Panama

I should like to begin my statement by expressing the deep and heartfelt pleasure of Panama at your election to preside over the debates of this eighteenth session of the General Assembly. The practice of choosing the representative of a small country for such a high office is in itself a very agreeable and sound one. On this occasion one of the countries of the Latin American group has been chosen, and to add to our satisfaction, the country selected is our sister republic, Venezuela, the birthplace of the Liberator, Simon Bolivar, under whose glorious leadership Venezuela and Panama emerged almost simultaneously from the Spanish colonial world. 41. At the Congress of Panama of 1826, inspired, convened and supported by Bolivar, the principles of international law and the foundations for an association of nations, which were laid down, are now included in the United Nations Charter, for they are immutable and will never lose their validity, so long as relations among States are guided by law, justice and international co-operation. 42. Venezuela and Panama have traditionally been united and inseparable in their international policies, and that would be sufficient to explain why we express to you, Mr. President, such heartfelt congratulations and why we are convinced that, with your great qualities, your ability and your experience, you will guide our debates with the tact, the wisdom, the firmness, and the skill shown by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, your predecessor. In your task you will be able to count on the invaluable assistance of U Thant, the dedicated, able and irreplaceable Secretary-General, who continues to apply the standards and directives laid down for the greater prestige of this Organization and for all time by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, his unforgettable predecessor, so prematurely and tragically taken from us. 43. Universality is and should be the goal of the United Nations, and the most expedient means of reaching that goal is decolonization. Yet this eighteenth session of the General Assembly is marked at the very outset by a slowing down in the liquidation of colonial regimes. At the last three sessions of the General Assembly the following numbers of newly independent States were admitted to membership of the Organization: seventeen in 1960, four in 1961, and seven in 1962. Since the seventeenth session, no newly independent State has been proposed for membership. Yet the report submitted by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories mentions sixty such territories, that is to say sixty territories which in one way or another are subject to foreign domination or administration. In addition, the Special Committee set up in November 1961 to examine the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples has already studied conditions in twenty-eight of those countries and has recommended immediate independence for at least eleven of them. 44. Notwithstanding the work of these bodies, the General Assembly has so far not received any recommendation from the Security Council for the admission of new Members, and therefore such admission does not appear on the agenda. 45. The process of decolonization should be speeded up in order to achieve that universality which the United Nations requires, if it is to carry out to the full the task for which it was created, if it is to be a true world organization. 46. When the United Nations was founded eighteen years ago, it had only fifty-one Members; today it has 111, and many more countries will be admitted as they achieve independence. Owing to such rapid growth the structure of the Organization's various organs, which was perhaps appropriate in earlier years, is now quite indefensible. Wider membership in these organs is an urgent need, if the African-Asian groups, which, taken together, constitute half the Organization's total membership, are to be adequately represented. To enlarge the membership of the various organs of the United Nations would merely mean giving effect to the principle of universality and applying it proportionately to representation in each of those organs. 47. The meetings of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly took place last year in a heavy and sombre atmosphere of fear. There was universal uncertainty and anxiety, since everyone was aware of the fateful risk of imminent war that would spread over the world in which tested thermo-nuclear weapons of apocalyptic destructive power would be used without restraint. Those meetings ended without sign of any easing of the situation, and the world was left in suspense at the sinister possibility that an accident, an error, an act of imprudence or a deliberate decision might press the button and set off the first bomb and thus provoke a chain reaction of successive explosions that would annihilate humanity in the greatest holocaust ever seen in history. 48. By contrast, the present session is beginning its work in a tranquil atmosphere, with minds unruffled, as a result of two recent events which have miraculously eased world tension, cleared the horizon, restored confidence and renewed flagging hopes for peace. 49. I refer to the installation of direct telecommunication between the White House and the Kremlin, which is an effective step toward avoiding the unleashing of war by error, accident or imprudence, and to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and acceded to by some 100 free countries. It is true that a direct telephone line cannot avoid a deliberately provoked act of war, that the Treaty referred to does not prohibit the manufacture, possession, transport, installation and use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons, and that the Treaty may, in certain circumstances, be terminated at three months notice. But despite these undoubtedly ominous facts, the two events to which I have referred are the first steps taken with a clear desire to prevent situations that might lead to nuclear war. They are useful steps designed to open up wider possibilities and are conducive to the preservation of peace through the prohibition of war. 50. The significance of the Treaty is most aptly appraised in the following two paragraphs in the Secretary-General's annual report to the Assembly: "If this