85. During 1966, two explosive tensions in Asia have been resolved or, at least, diminished. The fighting between India and Pakistan has come to an end through direct negotiations, with the good offices of a third party, and the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia has now ceased. The Foreign Minister of Malaysia has correctly ascribed this latter result to "direct contacts between the two countries in a sincere endeavour to bring about a peaceful settlement" [1416th meeting, para. 124], He added: "We hope that this will set a pattern for the settlement of disputes between nations" [ibid.].
86. Two clear lessons can be drawn from this and from previous experience. First, there are no military solutions between States. The international order is defective; but it is not anarchic. It contains many obstacles to settlement by force. Second, there is a direct relationship, a relationship of cause and effect, between the decision to negotiate a conflict and the tangible prospect of its settlement.
87. Now these considerations are sharply relevant to the cruel war in Viet-Nam. What are the alternatives here? The choice lies between a negotiated solution now, and negotiated solutions at a later date. In the latter case, the price of postponement will be exacted in heavy loss of life; in expanding destruction and havoc; in the prolonged agony of the Viet-Namese people, which has had no consecutive peace for a quarter of a century; in the constant growth of international tension; and in the frustration of what would otherwise be an authentic prospect for the improvement of international relations. Indeed, the penalty of delay may be even heavier than this. It is true that there are many inhibitions against the escalation of local conflicts into general war. But who can be certain that these would hold firm against expanding hostilities in a region where the policies and interests of great Powers are intimately involved?
88. In these circumstances, the United Nations, as the central embodiment of man's quest for peace, cannot evade its moral responsibility. An international organization which had nothing to say about the world's most perilous conflict would neither obtain nor deserve the respect of mankind. We are summoned to do all that lies in our influence to transfer the Viet-Namese tragedy from the battlefield to the negotiating table.
89. Can it be said that conditions are ripe for negotiation? To answer this question we must clearly define what the international community is trying to do, Our aim should be to bring about the end of hostilities and to rebuild the structure envisaged in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The effect of those Agreements, as the Foreign Minister of France has pointed out, was to provide for the existence in the former Indo-China of four States: independent, sovereign, safe from external interference, and able to fashion their government and society according to their own will and choice. These four States have a right to be free from domination, whether by outside Powers or by each other. According to the Geneva Agreements, the two parts of divided Viet-Nam may be united only by voluntary choice, not by force.
90. Proposals have been put forward in this debate from many directions in an effort to bring these objectives within view. The central ideas that have been outlined here in the past two weeks include the cessation of air bombardments of North Viet-Namese territory; accompanying assurances, public or private, of readiness to de-escalate the war; the over-all cessation of hostilities; negotiations in any acceptable forum with the participation of all the parties involved; arrangements for the withdrawal of all outside forces and the prohibition of their return; and the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreements under international guarantee.
91. It is true that these ideas have been presented here in different combinations and sequences. They emerge from the proposals of the Secretary-General in his annual report on the work of the Organization and they are present or implicit in the suggestions put forward by Mr, Goldberg on behalf of the United States of America in 21 September 1966 [1412th meeting].
92. The General Assembly is not called upon to endorse any of the specific suggestions that have been made. But surely their merits or inadequacies as a formula for settlement can only be revealed if they are submitted to a searching process of negotiation. What we need now is not the public discussion of general principles, but the private exploration of concrete steps. In particular, the full import and consequence of the United States proposals can only be tested if they are probed, explored and clarified in the most careful and detailed manner.
93. I speak for a small State which is not involved in the power struggle in South-East Asia. There are many other such States in the world community. It is surely their wish to see the parties directly concerned embark on unconditional negotiation on the terms for a peaceful settlement. The Government of North Viet-Nam, without necessarily accepting the proposals which have been made to it, would earn respect by submitting them to the challenge of negotiation. Nobody concerned by the fearful loss of life should be slow in examining any opening for the cessation of the war.
