Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

56. Allow me, Mr. President, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to congratulate you on your election to the post of President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, and to wish you every success in your endeavours in this important position. 57. This twenty-third session of the General Assembly is beginning its labours in a complex situation in which the policies of States are coming into increasingly sharp contrast. We say this in order to stress the importance of the tasks facing the United Nations and the responsibility of every Government for creating at this session an atmosphere conducive to productive discussion of the items on the agenda. 58. Whichever region of the world or major event we consider, we see everywhere a conflict in which the forces of peace, national liberation and progress oppose the forces of reaction and war. This conflict is being carried on ceaselessly and with varying degrees of intensity and passion on the battlefields of Viet-Nam and in the Sinai desert in efforts to eliminate the remains of colonialism, at the negotiating table in Geneva, and here at the Headquarters of the United Nations. 59. The reason why the most vital problems of the peoples of the world remain unsolved must be sought in the policy pursued by those circles of the Western Powers which place their allegiance to military blocs and to the armaments race above the interests of the peoples. Indeed, they associate the future of the social system of whose interests they themselves are the spokesmen with this very course in international affairs. 60. Those who really cherish the interests of peace and who can clearly distinguish between the conflict of ideas and ideologies per se and efforts to decide the outcome of that conflict by resort to arms can hardly fail to appreciate the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the states of the socialist commonwealth. 61. In our time, when unprecedently destructive types of weapons have been developed, only the ignorant or the foolhardy can fail to realize what a military clash between the two social systems would mean. 62. From the very first days of the Soviet State we have sought in the international field for points of contact with countries whose social systems and ideologies were different from our own. Even today the Soviet Union is a staunch advocate of the need to find possibilities of co-operation or even joint action with the governments of the bourgeois countries for the common purpose of preventing a new world war. 63. In the effort to prevent war and immobilize the forces of aggression, our natural ally is the large group of States which do not belong to the socialist commonwealth but have broken the fetters of colonialism, have started on the road to independent development and cherish the interests of strengthening peace. These are the developing countries, where approximately 1,500 million people live. We know very well that they, too, regard our country as their friend and ally in the common cause, the struggle for peace and the freedom of peoples. 64. The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, is consistently and firmly pursuing a policy o peace and friendship among nations and upholding the principles of peaceful coexistence among States regardless of their social system. Does this mean that so-called military adventures, encroachments on the freedom of nations, and instigation of international crises could remain without rebuff from our side? No, it does not. Dedication to peace and opposition to aggression in any form, direct or indirect, are organically blended in Soviet policies. 65. Every session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is faced with major problems. In solving some of them it is possible to make some progress; others remain unsolved for years; and still others seem to have been raised simply to complicate the work of the United Nations and to poison the international atmosphere. 66. There are various reasons for this. However, as experience shows, the productiveness of the work of the United Nations largely depends on the degree of realism with which States assess each other’s interests, including the interests of the socialist-commonwealth. Attempts to use the United Nations against the vital interests of the socialist countries, against their security interests — and such attempts are sometimes made - are doomed to failure. 67. The socialist commonwealth was formed after the Second World War and was an historic achievement of all progressive humanity. The States that make up this commonwealth have common destinies, and solve common problems in building a society that excludes the exploitation of man by man and opens up limitless vistas for the use of all human abilities and achievements in science, technology, and culture for the welfare and not for the extermination of peoples. These profoundly humane ideals inspire the socialist countries in their joint efforts in the international arena. 68. The socialist countries have their own vital interests, their own obligations, including the obligation to protect their mutual security, and their own socialist principles of mutual relations based on brotherly assistance, solidarity and internationalism. This commonwealth is an indissoluble whole, cemented together by indissoluble ties such as history has never known before. 69. The interests of socialism and the foreign policy of the socialist countries have global significance, and this is now recognized by very many people, including those who do not belong to our socialist world. Socialism is indeed the most reliable bastion against any attempt at aggression, the breeding ground of which is that social system which has given rise to two world wars. Socialism stood at the cradle of the national freedom and independence of many countries represented in this Organization. 