Mr. President, it is a pleasure at the outset of my statement to offer you the sincere congratulations and good wishes of New Zealand on your election. Both you and Venezuela and, indeed, the rich civilization of Latin America have been justly honoured by this expression of the Assembly's confidence. The high standards of courtesy and authority set by your distinguished predecessors are already being further enhanced by your example.
70. I should also like to extend New Zealand's warmest good wishes to Malaysia. The Federation of Malaya established an impressive record of political and economic achievement. Now Malaysia offers to Singapore and the formerly dependent areas of Sarawak and Sabah opportunities to fulfil themselves within the framework of a prospering, stable and democratic State.
71. As a fellow-member of the Commonwealth, New Zealand has enjoyed close and friendly ties with Malaya and with the other constituent parts of Malaysia. We have from the first supported its formation because we were convinced that Malaysian federation was desired by the great majority of the people concerned and that it fully conformed to the principles laid down by this Assembly. For these reasons, we have welcomed the Secretary-General's own assessment as confirming, with his well-known care and impartiality, the breadth of popular support which our own reports had suggested. The Secretary-General's findings dispose of any reasonable doubts. They open the way, as the New Zealand Prime Minister has commented, "for the full and unqualified acceptance of Malaysia by all concerned". That this will be given is the earnest wish of my Government. For its part, New Zealand will give its continued full support both for the economic development and the defence of this small and progressive nation.
72. In this hall a year ago [1133rd meeting], the Prime Minister of my country expressed the alarm of all New Zealanders at having to live under the balance of terror in a world where the nuclear arms race was accelerating. He spoke of our deep unease as we compared the furious rate of arms development with the sluggish pace of disarmament negotiations. Since that time there has been a gleam of hope. But we should be deluding ourselves if we pretend that a measure of real disarmament had yet been achieved, or, indeed, that the road to general disarmament had yet opened.
73. The test ban treaty concluded in Moscow was a momentous event. It has been signed by New Zealand along with the great majority of the other nations of the world. There are sound reasons why it should be acclaimed: it should stop further poisoning of our atmosphere and our food; it should put some brake on the arms race; and the more widely this treaty is accepted, the more it will tend to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. These are real gains and we should be the last to minimize them.
74. But even this most welcome treaty is not the treaty which the United Nations has consistently sought. Despite years of laborious negotiation the result attained is, regrettably, less comprehensive than the original objective. The treaty is certainly a prerequisite for disarmament. But it is not a comprehensive ban. Still less is it a measure of actual disarmament. It does not provide a system of verification. Consequently, it does not serve as the model for that all- embracing treaty for which the world is searching. Unless the Moscow Treaty is reinforced by further measures, the arms race will inevitably continue.
75. Its full significance cannot yet be measured. Its present significance is, however, simple. It is the first binding agreement affecting nuclear weapons and as such it is a hopeful portent. Whether this hope is borne out will depend on how effectively the treaty is observed. And it will depend on further efforts which have yet to be made. A momentum has been created. There has been a small but perceptible growth of international confidence. If this momentum can be sustained, negotiations on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee could lead on to other measures which have hitherto been beyond our grasp.
76. What has been so painfully gained could also be lost should the treaty not be universally observed. The 102 Governments which have signed it have pledged themselves not to carry out tests that poison the human environment. This number happily includes several countries which have the technical and economic capacity to make nuclear weapons. It would be tragic if the objectives of the treaty and the hopes it has raised or further progress should be jeopardized by the failure of other nations with a nuclear capability or potential to accept its terms.
77. New Zealand has long been concerned about the consequences for human health of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We are aware, of course, that such hazards may be exaggerated. We are aware that precise scientific knowledge is lacking about the genetic effects of radioactivity. But on one point the scientists are agreed: the less that people —indeed, all living matter— are exposed to contamination, the better.
78. It will be no surprise that New Zealanders and other peoples of the Pacific —we who have seen the awesome glow in the evening sky— feel profound concern lest further atmospheric nuclear tests be conducted. In other years the countries most directly affected by tests have been the first to express their anxiety. It was the African States which, in 1959, declared their opposition to nuclear testing in the Sahara. Similarly, in 1961, those countries most directly in the path of nuclear fall-out took the initiative in appealing to the Soviet Government not to explode its 50-megaton bomb. New Zealand, by its geographical location, is especially affected by testing in the South Pacific. So are the Polynesian peoples of the area, peoples with whom New Zealenders have ties of kinship and towards many of whom we have an obligation and a responsibility.
