I am delighted to have the honour of speaking from this rostrum under the presidency of Mr. Gunewardene, though I should have welcomed another opportunity to congratulate Sir Leslie Munro, on behalf of my Government, upon his election as President of this Assembly and to honour him as the representative of a free, democratic Power whose citizens have never hesitated to support causes, however remote they may have seemed, which for them spelt first and foremost liberty and peace.
83. The French delegation is particularly happy to see at the President’s side, his term of office renewed for another five years, our Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, whose patient and efficient efforts are directed towards vindicating and furthering the work of the signatories of the Charter.
84. I also wish to extend a welcome on behalf of the French Government to the new Member States, Ghana and the Federation of Malaya, whose presence in this Assembly is another step in the direction of universality.
85. The practice during the general debate which traditionally begins our sessions has been to enumerate the main problems before our Organization, beginning as a rule with the most critical and controversial ones. I have often felt that it is a pity the General Assembly has thus become a closed arena where opposing ideas clash, instead of a place where common solutions to problems are sought. But this will continue to be the case for a long time to come unless we endeavour to define and limit our function.
86. Breaking away from this tradition, I should like to devote the first part of my address to a problem on which almost unanimous agreement is possible, a problem characteristic of the subjects with which we have to deal, namely, assistance to under-developed countries.
87. Since May 1956, France has shown by definite proposals that it is deeply interested in this question and regards it as the key to peace and stability throughout the world.
88. We are well aware that an international agreement on disarmament would make our task easier and enable us, by saving money on armaments, to allocate a much greater proportion of our national income to the development of our own economies and those of less favoured nations. We should not wait for such an agreement to be concluded, however, before taking organized action on the technical, financial and commercial levels to raise the standard of living of under-developed countries.
89. With regard to technical assistance, we are gratified to note the ever-increasing interest which Member and non-member States are taking in the Expanded Programme. This programme, rightly considered to be one of the Organization’s major successes calls for a few brief remarks, and when I say Organization, I mean the United Nations Secretariat and the specialized agencies, which by working together are achieving vital results in the economic and social field.
90. It would appear, first of all, that the existence of the United Nations programme, taken in its widest sense, side by side with the numerous bilateral programmes of technical assistance, presents problems which can be solved only by a policy of constant co-ordination. Moreover, we must recognize that technical assistance cannot be an end in itself: economic development begins with the training of personnel but cannot become a realty unless sufficient funds are put at the disposal of Member States to carry out their programmes. If a country requests the services of a United Nations expert and the expert recommends a certain plan for the development of hydro-electric resources or means of communication, or the construction of schools or hospitals, his recommendations may never be followed up if the necessary funds are not forthcoming.
91. For this reason, on the financial side, we should establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development which would supplement the activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.
92. We have for many years been discussing the possibility of establishing SUNFED. A resolution recently adopted by the Economic and Social Council recommends that the General Assembly should set up a commission to draft a statute. This is no doubt a step forward; however, let us face the fact that if the General Assembly does adopt the Council's recommendation and decides to set up the commission, the commission's task will be an extremely difficult one. Except in certain purely technical fields, the reports which have thus far been submitted as to how the fund might be operated are, despite the ability of their authors, somewhat vague regarding certain aspects of the problems to be solved, particularly the amount of the contributions and the criteria for the selection of projects for financing.
93. If this unprecedented experiment is to succeed, and the countries which are vacillating or even opposed to the establishment of this fund are to change their minds, we must draw up a statute with great care and take all the time we need to accomplish this revolutionary task.
94. However extensive our financial and technical assistance to under-developed countries, capital investment is not sufficient in itself, but must be supplemented by agreement on trade relations.
95. We must admit, in this connexion, that, following on a period during which the prices of raw materials favoured the producing countries, the events of the past few years do not encourage optimism. Raw materials are an essential source of foreign currency for the under-developed countries, but the stabilization of the prices of such materials by means of an international agreement is still little more than a pious hope. Moreover, fluctuations in the prices of basic products and in the volume of trade have rarely been so great.
96. If we leave things as they stand, we shall encounter serious difficulties. As the Secretary-General recently pointed out, a drop of a mere 5 per cent in the terms of trade of the under-developed countries is equivalent, in its effect upon the balance of payments, to the cancellation of all public and private aid received from industrialized countries. In the case of certain countries, the terms of trade undergo even greater variations from one year to the next. Any efforts to set up financing machinery may remain ineffective if we do not strive with more diligence than in the past to find solutions to the problem of stabilizing the prices of basic commodities.