70. To damage the positions taken by socialism throughout the world is tantamount to increasing the danger of the outbreak of a new world war. 71. Those who represent the other world and its ideology should not rejoice that things do not always go smoothly in the difficult task of shaping new social relations, including international relations. Sometimes phenomena occur that are interpreted by our enemies as weakening the forward movement of socialism. 72. They judge us by themselves and rejoice prematurely. We are profoundly convinced that the common aims and common principles on which the socialist states are based, and which have their origin in the most vital needs of human society and the laws of its development, will ensure that difficulties are overcome and that the peoples of these brotherly countries will close ranks more tightly in their progressive march ahead. 73. Attempts have been made here to reproach us in connexion with the events concerning Czechoslovakia. The actions of the allied socialist States are called “unexpected” and “incomprehensible”. But how can they be unexpected? You know only too well that there can be nothing unexpected in the action which the socialist countries take to defend themselves against the intrigues of imperialism. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have often warned those who are tempted to try to embarrass the socialist commonwealth that we will neither tolerate nor allow even one of its links to be torn off. 74. Sober-minded political leaders in the West know that very well. We are inclined to believe also that those who are not averse now to making a hullabaloo about this question know it too. They know it, but obviously for some reason this hullabaloo serves their purposes. It is not for us to judge what they find advantageous to them in this situation. We should like only to point out that this does not serve the true interests of their own governments, still less their own long-term interests. 75. Just whom do these noisy drum-beaters, who have suddenly metamorphosed into champions of “attractive” and “effective” socialism, expect to impress? To believe them, one would have to think that everything in the world had turned topsyturvy; that some marvel had occurred. But of course nothing of the sort has happened. 76. When representatives of the imperialist camp resort to quoting what V.I.Lenin said on the nation question, then everyone can clearly see what a consummately surprising picture they are drawing here. Apparently it is difficult for them to comprehend that the national question has really and truly been solved by socialism. I say it is difficult for them because they express the views of a social system which for centuries has oppressed and enslaved the colonial countries, of whose territory in all truth hardly a square metre is not strewn with the bones of those who have perished under the colonialist heel. 77. Just imagine: the opponents of socialism worry about its effectiveness and attractiveness; colonialists are concerned about the rights and equality of nations! What is dear to their hearts in reality, however, is not the success of socialism and communism but the schemes of anti-communism. 78. The Soviet Union deems it necessary to proclaim from this rostrum that socialist States cannot and will not permit the vital interests of socialism to be infringed or encroachments to be made upon the inviolability of the frontiers of the socialist commonwealth and hence upon international peace. 79. Let no one search for contradictions between our determination to defend the interests of socialism and the security interests of the socialist commonwealth and our determination to defend the cause of peace and international security; for no such contradiction exists. 80. We hold out the hand of friendship to the States of Europe which know from their own experience that war Creeps up imperceptibly and that today, as before, the Soviet Union has stood and will stand as a mighty bastion against aggression and revanchism. 81. We stand for friendship with the States of Asia and for the further strengthening of Asia. 82. We hold out the hand of friendship to the African countries whose peoples have just recently thrown off the shackles of colonial oppression. 83. We hold out the hand of friendship to the States and peoples of Latin America, from whom there is nothing to divide us and for whose aspirations for freedom and progress we have full sympathy. 84. We favour friendship with the people of North America, including the people of the United States, who, like us, will always keep fresh in their memory the traditions of our joint struggle as part of the anti-Hitler coalition and who also shoulder a tremendous burden of responsibility for the maintenance of peace throughout the world. 85. One of the most important problems facing the world is ending the armaments race, disarmament. 86. The achievements of human genius in the peaceful fields of, science, technology, industry, agriculture and culture are put on display at world and international exhibitions and pass into people’s everyday life. 87. Suppose that samples of the increasingly destructive types of weapons invented and manufactured in the major countries, say over the last few years alone, were assembled and put on display for the inspection of the general public. Seeing with their own eyes what they had wrought with their own hands, people would probably recoil in horror as from the edge of an abyss. But weapons are really “put on display” not at exhibitions and parades but in war, unless people know how to prevent it. 88. The world long ago reached the point where the continuance of the arms race became madness. 89. Every additional heavy block added to the armaments pyramid increases its unsteadiness and the threat to bring down on the heads of the peoples the bombs, rockets and all the means of mass destruction that have already been stockpiled. 