I have already, on 17 September [678th meeting], congratulated Sir Leslie Munro upon his election as our President. I repeat the good wishes which I then extended to him for a successful term of office. I should like also, if I may, to say a few words in tribute to his predecessor, Prince Wan Waithayakon. We are all most appreciative of the wisdom, statesmanship and charm with which he guided the deliberations of the General Assembly during a difficult session, and he joins the little band of those who have been presidents of the General Assembly — distinguished international elder statesmen. We are delighted to have seen three others here during this general debate, Mr. Aranha, Mr. Romulo and Mr. Padilla Nervo, and I understand another, Mr. Entezam, is to join us shortly. I said "elder statesmen", although in fact they all seem to share in common the elixir of perpetual youth - they all look younger each time one sees them.
24. The general debate is the opportunity for an annual stock-taking of the state of the world. The tone and the themes vary from year to year. This is the sixth time in seven consecutive years that I myself have been present at the general debate. There have been ups and downs, moments of optimism and of pessimism, of hope and of fear.
25. I was thinking the other day of the situation in 1951, when I came for the first time to the General Assembly, which was held that year in Paris. At that time a bitter war was being waged in Korea. Sustained hostilities were taking place in South-East Asia. International exchanges between the great Powers had reached an advanced state of recrimination. On disarmament, the two sides were barely in contact with one another. There was a deep-seated misunderstanding of the British position and policy on colonial affairs. There were many countries which, though worthy candidates for membership of the United Nations, had not yet been elected. That was in 1951. Therefore, when considering the world situation of today, with all the anxieties attendant upon it, do not let us be completely oblivious of the progress made in the past and of the problems already solved.
26. The first topic with which I want to deal is that of the United Nations itself. This debate is an appropriate opportunity for frank discussion of the state of the Organization — its achievements, its failures, its strength, its weaknesses, its standing in the world, the hopes for its development in the future.
27. We have all, I am sure, read the thoughtful comments of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report [A/3594/Add.1], in the passage dealing with the role of the United Nations. I think that I can accurately summarize his views as follows.
28. The United Nations is not a super-state. It is not a world authority enforcing its laws upon the nations. The General Assembly is not a parliament of individually elected members legislating for the world. The United Nations is an instrument of negotiation between Governments. It can blunt the edges of conflict between nations. It can serve a diplomacy of reconciliation. Its tendency is to wear away or break down differences and thus help towards solutions. In the Secretary-General’s view, the real limitations upon the actions of the Organization do not derive from the provisions of the Charter or from the system of one vote for one nation irrespective of strength or size. They result from the facts of international life at the present time. The balance of forces in the world sets the limits within which the power of the world Organization can develop. The Secretary-General points out that enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter continues to be reserved to the Security Council and that it has not been transferred to the General Assembly.
29. In the light of these considerations there are, in his view, promising opportunities for improving the practices and strengthening the institutions of the United Nations. He points out that in the past two years a certain evolution has taken place, and he hopes that this process of evolution of emphasis and practice will be pursued and broadened in the future. That seems to him a more important task than to attempt formal constitutional changes.
30. That is an imperfect, but I hope not an unfair or inaccurate summary of this most important passage in the Secretary-General’s introduction.
31. I think that the Government of the United Kingdom would broadly accept those views. We believe that a world instrument endowed with the necessary authority, as Sir Winston Churchill once said, is necessary for permanent peace in the world. That remains my own deep conviction. So far as the United Nations in its present state of development is concerned, it is unfair to blame it as an. institution for its shortcomings. Any blame there may be must be attributed to the Member States that collectively constitute the strength or weakness of the United Nations.
32. I share the belief that this Assembly has a most useful function to fulfil as a forum for international debate. I believe that this annual meeting affords an occasion for colleagues with similar responsibilities to meet together. I am told that some forty Foreign Ministers have been here during the past week.
33. The United Nations should also be a place for mediation and conciliation, for reducing sharpness in controversy and for promoting settlements. Certain most interesting new developments have taken place in the practices of the United Nations — for example, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. I listened with a great deal of sympathy to what Mr. Diefenbaker said yesterday [683rd meeting] about a permanent force.
34. Another most important role is to inspire and promote the work of the specialized agencies. They have been joined by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Their work is perhaps less spectacular and less publicized than that of the political organs of the United Nations, but it contributes in an outstanding manner to the fulfilment of some of the objects of the Charter.
