Never before have men throughout the world more fervently and unanimously wished for peace. Never have they seen more clearly than now the horror and the vanity of war. And yet, through an irony of fate, never has the whole earth resounded more loudly to the clash of arms. Never have the nations, in times of peace, made such an effort to rearm.
115. This cruel paradox is not of recent origin. The threat that weighs upon us has been increasing week by week for the past three or four years, Two and a half months ago, out of a sky already heavy with dark clouds, the aggression against South Korea came like a bolt of lightning. In this exceptionally serious situation, the United Nations lived up to the trust which the free peoples had placed in it. It reacted promptly and unequivocally. At the moment, all eyes are upon it.
116. In spite of the disappointments of these last few years, this time everyone has come to New York with the stubborn hope that the Assembly will have something new to offer to the cause of peace, that it will help to enlighten men’s minds and to determine responsibilities, that it will once more appeal to forces whose names are familiar to us — justice, international-co-operation, law, security, the principles of the Charter. We have used these great, just and noble words so much that they have become worn; in the eyes of some they have lost part of their attraction and prestige. And we must admit that they have sometimes been abused in an attempt to conceal sordid interests or reprehensible actions. Yet we cannot do without them; they arise before us every time we undertake a great task. That is because these words express the ideal for which we fought and the great truth which we tried to incorporate in the Charter of the United Nations, and without which nothing would be left in the world but the law of the jungle.
117. Without, however, abandoning these high and necessary goals, we must face realities. The Korean adventure has helped us to do that. It has spelled out a triple lesson which our generation will never forget.
118. First, it has shown that aggression is still one of the means to which rulers dare to resort to further their plans.
119. Secondly, it has shown that military preparations carried on behind a curtain of mystery sometimes pay, in that they may give the aggressor a real though temporary advantage.
120. Lastly, it has shown that when preparations to repel aggression have not been made in time, there is no choice but to make the effort later under the pressure of events, though under much more difficult conditions.
121. These are not, of course, the only lessons of the Korean affair. It would be well if some of them were weighed on the other side of the fence as well,
122. Thus, it already seems clear that violence and surprise succeed for a relatively short period only.
123. Furthermore, it has been most comforting to see that moral force and the force of law still operate in our era. There is still such a thing as the conscience of mankind. It would be equally unrealistic to ignore the psychological reaction to the use of violence.
124. Finally, the United Nations has shown that in certain circumstances it can be, even as the Charter says, “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends”.
125. It may not be out of place to refer briefly to recent events. When right, after it has been flouted, is again supported by might, it ultimately triumphs. The Nazis learned this to their cost. And even as the United Nations is fighting in Korea to stop aggression, we are gathered here to seek, as is our duty, the means of strengthening the right, of preventing aggression, and of avoiding war.
126. From the first day, the general debate in the Assembly justified the high regard in which that forum of the United Nations is held everywhere. The representatives of several great countries at once began to deal with the most important problems. The Brazilian representative spoke in distinguished terms of eternal principles and of experiences which, even when they were disappointing, were most instructive. Today the representatives of the Netherlands and Chile followed in the same strain to speak with frankness and clarity. On the very first day the United States representative, in a particularly constructive speech, made positive suggestions concerning ways of preventing possible aggression and of pursuing more effectively our struggle against all forms of human hardship, hunger, fear, disease. The USSR representative repeated the principles which he says his country proposes to observe in the pursuit of a policy of peace.
127. Those two last statements, given the circumstances in which we find ourselves and the power of the two nations on whose behalf they were made, are necessarily of very special significance and must not be left without reply. In the name of the Belgian delegation, I wish to comment on some of their aspects.
128. We listened with mixed feelings indeed to the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union. When, with befitting words, he spoke of exalted principles, we felt astonishment, some incredulity and yet some hope; but when, on the contrary, he made allegations which have been repeated often and almost as a matter of routine and which are contrary to facts reliably known to us, amazement, doubt and at times even indignation marked our reactions.
129. I had listened attentively to Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech [279th meeting]. I then re-read it, word for word. I found in it many sentences to which I would subscribe without hesitation, for they express the ideal tor which, together with so many men of good-will, we have been fighting in the international scene since our youth. Here are some examples, and I quote: "[An answer must be given] to the question of what should be done… by the General Assembly… to respond clearly and firmly to the urgent appeal of the conscience of millions of human beings who hate war and long for peace.” That is correct. “At the present moment the problems with which the United Nations is faced — averting the menace of a new war, strengthening co-operation among nations and ensuring international peace and security — have become even more acute.” “[The United Nations is] based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all its Members, respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of every State ...”
