Mr. President, I have already had an opportunity, a few days ago, to congratulate you on your election to the Presidency of the General Assembly. But with your permission, speaking now in the general debate, I would like once more to express our conviction that with your ability, experience and knowledge you will be able to guide our work in such a way as the General Assembly would expect of you.
68. Revolutionary changes and gains have marked the period between the birth of the United Nations and its eighteenth General Assembly. This transformation, which is the result as well as the source of changes in men's minds, has been characterized by three great struggles. The struggle against exploitation of nation by nation has reached its final stages with the colonial peoples facing the desperate attempts of colonial Powers to translate imperialism and colonialism into neo-colonialism. The struggle against exploitation of man by man is the result of the age-old yearning of mankind for social justice and prosperity for all. And finally, there is the struggle for lasting peace, made crucial today by the threat of weapons of mass destruction produced by modern science and technology.
69. The three struggles are inextricably interwoven. Lasting peace cannot be guaranteed by disarmament alone for peace cannot endure without the universal practice of social justice, and neither peace nor social justice can be safeguarded without world-wide national independence. Each of the struggles is an aspect of what President Sukarno, my President, has named the "Revolution of Mankind" —the confrontation of the new emerging forces and the old established order. The tragedy of our time has been that the two great Powers, possessing different social systems, have evaluated the Revolution of Mankind in different ways. And it is these conflicting interpretations that have caused the deep mistrust that has so often brought the world to the very brink of annihilation.
70. It is with a great sense of reprieve, then, that we are able to notice today the beginnings of a new sentiment guiding the two Powers. Mutual distrust seems to be giving way to a common interest in avoiding mutual destruction. The terrible fear of nuclear warfare, which throughout the long years of the cold war has grown steadily more intense, is now so intolerable that it has at last begun to break down the stalemate of mutual lack of confidence. What only a short time ago appeared impossible has come to pass. The opposing Powers in the cold war have shown themselves able to agree on one of the thorniest issues that have divided them since 1945. The Moscow agreement on a partial test-ban treaty has created a feeling of such deep relief that it has renewed the hope of millions of people frustrated and disheartened by disarmament negotiations that hitherto have always ended in failure.
71. In his address to the Assembly last Friday [1209th meeting], President Kennedy of the United States said that an atmosphere of rising hope prevailed in the world. The previous day [1208th meeting]. Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union declared that this eighteenth session is "weighing anchor with a favourable wind —even if a weak one— in its sails". And we feel blessed because they are in virtual agreement as to the next steps to be taken. Both agree that the partial test ban should be followed by negotiations on the prevention of war by accident or miscalculation, on safeguards against surprise attack, on prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on prevention of armaments in outer space. We feel sure that other measures intended to help solve the prime difficulty of general lack of confidence —measures which received individual mention by both statesmen— can and will be negotiated.
72. The existence of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a produce of one of the wisest decisions ever taken by the United Nations, has proved to be of inestimable value. It was in this Committee that the non-aligned world began its successful attempts to persuade and pressure the opposing parties in the cold war to make their first concessions to each other, concessions which, however small, had never before been considered possible. Encouraged by the present spirit of give-and-take, and certain that a tortured world will not tolerate even the slightest lessening of hope for survival, Indonesia believes that Mr. Gromyko's suggestion of convening a summit-level conference of the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be given the most serious consideration. The armaments race has attained such a high point of danger that nations have no choice but to do everything in their power first to curb it, then to halt it, and finally to rid themselves of it altogether. Otherwise, to use the words of Canada's Prime Minister in the opening meeting of our debate, "scientific advances" will "move it beyond man's reach" [1208th meeting, para. 60]. And if, as one of the results of this proposed summit meeting on disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to President Kennedy's suggestion and cooperate in preparing and carrying out a joint expedition to the moon, the world would rejoice indeed.
73. Allow me now to touch briefly on the economic aspect of the Revolution of Mankind. In the interests of world-wide economic welfare, there is an urgent need for the international community to adopt a completely fresh approach to the position of the developing nations in the context of world economic relations. If we are to establish a balanced international economy, full account has to be taken of the essential nature of the developmental process in the new nations.
