1. Madam President, your election to the Presidency of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly is a fitting recognition of your exceptional contributions as a diplomat of your country and as an untiring and devoted worker for the cause of the United Nations. During a distinguished service, spanning a period of fifteen years, you have acquired rich and varied experiences from which, I am sure, the Assembly will greatly profit. That the second woman President of the General Assembly should be found in your person, an illustrious daughter of Africa, is a source of great pride to all of us. 2. Having had the opportunity of working with you in the various halls of the United Nations, you may well understand how happy I am that a friend of long standing, as well as a great friend of my country, should be in the Chair today as I speak. 3. May I also avail myself of this opportunity to extend the sincere condolences of my Government to the family of Mr. Emilio Arenales, and to the Government of Guatemala, in whose untimely death they have sustained a great loss. 4. The year 1969 will go down in the history of mankind as an important watershed. Future historians will, no doubt, record that by first setting foot on the moon, man not only realized an age-old dream, but also, with that achievement, opened up entirely new horizons for his imagination. It will also be said that that achievement dramatically transformed man’s perspective of himself. 5. If it has been true in the past that man has made progress by constantly holding out visions of his future and by acting out those visions, it should now be clearer than ever that never before in human history has man’s future looked brighter, his challenge nobler, his means greater. If we were thus to be led today by our past, we should have every reason to be optimistic about our future. Can we, however, in point of fact, look to the future with such firm optimism? 6. The paradox today is that we have entered a qualitative new age, in which our past has become increasingly irrelevant to our future. Up to very recently man never possessed the technical capability to commit mass suicide. So long as he had not reached that point man was capable of seeing his future without the spectre of total destruction impairing his vision or limiting his imagination. Now that that point has been passed, a dark shadow has been cast over man’s imagination; a sort of terminal point to his vision seems to have been reached. 7. Above everything else, the extraordinary feat of man’s landing on the moon has vividly underscored the dramatic scientific and technical achievements mankind has made in all areas and on all fronts of knowledge. The latest achievements of man should leave no-one in doubt that man has now the means to eradicate from the face of the earth his age-old Nemesis of ignorance, poverty and hunger. If man does not soon do away with those evils which still plague two thirds of mankind, it certainly will not be for lack of know-how but for lack of will, and the inability to organize and order his efforts and goals. 8. The other side of the picture is not, however, so hopeful. The same scientific and technical capability which put men on the moon can also be used for total self-destruction. Thus, in that sense, man’s landing on the moon was as much as demonstration of the frightening power he has acquired for self-destruction as it is of the many promising things these latest achievements hold out for mankind. Even as we rejoice and marvel at man’s fantastic voyage to the moon, the lesson of what it all means should not be lost on us. More than ever, it should now be clear to us that, in the interest of the survival of mankind, the destructive uses to which these dramatic scientific and technological achievements can be put should be controlled, and their application for economic and social development accelerated. 9. This brings me directly to the two important questions which we have debated for many years here at the United Nations. These are, first, the question of disarmament, and second, the problem of economic and social development. 10. The Secretary-General is quite right when he says with respect to disarmament that “the world is standing at what may be regarded in the perspective of history as one of the decisive moments in the grim challenge of the nuclear arms race” [A/7601/Add.1, para. 26]. Yet, we must all agree that the choice available seems to be very clear, nor should the present situation require unusually sophisticated understanding. There are at least two States which have enough power to destroy each other and, in the process, the rest of the world. In pursuit of an illusory concept of superiority those same countries have unleashed a feverish arms race. They are also acquiring at an alarming rate “over-kill capacity”, that is, the capability to destroy each other several times over. The end result of this process has been graphically described by the Secretary-General in the following terms: “As the spiral of the nuclear arms race goes up, the spiral of security goes down.” [Ibid., para. 28.] 11. In this situation, the choice that the two super-Powers will have to make is not the classical dilemma of the lesser of two evils: they will either have to give up their nuclear weapons entirely and place under effective control the development of science and technology for weapons purposes, or they will immeasurably enhance the risk of total destruction and the sense of insecurity to the point where, even if one day the big Powers wanted to, so complicated would be the problem of inspection that they would no longer be able to reduce their nuclear arsenals. This is not idle speculation; already we see the handwriting on the wall with plans for anti-missile defence and missiles with multiple warheads. If science and technology have, throughout history, found immediate application in weapons of war, the present rate of application is unprecedented. With every advance, man’s chances of controlling the use of these weapons has gradually diminished to a point where a totally uncontrollable stage will soon be reached. 