Australia

This Assembly is meeting at a period in history which can only be described as the half-light between war and peace. Over two years have passed since Japan laid down its arms, but the peace treaties are still not concluded with either Germany or Japan. Thus, although there is no longer any world war, it cannot be said that peace has returned. Over vast areas of the globe there prevails a condition of fear and unrest which is not only disturbing in itself, but is an active hindrance to the work of this great Organization. Therefore, we are faced with this extraordinary paradox: the primary function of the United Nations is to maintain peace yet there is no world peace to maintain. In Europe, political conditions are still unstable and the work of economic reconstruction is delayed by uncertainty as to the future of Austria and Germany. Their industrial resources, of course, are a vital element in the European economy considered, as a whole. Nobody knows what level of production will be permitted to those countries in future, or what trade and political structure they will be permitted or encouraged to maintain. Peace treaties with those countries therefore are urgently required. The peace settlement with Japan, also, is urgently needed. When that has been concluded, we shall have a firm basis for political and economic reconstruction in that vast, tremendously important region of eastern Asia and the Pacific. The United Nations has an important role to play in helping to raise standards of living throughout this region, and in that task, Australia is particularly interested. However, there is sound reason for believing that a peace settlement with Japan will be negotiated in the near future. The Australian Government considers that such agreement on the peace settlement in the Pacific and Asia need not necessarily await the peace settlement in Europe. One reason for this is that many declarations of Allied policy in relation to Japan have already determined the principles and many of the details of the Japanese settlement. Over the past two years, the eleven Powers which took part in the fighting against Japan, and in winning the Pacific war under the leadership of the United States, have been working together in Washington as members of the Far Eastern Commission, establishing occupation policies. This is a commission of which not much has been heard. Very few disputes have emerged from it, but it is doing a great job. The basic policy of that commission will provide a valuable outline for the peace settlement with Japan, as well as a valuable precedent in two respects — and here I recall the remark made yesterday by the representative of Mexico. It is a precedent against restricting the peacemaking to a few major Powers, and it is also a precedent for including, in the scope of peace-making, all countries great or small which made a substantial contribution to victory. But the present disturbed situation in the world is not due entirely to the failure to arrive at satisfactory peace settlements. To some extent, the delay in the drafting of the treaties is a symptom of the disease rather than its cause. In Australia, we watched with deep concern the tendency among certain nations to form dominating groups and rigid blocs or alignments. Such a tendency is entirely contrary to the spirit of the San Francisco Charter. That Charter stresses the need for tolerance. It proclaims as one of its fundamental purposes respect for human rights and for the freedom of all without discrimination or distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; above all, it seeks to substitute for physical power in this world as the determinant in international relationships the principles of eternal justice. It is to the spirit which animated the delegations at San Francisco that we should endeavour to return. Faced with this situation, the General Assembly today has a specially heavy responsibility. It will have to grapple with problems which include some that the Security Council has not been able to settle. The Assembly, because it represents all the Members of the United Nations, is more responsive to the public opinion of the world than the Security Council. The Assembly cannot be obstructed by the procedure of the individual 1 veto. Australia and other medium and small Powers represented here fought vigorously at San Francisco two years ago, to enhance the powers and influence of the General Assembly. It is very heartening to see so many of those representatives still here in the Assembly. Fortunately for us and fortunately, for the world, the position finally established at San Francisco for the Assembly affords grounds for hope. There is no reason at all why this great, Assembly should succumb to the spirit of defeatism which has been created in so many quarters as a result of the Security Council’s inability to reach decisions. The Australian government regards the support of the United Nations as a cardinal principle in its foreign policy. Why? Largely because of the confidence it reposes in the immense possibilities of the General Assembly as an effective forum for international discussion, bringing nearer to all the peoples of the world their chief desire, freedom from fear of war and freedom from want. The peoples of the world are determined, if they can, to reach for it — if not for themselves, at any fate for their children. I return now, if I may, to some of the specific problems which will confront us during the present session of the Assembly. At San Francisco, Australia associated itself with other medium and smaller nations, in seeking to confine the use of the veto of each permanent member of the Security Council to the matters contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, namely, matters involving the use of diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, or in the last resort, military sanctions against an aggressor. In particular, we sought to