97. United Nations action in the fields I have just mentioned should help to co-ordinate and not undermine regional or private undertakings having the same purpose in view. We can prove, moreover, that it is both possible and desirable to combine various types of assistance to under-developed countries.
98. France allocates a large part of its national income to financing investments of a social or economic nature within the franc area even when it is doubtful whether they will yield a profit; and it has secured the co-operation of its colleagues in the European Economic Community in establishing a fund for the development of territories, especially in Africa, which are politically bound to members of the Community.
99. We are convinced that a Euro-African policy can promote the development of Africa if, as we hope, the funds placed at the disposal of the African countries are increased yearly. Incidentally, France’s considerable efforts in this direction — no other country in the world allocates so high a proportion of its national income to aiding under-developed countries — are increasing, and in all probability will continue to increase.
100. This is not a “neo-colonialist” policy, as some people claim, but a mobilization of part of Europe's capital resources for use in Africa. Nor does it involve any "strings”, or any concessions on the part of the recipient countries. On the contrary, our goal is to develop industrialization in those countries and to raise the standard of living of the population. For this reason, arrangements have been made’ by which the countries concerned can increase certain customs tariffs in order to protect their nascent industries.
101. The procedure selected is one which enables the countries concerned, through the development of representative institutions, to manage their own affairs in a democratic manner. It is our belief that the members of the Community, by undertaking to increase their economic and social investments in Africa, while at the same time ensuring that the African countries are able to protect themselves against competition from industrialized countries — including those of the Community itself — have not only respected the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter, but have also endeavoured to put its principles into effect.
102. Nevertheless, the provisions of the treaty signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community have aroused misgivings in certain sectors of our Organization, particularly the Economic and Social Council and the regional commissions. Some countries fear that they will no longer have the easy access to the European capital market they have had in the past, or that the members of the Community may reduce the level of their investments, particularly in Latin America and Asia. They also seem to be worried that the development in Africa of industries competing with their own may harm their export trade with Europe as soon as Europe opens its doors wider to African products.
103. I should like to say here and now that the Treaty of Rome cannot in any way jeopardize the legitimate interests of other countries. The Common Market was an idea conceived on the assumption that there would be a rapid expansion in the European economy. We believe that it is reasonable to count on an annual increase of about 5 per cent in the national income of the Western European countries over the next few years. This income will thus probably have doubled by the end of the transitional period, that is, by the time the Common Market is fully established. An increase in buying power in Western Europe will make it possible for Western Europe to absorb an increasing volume of the products exported to it from Latin America or Asia, whereas an economic regression due to isolation or cut-throat competition would have the opposite effect.
104. Moreover, even though the establishment of the Common Market requires increased domestic investment on the part of each member country, the Community as a whole will gradually be able to put an increasing amount of capital at the disposal of underdeveloped countries in other continents besides Africa.
105. Lastly, we are far from opposing the participation in the Euro-African plan of non-African countries undergoing development, particularly the Latin American countries, with which France and other European countries have so many common ties.
106. The experience gained in the operation of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance proves, moreover, that technical assistance consists not merely in assistance given by industrialized countries to under-developed countries, but often, also, in help furnished by these countries to other countries still less well-off than they are.
107. The fact that we favour the establishment of SUNFED surely indicates that it is not our intention to deprive countries outside the franc area with which we have long had mutually advantageous economic relations of the capital necessary for their development. We believe that the Development Fund for the Overseas Countries and Territories provided for in the Treaty of Rome does not preclude the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, but rather points the way along which we should travel.
108. The harassing problems of the Near East at the present time illustrate how dangerous to world peace is the state of economic development of certain countries and regions of the world. Indeed, several of the countries of the Near East, despite the wealth they possess and their valiant efforts to exploit it, are still far from achieving a standard of living commensurate with their age-old civilizations and their youthful determination to maintain their political independence.
109. If they are to catch up rapidly, they need assistance from the industrialized countries. But what kind of assistance? I cannot help expressing my uneasiness, in the light of the expansionist outlook of certain totalitarian countries, at the way in which the export of arms to that region of the world is increasing with every month that passes, when what those countries really need is the means of raising their standards of living and developing their economies within the framework of a general movement for international solidarity.