74. In seeking to create a just and prosperous society for its citizens, each new nation must strive to develop an economic system that expresses the political and social structure which has been devised to embody its own unique national characteristics. Efforts to do so, however, are often seriously hampered by the vestiges of economic imperialism and feudalism which are maintained by outside forces seeking to control the economic life of a developing nation. The first task of the new nation, therefore, must be to free itself from these alien influences in order that it may create its own conceptual, organizational and structural economic framework. Only when this has been accomplished, can a new nation effectively mobilize all its material and human resources to build the society it desires.
75. Unfortunately, the structure of present-day international economic relations continues to reflect the old-established order. Originally designed, as it was, essentially to serve the narrow interests of a small number of industrialized countries, it is necessarily Inimical to the interests of the new nations, and as a consequence they are frustrated in their attempts to reach a stage of self-sustaining growth. The international community as a whole has a duty to correct this situation. Nothing less than an entirely new set of rules for international economic behaviour, based on the principles of freedom, equality and social justice, is required.
76. The first step in that direction should be a radical revision of those obsolete principles that still govern today's pattern of international trade. Trade is a new nation's primary instrument for economic self-development; yet the existing world pattern of trade operates sadly in its disfavour. Developing countries have an urgent need for an expansion of their traditional exports, coupled with an opening up of markets for their new products. Improved general terms of trade to afford them an over-all increase in their share of world exports are also desperately required. Indeed, if the economic independence of the new nations is to be assured and if a truly interdependent integrated world economy is to be achieved, a new international division of labour with new patterns of production and trade will have to be established. We may note that a unique opportunity for taking such action will be offered in the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
77. The second major step in the direction of establishing a just international economy is to reconsider the manner in which much of the economic assistance is now being rendered to the developing countries. It is my delegation's firm conviction that assistance should be prevented as far as possible from being wielded as a weapon in the competition between rival ideologies. Nor should It be used, as it is being now, by old colonial Powers in order to maintain an undue influence over the live of a new nation. Economic principles should be the sole criteria; and these principles should arise from a concept of equal partnership and cooperation consistent with changed world conditions. Adherence to such a concept should, at the same time, have the welcome effect of increasing the present volume of capital and technical assistance and of liberalizing the terms under which it is rendered. Moreover, greater use would then be made of United Nations channels for transmitting aid; which in turn would enable our Organization to play an even greater part in the development process.
78. If the developing nations are ever to achieve economic emancipation, the rules of international economic behaviour must be revised. Only through decisive action on the part of the United Nations can this revision be effected.
79. Before I come to consider the main subject of my statement, the process of decolonization, I should like very rapidly to summarize my delegation's position on the question of the Charter review, for, in our opinion, this question necessarily encompasses the other three major internal problems which beset our Organization: the problem of peace-keeping operations, the problem of the enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and the problem of representation of China. It seems we are almost alone in asserting the need to hold a Charter review conference as soon as possible.
80. There is general agreement among Members that the United Nations Charter conceived in 1945 no longer answers present world conditions, which have undergone a revolutionary transformation since the birth of the United Nations. However, while there seems also to be general agreement that the Charter should accordingly be revised, a great many Members nevertheless continue to believe, as they have believed since the tenth session, that the "times are not auspicious" for holding the necessary review conference. In view of the fact that that is merely a respectably vague phrase to hide a naked, head-on legal stalemate that arises from the seemingly unalterable opposing stands of the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of Chinese representation, my delegation is of the firm conviction that unless we ourselves purposely undertake to render the times auspicious, we shall never be in a position to carry out the revision of the Charter that is now so urgently required.
81. It is clear that, to achieve an effective revision of the Charter, we shall have to think in terms of several General Assembly sessions. Perhaps even as many as three, four or more will be needed. Certainly my delegation does not believe that anything sufficiently radical could be achieved at one single session. We should, therefore, do our utmost to see to it that this session is the first of the series, by deciding to convene a Charter review conference to be held as soon as possible, The conference would give all Members ample opportunity to declare their opinions and their wishes. It is essential for us to know which Articles the majority of Members wish either to amend or to replace, and what new provisions they consider desirable. Most importantly of all, we have to know the opinion of Members —and of the majority of Members— on the way in which they wish to amend Articles 108 and 109; since it is these Articles that define the limiting procedure under which all the other Articles must be revised at present.