79. In many public statements in recent years my Government has voiced its intense dislike of all such tests, and has consistently made known its deep concern to all Governments about the dangers of nuclear testing in the Pacific. We shall continue to do so, because we are all too conscious of the danger that if further tests are held they may be followed by others, that they may thus jeopardize the Moscow Treaty and put yet another obstacle in the way of disarmament.
80. There is still time for change in the course of world events and for adjustments of national and international policies. We fervently hope that the conclusion of the test ban treaty and the other steps which may follow —the other steps of real dis armament which must follow if even this small gain is not to be lost— will produce a situation In which no further tests take place or need take place in any environment, in any area of the world.
81. Before I pass on to other matters there is one aspect of the great disarmament debate which my delegation wishes to stress. We stress it because of the emphasis which has been laid upon it by the Secretary-General and because it is an important question to which attention has been devoted in various public statements by the Prime Minister of New Zealand,
82. This is the idea that it may be possible to designate certain areas as nuclear-free zones and to exclude nuclear weapons from them. We recognize that different areas have different problems and that what may be feasible in one region is not necessarily so in another. The greatest difficulties arise in regions where the contending forces of the great Powers are deployed, for it is there that the full implications of what is involved in disarmament assert themselves most powerfully. Any such proposal in these regions —the principal zones of military confrontation-may affect the strategic balance of power so directly that it may be impossible to consider nuclear weapons in isolation from conventional forces. It has to be remembered that the disruption of an existing balance may invite, rather than avert, breaches of the peace. In our own area, moreover, the existence of vast international waterways complicates the problem of ensuring that any agreed nuclear-free zone would remain nuclear-free in fact. The difficulties of verifying such an agreement would scarcely be less than those which have so far proved intractable in the negotiations for general disarmament.
83. It may be that for some regions agreement can be reached on nuclear-free arrangements capable of verification. The efforts made in some continental areas may well show that in certain circumstances the problems posed can be solved. And if, as we all hope, the negotiations for general disarmament begin now to make headway, we should expect that the feasibility of nuclear-free zones would be one of the measures to come under intense and continuing scrutiny.
84. I have spoken of the United Nations as an instrument for peace —its primary concern. But it is no less an instrument for economic development, so that the people of the whole world —not just the most fortunate minority— can be rid of hunger and poverty and the shackles of ignorance and so enjoy a satisfying standard of living. The Preamble of the Charter speaks of the peoples of the United Nations employing ... "international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples". Even now we are preparing ourselves for action of this kind. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development will bring together a whole range of related problems in the expectation that concerted international action will be able to alleviate at least the most pressing of them.
85. What are the prospects that performance will match hopes? The powerful industrial nations hold the keys to action. On an occasion like this there is no need to reiterate the reasons why. The responsibility that accompanies their economic power has been heightened in recent years by the creation of regional economic associations. The question we ask is whether those nations and those regional groups are prepared to establish the trading conditions essential for more rapid economic progress in other parts of the world.
86. Some signs are favourable, notably the passage of the United States Trade Expansion Act. On the other hand, we have heard arguments in the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which suggest that nothing much can be done for the rest of the world until the economic giants have settled their conflicts, or until the doctrine of one group has been accepted by others. The industrial countries in GATT have been asked to accept a moderate programme of action for the liberalization of trade in tropical products, and in the Preparatory Committee it has been proposed that the programme should be adopted by industrial countries not members of GATT. The response has scarcely been enthusiastic.
87. In these circumstances New Zealand and countries faced with similar economic and trade problems cannot but feel discouraged. Any success we in New Zealand may have had in building up a satisfactory standard of living rests on a precarious basis of external trade receipts. Like most developing countries, we depend on the export of a few agricultural products to finance our development. Opportunities to export are, however, denied by a whole armoury of restrictive devices. These are responsible, in large part, for the serious decline in the terms of trade we have suffered in recent years, a decline which is twice that of the developing countries as a whole. The situation is aggravated by our almost complete dependence on external supplies of capital goods, external transport services and external financial services.
88. New Zealand wants to do what it can to help the developing countries surmount their trading problems and achieve improved standards. The prosperity of each is bound up with the prosperity of all. As a trading nation, we have an interest in seeing income levels rise in developing countries so that we may find new markets for the goods New Zealanders produce cheaply and well.