94. The United Nations should not confine its efforts to the public forum. The Secretary-General's predecessor once made a plea that greater emphasis be given to the United Nations as an instrument for negotiation of settlements as distinct from the mere debate of issues. The plea has so far been in vain. Debate, not negotiation, has all but monopolized United Nations practice. The Viet-Nam conflict is approaching the stage at which all that can be publicly said will have been uttered. The time has come to seek concrete solutions in private negotiation.
95. The Secretary-General, by virtue of his unique office and the confidence which he universally inspires, might be of assistance in bringing the parties involved into contact in order to submit existing and future proposals to detailed discussion.
96. The United Nations might have been able to play a more assertive role in this case if its own structure had been complete. This Organization represents a wide diversity of sovereignties, traditions and cultures. For this very reason, the deadlock on Chinese representation stands out as a sharp anomaly. It may well be as the Foreign Minister of France has said: "It is neither today nor tomorrow that the United Nations is going to be in a position to settle the problem of China" [1420th meeting, para. 85], Some Asian delegations have pointed out that the policies of Peking are partly responsible for the lack of progress in solving the problem of Chinese representation. After all, Member States are required by the Charter to be peace-loving and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter.
97. My Government's approach to this issue is governed not so much by doctrine about China as by doctrine concerning the United Nations. This Organization should strive to present a vision of mankind in its organic unity. Its aim should be to reflect the realities of the world as it is. One of the central realities about the Far East is the existence of the People's Republic of China on the mainland; another reality is the existence in Taiwan of an independent political unit effectively organizing the life and destiny of 12 million people. Indeed, Taiwan has a greater population than many of our Member States. Now, since this situation could only be changed by war, which our Charter forbids, it is surely our duty to recognize it as an existing reality on the international scene. It is surprising that the United Nations has not been offered the opportunity of considering a formula which would acknowledge both the reality on the Chinese mainland and the reality in Taiwan.
98. The tension arising from the Viet-Nam problem communicates itself across the whole range of international relations. It is not difficult to make a catalogue of conflicts unsolved, 'of tensions unabated, of agreements blocked try suspicion, and to reach the conclusion that the international situation is graver than at any time in the post-war era. I think that there is room, however, for a less sombre evaluation. The continent of Europe, from which sprang the two wars which have afflicted our generation, is moving towards greater harmony. Western Europe has shown resilience in its recovery from the havoc of occupation and war. Between Eastern and Western Europe there is now a broader flow of people, commerce and ideas than would have seemed conceivable in the 1950s. The unhappy metaphor of the "Iron Curtain" is losing its force. In Africa, Asia and the Caribbean area, national freedom has accelerated great triumphs, most of them without the violence that traditionally accompanied the emancipation of subject peoples. For the first time in history, 98 per cent of the human race live in conditions of national sovereignty. The medium and small nations are carrying out their international tasks with responsibility and restraint. In the Middle East, slogans implying the elimination of a sovereign State are becoming increasingly discredited as obsolete, irresponsible and, above all, totally unrealistic.
99. In many areas, even where problems still defy solution, the world is growing accustomed to living with them unsolved. This itself is no small achievement. There are many agreements and demarcations which were once considered to be unstable and provisional, but whose maintenance is surely preferable to their violent alteration. A salutary caution inspires the attitudes of most Governments towards the use of force for the alteration of independent political and territorial structures. The ideological conflict too has lost something of its acuteness. Nations no longer believe that their own social systems must either conquer the world or perish. Men are united in tribute to the healing powers of science. There are new opportunities to fertilize soil, to harness water, to desalt the sea and irrigate the deserts, to diffuse the fruits of knowledge, and to draw all men together in growing accessibility. Governments and peoples come increasingly into contact with each other in laying the foundations of an international order. There is a tendency, to which the United Nations has greatly contributed, for nations to rise above self-preoccupation in order to recognize the needs and aspirations of others and thus to enlarge their own understanding and deepen their own compassion.
100. It is, therefore, much too early to pass a negative judgement on the international life of our times. It might be more accurate to regard the Viet-Nam conflict as an exception to the rule rather than as the rule itself. It is not a symptom of the general human condition, but a sharp, and, I hope, temporary disturbance of deeper and more hopeful international trends.