12. This problem seems to be even more urgent with regard to chemical and bacteriological weapons. For one thing those weapons are cheaper than nuclear weapons to develop and one can more effectively conceal their development. Secondly, more countries, about thirty by the latest estimate, have the potential to develop chemical and bacteriological agents into lethal and uncontrollable weapons of war. 13. The Secretary-General’s report on this aspect, drawn up with the assistance of fourteen eminent scientists, confirms our worst fears. The report stated: “Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society ... in which we live.” 14. Unless the international community, and particularly the super-Powers, summon their last effort of will, the chances for mankind’s winning. the race for time will be soon out of the question. At any rate, there does not seem to be very much time left; considering the alarming rate of scientific and technological development, at the most we only have ten years. 15. It is thus with an apprehensive understanding of what has been often described as the “mad momentum” of the ever escalating arms race that my delegation enthusiastically welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal that the seventies should also be declared a Disarmament Decade. We also agree with him that, similar to the exercise presently under way to establish goals and specific objectives for common action with respect to economic and social development in the decade of the seventies, specific objectives and timetables should be established in the field of disarmament. 16. Science and technology are also exerting a decisive influence on economic and social development. The growing scientific and technological gap between the developed and the developing countries is the root cause of the widening disparity in their development. The present unequal sharing of the benefits of international trade between them, a factor which the developing countries consider one of the most restrictive to their economic development, can, in large measure, be explained by the uneven distribution of the benefits of modern science and technology. New scientific advances have enabled many a developed country to produce comparable, even at times better, substitutes for some of the commodities which they have traditionally imported from the developing countries, and their ability and efficiency in this regard has also increased. 17. The impact of science and technology on agriculture in the already developed countries has been so spectacular that many of them find it today cheaper and more convenient to produce their own food and other agricultural commodities which they can use for industrial purposes. In many a developed country the agricultural revolution not only preceded the industrial revolution but, in fact, made their industrialization possible. Except for a handful of countries, the result of this historic development has been to make the developing countries uncompetitive vis-a-vis the developed countries in the production of almost every agricultural commodity and industrial product. In the few instances where the developing countries have still preserved certain advantages, it has not been because of any advantages resulting from efficiency of techniques or organization, but from such factors as climate and unusually generous gifts of nature. Those exceptions are countries which produce some tropical agricultural products which are needed in the industrialized countries, rare countries which dispose of such valuable wealth as oil or other precious minerals which are in short supply in the developed countries themselves. 18. The application of science and technology in production also means, in the immediate sense, capital and trained manpower — two resources which the developing countries have in such pitifully limited supply. However, the fact that there is not enough capital or trained scientific and technical manpower, severely limits the development of science and technology in those countries. Whereas countries which are at an advanced stage of scientific development have an increasing ability to develop their science and technology at a much higher rate, the developing countries are caught in a vicious circle. The net result of this phenomenon is to make the importation of scientific and technical know-how into the developing regions exorbitantly expensive. Even more serious, because of the disparity in the level of their development, and therefore in their problems, the development of science and technology in the advanced countries is turning away from the needs of the developing countries. 19. We have today reached a stage where even if the developing countries were to do all that they should in order to develop with optimum efficiency — which they are not doing for reasons which must be obvious—they simply cannot go anywhere, for such external factors as the widening technological gap, the unequal division of the benefits of trade over which they have no control, have a more decisive influence on their economic development than the decisions that they themselves can make. To assume, on the other hand, that the developing countries will be doing all that they can or to demand that they should do all that they must, is an idea bordering on the unrealistic. It should be obvious that the fact that the developing countries are under-developed means in a large measure that they simply do not have the ability to do things right; if they had that ability, they would not be under-developed countries in the first place. 