89. We are making, and will continue to make, our modest contribution towards solving the trade problems of developing countries, with which we have so many interests in common. These are not limited to agricultural trade. In New Zealand, too, the need to industrialize is dictated by economic reality. In an ideal world, it would no doubt be profitable to specialize far more in those agricultural activities for which our natural resources best suit us. But this is becoming less and less feasible. We are familiar with the practical difficulties of building up a manufacturing sector to our economy, and we can therefore well appreciate the desire of the developing countries to have the United Nations contribute towards their industrial progress.
90. When I speak of the activities of the United Nations in trade and industrialization, I refer also to the regional economic commissions. All are part of one organization; there can be no question of strengthening the regional bodies at the expense of the centre. We think of a coherent whole in which Headquarters and regions perform the functions to which they are best suited.
91. New Zealand, as a result of decisions taken at the recent session of the Economic and Social Council, has become a full regional member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and intends to play a part in keeping with its new status. We should like to acknowledge with appreciation the confidence expressed in New Zealand by members of ECAFE. Equally, on behalf of the State of Western Samoa, we should like to thank them for the support they have given to that former trust territory which as an independent State has now become a full member of that Commission.
92. The task of decolonization, like the tasks of disarmament and development, was built into the very foundations of this Organization. The world community is still grappling with disarmament and development and is still overwhelmed by their immensity. But decolonization is a task which may be seen to be nearing its end. Since the Second World War we have witnessed an annual accession of States to independence. Within a few years this has revolutionized the whole scope of international relations.
93. We are all familiar with the progression from dependent status through self-rule to independence. Every year more territories complete this progression. Now we are left with the special cases, with the fringe, with what are termed the remnants of colonialism.
94. No doubt all territories have in a sense been special cases. Many territories now independent presented formidable problems of political development, problems which were successfully overcome through patience and statesmanship. What is most striking about the territories which remain is their great diversity. They range from isolated coral atolls to the large land areas of Central and Southern Africa. Faced with this diversity the traditional modes of decolonization, though still relevant, will increasingly have to be supplemented by other and more flexible means.
95. As the problems become smaller in range, the need for specialized knowledge and imaginative thinking becomes proportionately greater. The argument is surely no longer about decolonization; the United Nations Declaration [General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)] is a political fact as well as a moral one. The challenge is to consider the individuality of the remaining territories, and to devise means of translating the principles established by the Charter and by this Assembly into solutions based on the requirements of a particular territory.
96. In voicing these thoughts the New Zealand delegation naturally has uppermost in mind those scattered groups of islands which are our neighbours in the Pacific. The peoples of these islands are few in number. Since Western Samoa became independent, New Zealand remains responsible for the inhabitants of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelaus, numbering only 25,000. The principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on colonialism apply to them just as much as to larger territories. New Zealand has for long willingly recognized that, few though they are, the people of our Island territories, as much as anyone else, possess the right to decide their own political future. The elected representatives of the people of the Cook Islands have over the past year been considering this question further. They have expressed their desire for full self-government while at the same time making it clear that they wish to remain closely associated with New Zealand. The solution which is now emerging may be as individual as the situation which is shaping it. But it will be a solution evolved by the peoples of the Islands themselves to meet their own needs and wishes; and thus it will fulfil the aims of this Organization.
97. We are well aware that the political advance of such small territories is perhaps the simplest of the tasks of decolonization. It is an undeniable fact, however unpleasant, that the most difficult colonial problems now remaining involve internal racial tensions. Such tensions may delay the emergence of a territory into independent nationhood but they have not in the past proved insuperable. It is necessary only to cite the recent examples of Jamaica, Trinidad and Malaysia. To submerge racial tensions in political unity requires a considerable act of courage by the races concerned. But it is an act of courage which must be made. Segregation seems to us no basis for an independent State. If the races cannot yet make this act of faith and courage, the United Nations has a responsibility to do its utmost to assist them. New Zealand's support this session will be given to attempts to do so.
98. Admittedly, the part which the United Nations can play in this process is not always an easy one. It is tempting to look for short cuts. We think there are none. .The structure of the United Nations is such that its most effective decolonizing weapon must always be its moral influence. The United Nations has an obligation to affirm and reaffirm the goals of equal opportunity; it has also an obligation to recognize and encourage progress towards this goal. But the United Nations cannot solve a society's problems for it. We believe, and our own experience of building a nation from two races gives rise to this belief, that the solution does not come overnight or just by wishing for the ideal. It is true that external influences can often play a valuable part in indicating the direction in which progress might be sought, but they can never eliminate the need for the often painful process of adjustment which must take place within a racially-discordant society.