101. In Africa, too, there is a general rule of progress marred by some dangerous exceptions. The United Nations can take pride in its contribution to the liberation of African peoples. However strongly the colonial Powers chafed at the persistence of the United Nations, they have never been immune from its strong bias for national independence. And when the new State, often small and meagre in resources, comes into the light of freedom, it is its flag in the United Nations, above everything else, which symbolizes and excites its sense of identity and equality. The admission of Botswana and Lesotho will take Africa further along the road to complete continental liberation.
102. It is true that not all African States have found social systems and political institutions which fully express their traditions and aspirations. Voices are sometimes heard outside Africa expressing surprise at what is called the "instability" of some new States. But history does not tell us that the States of Europe, Asia or the Americans passed in a single decade from national independence to peace and stability. It would be extraordinary if all Africa were to achieve this transition overnight. If there is travail in parts of Africa, it is not because independence was granted too soon, but because it was accorded too late and after long periods of colonial neglect. The tensions of African life are not the fruit of independence; they are the heritage of colonialism.
103. If Africa is now to pursue its destiny in peace, it must be released from the torment created by the remaining expressions of colonialism. These have now become grossly anachronistic. They offend the mood of Africa and the spirit of the age. The United Nations should persist in the attitude that it has pursued for more than a decade in favour of national liberation. It should intensify Its pressure upon the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia in order to bring about a constitutional situation in accordance with democratic principles. In the case of South West Africa, the General Assembly should insist that a mandatory Power forfeit its mandate when it flagrantly and constantly violates the central aims for which the trust was conferred. The General Assembly must press for the independence of Angola and Mozambique; and its condemnation of apartheid must be governed by a stern consciousness of what ensues whenever men are classified in different levels of privilege, rights and disabilities. Israel's solidarity with Africa on this question is determined by the memories that our people carry with them across generations of martyrdom and discrimination.
104. When the United Nations launched its Development Decade five years ago, it had a true understanding of the relationship between world peace and accelerated development. The nations which compose the international community are equal only in the juridical and institutional sense. But in social opportunity, in educational and technical achievement, in the prospect of a healthy and creative life, they are separated by a vide and expanding gap. Nobody believed that a single decade could correct imbalances and disparities that had developed over centuries. But there was reason to expect that there would be, in this decade, a strong impetus of development and that this would sustain the patience of developing nations even if the goal renamed far ahead.
105. These expectations have been frustrated. The goals of the United Nations Development Decade have lot been attained or even approached. There has not teen an annual growth rate of five per cent in the national income of developing countries. Nor have he developed countries shown a willingness to transfer one per cent of their gross national product to the developing countries. Indeed, the growth rate in developing areas has actually slowed down, and the developed countries have increased their own wealth dale generally reducing the proportions of their id to developing lands.
106. It is not difficult to illustrate the results of this allure in concrete terms. Sixty-six per cent of the world's population share 16 per cent of the world's income. The death of small children in developing countries takes place at a rate ten times higher than in the West. At least 1,000 million people in the developing countries live below any acceptable standard of nutrition and housing. Life expectancy is not rising. The rate of illiteracy is not falling. The growth of the world's population goes forward without a corresponding increase of resources. The pressure of population upon resources is greatest in the undeveloped areas. And in those regions a massive flight of populations is taking place from the countryside to urban areas amidst social anarchy and economic distress.
107. Let us imagine a city in which a few wealthy suburbs flourish while the mass of the population languishes in squalor and disease; in which disparities of income are enormous and continue to grow; in which the most boroughs and regions are plunged in illiteracy and technical backwardness; and in which there are no effective organs of security for keeping the peace. Would such a city have any chance of peace and stability? But this is a true picture of the City of Man. If there were a genuine municipal consciousness amongst the nations of this shrinking world, idealism and self-interest would come together to infuse the Development Decade with new life.
108. The issue is not one of techniques but of policy. Those of us who have taken part in the work of the Advisory Committee on the application of Science and Technology to Development know that a break-through is objectively possible.