35. On the other hand, it would be wrong to blind ourselves to the fact that there are some weaknesses or defects in the practical operation of the Organization. I know that in some quarters it is regarded as wrong to utter even the mildest criticism of the United Nations. I think that is a foolish attitude. Any comments of mine are designed to strengthen the institution, not to weaken it. We have to admit that in fact some controversies are sharpened by discussion here; that some countries, bitterly resentful of any criticism of their own internal affairs, are only too ready to use the United Nations procedures to interfere in those of other nations; that certain processes of evolution in human relations, political and otherwise, are complicated and not facilitated by bitter argument in this place.
36. Above all, if there grows up the belief that the Assembly has two standards, one for the law-abiding for those who are influenced by its views, and another, less stringent, for those who treat it with indifference, the Assembly will never build up its authority in the world.
37. However these things may be, I think that the Secretary-General's views should be studied with the greatest care by all those who believe, as I do, that the world has got to make a success of the United Nations. So very much depends upon that success, both for us and those who are to come after us.
38. And now for some of the matters which have been raised in the course of the general debate so far.
39. The Assembly listened with close attention to the speech of the Soviet representative on 20 September [681st meeting]. I think its tone was a little milder than that which he adopted in the Press conference which he gave just before he left Moscow. And that we can no doubt attribute to the calming influence of the United Nations. But when his speech is refined and analysed, I think it really can be reduced to the following propositions: first, let the Western countries disrupt the alliances which they formed to meet the threat from the Soviet Union; secondly, let the Western countries lay aside the weapons on which they principally rely to deter further Soviet aggression; thirdly, the Soviet Union promises in return to infiltrate and subvert with increased intensity all areas which are not already under its control. And that, I think, really is what his speech came down to. His propositions were really as simple as that.
40. Now let me deal, first of all, with the attack upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The origin of NATO is well known. At the end of the war, the Western Powers voluntarily handed over to Soviet control large areas in Europe. They withdrew to the dividing line previously agreed upon. They demobilized their armies; they reduced their overseas garrisons. The Soviet Union on the other hand maintained its armed forces; it maintained its military grip on Eastern Europe and it sprawled westward. The final danger signals were the overthrow of the democratic government in Czechoslovakia in 1948, followed by the Berlin blockade.
41. It was to meet the threat of further expansion that NATO was formed. NATO is a purely defensive alliance. It would never have come into being but for the actions of the Soviet Union. It is true that these actions were under the direction of Stalin. It is true that Stalinism is no longer in favour in the Soviet Union, so we are told. But we are not yet convinced that the fundamental aims of the Soviet Union have changed. Until we are convinced of that, not by words but by actions, we intend to retain our defensive alliances.
42. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Baghdad Pact and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, saying that they bore the same stamp as NATO. So far as we are concerned, that is a cause for pride. They are defensive alliances of precisely the same type, brought into being to provide a feeling of collective security against what we consider, and our allies consider, to be a military threat. They are alliances for collective self-defence specifically authorized by the Charter.
43. Mr. Gromyko referred to them as "blocs". The countries of NATO do not vote as a bloc in this Assembly. We do not even hold meetings to discuss Assembly matters together, and we rarely, all of us, vote the same way. Exactly the same applies to the countries of the Baghdad Pact and the countries of SEATO. The only bloc here is the Soviet bloc, whose nine hands, or perhaps I should now say eight, are always raised as one.
44. Mr. Gromyko put forward the suggestion, and other representatives have to some extent endorsed it, that Soviet troops should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact countries and that United States and British troops in return should withdraw from the mainland of Europe. That, it was suggested, would be a contribution to security in Europe. That idea, of course, has a superficial attraction, but what does it mean when you think about it? What does it mean geographically? The troops of the Soviet Union would remain in position one mile beyond the frontiers of Poland, Romania, etc. United States troops would go back 3,000 miles across the ocean. Soviet troops could return literally at an hour’s notice. For United States troops to return would involve vast problems of transportation and logistics. Even the United Kingdom has found it a considerable task from time to time to cross the English Channel. That is not the way, in existing circumstances, to European security.
45. I thought that in the context of European security the strangest omission from the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union was any reference to German reunification.