90. Every new block added to this pyramid increases the economic and social burden weighing most heavily on the shoulders of the working masses who create the wealth. 91. Of course the arms race cannot be ended at one stroke. To end it would require a drastic change in the policy of the Governments whipping the spiralling armaments race up higher and higher but which so far have not dared to set off with us on the road to the general and complete disarmament on which the Soviet Union has always insisted and continues to insist. 92. We are convinced that barriers must be erected to slow and stop the onrushing torrent of armaments, and that a start must then be made towards arms reduction and the elimination of all means of waging war. Some important measures to restrain the nuclear arms race which have been agreed upon in recent years — such as the cessation of tests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of nuclear competition in space — prove that this is possible. 93. We flatly reject the fatalism of those who, having lost faith in positive results from negotiations, are prepared to fold their hands paralysed with fear before gun-muzzles and rockets. 94. Sometimes those who preach the inevitability of the arms race do so to conceal their own intention to hazard the future of the human race solely to obtain the maximum amount of profits or to gain some strategic advantages. 95. In other cases the futility of efforts to achieve disarmament is dwelt upon by those who claim to be virtually the foremost fighters against imperialism but actually form common cause with it, thus helping to push the world along a dangerous path. 96. What must be done to prevent further accumulation of armaments? Various approaches and methods have been tried during the past twenty years. Some think it is necessary to begin with nuclear disarmament. Others want to begin with conventional weapons. Some say it is better first to create a more favourable international atmosphere and then proceed to disarmament. Others say that if some disarmament measures are put into effect the international atmosphere will take care of itself. 97. These and still other alternatives have been propounded at the negotiating table, but there has been no change. Why? Perhaps because the methods are inadequate. No: the methods do not matter. Whichever method is chosen, success can be achieved only on one condition: there must be a willingness to disarm and a determination by States, primarily the most powerful ones, to move in that direction. 98. Otherwise, all this comes down to mere verbal fencing. If pitfalls are prepared for a proposal on this or that particular step in disarmament even before it is discussed, there is little reason to expect any progress. 99. In many parts of the world there are still shortages of metals and bread. Even such gifts of nature as fresh water are becoming scarcer and scarcer in various regions of the world, but it takes time to solve this increasingly difficult problem. 100. Why should this be? Because the arms race and the danger of armed conflict and clashes which it engenders makes it necessary to pour enormous material resources into the war industry, into design offices and laboratories, and into the maintenance of armies. If even a part of those resources and the accompanying mental effort — the scientific thought, the experience of production managers, the labour and abilities of the workers, the skill of farmers, the talent of artists — could be used for peaceful development, then mankind would take a giant step forward. 101. Yes, we are followers of an ideology different from the one which prevails throughout the world, which has given rise to the arms race and is whipping it up. We very well know that disarmament by itself will not solve major social problems; such problems are solved and will be solved only in accordance with the objective laws governing social development. Our convictions on that score are well known and we will not deviate from them by one millimetre. 102. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, like other socialist countries, strongly urges all those who hold dear the interests of peace to put a brake on the arms race and begin disarmament; no people and no State will fail to gain from this. 103. Many scientists point out that the gap in production rates between the developed industrialized countries and the newly-independent countries will continue and even if such a danger exists — which is very probable — escape is there? 104. One way of escape exists: diversion of the material resources consumed in the arms race to peaceful economic development, including the needs of countries for which healthy rates of economic development and growth are as necessary as air. 105. Disarmament is one of the imperatives emblazoned on the banners of Soviet foreign policy by the founder of the Soviet State, V.I.Lenin. The Soviet Union proceeds from this principle in working out the appropriate steps and in its approach to the tasks facing the United Nations. 106. The Soviet Union has submitted its “Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament” [A/7134] for inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly [A/7223] as an important and urgent question. This document has been circulated to the governments of all countries, and we believe that it has now been studied thoroughly enough to be discussed in specific terms in the General Assembly. 107. Before I discuss the Soviet proposals, allow me on behalf of the Soviet delegation to express our gratification that the successful conclusion of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXIII)], which has so far been signed by approximately eighty States, has opened prospects for the conclusion of further international agreements in the vitally important matter of nuclear disarmament. 