130. I could go on with such quotations. If we could unreservedly believe in such declarations of principle, if they were not in conflict with a series of actions carried out so far under auspices of the Soviet Union, we should certainly have cause for rejoicing.
131. I should like, incidentally, to refer to two points in Mr, Vyshinsky’s speech, in order to define our own position: the condemnation of the armaments race and the renewed suggestion for a policy of disarmament.
132. The attitude adopted by Belgium from the outset, that is to say, from the time of the League of Nations, has never varied: we have always favoured, and continue to favour, a policy leading to a reduction of armaments, gradual, concerted, general, balanced, effectively supervised reduction; we have never missed an opportunity to support the efforts, made here and elsewhere, for international disarmament. We are not relinquishing this ideal. Today, as in the past, we believe that the danger of war is inherent in a policy of competitive armament; such a policy imposes upon the peoples of the world burdens which involve a waste of strength and slow down the rate of social progress.
133. A disarmament policy, however, can be contemplated only if it is truly multilateral; it must be sincere, realistic, honest from the start and protected by concerted guarantees. It must be pursued by all the nations. It must develop in an atmosphere of trust; and this atmosphere can exist only if nothing is hidden from the nations voluntarily prepared to entrust themselves to one another’s good faith and good-will.
134. It is surely obvious that such an atmosphere is entirely incompatible with the policy of absolute secrecy maintained behind an iron curtain.
135. There exists, however, a danger to peace even more serious than the armaments race. That is unilateral disarmament, an international situation in which one group of States foregoes the preparation of its defences, while another group devotes its best efforts to the development of its armaments.
136. On this point we, the representatives of the free nations, are able to state that our conscience is clear. After the last war, our countries acted with complete honesty; they did, of course, comply with the specific commitments they had entered into in respect of international co-operation, but they did even more — they retained, for as long as possible, the feelings of esteem and solidarity which they had for their war-time allies. If we must reproach ourselves for anything, it is for having pushed those feelings to the point of imprudence. Our countries believed in peace. They disarmed rapidly. They neglected to take the precautions which were perhaps indicated. In running this risk, some of us have tried to give an irrefutable token of the purity of our intentions. But we were grievously disappointed. For while we were following this line, the Soviet Union was expanding its military equipment to a point which, so far as we know, has never yet been attained by any people in time of peace,
137. We are, I think, entitled to say to the Russians that if they had followed our example, disarmed while we did, stopped arming instead of rearming more and more intensively and checked their policy of expansion, the problem now before us would not have arisen, the organization of peace would proceed in an entirely different atmosphere. It is the Soviet Union which has brought about the armaments imbalance from which we are suffering. And such an imbalance invites war; it creates the danger of war more assuredly than anything else.
138. In the end, the free peoples, unable to achieve the general disarmament which they desired, have had to recognize that they had no choice but also to rearm. So far as they are concerned, this is not an armaments race; it is an attempt, undertaken reluctantly but resolutely, to redress the balance in armaments which has been disturbed by others, and so to restore the chances of peace. Such is the spirit in which we have allied ourselves under the Treaty of Brussels and the North Atlantic Treaty; such is the spirit in which we have decided now to regain the military strength of which we are capable.
139. If only the USSR representative, after mentioning the admirable principles which have never ceased to inspire us, had said, for example that the Soviet Union would scale down its military power to the level now prevailing in other countries, we should have had faith in the principles invoked and we should have been entirely willing, ourselves, to pursue once again, as zealously as in the past, the organization of the peace on the basis of disarmament. But the mere attempt to formulate such thoughts shows how vain — I was going to say naive — they are. Accordingly we are inevitably led back to the solution, which is admitted only with difficulty but is now quite settled, that at the present time the road to peace leads through the balance of armaments,
140. Hence we shall continue with all the energy at our command this policy of defence, of defence proper, of defence of the peace. Such a policy, however, does not at all release us from the obligation to carry on with the organization of international relations — political, economic and social — within the framework of the United Nations. On the contrary this policy makes it even more our bounden duty to carry on with this task.
141. I thus arrive quite naturally at the specific proposals [A/1377] made by the United States Secretary of State for strengthening international co-operation and fortifying the bulwarks against aggression.