46. We believe that the Soviet Union should recognize its responsibility for the reunification of Germany as stated in the directive issued by the four Heads of Government to their Foreign Ministers at Geneva in July 1955. We believe that the Soviet Union should agree that it is desirable to reunify Germany at the earliest possible moment. The Soviet Government should agree that the German people should be allowed freely to choose their own government, by means of free all-German elections. The Soviet Government should recognize the right of a freely elected all- German government, freely to choose its own domestic and foreign policies.
47. If the Soviet Union were to accept those four propositions, the main obstacle to establishing European security would be removed. If, as a result of this self-determination of their future by the people of Germany, the Soviet Union felt any anxiety, the countries of the West would be prepared to enter into a treaty giving binding assurances designed to secure the Soviet Union against any threat of German attack.
48. The representative of the Soviet Union, in his rather scanty remarks about the problem of Hungary, said that it was provocative to inscribe the item called the Hungarian question on our agenda. He said it was time to realize and reckon with the fact that Hungary had had its say. I think that is an ominous phrase.
49. Even if Mr. Gromyko considers that the Hungarian people have had their say, this Organization should not be silenced. Until the Hungarian people are independent and have the right to determine their own future, we cannot remain silent. I say no more about Hungary today because there has recently been a lengthy debate in which our views were fully stated.
50. I now turn to the Middle East. This is the area of greatest tension at the moment. In 1948 I suppose it was Europe. From 1950 to 1952 or 1953 I suppose it was Korea. In 1954 it was Indo-China. Last year and this year without doubt it has been the Middle East. I do not want to add by anything I say to this tension. I merely want to outline some of the facts as we see them and try to measure deeds against some of the speeches here.
51. The outstanding issue for nearly ten years has been the conflict between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. We, the United Kingdom, have tried in all sincerity to promote a just and honourable settlement. The United Kingdom has been second only to the United States in contributions to the United Nation Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and we still believe that a just settlement of the tragic refugee problem is a primary element in a wider solution. On all these issues we have urged compromise if the problem is to be solved, because as long as it remains unsolved, all the countries of the area must suffer.
52. What has been the Soviet contribution? The policy of the Soviet Union appears to us to have been simply opportunist. At first the Soviet Union was among the foremost champions of Israel. It was the votes of the Soviet bloc that gave the necessary majority for the State of Israel to be created. It was the Soviet bloc which first sent arms to Israel. Now the Soviet Union represents itself as the friend of the Arab States. Who knows when its next change of policy may come about? I do not know of one single constructive contribution that it has made towards the settlement of this problem. Many people feel that its whole purpose is to perpetuate and not to reduce tension in the area.
53. Another test of deeds, as against speeches, is the way in which the Soviet Union is handling its propaganda to the area at the present time. I read over the weekend extracts from some recent Soviet broadcasts and statements in the official Soviet Press: bitter attacks upon the present Government of Jordan - every kind of allegation against it of terrorism, torture and repression; bitter attacks upon the Government of Lebanon - descriptions of Lebanese leaders as enemies of the Lebanese people; attacks upon the Government of Iraq, calling for a holy struggle to bring about its downfall; attacks upon the Government of Iran; appeals to the peoples of these countries to rise up and overthrow their Governments. All this from the official propaganda sources of the Soviet Government. Yet it is the representative of that same Government who has presented a draft declaration calling upon all States to base their relations on the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs for any motives of economic, political or ideological character! It would be laughable if it was not so serious. I say again, it is deeds, not speeches here, which count.
54. What has been the new factor over the last two years or so which has complicated the existing issues and done so much to promote anxiety and tension? To my mind it is clearly the deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms, tens upon tens of millions of pounds' worth, introduced into a situation one would have thought already sufficiently explosive. Certain of the Arab States have had to mortgage their economic resources to pay for them and probably have done permanent damage to their economies. The arms themselves are more likely to cause trouble than to prevent it. There are some who believe that the purpose behind all this is to pre-stock forward bases for the Soviet Union itself. The deliveries are on such a scale as to give some colour to this suggestion. Again I say, it is deeds, not speeches here, which count.
