringly, "is repaid by security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of mankind; temporary suffering is repaid by lasting or even perpetual peace and happiness".
115. Do any of us here, we who accept the Charter, support this doctrine? New Zealand opposes it, not simply because we reject the ideology that has given birth to it, but because it is a menace to the security of us all. We are not committed to an ideological war. But we are committed to defence against aggression. Certainly, it would be quite wrong for us to let any ideological concern excuse anyone from seeking to bring the war to an end. But wars of this kind will not be stopped by making them profitable. The world community must make known its desire for a settlement; it cannot ask for a unilateral capitulation.
116. What can such a settlement be? It is not perhaps here t..at its terms can be formulated. This can be done by negotiation among those most directly concerned, as soon as the will to seek a solution is evident on both sides. But such a settlement will surely be one that seeks its modalities and its justification in the wishes of the people most directly concerned. The people of South Viet-Nam should be able to choose their own government and their own political and social system, including the question of relations with the North, free of pressure from any quarter, free from the threat of terror and reprisals. Self-determination for the people of Viet-Nam as a whole can hardly be advanced by allowing South Viet-Nam to have imposed upon it the same lack of choice that marks elections in North Viet-Nam and other communist States. If the people of South Viet-Nam were to choose communism, we should be surprised, even concerned, for nowhere, not even in North Viet-Nam, has a people freely shown by an election or referendum offering a genuine choice, that it wants communism. But if the people of Viet- Nam, North or South, were freely to choose communism, this is their right. If they freely choose to reject communism, this is equally their right.
117. The question now is how to bring the war to an end in a manner which will safeguard this right. We have heard constructive proposals made from this forum. We have heard readiness expressed to consider other proposals also. What is now needed is a constructive response from the other side, a response which Members of the Assembly have a right to expect.
118. It is too much to hope that an additional benefit of a successful negotiation bringing peace to Viet-Nam might be an easing of tension in the whole of Asia — a process which might, in turn, open up possibilities for gradual accommodations between Communist China and the non-communist States of Asia and the West? Such a trend, a softening of hostile attitudes, might then aid the important task of bringing the Government of Peking into a wider and more constructive relationship with the international community at large and with this Organization.
119. At this point, I should like to express our pleasure at the recent admission to membership of that international community and this Organization of three new Commonwealth States: first Guyana, and now Botswana and Lesotho, admissions which my delegation has had the privilege of co-sponsoring. I should like also to welcome the return of Indonesia to active membership. It may perhaps be questioned in some quarters whether the entire episode constitutes a good precedent for the Organization. Whatever we may think of the principle, we can at least draw the lesson that even a nation as large and as richly endowed as Indonesia saw greater advantage in full' participation in the work of the United Nations than in being outside it. At a time when the United Nations is in faltering health, we believe that this is a good augury for the Organization. For this reason and because, too, of
our own friendly ties with Indonesia, a great nation straddling the regions of Asia and the Pacific, New Zealand received news of Indonesia’s decision with much pleasure.
120. In conclusion, I wish to express our deep appreciation for the devoted work of the Secretary-General, Throughout his term of appointment he has worthily maintained the high standards of impartiality and integrity which the Charter demands of his office. He has never spared himself in his search for means to promote and to maintain peace. In this aim, he has had the warm support of the Government and people of New Zealand. It is our hope that U Thant will agree to continue to serve the United Nations and the world community as Secretary-General of this Organization.