110. Here we see how greatly the United Nations is hampered for want of a solution to a number of world problems and by continued rivalries or misunderstandings among nations.
111. As far as France is concerned, we have taken steps to put an end to the long-standing feuds which have been a recurrent cause of bloodshed in Europe and which have twice resulted in world war. In taking the lead to bring about constructive co-operation among the nations of Western Europe, France had vividly in mind the need to settle once and for all its differences with the Federal Republic of Germany which stood in the way of any rapprochement between the two States.
112. One of the most critical of these differences was the problem of the Saar, not only because important economic interests were involved, but also be cause the future of a territory with a million inhabitants depended on its solution. The negotiations were carried out in a spirit of good will on both sides and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Luxembourg, on 27 October 1956, of whose historic significance you are well aware.
113. By proceeding to the settlement of this highly complex problem with the German Government, the French Government’s idea was to wipe out the past. In the two world wars which cost the human race so much in material and moral destruction, the antagonism between France and Germany played a major role. We hope, and we are determined, that this antagonism shall finally disappear.
114. Obviously it was not easy for our peoples to forget so many painful memories. Nevertheless, anyone who visits Europe today will bear witness to the fact that we are not giving ourselves up to fruitless bitterness and that our two peoples want to shape a future of friendship and understanding out of the very sufferings which once divided them. This attitude can only be a source of gratification for the other peoples of the world because harmony between France and Germany and, in a wider sense, among the peoples of a once divided Europe, is one of the soundest and most stable guarantees for peace.
115. Not content with forgetting old quarrels, our peoples earnestly desire to co-ordinate their efforts and to achieve common objectives which will help to strengthen world security.
116. I must stress the great importance which the French Government attaches to the efforts made to end the present division of Germany. This abnormal and unjust situation is the principal source of tension and insecurity in Europe.
117. During the second Geneva Conference, the French Government, jointly with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, submitted specific proposals designed to lay the foundations for the reunification of Germany, at the same time offering the Soviet Union the opportunity to participate in working out a system of European guarantees and security which would be satisfactory to all.
118. The declaration signed at Berlin on 29 July 1957 by the allied Governments and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - the only government freely elected by the German people - enabled France to reaffirm its proposals in the light of the events that had occurred during the past two years. The reunification of a free Germany, with the establishment of a system of European security which will make a vital contribution to world peace, is one of the basic objectives of French policy.
119. We have also directed our efforts in Europe towards the achievement of peace and security. For the first time in history, military affairs have been brought under a system of control on a reciprocal basis. The Paris agreements, which some people persist in denouncing as "aggressive", actually contain mandatory provisions prohibiting the individual signatory States from resorting to the threat or use of force and requiring them to publicize, to limit, and to submit to reciprocal inspection, their military forces and armaments. Such provisions make the Western European Union a strictly defensive body which should be proof against criticism by anyone who favours organized and controlled general disarmament.
120. This problem of disarmament is the key to many others, and I should like at this point to take up the problem.
121. Need I recall here the efforts made by France in the period between the two world wars to establish a system of collective security based on the limitation and control of armaments? The Second World War was the result of the failure of the Geneva Conference of 1932. We do not want to make the same mistakes all over again.
122. Today a general document is submitted to us, with the approval of four members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and with the support of eleven other Governments. It represents the most tangible result obtained since the Sub-Committee began its work. You are all familiar with the part played in this matter by Mr. Jules Moch, the French representative on the Disarmament Commission, who has taken part in all the meetings of the Sub-Committee since it was established. We had hoped against hope that, in the weeks preceding the discussion in the General Assembly, some progress might have been achieved towards a relaxation of undue inflexibility of views. The Soviet delegation assumed the responsibility for a premature break down of negotiations which we, for our part, keenly regretted.
123. The proposals for partial disarmament submitted on 29 August 1957 by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States [DC/113, annex 5] constitute a solid and well-balanced whole. Their objectives are limited to measures which can be controlled and put into practice without delay and which take into consideration the legitimate concerns of each Power.
124. The tangible and immediate measures we propose make provision - subject to the establishment of the necessary controls - for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, a two-year prohibition of test explosions, the cessation during the same period of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, a start in the reconversion of nuclear stockpiles, guarantees against the possibility of surprise attack, and a study of the regulation of armaments movements and of objects entering outer space.