prohibit the use of the veto in connexion with the peaceful adjustment of international disputes by the Security Council or with such matters of administration as the Security Council’s recommendations for the admission to this Organization of new Members. Our proposals were not adopted, mainly because it was intimated to the Conference at San Francisco, not obscurely, that the Charter would hot' be signed at all if the veto power was limited. At the same time we were told that the permanent members would not use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the operations of the Security Council. At the last session of the Assembly twelve months ago, Australia again brought the matter of the veto to the agenda. We pointed out that the. privilege of the veto had been abused and we proposed that the Assembly should recommend to the Council that the veto power should not be used in connexion with the peaceful adjustment of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter; that is the chapter dealing with conciliation. The Assembly finally adopted a somewhat indefinite resolution earnestly requesting the permanent members of the Council to ensure that the Security Council was not impeded in reaching decisions promptly. Even so, the intention of the Assembly was clear enough, and some progress was made in the development by the Security Council of the principle or practice that abstention from voting by a permanent member should not be deemed to have the effect of a veto. Despite the resolution of last year, the veto practice has continued, and the matter comes up again for review here. In the course of this review, it will be necessary to distinguish sharply between the veto on measures of enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter on the one hand, and the veto on measures of peaceful adjustment or conciliation under Chapter VI and administrative matters on the other. I submit to my fellow representatives that at San Francisco, and since San Francisco, the view we have submitted has been direct and reasonable, and it has been proved to be the proper solution of this difficult problem. We have denied the soundness of applying the veto to the procedures of international conciliation, and the reason for that can be explained very easily. Chapter VI simply deals with conciliation by the Security Council of parties to an international dispute. In our view, conciliation by the Security Council is its primary function. The use of force is a matter of last resort and we hope it will never occur, but conciliation is the day-by-day performance of a function which should not be a power or a right on the part of anybody, but rather should be a duty on behalf of the body whose function it is to conciliate. In accordance with that view, if the Council, or if the majority of the Council at any rate, wishes to recommend conciliation procedures, no single nation should be permitted to say : “You cannot conciliate between these disputants,” and overrule the clearly expressed view of the majority. An international situation causing friction will not remain constant. The friction will increase if nothing is done and the international dispute remains unsettled. The futility of it all is so apparent. Sometimes after weeks or months of labour, a clear majority having expressed its view in favour of an attempt to conciliate, the veto is exercised in the Security Council against the will of the majority, thereby simply prolonging the uncertainty, increasing the confusion, continuing the dislocation, and adding to the friction. I must say that it is most heartening and satisfactory to find — and I am sure I speak for many other nations here, both large and small — the United States Government has publicly announced to this Assembly, as Mr. Marshall did yesterday, its belief that the veto should not be applicable to the peaceful adjustment of situations as set forth in Chapter VI, "We think, however, that all the relevant facts are sufficiently known to justify appropriate recommendations by the Assembly. Accordingly, the mere appointment of a committee to study the matter further would not be adequate in the circumstances. We have studied the matter long enough. We have seen the Organization operating for two years. There is no aspect of it which has not been discussed. The time has come for adequate review. In one vital respect — in respect of the question I have been dealing with, that of conciliation — the matter of reviewing the right of individual veto in the Security Council is inseparably connected with the powers of this Assembly. At San Francisco, most fortunately, the jurisdiction of the General Assembly was broadened in important respects. The power of discussion granted it by the Charter was extended to cover any matter within the wide scope of that Charter, and the Assembly was empowered to make recommendations either to the Members concerned or to the Security Council, or to both. The only case where there is a limitation upon the Assembly’s power to make recommendations is in connexion with disputes or situations which the Security Council is actually handling. The truth is, therefore, that in relation to the pacific settlement of disputes, or conciliation the jurisdiction of the General Assembly, although it is not precisely described as is that of the Security Council in Chapter VI of the Charter, is in essential respects equivalent to the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Therefore, just as the Security Council can investigate a dispute or a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether there is a danger to the maintenance of international security, so, tots, the General Assembly has a similar jurisdiction. Of course, the matter is entirely changed when we study Chapter VII, which deals with sanctions. Broadly speaking, that Chapter deals with cases involving an existing threat to the peace of the world, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. In