Sir, I have already made brief reference to your election to the position of President of this Assembly and I now amplify that reference in this general debate, because your elevation is a matter of pride and satisfaction to the people of New Zealand, as it must of course be to yourself. Those associated with you here know the vigour and enthusiasm you have shown in your work as permanent representative of New Zealand in this Organization. Your experience here will provide a splendid background against which you will carry out your duties as President. Throughout your career in New Zealand you have taken a keen interest in international affairs and have fostered in your own country a wider public knowledge of world events. The Government and people of New Zealand wish you well in your important position, which I am sure you will fill with great credit.
114. This session of the General Assembly will be concerned with a number of pressing political issues. Among these, the subjugation of Hungary has a strong continuing claim to our attention. The issues which disturb peace in the Middle East demand early and resolute action. The imperative need for an effective international agreement on disarmament overshadows all the other questions which may affect peace and security. I shall return to these issues; but first I should like to make some broader observations.
115. The vitality of the United Nations is reflected, not only in the scope of the Assembly’s agenda, but also in its growing and nearly universal membership. It is particularly gratifying to my country that Ghana and The Federation of Malaya, the two States which have been admitted to the Organization this year, are both members of the Commonwealth to which New Zealand also belongs. We look forward to co-operating with their representatives in this Assembly and at other United Nations meetings.
116. Both Ghana and the Federation of Malaya have come to nationhood by the process of peaceful evolution, which has been so notable a feature of the post-war world. Within the Commonwealth other nations are in the process of emerging in that way. We are confident that they too will seek and gain admission to this Organization when they attain full sovereignty.
117. I wish, Mr. President, that I could speak with equal certainty of the day when the partitioned States of Europe and Asia would be free to find their own destiny, and an open door to membership of this Organization. The way to the reunification of Germany continues to be barred, because the Soviet Union will not permit the people of the Soviet-controlled area of Germany to choose their own form of government freely.
118. For similar reasons, the representatives of the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam have not been able to take their places in this Assembly. Yet Viet-Nam, for example, will next month be host to all the countries participating in the Colombo Plan. In that circle, Viet-Nam is an equal and an adult nation. There will be a continuing injustice until these partitioned States are restored to themselves and are freed from all disabilities.
119. As I have had occasion to speak of our growing membership, I should like to add a few thoughts about the political functioning of the Assembly itself. Informal consultation among delegations is an essential part of the process by which Assembly and committee decisions are influenced. The more there is of this consultation, the more likely it is that the decision will represent the reasoned view of the majority of delegations. Yet, as the membership grows, it becomes more and more difficult to maintain a full range of consultation.
120. This is a problem which specially affects the smaller delegations such as my own. To form a sound opinion about one's own course of action, one must take account of other points of view. And these cannot always be gauged solely from the formal statements made during a meeting. It is therefore easy to conclude that, as meetings grow larger, more reliance must be placed on consultation within various groupings.
121. It is beyond question that these groupings play a very useful role. It is natural and proper that delegations which have much in common should first consult among themselves. We, for our own part, attach special importance to our regular consultations with other Commonwealth delegations, and we readily understand the growth in consultation and co-operation within other groupings.
122. Even so, I think it is evident that the system of group consultation should not come to play too large a part in the shaping of Assembly decisions. Few of the issues before the Assembly are so clear that they admit no divergence of opinion between different groups or even within those groups; and similarity of interest or outlook should not usually be a more important factor than individual judgement. Perhaps the only valid conclusions are these: a larger Assembly increases the need for group consultation, but it should not increase the influence of the group over its own Members.
123. The Assembly which reconvened on the eve of this session has endorsed, with few dissentient voices, the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary [A/35921. The report is a conclusive account of a grave breach of the Charter. Resolution 1133 (XI), adopted with the support of sixty nations, emphasizes the gravity of that breach.
124. It emphasizes also a grim disparity between Soviet deeds and Soviet words. Earlier in this debate, [681st meeting] the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union laid stress on the need for measures to enhance the authority of the United Nations and to ease international tension. With this in mind, he put before the Assembly a draft declaration on the principles of peaceful co-existence among States. [A/3673] Can Mr. Gromyko be surprised, while our deliberations on Hungary are fresh in our minds, that we should weigh these draft principles against Soviet conduct in Hungary? One principle is equality and mutual benefit. But in Hungary the Soviet Union intervened to perpetuate a cruel inequality and to deprive the Hungarians of the right to order their own lives. Another principle is respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. But in Hungary the Soviet Union sent armed forces into the territory of a small neighbour to overthrow an established government. A third principle is noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. But in Hungary the Soviet Union intervened to extinguish freedom and to re-impose a cruel conformity.
125. Nothing that the Soviet Union has said at the current or at the last session of the General Assembly, nothing that the Soviet Union may say in the future, here or elsewhere, can alter the facts. There can be no further argument about what was done in Hungary. In the five-Power report, [A/35921 the Assembly has an unassailable record of the origin, course and consequences of a brutal and unremitting attack on the liberties of a proud people.