Treaty is followed by agreement on other measures aimed at lessening international tension and establishing confidence among States, it may be the beginning of a new era of better understanding between nations, and create a more favourable international climate that would facilitate progress towards general and complete disarmament and the goal of stable international peace and security, which remains the primary purpose of the United Nations … "It will require the collective effort and wisdom of all members of the international community to ensure that the momentum generated by the recent agreements is maintained until the goal of global security and freedom from fear of war is reached." [A/5501/Add.1, section II.] The first step has been taken. Whether we continue along this road depends upon the good faith and determination of the nuclear Powers that negotiated the Treaty. But continued and tenacious endeavours for the progressive reduction of the risk of war and the strengthening of peace will, as the Secretary-General says, largely depend upon "the collective effort and wisdom of all members of the international community". 51. Of no less, if not of greater importance than the Moscow Treaty, which confines itself to the partial prohibition of nuclear tests and is of uncertain duration, are the statements which we were pleasantly surprised to hear in this General Assembly, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the President of the United States of America. 52. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union said [1208th meeting] that the people of each country —and they alone— must themselves determine their fate and decide which system they preferred; that all States should observe the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; that the example given by the Soviet Union was convincing, but did not mean the imposition of one's own system on other States, that the Soviet example meant peaceful competition, competition by example and by force of conviction, competition which completely excluded the use of force to affirm one's own views, and that the need to affirm in international relations the principle of the peaceful coexistence of the two social systems —socialist and capitalist— had been consistently upheld by the Soviet Union. 53. For his part, the President of the United States said [1209th meeting] that the American people believed in self-determination for all peoples; that people must be free to choose their own future, without discrimination or dictation, without coercion or subversion; that there must be a freer flow of information and people from East to West and West to East; that the two nations should concentrate less on their differences and more on the means of solving them peacefully and that the best weapon providing security for both nations was peaceful co-operation. 54. This coincidence of ideas and purposes between the two foremost world Powers, with the ultimate goal of settling their differences in peaceful coexistence or co-operation, shows quite clearly that the probability of a nuclear war is now sufficiently remote to justify the restoration of a climate of calm and peace of mind. 55. This removal —which may or may not be permanent— of the nuclear danger is the result of an agreement between the great Powers that possess these weapons of annihilation and are struggling for the world hegemony of opposing and irreconcilable ideologies. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the whole world. Yet in solving their own difficulties, in serving their own interests and averting their own dangers, they may save humanity from the risk of atomic war for their own good and for the good of all the peoples of the globe. But this does not mean that the Treaty concluded between Washington and Moscow will solve the difficulties besetting other nations, especially the smaller and less developed countries, which are the immense majority, as is shown by a glance at the membership of the United Nations. 56. It is true that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests is a sedative for people all over the world, for minds tormented by what seemed to be the immediate threat of global destruction. But this alleviation of world tension does not mean that the problems and critical needs afflicting four-fifths of mankind have disappeared; nor have they diminished in importance and intense urgency. The free nations have almost unanimously acceded to the Treaty, and all of them pray fervently that this may be only the first step, to be followed by another, the prohibition of all atomic weapons and, finally, general disarmament. 57. Thus we seek a world freed from the terror of war, a world of permanent peace. But the fact is that it is not armaments that cause war. Wars are the result of the lack of political, economic or social balance which, failing timely solutions, leads inevitably to situations of grave crisis where the only outlet seems to lie in preparing for a settlement by force when a peaceful arrangement is no longer possible, because the atmosphere has become too heated. Then, when belligerence has become the current policy, it brings with it a specious prosperity because the war industries absorb a great amount of capital, raw materials and labour. Thus, at all levels of the social structure, vested interests emerge which have to be considered when disarmament is planned because it would lead to the indispensable dismantling of the war industries. For these, civilian substitutes would have to be ready since, otherwise, there might be domestic upheavals even greater than those which disarmament might have solved. 