that case the Security Council, and the Security Council alone, can order diplomatic, economic or military sanctions. To sum up, our position is that the jurisdiction of the Security Council and the General Assembly in relation to the pacific settlement of disputes and situations is a parallel jurisdiction, and I have already attempted to describe the only limitation placed upon the full exercise of jurisdiction by the Assembly. That limitation affects matters actually engaging the attention of the Security Council. Yesterday the representative of the United States pointed out, with great force indeed, that there is a definite need for making the facilities of this Assembly available not only during the actual Assembly session but continuously. That suggestion has particular force, as the representative of the United States pointed out, in relation to the Assembly’s functions in the maintenance of peace and security. I repeat that there is a parallelism between the functions exercisable by the Security Council and by the General Assembly in relation to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It is not as if the Assembly is entrenching upon the area exclusively reserved to the Security Council; nothing of the kind. Each body has its own jurisdiction, and we took care at San Francisco to reinforce the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks draft in order to make that fact abundantly clear. If that is so, it follows logically that in cases where the Security Council has failed to reach any decision recommending the solution by peaceful means of any international dispute — at any rate, where that failure on the part of the Security Council is due not to the absence of the necessary majority of seven members but to the exercise of the veto by one or more permanent members — machinery should, in fairness, be made available whereby the process of conciliation can be attempted by the General Assembly instead of by the Security Council. However, if the parallel and subsequent jurisdiction of the General Assembly is to be exercised effectively, it will probably be found necessary to prolong or reconvene the Assembly session for the specific purpose of handling such matters of international conciliation. By such machinery the letter and the spirit of the Charter will be observed because the situation will be dealt with and disposed of by the Assembly. Why? Because the Security Council has failed to adjust the matter solely as a result of a single veto. Why should not the Assembly try to act where the Security Council has failed to act? Nothing could be much worse than to leave unsettled situations or disputes causing international friction. Moreover, as was pointed out by Mr. Marshall yesterday, the interval ordinarily elapsing between the Security Council’s failure to reach a decision and the next regular session of the Assembly is do long that it should be shortened, if that is possible. Therefore, without necessarily pinning ourselves to the precise methods suggested in the United States proposal, Australia feels that the course of international conciliation will be advanced, and not retarded, by establishing means for the prompt and continuous exercise by the Assembly itself of its jurisdiction in the peaceful adjustment of international situations and disputes wherever, as the result of the veto, the Security Council has failed to devise any remedy for such international disputes or situations causing friction. Definite safeguards will, of course, be required because the multiplication of the machinery for handling disputes may, in certain circumstances, facilitate the creation of disputes. Nothing could be worse than to convene the Assembly in order to deal with situations or disputes which are too trivial to merit its attention. No doubt such safeguards can and will be devised. I now turn to two other matters with which the Assembly will be required to deal. The case of Greece, which was before the Security Council until the other day, affords an excellent illustration of the frustration, the futility, and the positive injustice caused by the use of an individual veto in cases where the majority of the Security Council is attempting to exercise concilatory jurisdiction in a dispute between nations. What happens? A commission of investigation was appointed. An interim subsidiary group was appointed. Subsequently, in proceedings before the Security Council, although no actual enforcement measures were proposed and although the functions of the suggested commission were to be purely conciliatory and designed to restore normal diplomatic relations between the parties concerned, the veto was again applied in opposition to the clearly expressed will of the majority of the Council members. In these circumstances, and in accordance with the principle I have endeavoured to enunciate, the Security Council having failed through the exercise of the veto to complete its job efficiently, it is only proper that the Assembly itself should take up the problem. The other day permission- was sought from the Security Council for this Assembly to make a recommendation on the dispute without having to terminate or liquidate the subsidiary group now stationed at Salonika. But that request was refused once again by the use of the power of veto; as a result the Greek dispute had to be removed from the Security Council agenda. But, having been removed from that agenda, it has now been placed on the agenda of this Assembly. In my opinion, it will be open to this Assembly to reinstate the present group in the exercise of its powers or to appoint another subsidiary group. It is unneccessary to deal specifically with the merits of the Greek dispute. Australia’s representatives have already expressed themselves with frankness on the matter at the Security Council level. No doubt there will be differences of opinion as to the merits or demerits of the opposing