55. The situation in Syria is very much in our minds. We view it with grave concern. We have no desire to prescribe the form of government. Our desire simply is that Syria should be independent and should respect the independence of its neighbours. I do not think that the Syrian people have any idea of how far their true Interests are being subordinated to those of the Soviet Union, because the long-term bill will be a heavy one.
56. I have read carefully what Mr. Dulles [680th meeting] and Mr. Gromyko [681st meeting] said about this matter, and the comments of the representative of the Soviet Union on this situation are utterly divorced from reality. I cannot conceive that the Soviet delegation really can believe in what it says. It says that none of Syria's neighbours seem to be anxious. I advise the Soviet representative to study the note from the Jordan Government to the Government of Syria which has just been delivered.
57. What is to be done about the situation? I think that we have to review it calmly and, as I say, having particular regard to deeds and not speeches. I think that Mr. Dulles did a useful service in drawing our attention to the "Essentials of peace" resolution [290 (IV)1 of 1949, with its reference to indirect aggression. I agree that this resolution should be the standard by which we judge the situation there. But in the meantime, I hope that the Soviet Union will, upon reflection, perceive the dangers in its policies of increasing tension, and that some idea of what is really happening will percolate through to the Syrian people.
58. I now turn to disarmament. One of the difficulties during the years which I have been trying to deal with this matter has been the tendency to turn it into a propaganda issue. I think that is wholly the wrong approach and out of tune with the demands of this time. I think that the last series of meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission has afforded opportunity for useful discussion. The issues involved and the paths along which progress can be made have been more clearly defined than ever before. I welcome the careful consideration which this Assembly clearly intends to give to the matter, because I think that psychologically it is the time for us to make progress. Every country is increasingly conscious of the dangers inherent in modern weapons and in the strains and stresses at the present time in international affairs. Progress in disarmament would not only relieve the burden of armaments, but it would also of itself contribute to the relaxation of tension and would make further progress in disarmament not only desirable, but also feasible.
59. In seeking common ground for progress, I think there are certain essential considerations which should govern our thinking. Firstly, a comprehensive disarmament plan covering all stages is not practical politics at this moment. The objective of the United Kingdom is still a comprehensive plan along the broad lines specified in the Anglo-French proposals of 1954 [DC/53, annex 9], a plan which will involve the prohibition and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, under strict control, to levels needed for internal security only. That is still our objective and our ideal.
60. We know, however, that the Soviet Union for one would not accept at this juncture the degree of control which alone could make such a plan practicable. We should therefore aim at a partial or first-stage plan, one upon which there was a chance of agreement being reached.
61. My second point is that it would not be wise to impose political preconditions for the partial or first- stage disarmament agreement. There will have to be a settlement of certain outstanding problems before sufficient confidence can be engendered to enable disarmament to progress to its more advanced stages. I think that view is a common-sense acceptance of reality. I think it would be a mistake to complicate the issues by specifying what political settlements might be necessary for further stages. That might hamper and not help further progress. But at the present, for a first-stage or partial plan, I think that we should concentrate on such measures as are likely to be acceptable without political pre-conditions.
62. Thirdly, disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields must proceed together. They are interrelated; they are intertwined. We of the United Kingdom, together with the other countries of Western Europe, depend for our security very largely upon the deterrent afforded by the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the West. Vis á vis the Soviet Union, we have a chronic inferiority in the conventional fie Id. The Soviet Union is in the geographical position to move conventional arms and armies without great problems of transportation. It is much easier for it to mass armies for a conventional attack. It has the advantage of interior lines.
63. The United Kingdom has defence responsibilities all over the world. We have long lines of communication, over the sea in large measure. For the Western allies, the deployment of conventional forces for defence involves great problems of manpower, of transportation and of logistics. Therefore we are not prepared to weaken the nuclear deterrent unless there are corresponding advances made towards disarmament in the conventional field.
64. There is another reason for this view that nuclear and conventional disarmament must go along pari passu. We do not accept the implication that war fought with conventional weapons is more tolerable than war fought with nucleus weapons. Both are terrible, and I have not the slightest doubt that a global war fought with what are called conventional weapons would destroy international society just as surely as one fought with nuclear weapons. It might take a little longer for society to destroy itself, but that would happen just the same. We, with some experience, have a horror of war, whatever the weapons that may be used. The Soviets object to what they describe as making legitimate the use of nuclear weapons. I object to the proposition that global war fought with conventional arms is somehow tolerable.
