Belgium

I should like first to associate myself with the well-deserved congratulations which have been addressed to the President on the occasion of his election. 102. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom has just said that his Government believed in the world mission of the United Nations. The Belgian Government also believes in it, and we wish to pay a tribute to all those who co-operate in that mission on a permanent basis. It is in the particular interest of the small and medium-sized countries such as mine that this institution should prosper and that it should some day be able to determine the law. 103. I should like to make a few brief remarks to the Assembly concerning one of the topics just dealt with by Mr. Lloyd. That topic is disarmament. I shall follow up my remarks with a practical proposal. 104. The discussions of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London showed that, on certain points, agreement was possible. No agreement, however, was concluded. As the Prime Minister of Canada has said [683rd meeting], efforts will have to be redoubled. The length of the negotiations has aroused criticism, particularly the criticism which was expressed from this rostrum by the representative of the Soviet Union [681st meeting]. To my mind, these criticisms are not justified. The problems are so numerous, so important and so closely interrelated that it is impossible to think of solving them in a few months. It will inevitably require a long time to arrive at the first lasting agreements. 105. The unfortunate result is that faster progress is being made in inventing and manufacturing new weapons of mass destruction than is being made in disarmament negotiations, and it is only natural that world opinion should be disturbed by this situation. 106. There is no lack in the world of persons who think deeply on political and military questions and who express doubt as to the possibility of any form of disarmament whatsoever and speculate on the failure of the disarmament conferences. Perhaps the future will prove them right. But let there be no mistake about it; if the future proves them right, we shall have war within a foreseeable time, because the opportunities which are missed for disarmament will be seized upon for war. 107. It has been noted that the principal wars of modern times, from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to the two world wars, were preceded by very vigorous discussions on disarmament. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to say that the wars broke out because those conferences had been held. The wars broke out because the disarmament conferences failed. 108. It is not my intention to revert to any of the problems which were raised in London. I should like simply to ask you a question: is it not possible to make the task of the negotiators easier by informing the peoples objectively and directly about the extreme gravity of the problems awaiting solution? In other words, would it not be possible to arrive at some preliminary, practical solutions more quickly - partial and imperfect as such solutions might be - by pointing out the danger which lies in the absence of any solution at all? 109. I think that the United Nations can give an affirmative answer to this question. If, by some misfortune, it were impossible for the United Nations even to provide the peoples, all peoples, with impartial information, what could we expect from a disarmament conference, which has much more difficult work to do? 110. I think that three facts emerge from the London talks. The first is that disarmament or the controlled limitation of nuclear armaments cannot be separated from the controlled limitation of conventional armaments. Atomic disarmament alone, which would permit the conventional armaments race to go on, would not reduce the risks of war. And rather than try to make war more humane - which has always been a great delusion - we should try to eliminate the danger of war itself and, consequently, reduce nuclear and conventional armaments at the same time, 111. The second fact is this: in the present circumstances, a general war would be an atomic war, with all its consequences. Let us make no mistake about it: if no agreement is reached on armaments in the next few years, any general war will be a war of annihilation. Some optimists imagine that this will not be so, but they are deceiving themselves. They deceive themselves in order to allay their own fears, but this will not avert the danger. The most lethal modern arms are much too expensive and at the same time much too decisive to remain unused in the event of a large-scale conflict. 112. While the Sub-Committee was in session, serious warnings were sounded from both East and West, particularly in Moscow and Washington. A Soviet note addressed to a European State on 27 April 1957 stated literally that, in case of war, the territory of that State would be transformed into "one big cemetery". A few weeks later, General Norstad declared in turn that, in the event of aggression against the West, all the vital centres of the Soviet Union would be destroyed. These reciprocal warnings were not mere bluster. It is extremely likely that they would be realized to the letter if war broke out. 113. In this connexion, and without desiring to engage in polemics, I should like to make very brief mention if what I regard as a deplorable phrase which the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs used several times while addressing us on 20 September [681st meeting]. Several times Mr. Gromyko spoke of certain Western countries which, he alleged, wanted atomic war and were preparing for it. What is the good of making such accusations in a discussion as serious as this one? The Western States are well aware that an atomic war would be no less terrible for those who started it than for those who retaliated with the same weapons. The Western States are well aware that there would be neither victors nor vanquished in a future atomic war, but only a frightful mutual slaughter. They have said this on several occasions, and I recall that Mr. Khrushchev repeated this statement verbatim at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. In these circumstances, how can anyone maintain that the Western States would be so insane as to want an atomic war? 114. The third fact which became evident in London is, as it seems to me, no less obvious than the two preceding ones. It is that at the present time, unfortunately, there is not the slightest mutual trust between East and West, so much so that any agreement which assumed such trust would be only a sham. If we look at things realistically, we must clearly recognize that, in the present state of affairs, a disarmament agreement which was based primarily on the goodwill or good faith of its signatories would be regarded with suspicion by both sides. It would have the appearance of a trap or a deception. 