contentions, and differences of emphasis on the importance of certain findings by the special commission. The point to emphasize, and the overriding point for the representatives here, is that after months of labour, the proceedings in the Council have been practically nullified. Accordingly, the Assembly will have to redress the balance and step in and exercise its jurisdiction as it deems appropriate according to its sense of what is just in this great matter of international security. Perhaps the most striking and the most simple example — for I am quite sure that discussing these other matters will involve technical questions — perhaps the most simple example of the use of the veto for a purpose entirely unrelated to enforcement measures, or even to the vital interests of any nation, concerns the admission of new Members to the United Nations. The Charter provides that membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving States which accept the obligations of the Charter and which, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out its obligations. Of course, that does not mean that all applicants should automatically be admitted. On the contrary, the case of each applicant has to be carefully considered to make sure that the conditions of the Charter are complied with. It is clear from the Charter that the -body to decide on the eligibility of a candidate ultimately is not the Security Council, but the General Assembly acting upon the recommendation of the Security Council. But what has happened in practice? Let us be frank about it. Last year the Security Council refused to recommend five applicants for admission, three of them were refused as the result of the veto of one of the permanent members, the Soviet Union. In the Assembly a large number of delegations, including Australia, strongly criticized this unjustified use of the veto. Take the case of Ireland. Ireland applied for membership last year, and the Security Council favoured its admission, with only the Soviet Union dissenting. But that one dissenting vote was sufficient to bar Ireland from the Organization. We made a recommendation last year dealing with the matter, but the same procedure has been repeated this year. I say quite frankly, and I challenge anyone to contradict me, that it is impossible to justify the exclusion of Ireland from the United Nations. It is true that that country was neutral during the war, but those who know the facts will remember the story about the country that Ireland was neutral against: that country was Germany. The Irish people are obviously capable of fulfilling the qualifications set forth in the Charter, but, as matters are now shaping, I say this — and I say it with all the emphasis I can command — nations which not long ago were our bitter enemies, not neutral countries, will be admitted to the United Nations before peaceful neutrals which were sympathetic to the Allied cause. Was Ireland kept out because it was alleged that it was not a democracy? That would be palpably false. Ireland is clearly a democratic nation, and should be admitted to the United Nations. There can be little doubt that if there were a vote, the vast majority of the Members of the Organization would accept that view, so that in this case, the right of the individual veto has been used to obstruct the will of the overwhelming majority. In fact, through the procedure I have mentioned, the Security Council has virtually usurped the powers of the Assembly in arrogating to itself the right to decide whether or not a nation should be admitted to the United Nations. The Security Council should confine itself to making recommendations on matters clearly within its jurisdiction, that is, security matters and the ability of an applicant to discharge its security obligations under the Charter, and should leave the final decision with regard to admission, to this Assembly, where no veto exists. On Australia’s proposal, a committee was established at the last session of the Assembly to devise rules of procedure for the admission of new Members which would be acceptable to both the Assembly and the Security Council. Largely because the Assembly did not express its mind clearly enough or firmly enough, that committee suggested to the Council only minor changes. At this session the Australian delegation will propose the adoption of a more specific and comprehensive resolution, drafted in the light of the fact that five States, whose applications for membership had been approved by twelve of the fourteen members and ex-members of the Security Council, have all been arbitrarily excluded from the United Nations by a tiny minority. The Assembly will have full power to express its views on the question, and at the same time safeguard its own rights in relation to the admission of new Members; it will also have authority to discuss the merits of individual applications, if it so desires, with power, I submit, to refer the applications back to the Security Council for consideration, not in the distant future but during the course of the present session of the Assembly. We favour the latter course, namely, that while this Assembly is sitting, a request should go to the Security Council to review recommendations on the individual applications of such States as, in the opinion of this Assembly, are clearly entitled to membership in the United Nations. I turn to another subject which is not on the agenda except in an indirect form: the Atomic Energy Commission. That Commission has submitted two reports to the Security Council. If its recommendations were put into effect, they would constitute a landmark in international co-operation. These reports directly concern the Assembly, which established the Atomic Energy Commission as far back as January 1946. I think it is a significant fact that the principles and most of the details of the control plan worked out by the Atomic Energy Commission have now been endorsed by thirteen of