Singapore

Last year we met in a celebratory mood. But after every party comes the sober dawn, and we now face the sombre reality that the United Nations risks marginalization. Its role in the twenty-first century is not to be taken for granted. The sad truth is that today the United Nations plays little or no practical role in the management of the most important political, strategic and economic questions of our time. But this was not always the case as we recall: the United Nations played a significant role in easing the pangs of decolonization. Even at the height of the cold war, the United Nations was not an unimportant instrument through which the super-Powers could manage regional proxy conflicts and, on occasion, even direct nuclear confrontation. This contrast with its past should lead us to regard the present and future of the United Nations with deep concern. We can no longer postpone a critical examination of fundamental issues. It is for this reason that my delegation is especially gratified to see Malaysia occupy the presidency of the General Assembly at this important turning point for the future of the United Nations. We in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) know Tan Sri Razali Ismail for his commitment and clear thinking. I can do no better than echo what you, Mr. President, said about reform in the first plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its fifty-first session; we entirely agree with you. The interminable debates about the need for United Nations reform have led to precious little real reform. These debates have served to conceal and not to clarify basic issues. An important theme has been the need for greater efficiency; we all support that. No one can seriously argue against more productivity, better management and less waste. The key question, however, is: efficient to do what? What kind of United Nations do we really want and for what purposes? We all know that the purposes of the United Nations are enshrined in the very first Article of the Charter. Nevertheless, the answers are not self- evident. We all know that the first of the United Nations purposes is “To maintain international peace and security”. But what does this mean? The more extravagant post-cold war hopes for a new Agenda for Peace have proved illusory. The failure of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) raises troubling questions about the role of the United Nations after the cold war. The essential lesson to be drawn from UNPROFOR’s fate is not merely how the Security Council became a political theatre to assuage the domestic concerns of some of its principal members; nor is it only the truism that the United Nations could do no more than what its principal members allowed it to do. The real tragedy for the United Nations in Bosnia is that when the major Powers finally decided to get serious about what they determined to be a threat to international peace and security, their preferred instrument was clearly not the United Nations. Again, we all agree that poverty breeds conflict, and that the gap between the rich and poor is widening. Yet the Agenda for Development has been mired in theological arguments about the definition of sustainable development. Now I do not mean to suggest that clarity of objectives is unimportant. But the real issues are not that complicated, because what the least developed most urgently need is not intellectual sophistry but help: help to build the institutions and formulate the policies that will allow them to plug into the global economy. The United Nations has not adequately met these challenges. The stalemate in reform is not merely because of the difficulty of the questions or because of conflicting interests. Of course, the issues are thorny and differences in interests inevitable in any system of sovereign States. That is precisely why we need the United Nations, as the Charter envisages, “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations”. Why then is the United Nations today less able to perform this vital function? In my view, it is because it has been reluctant to adequately confront the implications of the two most significant developments of our time. First, the end of the cold war and, secondly, the emergence of a truly global world economy. The conjunction of these two events is changing the manner in which States relate to each other in unprecedented and fundamental ways. Yet these developments are at best 12 only imperfectly reflected in the United Nations. And any international organization that divorces itself from international realities has no future. The most obvious consequence for the United Nations since the end of the cold war has been the great increase in membership. But the change in the nature of Members has occasioned less comment. In 1945, small States, which I define as those having a population of 10 million or less, formed 59 per cent of a United Nations with 51 Members. Half a century later, in 1995, small States by the same definition formed the same percentage of a United Nations of 185 Members. And 23 of the 26 countries — more than 88 per cent — that joined the United Nations after 1989 were also small States. I expect that when the United Nations membership expands further, as it surely must, the majority of new Members will also be small States. This is because changes in the structure of the international economy engendered by technological advances and the end of the cold war have made size less important in the determination of a country’s viability. What matters most today is not merely the extent of a State’s frontiers or the wealth of its resources; the key is the ability of a State to integrate itself as part of a network, and size is irrelevant to this. The most important international networks are not composed of relations between States. The critical networks are increasingly defined by transnational patterns of relationships between cities, regions and subregions that may only imperfectly fit in with the formal political boundaries of individual States. This again makes a country’s size or its resources less important than its ability to access these networks. It is a fact that many small countries are also among the less developed. This is not surprising given the skewed distribution of international wealth. But the significant point is that to be small is no longer an automatic or fatal disability. It can even be advantageous. This has emboldened many to seek self-determination. And since the same trends have loosened the ability of capitals to control their peripheries, many have succeeded. Where economics leads, politics inevitably follows. Paradoxically, the political consequence of increasing economic integration of a globalized world economy is a certain loosening of political bonds. We see the effects of this most dramatically in the physical breakup of large and diverse States. But these are exceptional situations. Even when, as is more usual, the formal political boundaries remain intact, the ability of capitals of large and relatively