58. The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests is most welcome. Also, may we be able to welcome —and the sooner the better— new agreements for the total prohibition of atomic weapons and for the progressive reduction of armaments to a minimum compatible with the internal security of each State. Until the oppressed peoples are given back their freedom, however, until the pressing needs of the great masses of the populations with inadequate living standards are satisfied, and their justified desire for a better life has been fulfilled, so long will the permanent seeds of war find here a propitious soil, awaiting a favourable moment to germinate and spread their roots to other regions. Thus, local disputes would mount up into major regional or world crises to be settled only by recourse to arms, that is to say, by war. 59. So long as there are national systems of government imposed and maintained by force, violating the freedom of citizens and fundamental human rights, there can be no peace. So long as there are communities stagnating at precarious levels of life simply because they lack education, organization and the necessary means and assistance to achieve the results indispensable for a better life, there can be no peace. So long as there are economically strong nations purchasing products and raw materials from underdeveloped countries at a low price and selling them manufactured goods at a high price, so long as there are nations that increase their national income by exploiting less fortunate countries, and so long as the workers of under-developed countries are badly paid so that the workers in the more developed nations may receive high wages, there can be no peace. So long as there is discrimination, so long as racial or religious persecution exists, poisoning the souls of men with hatred and rancour, there can be no peace. When all these political, social and economic inequalities have been removed, peace will be assured and excessive armaments will disappear because they will be superfluous. 60. The problems of peace, considered as the original causes which produce the seeds of war, affect the small nations more closely than the great Powers, because it is in the small nations that these seeds germinate; because their problems of growth are the same; because they lack individually the resources and means indispensable for solving such problems by themselves at a rhythm compatible with the growth of their populations; and because only their unity and solidarity can obtain for them the influence and means necessary for obtaining from international bodies the assistance which they need for the adequate and rapid solution of their vital needs. The small nations should not wait for the great Powers spontaneously to recognize their rights and just aspirations, or to offer them, gratuitously, the assistance which they so urgently need, because the wait might be, and usually is, a long one. 61. Here, in the United Nations, all States are equal. Here, in the General Assembly and in the meetings of its specialized agencies, a decision is made by a vote in which all Members are equal, concerning any action to be taken by these international organizations on all world, regional or national issues within their competence. Here, common interests combine to unite and strengthen one another, and antagonistic interests meet to find a solution to their differences. 62. The Republic of Panama has the same difficulties of development common to all nations not highly developed and, from the technical organizations of the United Nations, we have received and continue to receive valuable, timely and efficient financial and technical assistance of great help and benefit to us, and we are pleased to recognize this. The benefits received by Panama deserve our gratitude and strengthen our faith in this Organization. 63. Panama's international problems apart from those due to its membership of the Organization of American States, are bound up with the existence and operation of the Canal cut through the Isthmus of Panama by the United States Government pursuant to existing treaties that do not take into account the interests and just aspirations of Panama, and that are a permanent source of differences that have clouded the friendly relations that should exist between these two nations, and will continue to mar them until those treaties are revised. 64. I shall not tax the patience of the Assembly with a lengthy dissertation on the history of relations between Panama and the United States, or on the contents of the treaties between the two countries, nor even on the injustices that these treaties mete out to Panama. I shall limit myself to mentioning, succinctly and without comment, some very interesting facts which perhaps are not known to all, so that, once and for all, I may wipe out the myth of the advantages which Panama has derived from the Canal. 65. When, in the United States Senate, the treaty with Panama was submitted for ratification —a treaty signed in Washington, without the Panamanian Government's knowing its text— some Senators opposed ratification. Then the Secretary of State, John Hay, coauthor and signatory of the Treaty, sent a letter to Senator Spooner, asking him not to cause any delay in ratification. In that letter he said: "As it stands now, as soon as the Senate has voted upon it, we shall have a Treaty that in its main aspects is very satisfactory, amply advantageous for the United States, and we must confess, whether we like it or not, that it is not so advantageous for Panama. You and I know well how many points there are in it that any Panamanian patriot would reject." Therefore, it is a fact, proved by the words of Secretary Hay, that, when the United States Government pushed through the signing of the Treaty in Washington without waiting for the opinion of the Government of Panama, it did so in the knowledge that the Treaty was disadvantageous to Panama and would be unacceptable to any Panamanian patriot. 66. When the United States Government tried, in 1904, to govern the Canal Zone as though it were a dependency of the United States, the reaction in Panama was so violent that President Theodore Roosevelt had to send the Secretary for War, William H. Taft, to Panama. From the letter of instructions given by the President to his Secretary for War, I quote the following: "The people of Panama have become unnecessarily alarmed at the establishment of a government in the Canal Zone. Apparently they fear that we may establish in part of their territory an independent and competitive community that will prejudice Panama's trade, reduce its income and diminish its prestige as a nation. "We do not have the slightest intention of setting up an independent colony in the centre of Panama or of exercising governmental powers other than those necessary to enable us to build, maintain and exploit the Canal adequately and with security, in accordance with the rights granted to us by the Treaty; and what we least want to do is to hamper or hinder the trade and prosperity of the people of Panama." Secretary Taft went to Panama and fully complied with the instructions received from his President, making the necessary representations to the Panamanian Government. 