20. Given the present historical circumstance and the built-in and widening technological gap, there is no substitute for well-ordered and mutually beneficial international co-operation, based on the understanding that we have reached a point in history where the action of one country not only affects others indirectly, but also that the actions of the rich and industrialized countries vitally affect the destinies of the developing countries; so much so that for many a developing country what the advanced countries choose to do or not to do at a given moment spells the difference between economic development or stagnation. 21. It is against this background that we should approach our task of elaborating specific goals and objectives for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Unless we are able to agree on what the developing and the developed countries should do separately or jointly for the fulfilment of certain mutually agreed minimum objectives on this uphill and difficult road of economic development, we might not only be cancelling the benefits which may come about from the efforts of each one of us, but we could even be working at cross-purposes. It seems to my delegation that before we can hope to establish a framework for collective action for the Second United Nations Development Decade, we must learn how far the world has become interdependent. There should be a profound understanding of that basic truth, which for the first time in history has posed urgent problems. Now that mankind has begun to share a common destiny, a solution to the development problem should be foreseen, not on altruistic motives but on the enlightened self-interest of all members of the international community. 22. Changing the call for international co-operation in the economic and social field from one of appeal to humanitarian instinct to that of a plea for enlightened self-interest in which the benefits to all concerned would be emphasized, will, however, require a fundamental change of attitude. In this regard, the United Nations has a useful role to play in shaping man’s new conscience for this historically unprecedented age. Member Governments, in particular, should take it upon themselves to inform their peoples of the advantages that they could have from an effective system of international co-operation. 23. Obviously, the United Nations does not have the means to undertake, in this respect, a massive campaign on all fronts. However, it seems to us that a limited but effective campaign to reach opinion leaders in the Member countries, through their universities, Press, business and public life, especially in the advanced countries, is indispensable if the Second United Nations Development Decade is to achieve anything. 24. I now wish to turn my attention to some of the outstanding political problems that are before us. 25. A candid appraisal of the record of the United Nations in these troubled times inescapably leads one to the conclusion that the United Nations is undergoing a “crisis of confidence”. Our diagnosis may, differ but today no one can seriously deny that fact. There seems to be a general weakening of idealism. People everywhere simply do not believe any more that the promise which the Charter of the United Nations held out for mankind will ever be realized. In recent times, even those of us who are fortunate enough to work in diplomacy, in these halls and elsewhere, have had difficulty to come up with anything that we can call progress, even to satisfy our self-esteem. 26. Various reasons have been advanced to explain why this has come about. One school of thought, which has gained wide acceptance in certain well-known quarters, holds the Afro-Asian countries responsible. By making impossible demands which they know that the United Nations cannot meet, these critics assert that the Afro-Asian countries are slowly wrecking the Organization and they contend that the Afro-Asian countries are relying more on their mechanical majorities rather than on serious negotiation. 27. Another school of thought attributes the prevailing ineffectiveness to the fact that the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is too idealistic an Organization to really reflect in its actual working the realities of the world; it cannot, therefore, be expected to act responsibly and realistically. Yet to another group the United Nations is an Organization designed to maintain the status quo of a world which in 1945 was emerging from the holocaust of a devastating war. Hence, according to this point of view, it cannot now be expected to accommodate the revolutionary changes that took place in the last quarter of a century, thus making the present contradictions and deadlock inevitable. 28. No one, of course, can claim that he and he alone has the correct diagnosis for this malaise of the will. All these explanations may have, in their own ways and in varying degrees, something of the truth. We must all agree, however, that whatever is said of the United Nations, no one can seriously suggest that something is wrong with the principles which inspired the Charter; the weak point has always been in the realm of implementation of those principles by Members of the Organization. 