108. In Bonn and in various other capitals they are now saying: "Perhaps it is not worth while trying to dry up the channels of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Maybe it would be even better if all or almost all States had access to these weapons”. 109. Many objections may be raised to this point of view. We only hope that countries, whether they are represented in the United Nations or not, will seriously ponder the following point. If things move in the direction in which the acknowledged and unacknowledged opponents of the Non-Proliferation treaty try to push them, then many months and perhaps even years could elapse with the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still unsolved. Then, you who oppose this agreement, your own peoples will call you to account for your irresponsible approach to the solution of one of the most serious problems of international security. It is easier to wreck an important undertaking than to make it work; it is easier to tear down a positive decision than to make it. 110. The broad international acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including its acceptance at the recently-concluded Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva, is an impressive result, to the achievement of which the United Nations made a significant contribution. What must be done now is to take the necessary steps to broaden as far as possible the number of signatories to the Treaty and to ensure its entry into force as soon as possible. 111. Now to return to the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government. Here, in brief, are its main points. 112. The Soviet Union proposes that the use of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited. Unfortunately the Governments of the other nuclear Powers have not so far clearly expressed the wish to deal with nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union is prepared to do, namely to outlaw them. 113. But it is not too late to remedy the situation. We call upon the nuclear Powers to sit down at the negotiating table either in a small group or together with other States and to consider seriously the question of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. The Soviet Government is prepared to sign such a document at once. We should like to hope that the United Nations will, for its part, take the steps necessary to solve this problem as quickly as possible. 114. The Soviet Union proposes that all the nuclear Powers should immediately begin negotiations on cessation of production of nuclear weapons, reduction of stockpiles and the eventual complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. During such negotiations it is prepared to arrive at an understanding concerning not only the whole complex of measures but also certain separate steps leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. 115. The Soviet Government proposes that an agreement should be reached on specific measures for limiting and subsequently reducing the strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. The significance of such a measure, if taken, is obvious to all. 116. The General Assembly of the United Nations is of course aware that the Governments of the USSR and the United States have reached agreement on discussion of the reciprocal limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons — both offensive and defensive and including anti-missile weapons. The Soviet Government is prepared to begin a serious exchange of views on this matter. 117. We call for an immediate end to all nuclear-weapon tests. The allegations usually made about the need for control over underground tests are far-fetched and unfounded. Experience shows that nobody can explode nuclear weapons underground in secret. 118. The memorandum of the Soviet Government contains proposals inspired by the desire to avert the dangerous consequences that may ensue from flight by bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. United States aircraft have time and again lost nuclear bombs far from the shores of the United States of America. 119. Really, are not the people right when they think that if someone wishes to keep his bombers in the air, especially when carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs, then let him do so but only within the confines of his own national boundaries? This is precisely the proposal made in the Soviet Government’s memorandum. 120. Similar reasons have prompted the proposal that an agreement should be reached for the cessation of patrols by missile-carrying submarines with nuclear missiles on board in areas where the borders of parties to such an agreement are within range of such missiles. 121. The prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is known to have played a part in the Second World War. Not less known is the temptation which these weapons represent for military circles, which believe they provide a definite advantage even over nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, some countries have not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Soviet Government therefore proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should examine ways and means of ensuring that all States comply with the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. 122. Again we raise the question of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territory of other States. Some NATO Powers have such bases scattered everywhere. In most of the countries of Western Europe, foreign armies are also stationed. But experience has shown repeatedly that such bases are a source of friction and military conflict, threatening the freedom and independence of peoples, and that their retention hinders realization of international tension. 