109. In the appropriate committee, the Israel delegation will propose that the comparative failure so far of the United Nations Development Decade be frankly acknowledged and analysed; that the work of the Advisory Committee on the application of Science and Technology to Development be strengthened; and that development problems be given a far higher priority in the work and preoccupation of the United Nations. We may suggest consideration of some concrete measure, such as the eventual formation of a United Nations "peace corps" of technicians and experts for service in developing countries. Many people exaggerate what the United Nations can do to solve intractable security and political problems — and underestimate its capacity to contribute to accelerated social and economic development. This subject does not receive its due share of attention by Governments or by public opinion. Conflict and tension are more exciting than the measures needed to prevent them.
110. It is true that the United Nations specialized agencies bring a universal vision to bear on the problem of social and economic development, but they have never yet discussed them at a level of authority capable of launching co-operative and decisive action. Summit meetings take place all over the world which take a microscopic view of a few problems, instead of a panoramic view of the total human scene. Yet it is precisely in the concern for supra-national interests that Governments have a chance of transcending their rivalries and developing trustful attitudes which could, in time, transform their approach to the provincial squabbles of this troubled world. It might perhaps be salutary if the Heads of Governments came together for a week in a summit conference to contemplate not the affairs of any one nation, but the interests of the whole human nation; to contemplate those issues which affect the universal destiny, the population explosion, the significance of nuclear power, the desalination of sea water, the development of resources, the spread of knowledge, and the structure of the evolving world community. These are issues that can only be solved in a mood of responsibility for the total human condition.
111. Great responsibility falls on the developed countries. The specialized agencies could also play an enhanced role if their resources were increased. But developing countries and small States should not underestimate their own capacity. Nor should they rely exclusively on the Great Powers or international agencies. The world is not divided neatly between developed and developing States. Nor should the problem of development be regarded as a polarized confrontation between the clearly defined groups. Many small States have developed skills and experiences which they can already share and exchange with others. Our own national experience in the past eight years illustrates this fact. Since 1958, 1,755 Israeli experts have placed themselves at the service of development projects in developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and some Mediterranean and Middle Eastern States, Simultaneously, 9,186 trainees from States in four continents have studied development processes in Israeli courses and institutions, mainly in agriculture, irrigation, rural planning, youth training, health, teaching, administration, engineering and higher education. International conferences have met on our soil to commit development problems to joint examination by leading experts and leaders of States. Now, all this is, of course, a modest contribution.
112. Unfortunately, many of our countries are called upon to face their international responsibilities in conditions of regional tension. The situation in the Middle East has not substantially changed this year. Behind the armistice frontiers established by agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1949, the national life of sovereign States has become crystallized in an increasingly stable mould. There is some evidence that thoughtful minds in the Middle East are becoming sceptical about threats to change the existing territorial and political structure by armed force. Such threats, and the policies concerted to support them, offend the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, They violate bilateral agreements freely negotiated and solemnly signed. They undermine the central principles of international civility, and they have no chance; of being carried into effect, for they encounter insuperable obstacles in our country's will and capacity to defend itself, as well as in the opposition of the world community to the alteration by aggressive force of legally established and internationally recognized situations.
113. It is not really necessary to formulate new or special principles for peace and security in the Middle East. Nothing is required beyond the precise application of the Charter principles which enjoin respect for the sovereignty of States and the abstention from the use or threat of force against their integrity and their independence. It is sometimes forgotten that Israel's neighbours have already committed themselves in bilateral undertakings to the strict application of these principles. Seventeen years ago each one of its four neighbours agreed with Israel to move forward towards permanent peace; to regard the armed conflict between them and Israel as permanently liquidated; to abstain for all time from undertaking, planning or threatening any aggressive action by armed forces; to regard the present armistice lines as immune from any change without consent; actively to prevent any illegal crossing of those lines by armed forces or civilians; and to carry out all these engagements until a peaceful settlement between the parties was achieved. It is extraordinary that the official rhetoric and policy of some neighbouring States are so little influenced by Charter principles or by agreements which they signed and sealed seventeen years ago.