126. As long as the Soviet Union continues to defy the resolutions of the General Assembly, as long as it denies the Hungarian people the right to decide their own destinies, so long must the United Nations, by the most effective means available to it, continue to manifest its concern with the Hungarian issue. I know that my Government is not alone in this conviction.
127. In Prince Wan Waithayakon, who presided with conspicuous skill and distinction over the eleventh session of the General Assembly, the United Nations is fortunate to have a representative eminently well qualified to carry out the duties entrusted to him. [resolution 1133 (XI)]. As I have said before from this rostrum, [672nd meeting] the issuer are momentous, bearing as they do on the continuing defiance by a Member State of this Organization's resolutions and of the moral judgement of the world. World opinion waits for the response of the Soviet rulers to the Assembly's resolutions about Hungary.
128. In another troubled area, great nations and small gave practical demonstrations of respect for the Assembly's wishes. Open hostilities in the Middle East were ended. The forces of other countries were withdrawn from Egyptian territory. Relative quiet has prevailed along the armistice lines between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States.
129. We should, however, remember that this condition of peace is due in large measure to the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force. In many ways, the establishment of UNEF [563rd meeting] has shown this Organization at a high level of practical achievement. When the representative of Canada made here the imaginative proposal for the creation of such a force, the response of the General Assembly was impressive and immediate. The speed and skill with which UNEF was organized reflect great credit on the Secretary-General and his staff. The conduct of UNEF itself, and the good judgement of its Commander, have amply justified the Assembly's confidence.
130. These developments have been accompanied by other improvements in the Middle East situation. The Suez Canal has been cleared. To a large extent the Canal has again become what it was always intended to be: a free, commercial waterway linking the countries east of Suez, as far away as Australia and New Zealand, with the countries of Europe and the West.
131. Finally, a new source of support, both economic and military, has been afforded to the countries of the Middle East. In a period in which power relationships have shifted, the Eisenhower doctrine has offered help and encouragement in an area where stability has been gravely undermined.
132. Important as these gains are, they have yet to be consolidated and extended before any lasting achievement can be claimed. This is one of the greatest of the challenges which face the present session of the General Assembly; and it is as well that we should take stock of the problems still to be resolved.
133. It is true, as I have said, that quiet prevails on the armistice lines; but the bitterness of Arab-Israel relations has not diminished. The United Nations Emergency Force provides a buffer, but the will to achieve a lasting settlement has not yet appeared on either side.
134. Shipping is once more passing through the Suez Canal, but the conditions of passage are by no means satisfactory. As long as Israel shipping is prevented from using the Canal, the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 will not be fully carried out, and the international character of the waterway will be infringed.
135. In my Government's view, freedom of navigation demands that the Canal be operated under a system which treats the ships of all nations alike. Moreover, this system, while being of benefit to Egypt, should offer adequate guarantees of efficient and stable management in the international interest. The Security Council, in considering the Egyptian Government's declaration of 24 April 1957 concerning the operation of the Canal, referred to aspects which still required clarification. Failing such clarification, my Government can feel no assurance that the controlling power will not be misused.
136. As the past year has shown, the weaknesses and dissensions of the Middle East increase the ever present dangers of Communist domination. With the terrible example of Hungary before them, it might have been expected that all Governments in the area would have rallied to resist the spread of Soviet influence. In fact, however, the Soviet Union has found new opportunities to exploit not only international tension but also political difficulties and divisions within individual Middle Eastern countries. In one such country at least the Soviet Union appears to have succeeded in establishing a beachhead of subversion.
137. We have seen that when vigilance and efforts are relaxed the Communist danger advances like a forest fire, consuming everything in its path. It is this which gives an added urgency to the need for a lasting settlement of the problems of the Middle East. As many speakers noted during last year's debates, it is not enough that we should restore the conditions prevailing before the recent hostilities in Egypt. The General Assembly must look beyond the results of tension to its causes, and must work for the removal or correction of those causes. We must indeed make up for the years before last year, when the problems existed but failed to attract the Assembly's attention.
138. Though various suggestions have been made in the past, the Assembly has yet to determine how best to approach the question of permanent solutions. It may indeed be true that we have so far accomplished as much as could have been expected in so short a time. Certainly, the presence of UNEF in the area is helping to create the conditions in which further practical steps can more readily be undertaken. Equally, we cannot afford to do without UNEF until we are able to resolve the difficulties and tensions which it keeps in check.
139. The first test, therefore, is that of our willingness to keep UNEF in being and to assure its financial support. Here the record is not very encouraging. The United Nations Emergency Force is the creation of this Assembly, and UNEF itself is the chosen instrument of this Organization. Yet the facts, as I understand them, are these. Of the first 10 million dollars, which were to be subscribed in accordance with the ordinary budgetary assessments, little more than half has been paid. The voluntary subscriptions, which have come from six contributors only, have added another million dollars. Of the estimated cost up to the end of this year, less than one-third is in sight.