the fifteen members and ex-members of the Atomic Energy Commission. Detailed analyses have been made by the scientific experts on the Commission which demonstrate without doubt that production of atomic weapons can best be prevented by an international agency with wide powers to own dangerous atomic facilities and to control all other phases of atomic development through inspection and licensing. So far, however, the Soviet Union has not seen fit to accept the majority proposals of the Atomic Energy Commission. Nevertheless, although the recommendations of the Commission have not yet been accepted, I think it is right to say that there have been two advances made during the past year towards the agreement which must ultimately be reached. It is now unanimously agreed that there must be inspection by international personnel of facilities relating to atomic energy, from the mining of raw materials to the final development of power. It is also agreed that there should be no veto on the day-to-day operations of the international control organ. While mere periodic inspection is inadequate to provide effective safeguards against a violation or evasion of a convention for the control of atomic energy, the acceptance of those two points does mark a distinct advance from the position existing last year. Similarly, the exclusion of the use of the veto from day-to-day operations goes part of the way towards meeting the contention of the majority that there should be no legal right by which the violator of a convention can be protected. I especially desire to congratulate the 'United States Government on making radioactive isotopes available for international distribution. This action, which was suggested by the Australian Government at the opening sessions of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, should assist in building up à large measure of international confidence. It evidences the clear intent of the United States Government and people to assist bona fide scientific research and medical therapy, and thereby to make available from these new and great discoveries results which will be beneficial to all mankind. Despite the importance of proposals for specific disarmament, and bound as we are under the Charter to consider and study them all, they tend to divert the thoughts of the peoples of the world from the two main objectives of this Organization. The first of the two objectives is the prevention of war and the substitution of conciliation and arbitration for the method of force and violence. We should be concerned primarily with that objective and only in a secondary way with the fixing of the rules and conditions — because that is what it amounts to — under which future wars may be conducted. I do not relish the study of a set of Marquis of Queensbury rules under which the next war is to be conducted. I think we should realize that the injury and damage that may now be inflicted as a result of modern scientific invention would be so vast, would spread so rapidly that war, however conditioned and restricted by rules and regulations, which may or may not be observed, is bound to threaten permanent devastation of the human race. War itself is enemy number one. The second objective of the United Nations — dealt with by those important provisions of the Charter concerning the economic and social aspects of our activities — is that the mere prevention of war is not enough, but that economic security and betterment of all peoples and races is also to be pursued as an end in itself. That leads us to consider the economic work of the United Nations. Today a fundamental economic disequilibrium exists throughout the whole world. This situation demands a humanitarian solution generous in concept, generous in execution. In truth, we are members one of another, and economic misery, and depression in one part of the world will inevitably spread everywhere. What has the United Nations contributed to the required solution? I fear it cannot be said that the Economic and Social Council has yet come to grips with the substance of the world’s economic and social problems. It is an extraordinary fact that the Council has not yet made, or caused to be made, a general review of the current world economic situation. It has dealt at length — and I must say, successfully — with procedural and organizational matters, but a definite priority for urgent matters of substance has yet to be determined so that the Council can assume a corporate initiative in dealing with the main economic problems of the world. Let us take a striking example: so far as the Council has considered the economic crisis that now grips Europe, the result has been to produce machinery — the Economic Commission for Europe — and the main achievement of that machinery has been to absorb other machinery. At San Francisco we wrote an agreement into the Charter to provide full employment and higher standards of living. Subsequently, we included the same principles in the constitutions of the appropriate specialized agencies. The Economic and Social Council has completed its second year of work. This Assembly should be concerned with whether this machinery is working to translate those paper pledges of the Charter into life, or is it to be all harness and no horse? At its last meeting the Council recognized that the Economic and Employment Commission had failed in its task, and rejected the insubstantial resolutions it had prepared. But the Council seemed unable by its own initiative to make up for the failure of its subordinate body. We believe that the Secretariat in the Department of Economic Affairs must have more clearly placed upon it the responsibility for providing the Council and the Commissions with a basis of established facts and economic analyses on which they can make their own recommendations on policy. However, it is the Assembly which bears tire final responsibility for considering the whole complex of the economic