82. In Introducing my discussion of the third aspect of the Revolution of Mankind, the struggle against colonialism, I should like to refer to one of the recent examples of the successful eradication of colonialism— the eradication of the last vestige of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, namely, in West Irian. May I express here the gratitude of my Government to the Secretary-General for his initiatives and efforts in assisting the Indonesian and Netherlands Governments to reach a solution of the West Irian dispute. In this connexion, I should like also to make special mention of the part played by the Secretary-General's personal representative, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.
83. May I also express the high appreciation of my Government to the Secretary-General, and through him to all his collaborators, for the magnificent way in which he carried out the task entrusted to him by the Indonesian-Netherlands Agreement of 15 August 1962 on West Irian and authorized by the United Nations General Assembly. The part played by Secretary-General U Thant and the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) has greatly contributed to the preservation of peace in the area and to the hopeful development of friendly relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In this regard, I wish to mention the distinguished services rendered by Mr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran in his role as Head of UNTEA, I likewise wish to express the gratitude of my Government to Mr. Narasimhan and Mr. Rolz-Bennett of the Secretariat for their whole-hearted co-operation and excellent groundwork in implementing the Agreement. I wish also to express our sincere appreciation and gratitude to the Pakistan contingent under the able command of a distinguished soldier, Major-General Said Uddin Khan, for its eminent services in assisting UNTEA to keep law and order in West Irian.
84. Finally, I would like, on behalf of my Government, to express our appreciation and thanks to the Government of the Netherlands for its whole-hearted cooperation in helping to ease the task of the Secretary-General and in the smooth Implementation of the Agreement. The Indonesian Government is confident that, with the continued co-operation and understanding of the Secretary-General and the Netherlands, the implementation of the remaining part of the Agreement on West Irian can be carried out in the same smooth way.
85. The present situation in West Irian since its return to the Republic of Indonesia on 1 May 1963 is one of peace and order. With the co-operation of the people of the territory, the Government of Indonesia is now actively engaged in an endeavour to promote the welfare of the people. The problem of education is being vigorously tackled and numerous new schools are being opened to satisfy the new and ever-growing thirst for learning. Even during the UNTEA period, the Indonesian Government, in co-operation with UNTEA, undertook the opening of new schools in many areas of the territory. Freedom in West Irian has generated an enthusiastic desire for rapid self-development. In recognition of this spirit of progress, the Indonesian Government has appointed a native son of West Irian to the high post of Governor of the province. In its endeavours to bring to the entire population of West Irian a decent standard of living, the Indonesian Government is devoting special attention to the people of the interior who are considered, for the most part, to be still living in the Stone Age, and who, for the greater part, have never fallen under Netherlands control or administration. It is not an easy task, but the Indonesian Government and people are determined to carry it out to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. These people have for too long been separated from the process of national development. The Government of Indonesia is satisfied in the knowledge that even during the UNTEA period of administration, the leaders of West Irian already expressed their determination to remain within the Republic of Indonesia, to enjoy its freedom and to join in the national endeavours to make the 100 million people of our country a strong and united nation.
86. I should like now to single out for review the policy of decolonization as practiced by the United Kingdom, for this imperial Power, once possessor of the most far-flung empire in our time, who has granted independence to many of her former colonies, is today pursuing a policy in regard to her remaining territories that is hostile to the letter and spirit of the three General Assembly resolutions on decolonization.