homogeneous States to impose a single direction over all their constituent parts is clearly diminishing. Power is devolving everywhere. This trend is a new international reality. I do not wish to overstate the argument. So long as sovereignty remains the chief organizing principle of the international system, the exercise of force cannot be discounted in inter-State relations. In war, size is not entirely irrelevant, even though technology has made it something less than the totally decisive factor it was in the past. But war is an extreme condition of international relations. Under normal conditions, the very notions of power and wealth are being redefined and becoming more diffuse, their different dimensions less prone to be focused in just a few world capitals. Hierarchy is still a fact of international life. But what does it really mean to be a “great Power” at the end of the twentieth century? The very phrase today sounds anachronistic. Bereft of a simple strategic enemy, the post-cold-war foreign policy decision-making of the major Powers is increasingly localized, with domestic politics exercising greater impact. The policies of big Powers in a globalized world, where the economic and other interests of their component parts may be at odds with those of the capital, is becoming less coherent. The very notion of a single national interest is becoming somewhat ambiguous. All this is making it increasingly difficult for even the biggest countries to routinely bring their power to bear in an interdependent world, where an attack on an opponent may well damage their own interests. Wielding power is becoming more unpredictable even for those who control its greatest instruments. It is not an accident that the big Powers are now somewhat more cautious about exercising power nakedly save in exceptional circumstances and against States that are marginal in the global economy. I do not mean to suggest that the traditional notion of international relations structured by the interactions of a few big Powers pursuing their individual national interests is entirely obsolete. But it is surely an inadequate description of the world today. The balance of military power is still important. But the strict distinction between high politics and low politics on which the traditional balance of power rested is increasingly blurred. Now, all this ought to make a consultative, multilateral process more attractive to everyone, and not 13 less attractive. Alas, this is not so. Herein lies the root of the problems of the United Nations. All States, big and small, are adjusting to the changing international system. Indeed they have no choice. But not all are choosing to do so in or through the United Nations. In the United Nations, most of the Powers that we traditionally designate as “great” have reacted with varying degrees of disquiet to these new international realities. Some, troubled by their decreasing ability to control events even within their own frontiers, are frustrated at their inability to impose their order on what is perceived as a recalcitrant, unfamiliar and intrusive Organization. Others see a threat to their position and prestige. Psychological adjustments are always the most difficult to make. It is thus not surprising that in the United Nations their reflex reaction has generally been a stubborn defence of the status quo. In discussions on United Nations reform, this simple fact is all too often obscured by the use of arcane and convoluted jargon. I am encouraged, Mr. President, by your reputation for plain speaking, for pulling aside the veil of rhetoric and letting the truth be known. If the United Nations is to be marginalized, let the responsibility clearly be seen to lie where it should. This is most evident in the two most critical and inter-related areas: Security Council reform and finance. Discussions on Security Council reform have emphasized the Council's size and composition, and in particular the possibility of the admission of new permanent members. There is a wide consensus that in the event that there should be agreement for an increase in the permanent membership, an increase only by industrialised countries would be unacceptable. Many countries agree that Japan and Germany should become new permanent members when consensus is reached on the expansion of the Security Council. Nevertheless, crucial ambiguities remain about whether new permanent members should have the veto. It is especially difficult to imagine major Powers allowing developing countries the veto over their policies. And therefore the stalemate continues. There is also widespread agreement that Security Council reform should comprise a comprehensive package that would include changes in the working methods of the Security Council in the direction of greater transparency and participation by the membership of the Organization as a whole. But the permanent members have been reluctant to admit any but the most cosmetic of changes to the Security Council’s working methods. Yet this is the most critical aspect of Security Council reform for the small States which form the majority of United Nations Members. Small countries do not aspire to permanent membership. But as the principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council’s working methods and its decision- making processes are of vital and legitimate interest to them because they can have direct a impact on their security. One of the most important and innovative proposals currently on the table is for a reinterpretation of Article 31 of the Charter. This would allow greater participation by non-members in informal Security Council consultations when questions affecting them are being considered. It was extremely discouraging that this modest proposal was categorically rejected by almost every permanent member. Indeed, most refused even to seriously discuss it. It must surely be a basic principle of elementary justice that parties most directly affected by a particular situation should be allowed to present their views directly to the body that will have the most influence over any action that the United Nations may take on that situation. That is in fact the precise reason why Article 31 was included in the Charter in the first place. The intention was clearly to reconcile great-Power leadership with the principle of sovereign equality. Informal consultations are an innovation that has evolved over the years. All the most important decisions the Security Council takes today are made informally by permanent members. Even the participation of non- permanent members in the real decisions is sometimes more symbolic than significant. Formal meetings are clearly only a choreographed ritual to set the final seal of approval. A reinterpretation of Article 31 would not require an amendment to the Charter, nor would it mean that non-members must participate in all informal consultations. It is therefore no real threat to the authority of the permanent members; it is just an important reform that would undoubtedly enhance the legitimacy, and hence the general acceptability and effectiveness, of Security Council decision-making by bringing the process more in tune with the temper of our times. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that the size and composition of the Security Council are unimportant. I understand the merit of the claims for new permanent membership that have been advanced by both industrialized and developing countries. Singapore supports the expansion of the Security Council by up to five new permanent members as part of a 14 comprehensive package that would, among other things, include the consequent adjustment of non-permanent membership to maintain a balanced ratio. But given the profound changes in international relations that are under way, refusing to seriously discuss anything but membership, and even that with critical ambiguities, would be akin to trying to prepare the United Nations for the twenty-first century by applying a nineteenth-century model of great- Power politics to it. The same resistance to seriously engaging the legitimate interests of the small-State majority of United Nations Members also underlies the financial problems of the United Nations. No one disagrees that the key reason for the cash flow problems of the United Nations is the failure of Member States to pay their dues in full and on time. There are various reasons why various Member States have not met their legal obligations. Some are poor. But no one has ever suggested that the largest debtor lacks the capacity to pay. Its argument is that its assessed contributions must be reduced because the state of its domestic political consensus does not permit it to sustain its current share of the United Nations budget. The financial burdens, it is consequently argued, ought therefore be more widely spread. I do not lightly dismiss such arguments. They reflect the increasing difficulty of defining and exercising great power that I had earlier called one of the new international realities. I can therefore sympathize with such arguments. But it is not politically acceptable to pick and choose which of the new realities to emphasize when useful, and which to ignore when inconvenient. Several permanent members have complained of the financial burdens they bear, and have sought to spread them more widely. But there has never been any suggestion by any of the big Powers that their control over critical United Nations expenditure decisions, in particular peacekeeping expenditures, should be proportionately diffused among the majority of small countries which would be expected to take up the financial slack that they want to discard. All the permanent members have been reluctant to allow anything more than the most superficial reexamination of their authority or their relationship with the membership as a whole. Discussions on the role of the General Assembly, which is the only universal and truly representative United Nations organ, have touched mainly on peripheral issues, such as the timing of plenary meetings, the duration of the general debate and the organization of the General Assembly’s work. No one should disagree that to put the United Nations on a sound financial basis ought to be a common endeavour. We certainly do not. But it must really be a collective enterprise involving fair give and take. Political resistance coalesces because it has become clear that the majority are expected to give, while the few only take. Resistance is underscored by the historical fact that the percentage financial contributions of all permanent members, except France, have been steadily reduced over the years while their privileges have not. Resistance is strengthened by the recollection that the United Nations has in fact repeatedly made the financial adjustments asked for, but as yet without any appreciable change in the payment record of the largest contributor. I do not suggest that this situation is the result of a deliberate policy, since no country takes any pleasure in being unable to pay its dues for whatever reason. But it is politically incongruous and basically unfair to ask the majority to assume a greater share of the financial burdens without at the same time being prepared to allow them any more authority over the most important expenditure decisions. It is untenable to have an almost total separation between the authority for launching peacekeeping operations and how and who should pay for them. The United Nations is the only organization in which a small number of Members run up the largest bills while everybody else pays them. The stubborn defence of the status quo is all the more striking because no one has asked for anything more than the most modest and incremental adjustments to the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council to allow the general membership a little greater participation in and shared responsibility for the decision-making with the greatest budgetary implications. Singapore is, of course, a small State, and I do not claim to be a disinterested party. As a small State, we are passionately concerned about and vitally engaged in the future of the United Nations. However, our drawing attention to the real obstacles to reform is not just in the interests of small countries alone. I have suggested that the paradoxical political consequence of a globalized world economy is a certain enhancement of centrifugal tendencies everywhere. A universal international organization to play an integrative role is therefore needed by everyone, big and small, if this is not to lead to conflict. Only the United Nations can play this role, and if it did not exist, we would have had to invent it. But the United Nations can play this 15 integrative role only if the legitimate aspirations of the small States are not ignored and if the majority do not become increasingly alienated from the very Organization that purports to represent them. Some may dismiss the distance between the rhetoric and the reality of the big-Power attitude towards United Nations reform as simple hypocrisy. I do not accept such a simplistic explanation. I can empathize with the far more complex and wrenching psychological adjustments that the big Powers need to make. The big Powers must summon the political courage to begin this process and embrace the reality of, and necessity for, change. I appeal to them to work with us, the small-State majority, to make this truly a United Nations for all — all — its Members. Prestige does not depend solely on privilege, and power shared is not power lost. The new international realities are making a zero-sum conception of State power obsolete. A credible United Nations, one that is not regarded as the mere tool of its largest Members, will be a more effective instrument for the foreign policies of all its Members, big and small. In closing, let me say that my delegation looks forward to close collaboration with you, Sir, and all other members over the next year to advance a collective vision of a truly representative, effective and united United Nations for the twenty-first century.