123. The Soviet Government as heretofore advocates measures for regional disarmament, and in particular supports the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. We believe that the creation of such zones should effectively limit the area of emplacement of nuclear weapons and is fully in accordance with the purpose of preventing their direct or indirect proliferation. 124. The memorandum sets out the point of view of the Soviet Government also concerning the implementation of disarmament measures and the reduction of armaments in various areas of the world, including the Middle East. 125. Increasing attention has recently been given to the question of limiting the military uses of the environment in which human beings live and work. A number of governments have expressed concern about the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The Soviet Union believes that the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and is prepared to enter into appropriate international negotiations. 126. This is the gist of the memorandum of the Soviet Government, which suggests a number of directions holding out hope for fruitful results if, of course, the other participants in the negotiations will also work for them. 127. The simultaneous or phased implementation o1 the proposed measures would help to make the international atmosphere healthier and eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, and would make a serious contribution to the efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the historical attempt to halt the arms race and solve the problem of disarmament. 128. Whenever there is talk of the arms race and of hot-beds of international tension, and especially of the interwoven interests and counter-interests of States, one thinks involuntarily of Europe. And history punishes any deliberate or inadvertent disregard of the significance of European affairs. 129. True it is that in Europe, as nowhere else, States belonging to different social systems or members of opposing military groupings and alliances live in close proximity. Here there is a greater concentration of weapons than anywhere else. It was here in Europe that aggressors were taught their sternest lesson, not for just a decade but probably for a lifetime. 130. The destruction of Hitler Germany, which proclaimed the criminal policy of genocide of other peoples and nations and strove to establish world hegemony, was and will for ever remain a great triumph of all mankind. 131. But the changes that have taken place are not to everyone’s liking. There are politicians in Bonn who would like to recarve the map of Europe. Their main goal is to undermine the Potsdam Agreement and other allied agreements entered into during the war and shortly after its end, at a time when the narrow interests of certain circles had receded to the background and what was at stake was the post-war structure of Europe and the safeguarding of a lasting peace in Europe and beyond its borders. These were agreements not only among Governments but also among peoples. 132. The experience of the war and of post-war development did not, of course, pass without leaving any trace on those circles which now determine the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. They also have learnt something but they have drawn their own conclusions; having attained their earlier goals, they have now started acting with more finesse. 133. The idea of a “new Eastern policy" for the Federal Republic of Germany has recently been developed. Now, two years after this policy was announced, we can in full knowledge of the facts answer the question: “What is new about it?" Nothing. The core of the “new Eastern policy” is the same and always was: to recarve the map of Europe. 134. Only very recently Chancellor Kiesinger openly stated that the Federal Republic of Germany was demanding a change in the “status quo” in Europe. 135. It is sometimes argued that West Germany states that it will achieve its goals by exclusively “peaceful means", and that the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to restore the German Reich piecemeal rather than all at once. 136. But Hitler did not begin with cannon fire either. When he was able to seize foreign territories “by peaceful means" — such as building bridges, or playing on feelings of kinship or similarity of civilizations, or by arguments concerning solidarity in face of the “Bolshevik danger” — he did not neglect them either. 137. There are different ways of looking at what is now going on in Western Germany. No one, however, would venture to deny that forces are openly at work in that State which glorify revanchism as virtually the national duty of every German. Nor can anyone deny that the Nazi ideology is again flourishing on the fertile political soil of Bonn. The activity of a party which displays on its banners slogans virtually identical with Hitler’s political slogans has been developing and flourishing in a stupefying atmosphere of chauvinism and militarism. The difference lies only in the scale and degree of its influence. 138. Those who think even for a minute that by opposing the Potsdam agreement the Federal Republic of Germany is encroaching upon the interests of the socialist countries alone are gravely mistaken. Only the politically naive could think so. 139. The Federal Republic of Germany is constantly encroaching upon West Berlin, which has the special status of an independent political entity. Our answer to this is clear: West Berlin has never belonged, does not belong and never will belong to the Federal Republic of Germany. If sometimes there are crises there, then the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and only that Government is to blame. 