142. Far be it from me to take Issue with Mr. Vyshinsky’s argument that the great Powers have a special function to perform in the maintenance of peace. I agree with him that it is extremely important “that five Powers — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union — should unite their efforts towards peace”.
143. Nor do I fail to realize that the Charter itself has conferred upon the Security Council the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. But we should dwell on this point a little longer. Those who settled the terms of the Charter at San Francisco were inspired by the hope that the five great Powers would continue to act as they had done during the war, that is to say, in harmony, with a common outlook on the essential points.
144. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the facts; this hope has been disappointed, this foundation has collapsed, the Security Council has not' functioned as it should have done. The mere fact that one of the great Powers has seen fit to exercise its right of veto forty-four or forty-five times shows that there is a flaw in the mechanism of the Security Council.
145. But surely this is not a good enough reason for us to give up the whole business as a bad job, to forego recourse either to the Security Council or to the United Nations. It is our duty to take fullest advantage of everything the Charter offers. We have the right to make use of every single one of its Articles; they are all of equal value.
146. That is why we regard as timely and practical Mr. Acheson’s suggestions for expanding, in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, the function of the Assembly. In cases where the very purposes of the United Nations — promoting peace, fighting against aggression — are at stake, the Assembly is not relieved of its own responsibilities by the mere fact that some other organ of the United Nations falls short of its task; on the contrary, in such a contingency the Assembly has an added responsibility.
147. In adopting this attitude, my country remains faithful to a policy which it has followed ever since the establishment of the United Nations. At San Francisco our representatives on several occasions sponsored proposals or supported amendments all of which were designed to give the Assembly a more important and more decisive role.
148. We have no desire to recall past history, nor on this occasion do we advocate amendments to the Charter. We simply take the view that it would be wise and expedient to make use of all the opportunities afforded by the Charter for the more effective attainment of the purposes of the. Organization.
149. _ We therefore support the idea of simplifying the conditions under which a special session of the Assembly could be called in case of emergency.
150. We also favour the creation by the Assembly of something in the nature of a standing commission of inquiry which, with the consent of the country concerned, could immediately visit any area in which an international conflict appeared to be imminent; the idea is a sound one and reflects the experience gained by the Organization in a variety of circumstances and again, quite recently, in Korea.
151. Lastly, we consider that it would be useful for the Assembly to give immediate consideration to practical methods of utilizing the forces which the United Nations would place at the service of the purposes and principles of the Charter.
152. But we should be so happy if we could go beyond the sphere of strictly defensive measures, of measures designed solely to remove a threat, to safeguard the peace. We should be so happy if we could devote all our attention and all our efforts to constructive measures. There is so much we could do to create wealth, to make that new wealth available to men, to raise the standard of living, to improve health, to prolong life and to open wider doors that lead to the highest realms of the spirit.
153. Nothing, however, prevents us from undertaking these multifarious tasks at one and the same time. For our part, we consider it right and necessary that, as soon as Korea has been liberated from aggression, the United Nations should help the Korean people in the task of reconstruction with which it will be faced. This must be a twofold effort; on the one hand, we must rebuild the ruins caused by the war and, on the other, we must take the opportunity to help Korea in rapidly reducing the gap which separates its economic and social circumstances from those of the more advanced countries.
154. We wish to associate ourselves straightaway with a great project whose conception, in present circumstances, Is at once an act of faith, of hope and of human solidarity. When peace has been assured, when an effective organization of international relations has given the peoples security for the future, when it has become possible to reduce the crushing burdens imposed on national budgets by the struggle for equality of armaments, the resources thus released must be used to sustain an immense and common effort to make available to the less advanced nations the means of overcoming their backwardness and of attaining full economic and social development. This is an idea which is at once generous, realistic and fruitful. The sooner it can be carried into effect, the sooner will the world regain stability in peace and progress.
155, As you see, I find myself impelled to repeat, in concluding these remarks, the great and noble words I used at the beginning — universal peace, international stability, progress and prosperity. But why, after all, should we fear these words, since we are sincere? It is for us to give them their true meaning, scope and prestige.
156. We are none of us under any illusion as to the effort which such an undertaking will entail or the serious risks which we shall continue to run, perhaps for a long time to come. But what does it matter? Our duty is plain. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Let us act. And perhaps eventually our generation, on completing its task, will leave to its successor a world which is better ordered, in which the past may be thought of with gratitude and pride and the future may be contemplated without anxiety and even, perhaps, with calm and steadfast hope.