114. In these circumstances I deem it useful to summarize again my Government's policy for the advancement of peace and security in the Middle East, as well as our own vision of the region's future.
115. We hold that Israel and each Middle Eastern State have an absolute right to maintain their sovereignty and integrity immune from the threat or use of force. We stand for the precise and reciprocal application of Charter principles and of existing agreements. We make no claim against the integrity or the independence of other States. We have no concern with the nature of their regimes. We assume that different social and political systems, different attitudes to traditional culture, are destined to co-exist in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world. What is needed is the consolidation, not the destruction, of existing elements of stability in the Middle East. If our neighbours refuse us recognition and contact, we shall pursue our national development and international vocation as best we can, and with strong prospect of success. While peace is not an indispensable condition of Israel's existence, we hold it to be a high aim fraught with equal benefit to our neighbours and to us. A peace settlement, freely and directly negotiated, would inaugurate a new and glorious chapter in the history of the Middle East. It would open up communications across our region, expose it to the fruitful interchange of commerce and ideas, unite its sovereign States in great enterprises of development, liberate them all from sterile and bitter controversy and lift from their shoulders the crushing load of an armaments race. Indeed, the negotiation of an agreement on arms limitation might well be the first step leading to a more stable co-existence. Only by establishing peaceful and stable conditions amongst themselves can the States of the Middle East keep the area free from external intervention, such as invariably arises wherever tension grows. All the residual problems left behind by the war launched against Israel eighteen years ago, including those problems created by movements of population in both directions between the Arab States and Israel, could be solved in an atmosphere of bilateral, regional and international co-operation. Thus, in full respect of existing sovereignties, and of the region's creative diversity, an entirely new story never told before would unfold across the Eastern Mediterranean.
116. In our conception the aim of statesmanship in the Middle East is not to change the character or structure of existing States but to change the relations between them. What we seek for ourselves we respect for others. We respect the desire of all Middle Eastern States, Arab or non-Arab, to maintain their lawful sovereignty in peace, refusing all domination or hegemony, whether from outside the region or from within. The principles of separate nationhood, free from domination or hegemony, are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the armistice agreements. We are confident that the destiny of the Middle East lies in the pluralism and diversity of its sovereignties, its cultures and its social systems. In such conditions the East Mediterranean area, at which Europe, Asia and Africa converge, would be ripe for a new emergence of human vitality.
117. Whether this vision can be fulfilled in the present, or, at least, saved for the future, depends on how we interpret the principles of co-existence and peaceful settlement. The United Nations has repeatedly endorsed these principles. Two years ago they came before us in the form of a Soviet proposal — which we supported — for the prohibition of the use of force in territorial disputes between States. This year we have Soviet proposals on non-interventions [see A/6397] — in the spirit of resolution 2131 (XX) adopted by the Assembly last year — and Czechoslovak proposals [see A/6393], all demanding the support of peaceful coexistence among States, irrespective of any differences in social systems. But general principles of international conduct are useful only if they are generally applied. We have consistently supported resolutions on non-intervention and peaceful coexistence formulated in universal terms as binding on all sovereign States and in all situations, without loopholes or reservations.
118. But coexistence means more than mere abstention from conflict. It has a positive content that can only be expressed by intensified co-operation involving peoples as well as Governments, Never in history have so many men come into direct contact with peoples and experiences beyond their own national environment. International solidarity is composed of countless links which transcend national frontiers. Frequent cultural exchanges, tourist movements on a wide scale, a great increase in the number of international conferences, all help to create conditions in which prejudice, discrimination and hostility are reduced. In addition to national loyalties, there are solidarities of sentiment and interest which have a world arena. There are, for example, the links which Join labour movements together in common aspiration; there are world communities of scientists and scholars; there is a constant mingling together of competitors in cultural and sporting activities. Older, stronger and deeper than any of these are the links which unite religious, ethnic and cultural communities in their devotion to common memory or common faith.