140. There is a tremendous difference, of course, between what is happening now and what happened thirty years ago. The forces guarding European security are now much more powerful than the forces of aggression. It cannot be admitted that the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the war has merely been time used to regroup and reacquire the potential for new military conflicts. No individual in the world and no responsible Government can remain indifferent when a European State declares that it does not consider itself bound by any obligations at all other than to the NATO military bloc. 141. The Soviet Union has nothing against good relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. We are prepared to co-operate with it in a number of different fields. We are prepared to continue to exchange views with the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the non-use of force, since we realize that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has taken a constructive approach to this problem. We also believe that the Federal Republic of Germany should play a role in international affairs commensurate with its possibilities, especially its economic potential, and, by basing its policy on the realities of the situation resulting from the war and post-war development, make its contribution to the cause of consolidating peace. The Soviet Government believes that it is high time that both German States - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany — became full Members of the United Nations; and we should be prepared to support the admission of those States to the United Nations. 142. The Soviet Union is actively co-operating with those European States interested in a détente in Europe, in strengthening European security, and in the improvement and broadening of mutually-advantageous relations between the States of the East and West of the continent. The development of bilateral relations would contribute to the attainment of these aims, and even today the Soviet Union advocates the continuance and extension of all such useful work. 143. We took part in working out the broad programme to strengthen the peace in Europe set forth in the Bucharest Declaration and the Karlovy Vary statement, which have received a great international response. 144. One of these proposals is so self-evident that no one could have any objections to it. This is the proposal for the convening of a conference of all European States to consider urgent problems involved in the consolidation of peace in Europe. 145. How could this proposal be unacceptable? States send their representatives to the most varied international conferences. Many of them are concerned with details of interest only to a limited group of specialists. Surely political leaders and statesmen of the highest rank, if they can succeed in getting together, will find something important to say to each other about the situation in Europe as they discuss questions of war and peace. 146. It is said that an all-European conference must be prepared beforehand. Of course it must; who denies that? The General Assembly of the United Nations must also be prepared, because it has on its agenda some one hundred and even more items and some nine or ten months are needed to prepare for their discussion. Then why is not one year, or even two, sufficient to prepare for an all-European conference? 147. Europe’s future is not exclusively bound up with the existence of military blocs. There is an alternative which is more compatible with the interests of peace. Our opinion on this score has been set forth in the Bucharest Declaration and in other joint documents of the socialist countries, so I need not reiterate it. 148. The Soviet Union and its allies stand for a real attempt to put European affairs in order in the interests of European security. 149. The state of international affairs is still largely determined by the war in Viet-Nam. The Soviet Union’s position on the Viet-Namese question is well known. It has been set forth in the documents of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in statements by the Soviet Government and on many occasions here at the United Nations. The Soviet Union is strongly on the side of the heroic Viet-Namese people and their just cause. It is giving and will continue to give every possible assistance to the brotherly Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against United States aggression. 150. On what grounds does Washington arrogate to itself the right to dictate to the Viet-Namese how they should arrange their internal affairs? Perhaps Washington believes that such a right is created by the machine-guns of the American soldiers who are dying — who knows why — on the far-distant soil of Viet-Nam. The viciousness of this policy is becoming increasingly evident even to the Americans themselves. 151. Is there any possibility of putting an end to the war in Viet-Nam and ensuring a political settlement of the Viet-Namese problem? Yes, there is. The well-known proposals of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam offer one. 152. All that is necessary is that the United States should take a realistic approach and should once and for all throw overboard all the ballast which still prevents it from taking such an approach. The key to productive negotiations lies, not in attempts to impose on the Viet-Namese people a political system and corrupt puppet régimes against which they have taken up arms to fight, but respect for the inalienable right of the Viet-Namese themselves to decide their own future without any interference from outside; not in a race for strategic military positions on Viet-Namese soil but in the unconditional withdrawal of the United States military forces from Viet-Nam and the fulfilment of the other conditions laid down in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The first essential step in that direction must be the complete and unconditional cessation by the United States of its bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 153. With such an approach the negotiations — whether they are held in Paris or anywhere else — can lead to a settlement in Viet-Nam. The cessation of the United States aggression against the Viet-Namese people would be a good service not only to the cause of general peace, but also, we believe, to the interests of the United States itself. 