140. Unless Member States show greater willingness to contribute to its support on an equitable basis, there is a clear danger that UNEF will come to an end. My own Government believes that its maintenance is essential. We have already contributed to its upkeep, both in accordance with our budgetary assessment and on a voluntary basis. We are prepared to continue to play our part in the future, while the need for UNEF remains. At the same time, we feel that the effort to deal with the underlying problems of the Middle East must be intensified.
141. If the Middle East presents the territorial issue which most requires our attention, the problem of disarmament faces this Assembly with an even greater challenge. For eleven years the topics of disarmament and the control of atomic weapons have figured prominently on each session's agenda. Success has proved elusive, though sometimes - as earlier this year - it has seemed just within our grasp. The challenge is all the greater in view of the failures of the years gone by.
142. My Government is acutely conscious of the economic burden of defence, and of the dangerous tensions which always accompany a competition in armaments. Nevertheless, we are also convinced that the countries of the West cannot relax their defence efforts until there is international agreement to the controlled reduction of armaments. Without genuine reciprocity and an adequate system of inspection and control, disarmament would be disastrous folly.
143. The most recent negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have, of course, concentrated upon achieving a limited agreement about certain first steps. This aim was a modest one, and it could only have produced modest benefits. There would, however, be great virtue in any agreement, however limited, which removed disarmament from the realm of controversy and propaganda, and which showed that it could be made to work.
144. To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, I should stress that such an agreement would require the same kind of safeguards as a comprehensive agreement. The safeguards would, however, be on a smaller scale. They should therefore cause less difficulty for any State which is reluctant to accept necessary measures of control and inspection.
145. It is true that a disarmament agreement, like any other agreement, will limit the sovereign rights of the contracting parties. In the case of a disarmament agreement, this limitation will take the definite and concrete form of control posts and inspectors. This may seem inconvenient to certain countries; but I suggest that the inconvenience is a minor one to accept in order to reach a disarmament agreement and to ensure that it is carried out.
146. This aim of honest dealing and reliable safeguards is at the heart of the Western position on disarmament. It is true that the Soviet Union has accepted the idea of safeguards. Indeed it has made certain proposals for control and inspection. But these and other Soviet proposals fall far short of a genuine willingness to agree upon effective control measures on a basis of true reciprocity.
147. Similarly, the Soviet Union, playing on the reasonable fears of earnest people in all parts of the world, calls for an agreement to end the testing of nuclear weapons. But it declines to link this proposal with real disarmament measures.
148. My Government would welcome an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, but not at the price of submission to a Soviet bid for military advantage. Meanwhile, we are grateful for the restraint and care exercised by the United Kingdom and the United States in conducting such tests. It is heartening to know that they have already achieved a large measure of success in reducing the radio-active fall-out from explosions. We shall also await with keen interest next year's report of the Scientific Committee set up by this Assembly to determine the long-term effects of radiation in the atmosphere, [resolution 913 (X)]
149. The goal of a disarmament agreement, and of the cessation of weapons tests, remains primarily a matter for the three nuclear Powers, though it affects all of us closely. We must not cease to advocate, and we must not cease to hope for, such an agreement; but we can derive little encouragement from the present attitude of the Soviet Union. That country seeks both a propaganda and a military advantage by insisting on a cessation of nuclear tests in isolation from other initial measures.
150. That is the balm, the soothing mixture, which the Soviet Union offers to a fearful world. At the same time, it flaunts a new instrument of terror - an intercontinental ballistic missile. It continues to test its own weapons. It obstinately refuses to agree to the four-Power proposals put forward in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission [DC/113. annex 51 for a linked agreement both to cease testing nuclear weapons and to cease making the nuclear explosives used in those weapons.
151. My Government regards the four-Power proposals as fair and genuine. Despite the swift rejection of these proposals by the Soviet Union, we believe that the Sub-Committee’s recent series of meetings was most valuable. Because of these meetings we are all in a better position to decide what could and what could not be included in a first realistic programme of arms reduction, capable of being put into immediate effect.
152. The Assembly is now faced with a choice. It is a choice between deceptively simple proposals whose purpose is propaganda, and more complex proposals genuinely intended to bring about a solution. One alternative offers false security; the adoption of the other would be of long-term political and economic benefit. Much turns on our ability to distinguish between appearance and reality, and to reject specious and easy solutions.
153. The urgency of the problem makes us impatient for early success. The gravity of the problem requires us to endure a further round of negotiations, for success will come not in any spectacular way but from the progressive narrowing-down of differences among the great Powers. It is they who bear the main and ever-growing burden of responsibility. But this Assembly, acting in the spirit of the Charter, can separate truth from falsity, and point the way.