29. It should be clear in this respect that if all of us, as Members of the United Nations, were to accept a certain amount of responsibility for having made the United Nations less effective than it is capable of being, it should be equally obvious that some Members would, in this regard, assume more responsibility than others. 30. Let us, for example, review the record with respect to colonialism. Although the Charter of the United Nations held out the promise of self-determination to all subjugated peoples, the Organization did little about decolonization until the beginning of the sixties. The failure to involve the United Nations in the decolonization of most of South-East Asia, North Africa and other parts of Africa led, as we all know, to bloodshed which conceivably could have been avoided. The record of the United Nations in the field of decolonization in the first fifteen years of its existence can, in fact, be summed up appropriately as one of a string of missed opportunities. On the part of some influential Members, their records amount to a complete abdication of their responsibilities and obligations under the Charter. 31. What we are today witnessing, with respect to the remaining colonial questions in Africa, is the continuation of the same pattern; a group of countries which have either been invested by the Charter of the United Nations with great responsibility for the fulfilment of its principles, or which circumstances have given the power to effect improvement in all critical colonial situations, still persist in their refusal to live up to the full measure of their responsibility. 32. Be it with respect to the Portuguese Territories in Africa, or to Rhodesia or the question of Namibia, or apartheid in South Africa, any prospect of evolving satisfactory solutions through persuasion or negotiation is ended. The record shows that in most cases for over ten years, all the available means of United Nations diplomacy have been used to that end repeatedly, but to no avail. If one were to be candid in one’s appraisal of this record, I cannot see for a moment how one could still harbour the hope that somehow the colonial régimes in southern Africa will be persuaded to change their policies. Under the circumstances, the only conclusion that logically presents itself is that those who still entertain further hope on this score are either indulging in wishful thinking, or simply trying to justify their failure to act in a manner required by their responsibility. 33. It should be clear by now that we have reached a position in which, if any plea for a change of course is to be addressed, it should be addressed not to the colonial régimes in southern Africa — for we know they cannot hear — but to a handful of Governments whose failure to act forthrightly and in accordance with their responsibility has made it possible for those colonial interests to persist in their defiance of the United Nations. 34. It should surprise no one, therefore, that no improvement has been seen in any one of the critical colonial situations in southern Africa. The colonial wars which Portugal is waging in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) have increased in savagery and in repercussions; yet the world seems to hear little or nothing about them. Those Member States whose generous gift or sale of arms has made it possible for Portugal to sustain those wars have lately intensified their efforts so as to increase their share of the spoils of war by helping Portugal to tap the resources of those Territories. In this respect the long-term implications of the massive influx of South African and Western capital into Angola and Mozambique should not be lost on anyone. 35. With respect to Rhodesia, even the most optimistic advocates of mandatory economic sanctions should see by now that those measures which have been in force since June 1968 have failed to bring down the illegal rebel régime of Ian Smith. The reports that have been submitted by the Security Council committee on the implementation of sanctions have proved demonstrably that those sanctions are not in general being complied with. If the sanctions were fully implemented, a small country such as Southern Rhodesia, which depends entirely on import and export for its life sustenance, could not possibly have survived such a severe punishment to its economy. 36. On our part, we have never had any illusion that South Africa and Portugal would co-operate in this respect with the United Nations despite the fact, of course, that under Article 25 of the Charter they have an obligation to abide by the decisions of the Council. What has surprised us, however, is what the reports of the Security Council’s committee have shown by implication; that is the fact that a number of countries, while giving the formal appearance of implementing the sanctions, have not prevented some of their nationals from buying and selling to Rhodesia through intermediaries. 37. In this connexion the fact that some important members of the international community are still maintaining consular representation in Rhodesia should not be overlooked. 38. Assuming that their hope has always been genuine, to those who have hoped against hope that by some miraculous process the Salisbury régime would be prevailed upon to change its course, the imposition on the Territory of a system of apartheid and the increasing repressive measures which that régime has taken against the freedom fighters should now be the last straw. By those actions the régime of Ian Smith seems t have burned all the remaining bridges that linked it to the international community and those who had persisted in giving it the benefit of the doubt. 