87. Let us take, first, the instance of Southern Rhodesia. It is here that the facet of British decolonization policy which is based on racial discrimination finds its clearest expression. Decades ago, a small white minority in the territory was granted the power of self-government. The constitution which the United Kingdom granted to Southern Rhodesia naturally contained explicit provisions for the protection of important British financial interests. But besides this, it also contained a written provision reserving the right of the United Kingdom Government to intervene in the affairs of the territory whenever it may seem necessary. Since all Rhodesians, of whatever racial origin, are in effect subjects of the Queen, this right therefore necessarily encompassed any action demanded in the course of a Government's most sacred duty to protect its subjects.
88. The British Government was certainly not unaware of the racially discriminatory acts of repression that the ruling white minority has systematically and mercilessly conducted throughout the years of Rhodesian self-government against the overwhelming African majority. Yet they allowed it to become, to use the words of official British texts, "an established convention for Parliament at Westminster not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesian Government", which was the white minority Government. In other words, the United Kingdom voluntarily abdicated its written constitutional right, and its duty, to protect the African majority by sheer convention. And now they have endorsed this convention by granting a new constitution which has transferred to the Rhodesian Government the reserved powers formerly vested in the United Kingdom. The Declaration of Rights which has been included in the new constitution is a mere formal gesture in the direction of protecting the Africans. I suppose no one can contest a Government's legal right to abdicate another legal right. But who has the right thus to abdicate a right that is also a duty, a duty to protect a subject?
89. An already explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia now threatens to degenerate even further. As a result of the Victoria Falls decision to dissolve the Central African Federation. the United Kingdom has agreed to transfer certain powers from the Federal Government to the white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. Among these powers is included the control of well-equipped and efficient modern armed forces. Although, strictly speaking, these armed forces were originally the property of the Southern Rhodesian Government before the Federation, there is no denying that, due to their merger with Federal military units, they are today a significantly strengthened force. And there seem very good grounds for the fear that with these much strengthened forces at its disposal, the leaders of the white minority Government, who have always been very close in spirit to the universally condemned apartheid policy of South Africa and who have already indulged in numerous acts of racial repression, might be encouraged to carry out even more dangerously irresponsible action in the near future.
90. The United Kingdom's avowal of its constitutional inability to intervene to prevent the transfer of the armed forces and other powers to the Southern Rhodesian Government has justly outraged all Africa. Imbued with the spirit of the recent and historic Addis Ababa Conference, which pledged the African peoples to eradicate all traces of colonialism from the soil of their continent, thirty-two African States protested in the most decisive manner open to them. Only two weeks ago, they brought the matter before the Security Council as a situation constituting a serious threat to peace. The Indonesian delegation, representing a Government firmly in accord with the Addis Ababa spirit, followed the proceedings in the Council with close attention. We are prepared to concede the strength of the United Kingdom's legal stand. In so doing, however, we feel bound to comment that the stronger its legal stand in this instance, the weaker is its political and moral position, for it is only in the very recent past that the British Government, in full knowledge of the deteriorating racial situation in Southern Rhodesia, took the action which now enables it to adopt this stand. We may also note that its legal stand today is somewhat inconsistent with its attitude in former years, when the United Kingdom had to establish a convention against its written constitutional right to intervene, in order not to intervene. But then we fully appreciate that significant British economic interests are tied up with the maintenance of the white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. Doubtless the United Kingdom has considered well what would happen if the banked-up hatred of millions of Africans were one day to burst forth in insurrection.
91. The dangerous British political manoeuvrings in Southern Rhodesia are an example of but one aspect of its attempt to make the decolonization process serve their own interests. The second facet, which I now wish to examine, is perhaps even more clearly expressive of its selfish policy. In an effort to achieve identification of decolonization with its own self-interests, the United Kingdom devised a particularly subtle technique for side-stepping the granting of genuine independence. As a means of perpetuating its spheres of influence in different geographic areas of the world, Britain has brought together neighbouring colonial territories which had previously been administered as separate colonies, and then granted self-government or independence to the resulting unit as a whole. Hence the four Federations which were created by the British during the past decade: the Central African Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the Federation of East Africa of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya; the Federation of the West Indies of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago; and the Southern Arabian Federation of several Arab sultanates, sheikhdoms and emirates with Aden. All these units were conceived by British politicians almost entirely in terms of British interests. And what has happened to them now? Of the four Federations, only the Southern Arabian Federation remains in shaky existence; the other three, within a very few years of their creation, have had to be abandoned or disbanded by the very same nation that so painstakingly brought them into existence.