154. The question of the situation in the Middle East appears once again on this session’s agenda. Why is it that the consequences of last year’s aggression by Israel have not yet been eliminated, and why is it that tension in that area not only is not diminishing but has recently even been increasing? 155. The blame for the dangerous delay in finding a political settlement in the Middle East rests with those who refuse to carry out the Security Council’s resolution of 22 November 1967 [242(1967)], with those who, in defiance of appeals by the United Nations, provoke armed clashes and are conducting an annexationist policy in the occupied territories. The blame must rest with Israel. 156. The Arab States will speak for themselves here. But we know that they have repeatedly reiterated, in particular to the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Jarring, their willingness to comply with the Security Council resolution. 157. The Government of the United Arab Republic is well known to favour the drafting of a time-table of co-ordinated measures to be taken by the parties in order to solve the problems of the Middle East. We support this realistic proposal and are prepared to contribute to the implementation of this plan for the restoration of peace to an area which lies close to our southern borders and to a situation which directly affects the security of the Soviet Union. 158. We condemn the position of Israel and of those who turn a blind eye to its military ambitions, which frustrate any attempt to settle the Middle-Eastern crisis. 159. There are now possibilities of reaching a turning-point in the direction of peace in the Middle East, the termination of a state of war between Israel and the Arab States, and of guaranteeing the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State of the region and its right to live in security. The Israel Government will have to abandon its attempts to retain the occupied Arab territories; otherwise it will have much to answer for. 160. The United Nations constantly keeps its attention focussed on the task of eliminating colonialism in all its forms. Its great political asset is the fact that, on questions related to the struggle against colonialism, a broad front of States acting generally from common positions has been formed. This is a contribution of no little importance to the just struggle of the peoples for their liberation. 161. The peoples of the former colonial and dependent countries who have thrown off the fetters of colonial enslavement have every right to be proud of their achievements. At the same time, a situation in which more than 50 million human beings are still today enduring colonial slavery cannot be tolerated. 162. The Soviet Union condemns the racist regime in Rhodesia and will, for its part, continue to support decisively those African forces which are fighting for the national liberation of this and other regions which are still under the yoke of colonialist regimes. 163. We condemn the inhuman policies of apartheid and racism which the authorities of the Republic of South Africa have elevated to the rank of a State policy. 164. We condemn those who, in defiance of United Nations resolutions and contrary to the will of the peoples, still cling to the colonial régimes in Africa and other regions of the world. We believe that international measures must be taken to put an end to the attempts of the colonialists to perpetuate the helpless position of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, “Portuguese” Guinea and Namibia. 165. The countries which have achieved their liberation from the colonial yoke are faced with the complicated problems of consolidating their national independence and surmounting as quickly as possible the disastrous consequences of colonialism in many fields. The recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held at New Delhi, drew attention to numerous facts concerning the continuing exploitation of these countries. 166. The Soviet Government considers that the view expressed by the Governments of many States concerning the need for a significant increase in the share of profits received by the developing countries from the development of their natural resources by foreign capital is fully justified. It supports the proposal for an international agreement to raise the artificially-lowered prices of fuel, raw materials and agricultural products on the world market, and to lower the artificially-inflated prices of manufactures imported into the developing countries. 167. In its relations with the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the Soviet Union does not seek to obtain unilateral advantages. The principles of internationalism and unfailing support for the countries and peoples fighting for their national liberation, the strengthening of their national and economic independence, are cardinal points of Soviet foreign policy. 168. The attention of the General Assembly has for many years been drawn to the use of the United Nations flag as a screen for the occupation of South Korea. The reason for the division of Korea is the flagrant intervention by the United States of America in the internal affairs of the Korean people and the United States policy of turning South Korea into its own strategic strongpoint and a powerful military base directed against the security of the peoples of Asia. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea is what is necessary for normalizing the situation in that part of the world and for ensuring the proper conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea on democratic principles. 