65. The fourth consideration for progress, I think, affecting a partial or first-stage agreement, is that it should extend as far as the area of control which is acceptable and practicable in the present state of the world.
66. We regard verbal agreement without control, however extensive, however solemnly concluded, as valueless. We have no confidence at all that the Soviet Union, if hard pressed, would abide by any scrap of paper — and there would be the same lack of confidence on its part, I should have thought, about other countries. And, if you do not know whether or not the other side is going to keep a particular agreement, that agreement adds to insecurity and to tension instead of diminishing it.
67. In the light of those four considerations, where should we seek common ground? What are the possibilities for a partial agreement?
68. First of all, with regard to the question of nuclear weapons, we believe that there should be agreement to suspend nuclear tests, subject to an inspection system to ensure that the suspension of tests is really enforced. The Soviet Union agrees that there should be a suspension of tests. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to the period of the initial suspension. We have said that it should be twelve months, followed by a second period of twelve months. The Soviet Union says that it should be two or three years.
69. Both sides now agree that there should be an inspection system. The Soviet Union maintains that such an inspection system is not necessary on the ground that explosions can be detected without it. That does not accord with our scientific information. We believe that it is necessary to have inspection posts with appropriate instruments covering the whole area where tests could take place. Without such a system it would be possible, so we are told, for a country with a large geographical area to have tests either underground or in the stratosphere about which other countries would not know. It has been agreed, however, that there should be an inspection system, and that difficulty has been removed.
70. The Western countries on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have said that suspension of tests should be linked with a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Our reasoning is as follows. Suspension of tests by itself is not disarmament at all. It does nothing to reduce armaments. It does nothing to prevent countries which have already tested weapons from piling up more weapons and more fissile material for weapons purposes. It does not prevent countries which have not yet made tests from also manufacturing fissile materials for weapons purposes, or indeed the weapons themselves. The suspension of tests by itself does nothing to stop the arms race. It does not prevent further countries from emerging as possessors of nuclear weapons.
71. But what would be a realistic beginning on the path towards nuclear disarmament would be to stop further manufacture of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Our scientists assure us that this is a realistic step, that the cessation of manufacture could be controlled. Unlike the mere suspension of tests, this would be a real measure of disarmament. It would call a halt to the nuclear armaments race. If the Powers which now possess these weapons would agree that they would produce no more fissionable material for weapons purposes after a certain date in the future, other countries might be dissuaded from pursuing their own nuclear programmes for military purposes. In this way alone, I believe, can we prevent a competition in the manufacture of nuclear weapons in which many countries might join.
72. Such an agreement is a prize really worth winning. It would mean something. A paper undertaking to renounce the use of nuclear weapons would not mean anything. It could not be controlled or enforced, and no one would know whether it was going to be honoured. It would add to insecurity.
73. The total elimination of all nuclear weapons remains, as I have said, the ultimate goal. But it is not practical politics today, since there is at present no known means of control by which it could be enforced. It is impossible to know whether or not existing nuclear weapons have been eliminated or whether countries have admitted to all their stocks. The Western Powers have, however, suggested that a start might be made now towards the total elimination of such weapons. They propose, as part of a first-stage plan, that a proportion of existing stocks might be handed over for conversion to peaceful purposes.
74. The next element in a partial or first- stage agreement is that of force levels in the conventional field. As I have said, the conventional field is just as important as the nuclear. All five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission seemed ready to accept the same figures for upper limits of military manpower in a first-stage agreement — 2,500,000 each for the Soviet Union and the United States, 750,000 each for the United Kingdom and France.
75. I think we have to recognize the fact, however, that limitation of numbers of men is of little consequence unless accompanied by the limitation of the weapons which those men may use. The numbers of men in the forces of a country can be cut down, but the military power of that country can be increased by augmenting the fire-power of the reduced number of men. Therefore disarmament in the conventional field, to be realistic, must include limitation of tanks, aircraft, warships, submarines and all the rest of it, and such limitations must obviously be subject to strict control.
76. We do not think that in a first-stage agreement much progress can be made in what is a very complicated matter. Therefore we would be content, for our part, with the proposals which have been discussed in the Sub-Committee for the exchange of lists of weapons which various countries are prepared to set aside under international control, possibly for future destruction.