92. Those of us who are members of ex-colonies cannot be surprised at this turn of events, even though it may have come as an unpleasant shock to the United Kingdom. The normal procedure for creating a successful federation, one would think, would be for the peoples concerned to agree of their own free will to band themselves together and to forge their own political system according to their own common desires and interests. But the peoples in the four abortive federations created by the British, being still colonial territories at the time, were hardly in a position voluntarily to agree to a federation. Still less were they able to mould these units to their own interests, since the units had been established precisely in order to serve those of the British. Inasmuch as these federations were created not by the countries concerned but by a foreign will, they were of necessity artificial units that bore no true relationship to the realities of the local conditions and requirements. So in time, in a greater or less time as the case may have been, the territories in each of the units rebelled against a federation that had been imposed upon them, not chosen by them.
93. The Central African Federation, to take an illustrative example, was created in order to provide the ruling white minorities in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, whose interests are closely tied in with those of the British, with an instrument for exploiting the Africans and their land still more profitably than before. Fortunately, the African majorities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were able to reverse the political power relationships in their domestic governments, and they naturally eschewed the inimicably conceived union that had been foisted upon them.
94. Similar situations obtained in the cases of the Federation of East Africa and the British West Indies. But in the former instance it is important to note that the intended British federation did not materialize at all, and that Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya are now contemplating steps to create a genuine federation of their own as soon as Kenya gains its independence— thus proving conclusively that it was not the principle of federation itself that these countries objected to in the earlier unit, but to the fact that it was imposed upon them.
95. The Southern Arabian Federation presents a rather special and complex case, the details of which I need not dwell on here. But the chief factor relevant to the point which I have been making is that in order to safeguard Britain's military, strategic, and oil interests in the process of decolonization, Aden was included in this federation of sultans, sheikhs and emirs against its wishes. The serious difficulties that have ensued from this unwise course are now the subject of investigation by the Special Committee of Twenty-Four. And, personally, I would not predict much hope for the future of this, the only one of the British federations that still survives,
96. Is the United Kingdom at all discouraged by the failure of its chosen technique for carrying out the policy of identification of decolonization with self- interest? Indeed, it would seem not, for as recently as 1962, discussions began on the creation of a new federation in the Caribbean area, designed to unite the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands and Barbados under the aegis of Britain. And, as we know, in my own area of the world, South-East Asia, yet another federation has just officially come into being.
97. Those who are at all familiar with the history of the United Kingdom's past efforts to subvert the decolonization process of so many of her territories will not be taken aback to find evidence of a similar policy at work in the creation of Malaysia. To allay the suspicions of the neighbouring States, the idea of Malaysia has from the outset been presented as a Malayan, not a British, conception, showing that, in one respect at least, the United Kingdom has learned something from its past failures. The proposal for the federation was first publicized in the summer of 1961. Differences of opinion between Indonesia and Malaya and between the Philippines and Malaya on the wishes of the people of the colonies of Sarawak and Sabah, and Brunei, and above all on the real motives behind the projected federation, at once became apparent. Tension between the three southeast Asian countries began to rise. In the summer of this year, however, the three States decided, on the initiative of President Macapagal of the Philippines, to hold a conference at summit level to try to settle their differences and to solve the common problems of their area. The result of this decision was the Summit Conference in Manila held from 30 July to 5 August, which was preceded by a Foreign Ministers' conference in June 1963.
98. This was an historic conference, at which agreements were reached on matters extending far beyond the problem of the formation of Malaysia, agreements of great significance for the future harmony of South-East Asia. The atmosphere between President Macapagal, President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was one of mutual understanding and of the utmost cordiality.
99. At the conclusion of the conference, the three Heads of State issued the Manila Declaration, stating the principles for their future co-operation. In addition, a joint statement was issued, elaborating on methods for implementing the main lines of the agreement which had been reached by the respective Foreign Ministers at their earlier meeting and which was published as the Manila Accord. To avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, I shall, in describing the decisions reached at the Conference with regard to Malaysia, use the words of these documents as nearly as possible.