67. Therefore, it is a fact proved by the word of the President of the United States himself that the correct interpretation of the Treaty on the part of the United States Government was that the Canal Zone would not be an independent colony within the body politic of Panama, that it would not compete with Panamanian trade, that it would not undermine the national prestige of Panama, and that the United States would exercise in that zone only the functions necessary to build, maintain and exploit the Canal. But a visit to the Canal Zone would be sufficient to convince anyone, at first glance, and without having to delve into the matter, that what goes on there is precisely the opposite of what the President of the United States promised Panama in 1904. 68. The Panama Railroad Company paid an annuity of $250,000 for the concession of the railway, and that concession was assumed by the United States Government by virtue of the Treaty of 1903. During the nine years that followed the signing of that Treaty, the United States did not pay Panama any annuity for the Canal or for the railway. When those nine years had elapsed, the United States began to pay Panama $250,000 a year, that is, the same amount which the railway paid previously. When President F. D. Roosevelt devalued the dollar, he agreed that, as from 1934, the United States would pay Panama an annuity of $430,000 as devalued, equivalent to 250,000 gold dollars before devaluation. Therefore, there was no increase in the annuity paid. In the Treaty signed in 1955, the United States agreed to pay an annuity of $1,930,000. Thus, it is proved that until 1956 Panama received, as payment for the Canal, no more money than it would have received from the railroad had the Canal never been built. From 1956, Panama began to receive $1,500,000 a year for the Canal. In order to receive that annuity, Panama had to agree, in that same Treaty of 1955, to reduce by 75 per cent the import tax on foreign liquor that was taken from Panama to the Canal Zone. At the same time the maritime conferences, controlled by North American shipping interests, raised freights to Panama. The reduction of the import duty and the rise in freights represented for Panama a greater loss than the sum of $1,500,000 that Panama began to receive from 1956. 69. In the Canal Zone, there have always been two categories of employment —one with high salaries, and one with low wages. In the first of these categories, 95 per cent of the employees are North Americans and 5 per cent are Panamanians; in the second category, 95 per cent of the employees are Panamanians and 5 per cent are North Americans. Surely, this is enough to prove that discrimination against the Panamanian worker has always existed in the Canal Zone. 70. The United States spends about $80,000,000 a year in Panama, throughout the Canal Zone, in return for services and on the purchase of Panamanian products. But Panama returns to the United States, in payment for imports and services, about $100,000,000 a year. That fact is that, because of the Canal, there is no drain of dollars from the United States to Panama. 71. Another point that I think worth making is that the Panama Canal functions as a commercial enterprise, producing income for the United States Treasury, and its operation does not cost the United States taxpayer one cent. On the other hand, the operation of the Canal produces for Panama, which lent its territory for its construction no financial compensation for the concession, since the Treaty of 1955 inflicted greater losses than the annuity stipulated in that same Treaty. 72. I should not continue in this vein because the list would be interminable, and I do not wish to mention the advantages and benefits that the United States has derived from the Canal, since they are well known to the whole world. But I cannot end without reaffirming the serene confidence that Panama has in its destiny and in the justice of our cause, and that sooner or later we shall receive full redress for our just claims. 73. When we see Mr. John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States, fighting whole-heartedly, and in doing so jeopardizing his political interests, to defend the Negroes of his own country against the injustices of the Whites, we in Panama cannot but think that, in order to hear our claims, he will also have to fight the North Americans living in the Canal Zone. For they think the Zone is a feudal territory of their own which will be handed down indefinitely from father to son; they have a typically colonialist mentality, as though the Canal Treaty had been only a pretext for the United States Government to acquire a piece of land in the heart of Latin America, and they cleave to the Panamanian soil of the Canal Zone, because neither here in the United States nor anywhere else would they be able to live with the privileges, advantages and comfort which they enjoy there at the expense of the Panamanian economy. 74. President Kennedy has told the President of Panama, by word and in writing, of his desire to solve the points at issue regarding the Canal and the Treaties governing it, and Panama has confidence in the desire for justice and in the fighting blood of President Kennedy. If, by some misfortune, this confidence is betrayed, Panama will tenaciously continue its already sixty-year-old unequal fight to achieve its objectives with the weapons of reason, justice and international law. 75. But time works in favour of Panama as it does in favour of all the weak nations, and those who oppose the Panamanian aspirations are uselessly trying to oppose the march of time; we shall soon find them by the wayside, tired and weary and we shall leave them behind. 76. The faith of Panama in its destiny and in its future is the same faith that we have placed in this great Organization. It is the same faith that this Organization has earned from all weak nations. It is the same faith that all mankind has placed in a brilliant and permanent future of justice and peace.