125. These measures represent a homogenous and coherent whole, which cannot be split up without disturbing the balance. Following the principle of “no disarmament without control” we submit practical proposals in this connexion; in 1955 and 1956 we gave our views on what the nature, functions, powers and duties of a control organization should be.
126. The Soviet delegation has never replied with anything but vague and incomplete statements. Proposals generous in appearance which steer clear of any idea of effective control engender insecurity. When the Soviet Union proposes the immediate cessation of tests and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, it may deceive an unenlightened world opinion, but it is not making any constructive contribution to a real disarmament effort. Neither the mere cessation of explosions - now that nuclear weapons have already been technically perfected - nor the prohibition of their use would have any value other than that of a moral commitment. They do not even represent a step towards putting an end to the arms race; they cannot reinstill the necessary confidence, and thus guide the world in the direction of peace. They are, in short, an illusion and they are misleading because they place a premium on aggression.
127. Control is the essential element in any system of disarmament; it cannot be carried out by measures which are merely regional in nature. Undoubtedly, in the initial stages, control must be subject to certain geographical limitations, but these limitations must not lead to the crystallization of unacceptable de facto situations in Europe and elsewhere.
128. Furthermore, no disarmament measure should have the effect of increasing the security of some nations to the detriment of that of others. No plan can start by reducing conventional forces while leaving nuclear weapons intact, or vice versa, without giving countries which are more advanced in one of these fields an advantage over others.
129. The proposals of 29 August, which are presented as an indivisible whole, are based on these principles; thus they pave the way for balanced and controlled disarmament without creating an imbalance between the different categories of armaments that might endanger general security still more.
130. France could not agree to limitations in the nuclear field alone, since they would aggravate the effect of the existing disproportion in conventional forces stationed in Europe. Nuclear disarmament should therefore be linked to similar measures in conventional means of defence; it must also be undertaken sincerely and not for propaganda purposes. I repeat, what purpose would it serve to stop nuclear tests if the Powers that have perfected missiles could continue to manufacture them from their stocks of fissionable materials, and thus daily increase in secret the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind?
131. Another principle we have consistently maintained is that of progressivity. Let me recall our formula: "We must bring about progressively all the disarmament which is currently controllable."
132. In the present climate of insecurity, States cannot agree to take more than a limited risk. The state of international relations cannot be changed from one day to the next. It is only through a gradual restoration of confidence that the universal security of internationally-controlled disarmament can replace the present security based on regional defensive organizations.
133. It is because the Western proposals are based on this motivation that we believe in their value. They are in line with the realities of the present day and the deep-seated wishes of the peoples of the world.
134. We therefore venture to hope that the Soviet Union will adopt a more conciliatory attitude, and that a step can be taken towards disarmament which will not only free the world from fear but will make it possible to devote vast resources to creating a better life for mankind. Once the Soviet Union becomes convinced of the sincerity of proposals which at first aroused its distrust, it occasionally lends them its support. The possibility of mutual good will is illustrated by the convening at Vienna of the first general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency which, in keeping with the idea of its originator, the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, will help to redirect nuclear energy into peaceful channels. This mutual good will must be affirmed with respect to disarmament.
135. I have followed the course I outlined at the beginning of my statement, and have thus far dealt with problems on which the French Government still cannot help but feel that general agreement is possible. There is, however, one question of which this may not be true. My country attaches the utmost importance to this question, and it has been mentioned from this rostrum.
136. France did not oppose the inclusion of the item on Algeria in the agenda of the present session, though this attitude in no way implies any renunciation of the fundamental rights to which my country is entitled under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The representative of France will supply other delegations with ample and accurate information on the present situation; he will inform them of the means by which France hopes to find a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" to this distressing question, in accordance with the hope expressed by the Assembly on 15 February 1957 [resolution 1012(XI)].
137. In a general debate of this kind, I do not wish to anticipate what my delegation will have to say when the question comes up for discussion in the First Committee and later in the General Assembly itself. But I should like to ask some of you to examine your consciences.
138. Leaving aside those who make capital of France's internal difficulties and look on the Algerian question as a means of achieving more ambitious aims, I appeal specifically to those who avow their esteem or affection for my country and their sincere desire for a rapid solution.