115. If irrefutable testimony had to be produced on this point, the choice would be only too easy. On 22 July 1957, Mr. Bulganin wrote in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: "No one in the USSR is so naive as to put the security of the State at the mercy of a guarantee furnished by the aggressive bloc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The Soviet leaders should understand that this kind of language provokes exactly similar retorts from the Western countries and, I am sure, from the rest of the world. There is nothing easier than to reply that no country in the West or in the rest of the world is so naive as to let its security depend solely on a guarantee furnished by the Soviet Union. There is nothing easier than a reply of that kind, but what good does it do? Meanwhile, one thing is certain: confidence on both sides is non-existent. 116. Does that mean that no agreement at all is possible? Probably not, but at any rate it means that the most formal mutual assurances and the most solemn promises are not enough. Whether it is a question of reducing the number of troops and armaments of all kinds or of discontinuing atomic test explosions, the only positive and lasting guarantee is that of international control. In order to make possible some beginning in disarmament, in no matter what field, it will be necessary to organize international control and inspection agencies and make sure that they will function continuously, so that their effectiveness cannot be challenged by anybody. 117. Until the need for this control is admitted and actually put into practice, any disarmament agreement will remain illusory. Negotiations will drag on indefinitely between partners suspected each of trying to disarm the other or of engaging in mere propaganda, rather than seeking joint disarmament under joint supervision. 118. By rejecting effective international control, any Power ipso facto gives the whole world reason to distrust its intentions. To refuse control in matters of armament is tantamount to refusing arbitration in matters of litigation. The acceptance of international control is the true test of a genuine desire for peace. This acceptance does not imply mutual confidence, but it implies recognition of the fact that the rights o; mankind are superior to those of any nation or of any group of nations. It is therefore in conformity with the spirit of the Charter to advocate the establishment of an international control body as a primary condition for a progressive limitation of armaments. 119. However, we are forced to admit that up to now nations have never actually submitted to this primary condition for success. Disarmament conferences have never achieved decisive results because they have always been brought up short by the question of control. 120. Those heads of State who oppose control advance a variety of reasons. They claim that international control would simply be a form of espionage, would weaken the morale of armed forces, maintain a deceptive sense of security, and prevent nations from righting their own wrongs. 121. In the past, these reasons have always proved stronger that the will for peace. Will they continue to prevail over the terrifying prospects of any new major war? That is the question which overshadows all others, as was shown more than once during the discussions in London. Several effective systems of aerial and land control were proposed. They were not accepted. In reality, it was the refusal to accept control or resistance to control which prevented the Subcommittee from reaching the slightest agreement. 122. Why is this resistance so stubborn? Because it clings to a concept of national sovereignty which is as narrow as it is outmoded. It cannot be denied - and we must recognize it - that international control over armaments is incompatible with a certain absolute concept of national sovereignty, and we must, unfortunately, acknowledge that many countries remain blindly attached to this concept. The heads of State who are opposed to control can easily find support among the masses of their populations. They have but to appeal to the so-called imperatives of sovereignty, national interest and national prestige, and the old reflexes are set in motion. This is the greatest obstacle to the efforts for peace. 123. There is only one way of surmounting this obstacle, and that is to enlighten all the peoples, without exception, concerning the realities of modern warfare, which has nothing in common with the warfare of the past, so that they may realize without the shadow of a doubt that an uncontrolled and unrestricted armaments race is leading them to suicide. 124. Here I should like to quote the declarations of two statesmen, one a Soviet statesman and the other an American statesman, who are not very often in agreement. These declarations, however, seem to me to complement each other. The first is that of Mr. Khrushchev. "We know," he said on 18 June 1957, "that the peoples of all nations want peace. But I think that among the masses of the people there is not yet sufficient awareness of the danger of war and not enough is being done to avert war." 125. If Mr. Khrushchev is right, as I think he is, and if his comment on the insufficient awareness of danger applies to the masses of the people in the Soviet Union as well as to those in other countries, then we must also agree with the United States Secretary of State, who declared on 22 July, and repeated from this rostrum on 19 September [680th meeting], that "humanity faces a tragic future if the war threat is not brought under control". 126. This international control is necessary, then. It is vital, and yet nothing could be more difficult than to secure its acceptance. It would be less difficult, no doubt, if the eyes of the people were opened to that formidable prospect evoked by Mr. Dulles. Therefore an appeal must be made directly to the peoples, to their instinct of self-preservation. That is the only means of overcoming the old reflexes which balk at international control. Side by side with the disarmament negotiations, we must undertake, under the auspices of the United Nations, a collective information campaign on the armaments race, on weapons of mass destruction, on their lethal effects and on the necessity of international control as a condition of any disarmament agreement. 127. That is the purpose of the proposal with which I wish to conclude. I wish first to explain it and then briefly to justify it. The aim of the proposal has just been stated. We must explain - in the most specific and compelling terms possible - to the peoples of those countries which in case of war would be exposed to the effects of modern weapons, that only the international control of armaments can avert a monstrous danger as yet incompletely understood. 