100. The three Heads of Government reaffirmed their countries' adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. In that context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia, provided that the support of the people of these Borneo territories could be ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, namely, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative. Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines. The Secretary-General was accordingly requested to undertake to ascertain, prior to the establishment of Malaysia —and I repeat: prior to the establishment of Malaysia— the wishes of these people within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), principle IX of the annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination embodied in principle IX of the resolution mentioned and taking into consideration certain items in connexion with the elections that had recently been held in Sarawak and Sabah, In the interests of all the countries concerned, the three Heads of Government also deemed it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams belonging to the Secretary-General. The Malayan Government would use its best endeavours to obtain the co-operation of the British Government and the Governments of Sarawak and Sabah.
101. That, almost exactly as I have just stated it, was the essence of the agreement between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya. And at this point may I say that my Government would like to express its sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for his willingness to comply with the request made by the three Manila Powers, at the same time recognizing the difficult position in which he found himself when he came to formulate his final conclusions on the basis of the report of his team.
102. Let me now try to evaluate the role played by the British in the events that followed the Manila Conference. First, let us consider Malaya's official announcement, made on 29 August, of 16 September as the date for the establishment of Malaysia, regardless of the outcome of the United Nations investigation, which at that time was still in progress. Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines is willing to believe that Malaya was already thinking in terms of acting contrary to the spirit of the Manila accords when we agreed at the Manila Conference to welcome Malaysia, provided that the support of the peoples in Sarawak and Sabah was ascertained.
103. It was clearly understood at the Manila summit meeting that Malaysia could be proclaimed only when and if the support of the people of Sarawak and Sabah had been ascertained by the Secretary-General. Indeed, on his return to Kuala Lumpur from Manila on 5 August 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman himself stated to the Press that the Manila Agreement on Malaysia had made "flexible" the date of 31 August 1963 for Malaysia Day. Questioned as to what would happen should the outcome of the ascertainment prove to be negative, he answered, rightly: "Then the formation of Malaysia should be cancelled". We were therefore very astonished by the sudden change in Malaya's position. The very inconsistency of this position, the suddenness of Malaya's reversal of attitude, is to us sufficient indication that it could have happened only as the result of heavy British pressure and manipulation.
104. For we should not by any means underestimate the United Kingdom's enmity towards the whole idea of a United Nations investigation team entering its territory and examining processes of elections held under its own auspices. Members will recall the United Kingdom's consistent refusal to allow the Special Committee of Twenty-Four to conduct similar surveys in British Non-Self-Governing Territories. Moreover, the demand which we made in the Manila Statement for a "fresh approach" to the methods of actually ascertaining the wishes of the people seemed to endanger the findings of the Cobbold Commission, which the United Kingdom itself had sent to investigate the territories in 1962.
105. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, having officially accepted the Secretary-General's investigating teams, the United Kingdom imposed limiting conditions. The Secretary-General himself acknowledged in his report on the team's findings that it was extremely difficult for him to implement his task properly within the short period he had at his disposal. But who was it that imposed this extremely short time-limit? Not Indonesia or the Philippines, certainly. It is true that the three Manila Powers were in agreement that there should be a time-limit. But, at the same time, they also agreed that the investigation should be a thorough one, based on a fresh approach. To meet both these requirements together, the end of September was considered a likely target date for the completion of the assessment. A period of a mere ten days, however, which was the actual duration of the United Nations investigation, was definitely not contemplated by the three Manila Powers.
106. Not content with trying to obstruct the work of the United Nations team, the United Kingdom Government also attempted to delay as much as possible the arrival of the Indonesian and Philippine observers provided for in the Manila Statement, even going to the length of warning Indonesian observers, in order to discourage them, that they would have to sleep in tents. As a result of British delaying tactics, the observer teams were present for only less than one third of the time during which the investigations took place. Despite this, however, the observers of both countries were able individually to establish certain important Inadequacies in the fresh approach required of the investigation, unavoidable because of the short period of time within which the United Nations teams had to work, the smallness of these teams and the insufficient facilities put at their disposal by the colonial administration. In their report, the Philippine observers likened the operation of the United Nations teams to a guided tour organized by the British colonial authorities.