169. Every year the representatives of the vast majority of the world’s States assemble in this hall to compare their respective assessments of current events and major trends in international development. This is a forum where an exchange of views and opinions takes place in the course of which there is sometimes attained that coincidence of interest necessary for the adoption of resolutions satisfactory to the peoples. This work, which has become an integral part of international intercourse, takes place before the eyes of millions of people, who pass judgement on whether the activities of the United Nations respond to their aspirations. 170. As far as we are concerned, we can state definitely that the Soviet Government appreciates the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, although it clearly sees its defects. 171. Those who try to undermine the United Nations Charter and disparage the principle it embodies of co-operation among the permanent members of the Security Council in the adoption of important decisions should remember the founders of the United Nations with a feeling of gratitude. The main task of the United Nations, its principal reason for existence, is to prevent a new world war. This is the aim which the Charter pursues and must pursue. 172. It is said that the United Nations cannot be relied on: too many arguments and too little concrete action. But everything depends on what the arguments are about. It is better to argue for ten or even fifty years at the negotiating table than to have one day, or even one hour, of a nuclear conflict. 173. We have not failed to notice that even representatives of some of the great Powers are sometimes ready to join with the critics of the United Nations Charter. This is a strange position, obviously explainable by considerations of expediency. If the Powers in the anti-Hitler coalition had not at the right time done all the work that is now embodied in the United Nations Charter, and if the Soviet Union and other States had not defended that Charter, there would today be no international organization for maintaining peace, and none could have been established. 174. The Soviet Union is in favour of converting the United Nations into a truly universal organization. This cannot be achieved until the Chiang Kai-Shek group is driven from the United Nations and the lawful rights of the Chinese People’s Republic are restored to it. 175. The Soviet Union is in favour of enhancing the role and the effectiveness of the Security Council. The Council recently adopted an important resolution on safeguards for non-nuclear Powers in connexion with the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [resolution 255 (1965)]. This is a new phase in its activity, a phase which will increase the authority of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole. 176. The Soviet Union is in favour of more fruitful work by the General Assembly and also by other United Nations bodies concerned with social, economic and legal problems. However, we believe that the United Nations should be freed of commissions, like the Korean Commission, which consume massive amounts of the United Nations budget out only do harm. 177. The special responsibility which the great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, bear for the fate of peace is not a privilege. No one can deny that the state of the relations between the great Powers will largely determine whether or not there will be a new world war. 178. The Soviet Union recognizes its responsibility for safeguarding universal peace. That is why every new step in international affairs that corresponds to the interests of international security, and every liberating action taken by the peoples, is and will be actively supported by our country. At the same time the Soviet Union has been and will continue to be in the ranks of those who give a suitable response to the policy of aggression. 179. Determination to defend the national interests of the Soviet people and of the States of the socialist commonwealth, to guarantee the inviolability of our land frontiers, coastlines and air space, and to protect the dignity of the Soviet flag and the rights and security of Soviet citizens, is basic to our foreign policy. A similar immutable basic principle is fidelity to our international commitments and devotion to our duty as an ally. 180. The Soviet Union makes no secret of its desire to continue to seek, together with other interested States, fields in which our interests coincide and where agreement is possible, even comprising the conclusion of the corresponding treaties and agreements, bilateral or multilateral, when they are in the interests of peace based on respect for the rights of the peoples. 181. We shall go half-way to meet any State willing to build its relations with the Soviet Union on the principles of mutual respect for each other’s interests, good-neighbourliness and peace. 182. In order to reach agreements on international problems, on which the peaceful future of the peoples depends, we are prepared to sit at the negotiating table with anyone who also wishes to reach them. 183. The complexity of the current international situation and the persistence of important international problems shows that this session of the General Assembly, too, is faced with important tasks. The fruitfulness of this session will be determined by the extent to which during its work States Members of the United Nations are able to preserve and augment the positive factors which have recently been noticeable in the activities of our Organization. 184. The Soviet Government would like to express the hope that the results of this session will not disappoint the people and that work will be done here which will contribute to the development of world events towards the consolidation of peace.