139. Do they feel they are right in encouraging outside intervention calculated to prolong the bloody phase of the struggle or in asking the United Nations to intervene in a conflict which it has neither the right nor the means to settle? Do they think that their attitude has played an insignificant part in encouraging the rebels to reject, as they have done so far, the repeated French proposals for a cease-fire, followed by free elections? Do they know of any other more democratic expression of the right of peoples to self-determination than free elections?
140. France will not allow itself to be dissuaded from what it believes to be its duty regarding a territory in which anarchy and poverty, and probably even civil war, would result from its absence. Is it in the interests of the Algerian people and of world peace to try to paralyse an attempt at pacification, reform and development at the very moment when it is beginning to bear fruit?
141. Do not, I beg you, encourage a whole sector of world public opinion to believe that the annual session of the United Nations only encourages the troublemakers and thwarts any attempt at finding a constructive solution.
142. I know how much prestige the concepts of freedom, independence and self-determination rightly enjoy in our Organization. They even inspire enthusiasm in those who in their own countries have never been able to give them form and make them a living reality.
143. In this respect France has better examples to show than many of those who criticize it. But France has never sought to separate the freedom of peoples from that of individuals, nor to isolate artificially political independence from economic independence. France believes that disorder and poverty do not further human progress, but only the designs of those who use them as a means to world domination. There are free men who accept the obligations of society; there are slaves who claim they are independent.
144. In any case, France is justified in expecting the General Assembly to take up the discussion of Algeria calmly and objectively, and, above all, to beware of taking any stand which constitutes unlawful and uncalled-for intervention in matters which are not within its competence and might well have disastrous consequences for the authority and future of our Organization.
145. And now I return to my initial statement; we must endeavour to define and limit our function. To be sure, experience has shown that the United Nations Charter has gaps and contradictions. We in France would be glad to see amended certain articles which are not in line with present conditions. But on this point we have no more illusions than the next. While a revision of the Charter is desirable, it cannot be carried out in practice without a mutual desire to obtain positive results, and at present no such desire exists.
146. We must therefore be content to try to improve our methods of work and discussion. We can of course, make an effort to rid our debates of the violence which too often marks them; to prevent squabbling, which never produces constructive results; to apply ourselves more to the solution of specific problems; and to concentrate rather on alleviating poverty than pandering to pride or nursing resentment.
147. But this is not the crux of the matter. The greatest weakness of our Organization is that its influence is really only exerted on those who are willing to accept it. Some of the Member States try to carry out United Nations decisions and to abide as closely as possible by its recommendations, even when perfectly legitimate interests of theirs are involved. They make it a point not to challenge the Organization’s competence except when the Charter gives them the right to do so; even then they show their good will by providing information, and their respect by discussing the views of the other side. There are States on the other hand — and they are generally the ones most critical of others — which invoke the authority of the Organization when it suits their convenience, but flout it openly when extremely questionable interests of theirs are involved.
148. Thus we end up by establishing two sets of standards and by severely handicapping in the game of world politics those countries which respect ordinary law as against those which give it cavalier treatment. How can you expect public opinion in the former countries not to become infuriated by this situation? As for public opinion in the latter countries, the question does not arise, because generally there is no public opinion.
149. Last year, when France complied with the recommendations of the General Assembly even though its fundamental interests were concerned, French public opinion was indignant because, at that very time, in the Hungarian affair, the judgement of the United Nations was openly scorned by the country against which it was pronounced.
150. It will be argued that the Organization had no way of forcing anyone to implement recommendations adopted by an overwhelming majority. We are only too well aware of that, but, even seen in this light, the problem is nonetheless serious. In order to be effective, an organization like ours needs world-wide respect. Its authority will always be questioned if some people, by their attitude, always make it subject to question.
151. A second weakness of our Organization is the way in which groups are formed within it that are justified neither by geography nor true solidarity, and whose sole purpose is thus by definition to take the negative view. Far be it from me to suggest that membership of the United Nations excludes a country from belonging to regional organizations for the defence of a common ideal or common interest. We are living at a time when a certain amount of regrouping is essential, but it must be done for the purpose of achieving positive results, and not to maintain or create artificial antagonism between nations, thus making the vital task of reconciliation more difficult.
152. The points I have dealt with here must not cause us to despair of the future of our Organization. The ideals by which France is inspired are the very ones that brought the Charter into being; and for that reason we still believe and will go on believing that the universal organization of peoples is a blessing. For that reason, too, we are extremely sensitive to anything likely to reduce its effectiveness and influence in the world.