107. Anyone who has lived under colonial conditions knows that it is not difficult for the authorities to make people answer questions exactly in the way required. Very often the mere presence of armed soldiers or police will suffice; all colonial peoples know this. In general, only those who are members of a militant freedom movement dare to defy the intimidation of a show of force. With this in mind, the investigators, in adopting a fresh approach towards ascertaining the wishes of the people, should have tried to make reasonably sure —and I say "reasonably sure"— that the persons questioned were relatively — I repeat: relatively— free from official pressure. And then they should also have tried to see that the hearings took place without any colonial authorities, troops or police present.
108. To say that the Investigators did not take all the necessary precautionary measures to ensure the integrity of their findings is not in any way to place blame upon them. Their number was too few and they had far too short a time at their disposal. Facilities were entirely dependent upon the co-operation of local colonial authorities. This being the case, my Government does strongly feel that in the circumstances their report should then have Included a full description of the conditions in which the hearings did take place. We, who were but a short time ago a colonial people ourselves, know very well from bitter experience that mere figures on the number of answers obtained are not enough. Without a knowledge of the conditions surrounding the various hearings, how can we be even reasonably sure that the wishes of the people have been genuinely ascertained? I can assure you that my Government, for one, is still in doubt. It is not that we are denying the possibility of the British Borneo peoples being in favour of joining Malaysia —I want to stress that. For if this were genuinely the case, Indonesia and the Philippines would, as we wrote in the Accord, welcome Malaysia. As things stand at the moment, however, we are, regretfully, not in a position to do so. There have been grave violations of the Manila Agreement, and these make it impossible for us to have any assurance of the true wishes of the colonial peoples concerned and of the goodwill of this British-sponsored Malaysia towards us. May I repeat that the date for the proclamation of Malaysia was fixed with utter disregard for the outcome of the ascertainment conducted by the United Nations, as required by the Manila Agreement. This arbitrary act was not overlooked by the Secretary-General in his report. It was a slap in the face of the United Nations.
109. The United Kingdom's motives for this wrecking of an Asian-supported Malaysia are clear. Malaysia was originally conceived by the British as a perpetuation of its sphere of influence in a strategic area of South-East Asia. The proud declaration by the three Heads of Government in Manila that foreign bases in their region are temporary in nature and should not be permitted to be used either directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three States, coupled with the declaration that each country will refrain from using collective defence arrangements in order to serve the individual interests of any of the big Powers, cannot have been welcomed by the British Government. Nor can the United Kingdom be expected to look with favour upon the new South-East Asian spirit manifested in the first steps toward "Maphilindo" —Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia— which were taken at the Manila Conference. The very conception of "Maphilindo" is anathema to the colonial interests of the British. They therefore felt that they had no choice but to try to destroy it. And they went about their unsavoury task by subverting the decolonization process in Sarawak and Sabah so that these colonies might be merged into a greater unit of its own making. It is just this form of decolonization policy, already pursued by the British in four abortive federations established in the previous decade, that we in Asia and Africa call British "neocolonialism". It is the desecration of the process of decolonization that we in Asia and Africa hold sacred.
110. Britain may cry victory now. South-East Asia is in turmoil. The unity of the peoples of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia embodied in the Manila Agreements is splintered. Sentiments are aroused, brother faces brother in angry quarrel. "Maphilindo", the real target at which Britain is aiming, is crippled. Crippled but not crushed. The "Maphilindo" spirit is still running high in Indonesia and in the Philippines. And even in British-sponsored Malaysia, there are signs that it has not been entirely extinguished. The immediate future seems dark for the sister nations of South-East Asia; but their natural affinity will surely triumph over any temporary conflict. And then "Maphilindo" will once more present itself to the world, in greater strength than before, free from colonial stains.