39. South Africa has also continued to tighten its hold on Namibia. Since, at the same time, Namibia is being progressively integrated into the apartheid system of South Africa, policies designed to break up the territorial integrity of the Territory are being implemented. In the meantime no action has been taken to give effect to the United Nations assumption of administrative responsibility for the Territory; all that the United Nations has done over the past year has been to address several pleas to South Africa to spare from execution some of the freedom fighters who have been sent to goal for resisting oppression — please no sooner made than they were rejected by the South African régime. 40. With respect to the remaining colonial questions in southern Africa the following conclusions must therefore emerge. First, the totally inadequate response of the United Nations to the defiance of the colonial régimes in southern Africa has contributed much to dampening enthusiasm for the United Nations. Secondly, by now it should be clear that no further pleas would make the colonial régimes change their course of action. Thirdly, if there is any hope for improvement in all those critical areas, that improvement will have to come as the result of the more influential Members of the Organization taking effective action commensurate with their responsibility under the Charter. 41. There is also some scepticism, especially among the small countries, about the United Nations being able to respond to their security needs. As is well known, because of the impasse in the Security Council, the hope of collective security under the Charter has never been realized. On the other hand, the increasing role of the United Nations in peace-keeping has been nipped in the bud as a result of the big Powers’ refusal to share responsibility with the smaller countries for the maintenance of peace and security. 42. I regret to say that the Special Committee of Thirty-three, which has been charged with the task of studying the various aspects of peace-keeping, has not been able to tackle the fundamental questions. I believe the time has come for the General Assembly to examine new ways of keeping alive the peace-keeping role of the United Nations which, it must be emphasized, grew, in the first place, in response to the demands of the smaller countries of the Organization. 43. In Viet-Nam, the Middle East and Nigeria the guns have not been stilled; even as we deliberate here at the United Nations, men are killing one another in all those places. 44. If there is anything we can call progress, it is the fact that, at least with respect to Viet-Nam, the Paris talks are still continuing. There have also been some indications lately that the level of fighting could be de-escalated. Even if there have been serious snags in putting into motion a process of de-escalation which could lead to a cease-fire, at least with respect to Viet-Nam, the key to the final solution is very clear. That solution lies in the prospect that the people of South Viet-Nam will be able to determine, without foreign interference, the political and social system under which they wish to live. 45. With regard to the Middle East, I said last year: “It almost seems as if the preservation of the fragile cease-fire arrangements is consigned to a blind interplay of incidents rather than the dictates of international obligations or even of self-interest.” [1683rd meeting, para. 14.] Since that time, such has been the extent of deterioration of the situation that I regret I cannot even repeat those words this year, for the fact today is that the cease-fire arrangements have collapsed in many sectors. Instead premeditated, highly planned and large-scale violations of the cease-fire have become daily occurrences. Along the Suez Canal and the Jordan-Israeli cease-fire sector the violations have assumed the dimensions of continuing warfare. 46. My Government believes that the main impetus for a solution of the problem of the Middle East should come from the big Powers within the framework of the United Nations. The problem in the immediate sense being one of turning the course of this continuing warfare, the big Powers have, under the Charter of the United Nations, an inescapable responsibility to act. Because of the fact that the big Powers are vitally involved, either economically or as suppliers of arms to the parties in conflict, and because of the danger in this situation of big-Power confrontation, those powers, as permanent members of the Security Council, also have the added responsibility to act urgently and forthrightly. 47. The basis for both the intermediate and the long-term solution to the conflict is contained in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 [242 (1967)]. As I said last year, that resolution contains a delicately balanced mutual set of obligations. The problem has been with regard to the timing of the implementation by the parties concerned of the various components of those obligations. If the big Powers were to give a guarantee under the umbrella of the United Nations, that problem, we believe, should pose no insurmountable difficulty. 48. However, time seems to be of the essence in the situation; the more the solution is delayed the more intractable will the problem become. Foreign occupation of a territory cannot be tolerated without also generating resistance from the occupied people; the longer the occupation lasts the stronger will that resistance be. The prolonged occupation is already bringing unpredictable and uncontrollable elements into the Middle East situation. 