machinery of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Agreements between the United Nations and the agencies came into force at the General Assembly a year ago, but the reports of those agencies are not before us for consideration today. I understand the Council’s desire to consider them as a whole, but that will not be possible, at least not until next year, and the Australian Government is concerned that the Council has not been more active in discharging its responsibilities, in trying to keep the specialized agency programmes in balance. The Food and Agricultural Organization which is so important to all our peoples has repeatedly pointed out that increased agricultural efficiency requires a parallel industrial development in order to use the farm labour thereby released and to manufacture industrial products to exchange with increased agricultural produce. This is only one example of an important practical problem in economic development. The problem of the correlation of specialized agency programmes cannot be resolved within the competence of individual specialized agencies, and requires active consideration by the Council and ultimately by the Assembly. Regarding the effective co-ordination of the various international secretariats, I believe that the Assembly must be concerned that the Coordination Committee, consisting of the Secretary-General and the Directors-General of the specialized agencies, has not found it possible to meet more than once. Whenever there is a tendency for rivalry to develop among these bodies, cooperation and leadership must come from the top. We have pointed out these weaknesses only in order to assist the Assembly and the Council in seeking remedies. After all, this is the town forum of the world, and this is the place to speak up and see whether we can improve the situation. It is our hope that the future work of the United Nations will be strengthened by the following factors: (1) Less political or ideological division in the Economic and Social Council; (2) A higher level of representation on the Council, actually bringing together the persons responsible for economic policy in each nation. If that is done, the Council’s recommendations will tend also to become the decisions of its Member Governments. (3) The reporting and analysis by the Secretariat of established facts relating to world economic conditions and trends. I have now frankly discussed the great difficulties with which we are confronted. But of course there is another side to the picture. The United Nations, after all, is in its infancy. The League of Nations lasted for nearly a generation and in the end it failed. Why?, Not because of organizational difficulties so much as because of the fact that during the rise of the vast and powerful fascist forces in the early 1930’s, the Governments responsible for the leadership of the League failed to support it with the full weight of their authority. It was not the League that failed the peoples of the world or the Governments of the world; it was some of the Governments of the world which failed the League. Even in the last twelve months, important successes in international co-operation have been achieved both within the United Nations and outside it. There seems to be general agreement that the action of the Security Council in taking up the Indonesian situation with a view to substituting the method of conciliation for that of force was wise and timely. I feel confident that the special committee of conciliation of the Security Council shortly to be announced will make a substantial contribution to the well-being of the Dutch and Indonesian peoples in South East Asia. The trusteeship system with its idealistic yet practical objectives has been brought into actual operation. The International Trade Organization, despite all complexities and difficulties, is moving in the right direction. Outside it, but parallel to the United Nations, an advisory South Pacific commission is being established and its scope will include all six nations with dependent territories in the Pacific south of the Equator. In the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Agreement for Reciprocal Assistance indicates that, within the framework of the Charter, regional security arrangements of a defensive character are not only permitted but are being encouraged. I think those responsible for that are to be congratulated. In the Far East, the settlement with Japan is nearer. The Far Eastern Commission in Washington has been an outstanding example of co-operation among the eleven countries which fought the Pacific war. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has been established. It may turn out to be an effective instrument for inter-governmental co-operation in developing the economic resources of that great area, where the future of world history may be determined. The first shipments of food for the International Children’s Emergency Fund are on their way. A number of nations have made a generous response to post-UNRRA relief needs. The International Refugee Organization has begun to function and some substantial progress is at last being made in reducing the numbers of displaced persons, the victims of a great tragedy for which Hitler was responsible. The recent ratification of five European peace treaties tends to free much of Europe from the extreme uncertainty and dislocation which were threatening. These are only a few instances, but I think they are sufficient to show that we, the representatives — if we actually represent our people at this Assembly and have their support and authority — can and should resolve to use this great instrument of our Organization, this General Assembly, with courage and with good will towards all. By so doing, we can help not only to bring peace to a troubled world, but to maintain peace on a basis of justice and simple decency in accordance with the purposes and principles of our great Charter.