128. This danger is obviously not appreciated in the countries where all means of information belong to the State and where, therefore, the dissemination of information is never completely truthful and impartial. But even in other countries, the danger is not understood as it should be, because it is more or less concealed among the so-called military secrets, because it is the normal practice for the authorities to attempt to reassure the people rather than to frighten them and, finally, because nothing is more persistent in the public mind than the illusion that armed might means safety. As long as this illusion conceals the danger, it will be idle to hope that the manufacture and stockpiling of armaments can be submitted to United Nations inspection. International control requires an information campaign organized and carried out on an international scale. 129. In the course of this year, thousands of scientists of all nationalities and all shades of opinion have denounced the appalling danger which hangs over the entire world. The most eminent nuclear scientists have described the immediate and long-range effects of atomic bombardments. They have spoken of millions of human beings killed in the countries at war and of hundreds of millions of others outside those countries who would probably be affected by the aftereffects of radiation. In India, two years ago, an extremely well-documented study appeared on these problems. This year, in the United States, a paper published by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission has just supplied precise information on the destructive power of a bomb a thousand times more powerful than the one used at Hiroshima. 130. These facts and many others are reported in the daily Press, at least in the countries where the Press is free, but they are given only a few lines, and experience shows that in general newspaper readers are not deeply impressed by them. Thus the masses adopt a fatalistic and apathetic attitude and end by regarding it as inevitable that the armaments race should progress on an increasing scale. Many of these readers think that the more frightening the prospects are, the less likelihood there is that they will become realities. Thus, because they are insufficiently conscious of the tragic future sketched by Mr. Dulles at this rostrum a few days ago, the masses are, so to speak, neutralized. And, in the face of the danger which threatens all of us, what is neutrality but a more or less voluntary form of complicity? 131. The fact is that certain countries at the present time seem to be more concerned with acquiring new weapons - and those as destructive as possible - than with allowing the weapons they have to be subjected to international control. These attitudes will change only when the peoples of these countries clearly understand the fate awaiting them in the event of large- scale conflict. 132. The General Assembly ought to decide at Its present session that a plan for a collective information campaign should be prepared immediately and submitted to it for approval at its next regular session. I propose, to that end, that the Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General, on the other, to undertake in co-operation the following two tasks: first, the compilation of essential information for dissemination in all countries; secondly, the establishment of a programme and of practical means for disseminating the information. 133. The first task, therefore, would consist of the compilation of full and authoritative documentation and information concerning, inter alia, the present state of the armaments race and the expense it involves; the destructive power of weapons of all kinds, their immediate and long-range lethal effects and the measures taken for their possible use; lastly, the inadequacy, to which the British White Paper bears witness, of all military or civil defence and the need to strengthen the security of all peoples through the controlled limitation of armaments. 134. The second task, which would be the special responsibility of the Secretary-General, would be to prepare a plan for the dissemination of the information thus compiled, with a view to enlightening the populations of all Member States on the inevitable consequences of any total war. It is understood that this information would include only scientifically established and irrefutable facts, that it would eschew all ideological or political bias, and that it would be brought to the attention of all the peoples in identical form, which would of necessity be the form that was clearest, simplest and most expressive. The campaign would be carried out in each country with the cooperation of the authorities, but on the initiative of the United Nations and under the effective and continuing supervision of representatives appointed by the United Nations. It would employ those means of publication and dissemination - Press, radio, cinema, and television - which were able to reach the entire mass of the population in each country. 135. Such are the two preliminary tasks - the compilation of information and a plan of action - which the Disarmament Commission and the Secretary-General would be jointly responsible for carrying out, and whose conclusions would be ref erred to the General Assembly in the course of its next regular session. 136. The proposal thus summarized is a contribution to the advancement of the spirit of peace and offers, I think, a threefold interest. In the first place, it would enable the United Nations to act directly on the mass of the population in every country, but in such a way that both the operation of the project and its results would be supervised by the representatives of the Member States. What Government sincerely devoted to the cause of peace could object to the free prosecution in its territory of such action on behalf of truth and against war? 137. Secondly, this information campaign would help to strengthen the efforts of the Disarmament Commission. In particular, it would help to convince all the peoples of the world that, if the armaments race is to be halted without impairing security, some action - armaments control - is essential. 138. Lastly, who can possibly doubt that, when they are confronted by the terrible prospects facing them, all the peoples of the world will press their own Governments and the great Powers to expedite the negotiations and the first agreements on disarmament? 139. The primary mission of the United Nations is to strengthen peace throughout the world; one of the means at its disposal is to enlighten the peoples in all lands concerning the unprecedented horrors of a new world conflagration. 140. The proposal which I have the honour to submit to the General Assembly is obviously open to amendment. What I hope, on behalf of a country which hates war, is that the General Assembly will agree to try out a means of action in the service of peace.