49. The fact that the Nigerian civil war is continuing unabated is a matter of grave concern to my Government. As Chairman of the Organization of African Unity Consultative Committee on Nigeria, my own Sovereign has devoted much of his valuable time to trying to find a solution to that situation, which can only be described as a great tragedy for the people of Nigeria and of Africa. Undaunted by the lack of progress, my Sovereign will continue his efforts until a solution is found to that conflict. 50. if progress has not been made so far, it is, above all, because of the deep-seated and delicate nature of the conflict. The civil war in Nigeria was born of the complications and frictions that accompany nation-State building. Such a problem is not uniquely Nigeria’s. In varying degrees many countries have problems of minorities and nationalities. Because of the changes and readjustments brought about by the necessity of creating organizations and institutions that cut across the old fabrics of tribal and national loyalties in the newly independent States of Africa and Asia, this problem has acquired new dimensions, and in some places has led to intermittent conflicts. Nigeria has to solve this problem of nation-State building as other nations have solved it or at least succeed in reasonably holding the inevitable friction to the minimum. In the final analysis, the solution to the present conflict will have to be based on a restoration of confidence in the future of one national Nigerian body politic, in which the peoples that constitute that nation must learn to minimize the inevitable friction that nation-State building involves. The problem will not be solved if one of the constituent parts chooses to renounce a common destiny, because in the African context that could be an endless process. 51. Finally, as the United Nations is approaching the threshold of the quarter-century mark we have to look forward. If the forthcoming commemorative session of the General Assembly is to fulfil a valuable function for the international community, it should offer all of us an opportunity for a painstaking assessment of the events and developments of the past quarter of a century and of the role of the United Nations in a world which, as I said earlier, has become, for the first time in history, inextricably interdependent. The time between now and the next session should, therefore, be used in our capitals for such a critical assessment. The planned commemoration should also provide an opportunity for Heads of State and Government of Member States of the United Nations to meet here in order to rededicate themselves to the fulfilment of the principles of the Charter. Above all, the commemorative session of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations should inspire Member Governments to come forward with new and bold ideas that could hopefully answer some of the crying needs of the international community for security and justice and for economic and social development. 52. Already a group of Member States of the United Nations that are not members of any military alliances have, last week, held a conference, of which I was privileged to be Chairman, to address themselves to the question of how Members of the United Nations could effectively co-operate in solving some of the outstanding problems that have for long bedevilled the international community. The participants in that conference have also agreed to hold meetings in the future at various levels, including a conference of Heads of State and Government, with a view to enhancing their contributions in the fulfilment of the principles of the United Nations Charter; they have also created a committee which would enable them to contribute useful ideas towards making the forthcoming commemorative session a worth-while exercise in stocktaking and in mapping out new approaches. 53. Speaking of commemoration, I feel it to be quite appropriate that at a time when we are planning to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, we should also take cognizance of the centennial of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi, and stop to ponder over the significance of his life and the examples that he has set. It is particularly befitting, because in all respects the life of Mahatma Gandhi was one long struggle for the fulfilment of the principles which inspire the Charter of the United Nations. It should also be of particular significance to the United Nations that Mahatma Gandhi started his fight for human rights in South Africa where the future effectiveness of the United Nations still hangs in the balance. 54. Finally, before I end my statement, I should like to refer to a declaration known as the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa to which all African Governments have subscribed and which, in accordance with the recent decision of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth session will soon be introduced in the General Assembly by the President of Cameroon, His Excellency Ahmadou Ahidjo, who is the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity Assembly. That Manifesto sets out in poetic majesty the aspirations and the hopes of the peoples of Africa for freedom, justice and progress. While aware that those ideals have not found fulfilment in their respective countries, the African States have let it be known that they are entirely committed to their full realization. They have demanded of the world that there should be such a commitment, especially with respect to the granting of the right of self-determination to the peoples of southern Africa. I believe this is not asking too much.