119. There is not much meaning to the idea of coexistence unless the world is increasingly open to the constructive expression of these affinities. Of special significance to my people are the links which unite the Jewish communities of the world in common pride and devotion, and above all in tragic memory. This year I was able, on Polish soil, to visit the scene of the extermination of 6 million of our people by the Nazis. I saw the mountains of women's hair shorn from the bodies of executed victims and the piles of children's shoes torn from their feet before they were committed to the furnace. The Governments and peoples of Europe, and especially of Eastern Europe, who witnessed and experienced the horrors inflicted by Nazism, are our partners in the memory of these fearful acts. We therefore understand their desire to strengthen the stability of that area and to see the region's existing frontiers universally and permanently recognized. We should not forget that the United Nations itself was originally an anti-Nazi coalition charged with the duty of preventing any recurrence of the most fearful anguish that had ever befallen any family of the human race.
120. It is inevitable that Jewish communities who witnessed and survived this assault feel a profound need to express their mutual solidarity. The wounds of war have not yet been healed. Countless families have been separated and dispersed across different countries and continents, and still cherish the hope of reunion. There is a natural longing of these communities to join together in the expression and further development of the heritage which lies at the root of their identity. These impulses have led to an international interest in the right of Jewish communities everywhere freely to develop their specific culture. Thus, men of good will and progressive outlook throughout the world who recognize the historic role of the USSR in crushing the Nazi perpetrators of the Jewish tragedy in Europe, have expressed a natural desire to see the largest Jewish community in Europe enabled to have access to its own particular heritage and to make contact with others who share it throughout the world, In a Europe increasingly open to movement between its Eastern and Western parts, in a world in which barriers are falling and international contacts are being multiplied, the renewal of contact between kindred communities will become a natural corollary of peaceful coexistence.
121. My delegation hopes that the General Assembly at this session will make further progress towards the formulation and proclamation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We hope that Member States will do more to bring their legislation into conformity with the progress made by the United Nations in this field. We shall give favourable consideration to the appointment of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to an appropriate celebration in 1968 of the International Year for Human. Rights.
122. There are elements both of tension and of stability in the international climate. It will not be easy to make the stability prevail over the tension. The Geneva discussions on the limitation and control of the nuclear arms race and on complete and general disarmament have revealed both the complexities of the problem and the tangible prospect of its solution. There is reason for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to persevere in its efforts. The eight non-aligned members have made valuable contributions in describing the conditions and consequences of a realistic international accord, involving an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations. Some of the basic considerations in this problem were Illuminated at the very opening of our general debate by the Foreign Minister of Brazil [1412th meeting].
123. The United Nations is going through difficult times, not only because of the conflicts through which it moves, but also because its task is inherently complex. Some philosophers and historians have stated that mankind must now choose between a world-state and annihilation, between political unification and mass suicide. I suggest that there is a third choice. History has more ingenuity than the historians. The world seeks to combine international security with the preservation of individual States. It would be tragic if the survival of mankind could only be assured at a price which men are clearly unwilling to pay — namely, the renunciation of national identity. The United Nations is committed to the proposition that peace is possible in a world of nation-States. Our Charter strikes a delicate balance between national sovereignty and international responsibility. There is, of course, a certain objective tension between these two concepts. To bring them into harmony is the central purpose of our age. We must find a way to live within this duality. Modern statesmen must now act in a double role: as spokesmen of their particular national interests and at the same time as representatives of the wider human cause. In so doing they will achieve a vital aim: they will create an international community which will be able to both to respect nationhood and to transcend it in a universal solidarity. Nothing in all human history has ever been more crucial or challenging.
124. The person and office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the chief embodiment of this quest for world community. I know that U Thant is aware of the esteem in which Israel holds him. As he considers the many sincere appeals made to him from this rostrum he will, I am sure, take two facts into serious account. First, the great Powers and our entire membership are unanimous in the confidence which they repose in him. Second, it is by no means certain that any such unanimity or harmony would emerge in the search for a successor in present international conditions. We can be sure that he will give due weight to these two facts in the spirit of international responsibility which has always inspired his actions and decisions. Let us express the ardent hope of world opinion that U Thant, having led us so far with grace and distinction, will agree to go with us further along the way.