99. Fortunately, with determination and goodwill this adjustment can and does take place. It is a process which we believe must take place in Southern Rhodesia. The future of Southern Rhodesia cannot help but be of special concern to New Zealand, for we are a member of the Commonwealth and take pride in terming it multiracial. Several months ago, New Zealand and some other members of the Commonwealth conveyed to the Governments involved our hopes of a peaceful and just solution and our concern that progress towards independence should be linked, through a widening of the franchise, to the proper representation of the people. We shall continue to use any influence we possess in this matter to assist and encourage the constitutional development of Southern Rhodesia towards its acknowledged goal of equal opportunity for all its citizens 7 That this goal should be reached peacefully must be the desire of every Member of this Organization. We hope especially that the various members of the Commonwealth will be able to exert whatever particular influence they may have to promote peace with justice in Central Africa.
100. South Africa seems to us a problem of an entirely different and much more saddening kind. We have counselled moderation towards South Africa in the past, sincerely believing it to be the best course. It has, we must admit, evoked no positive response from the South African Government. Moderation has been condemned as ineffectual; other and more extreme alternatives are being urged. Are extreme courses likely to succeed where moderation has failed? It is a matter for careful consideration whether they would help bring the system of apartheid to an end, or whether, in the present circumstances, they would succeed only in damaging this Organization. As the years pass and the system of apartheid remains, international impatience and distress, especially on the part of the African countries, increase. We should examine all possible courses most carefully in the recognition that we share the same ideal of human dignity and the same objectives —the enjoyment by all people of South Africa of a decent human society.
101. The questions I have discussed are all major problems of the world community. A problem strictly of more concern to the Organization itself but equally vital to the world at large, and particularly to a small country like New Zealand, is the financial crisis of the United Nations.
102. At its fourth special session in May 1963, the General Assembly attempted to deal with the financial burdens weighing on the United Nations. In spite of every effort little progress was made. While the majority overwhelmingly reasserted the principle of collective responsibility, the Soviet Union and some other countries actually extended the range of expenses to which they refused to contribute. This session of the Assembly is meeting, therefore, in the knowledge that some of its Members are not at present prepared to assume their share of the costs of keeping the peace. We are meeting in the knowledge that the denial by some Members of the collective principle is throwing into doubt the capacity of the United Nations to act effectively, whether in its primary role of keeping the peace or in the vital tasks of the Decade of Development.
103. The General Assembly has invited those who have hitherto refused to pay to make a special effort, without prejudice to their political or juridical objections, to cover their debts. If the United Nations is to continue "to play its part as the guardian of peace" —to use the Soviet Foreign Minister's phrase— it needs the cooperation of those who, by exercising a financial veto, have been attempting to dictate United Nations policy. If an "international 'détente'" is to encompass the interests of all nations, the small as well as the large, it should extend to a solution of the United Nations financial crisis.
104. Many speakers have observed that the present most welcome improvement in international relations holds an opportunity for removing some of the obstacles which still stand in the way of our hopes for peaceful co-operation between East and West. My Government shares in the general expectation that the Foreign Ministers' talks which are going on outside this hall will give substance to these hopes. But another opportunity is also presented —the opportunity to strengthen and develop the capacity of the United Nations to keep the peace and to make its own contribution to the growth of co-operation between East and West, and between rich and poor. We are concerned most earnestly that this opportunity also should be grasped now; and that from the efforts to reconcile national interests should emerge a stronger sense of international community.
105. Further crucial steps towards the solution of the most intractable problems of our time can certainly be taken by the great Powers themselves. But general, world-wide disarmament will not be achieved by this means alone. The gulf between rich and poor countries will not be bridged by this means alone. These things will be assured only through the development of a true sense of international community —which implies a determination by all of us to understand each other's wishes and help meet each other's needs, the large among us as well as the small, the rich as well as the poor, the old as well as the new. The United Nations is the sole institutional framework within which the still frail sense of international community can develop. We must therefore examine every course of action —and New Zealand for its part will do so— not only for its contribution to solving any given problem but also for its effect on the future of the Organization itself.