77. The next element which is a feasible part of a partial agreement can be dealt with under the heading of "Measures against a surprise attack", measures which will add to the feeling of confidence in the world. President Eisenhower put forward his "open skies" plan. This provided for aerial inspection. Marshal Bulganin put forward a plan for ground control posts at ports, communication centres and airfields. We believe that it is possible to amalgamate those two plans and for there to be both aerial and ground inspection; they would not necessarily cover precisely the same areas, but they should both be brought into existence.
78. If there are these areas of inspection, then each side will know whether armed forces are being built up, whether preparations are being made for launching an attack. We would be willing to have the whole of our country covered by such a system. Others may not yet be ready to go so far. That being so, we believe that a beginning could be made with certain trial areas — a beginning which would greatly add to international confidence.
79. There are other possible elements in a partial agreement -- for example, control of objects entering outer space — into which I will not go today.
80. That being our view of possible progress, let me compare it with what Mr. Gromyko indicated as the scope of a partial agreement in the field of disarmament.
81. In the nuclear field, the Soviet Union would agree to suspension of tests and to an inspection system. But the Soviet Union is not willing to agree to the cessation of the manufacture of more fissile material for weapons purposes. It pins its faith to an undertaking to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. But I think that the latter would be valueless, and I still hope that, after second thoughts, the Soviet Union will perceive the great step forward that could be made if there was cessation, under strict control, of the manufacture of more fissile material for weapons purposes.
82. In the conventional field, the Soviet Union agrees to the upper limit of 2,500,000 for itself and the United States and 750,000 each for the United Kingdom and for France. It wishes to include, however, in a first- stage agreement, further reductions of these force levels by two additional stages. We do not object to the figures suggested for those two further stages; in fact, they were put forward by the Western delegations. But we believe that we will not get progress to those further stages until there has been a relaxation of tension, to which a contribution would be made by a partial agreement. We therefore think that these two stages should come later. But we agree to them in principle.
83. With regard to the reduction of conventional arms, the Soviet Union proposes a reduction either by 15 per cent or by means of the presentation of concrete lists of armaments to be reduced as proposed by the United States Government. We favour the second of those alternatives.
84. The Soviet Union appears willing to accept in principle the idea of aerial inspection, and it has itself advocated ground control posts. For some reason, however, it no longer seems willing to have ground control posts on airfields in a first-stage agreement. I cannot myself quite see why that reservation should be made.
85. I hope that the Assembly will see from what I have said that, according to the declarations made by both sides, which I think I have summarized accurately, there is scope for a most useful partial agreement. There is, in my view, a real prospect of common ground. It is nonsense to say that the disarmament talks are necessarily at a deadlock at the present time. There is, however, one note of realism which I must sound. Mr. Gromyko in his speech rather scorned agreements in principle. I do not know why he of all people should be scornful in this connexion, because his scorn should apply equally to his own proposal to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. That could only be an agreement in principle.
86. It is clear that if agreement in principle is to be of any value, it has to be followed up by agreement on the practical systems whereby the agreement in principle will be honoured and enforced. And if that was the thought behind what Mr. Gromyko said, I entirely agree with him.
87. Over the last three years, and particularly in the past few months, we in the United Kingdom delegation have constantly sought to get discussions going upon these practical details. In early July of this year the four Western Powers made their answer about suspension of tests, indicating their desire to link that with the cessation of the manufacture of fissile material for weapons purposes. But they also said that while the discussion of that was proceeding they were quite willing that technical experts should meet to draw up the inspection system for the control of the suspension of tests. The Soviet Union refused to agree to the meeting of the technical experts. Why? Is it because it really does not intend to submit to an inspection after all?
88. There was some argument in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission about the definition of manpower. In Mr. Gromyko's speech on 20 September [681st meeting] he talked about civilians working for the armed forces. That is one point. There are also other questions, I gather, of reservists and the like, which at once present themselves to one's mind. In this connexion I offered in London in June to agree at once to a meeting of experts to try to get an agreed definition of what we mean by force levels, to determine exactly what types of military service should be included in that definition. The Soviet representative refused to agree to such a working party being set up. Again, I wonder why?
89. At a later stage, on 17 July, I suggested that experts should meet to discuss the practical problems involved in a number of matters. I do not want to repeat all that I said in that speech; it appears in the verbatim records of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee. But someone must at some time be able to answer the following kind of questions.
90. With regard to the inspection system for the suspension of nuclear tests, who will control the inspection system? Will it be an international body? What will be the relationship of that body to the United Nations? How will it be constituted? What will be its powers? How will it be financed? When will it start recruiting its personnel? How will it recruit that personnel and from what countries? What will be the status of the inspectors? Where will they be situated? Will they be situated in the territories of other States besides those mentioned? What means of communication will they have? What freedom of movement will they have? Will their numbers be limited? Will their instruments be limited? How will their reports be dealt with? What will be the procedure in the event of a suspected breach? What will be the relationship of other countries to an agreement for suspension of tests? Will they be expected to adhere? Will their adherence or the adherence of any of them be a condition precedent to the entry into force of such an agreement?
91. With regard to the limitation of conventional armaments, how will the lists be drawn up and exchanged? How will the lists be related to each other and to manpower reductions? What types of armaments will be included? How will the depots into which they are to be put be controlled?
92. With regard to aerial and ground inspection, what areas will be covered? Will there be over-flying rights over the territories of other countries? What will be the safeguards for the countries overflown? How will breaches of any regulations which may be made be dealt with? What will be the plan for the location of ground observation posts or ground control posts? How will they be composed? What will be their powers? What will be their methods of communication?
93. These are all or almost all matters of technical detail. I do not believe that they will present insoluble or even great difficulties. But this is work with which progress has to be made if there is to be any reality in our search for a disarmament agreement.
94. Every time, on every issue, the representatives of the Soviet Union have refused to play their part in beginning this kind of technical discussion. Their point of view — I hope I put it fairly --is that until there is agreement there is no point in working out the practical details. I believe that until you work out the practical details you will not get an agreement. In any case, even on the Soviet thesis, these details have at some time to be agreed, and therefore I cannot for the life of me see why a beginning could not be made at once. It should in fact have been made long ago.
95. This repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to get down to what we call "brass tacks" and to find out what is practically involved in a viable disarmament agreement makes me wonder whether or not all its talk about disarmament is anything more than a propaganda theme. I have a feeling that the Soviet Union does not want to be tied down in any of these matters. But we say that every country has to be tied down on these details if we are to have a disarmament agreement which will add to security and which will be a real step forward on the way towards wider disarmament agreement in the future.
96. I have dealt in some detail with what is involved in the Assembly’s discussions on disarmament. I have done that because I really believe that this is a field in which progress is possible in the course of the next few weeks. I echo what Mr. Diefenbaker said [683rd meeting] about this being a "disarmament Assembly". We in the United Kingdom at the moment depend in large measure for our security upon the nuclear deterrent. We would much rather depend for that security upon a comprehensive disarmament agreement capable of being properly enforced. The first step to such a wider agreement is the kind of partial or first-stage plan which I have outlined.
97. We as a country have a greater vested interest in peace than almost any other country in the world. We are a small vulnerable island. Our life depends upon our trade throughout the whole world. Peace is essential to our survival and our prosperity. It is our determination to give an impulse to this work in any way we can. But sham agreements, paper declarations, vague promises, are no good to us. We want something practical and definite. We want the real thing.
98. For us, in the United Kingdom, this twelfth session began upon two most pleasant notes. First there was the election of the President, and secondly there was the unanimous admission of the Federation of Malaya to membership of the Organization.
99. The Prime Minister of Canada referred yesterday to the Commonwealth in eloquent terms. He pointed out that it was an association of free nations which represented many different areas, colours and cultures, which had no rules or regulations and no constitution. But, as he said, its unity is forged in the sharing of a heritage of common ideals and a love of freedom under the law. I think that we in the United Kingdom can justly claim to have pursued and to be pursuing a forward-looking policy in the development of our relationships with the peoples of the Commonwealth. It is this kind of forward-looking attitude which I suggest is needed in dealing with the wider problems of the day.
100. We are at a critical phase in world affairs, and much hangs in the balance. I have tried to speak today with frankness, but without bitterness. I believe that plain speaking can contribute to better understanding. Our hope is that the work of this twelfth session of the General Assembly will look to the future. In that way, I think, we shall all of us best serve the causes in which we believe and the peoples whom we represent.