102. It is a pleasure for
me and the members of my delegation to associate
ourselves with the felicitations that wave already been
extended to our President on the occasion of her election
to her high and responsible office. To what has already
been said I would like to add my appreciation of the
refreshing note of frankness and realism she injected into
her inaugural address, thus breaking away from the sterile
protocol which prescribes that the President’s address
should be a tranquilizer rather than a stimulant to speakers
that follow. Her pertinent observation that this august body
has long been addicted to what she described as the
“mythology of achievement” [1753rd meeting, para. 54] is
as timely as it is welcome. Since next year we shall be
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment
of the United Nations, a more critical and realistic
appraisal of our past and present performance should guide
our rhetoric along useful channels when, next year, we
come to consider the United Nations prospects for the next
quarter of a century.
103. The President’s observation about our predilection
for the “mythology of achievement“, I am sorry to say, is
substantiated by an analysis of the agenda now before us.
Out of the 67 items — excluding routine items relating to
elections and administrative and financial questions — 33
have been on the agenda for periods ranging from 5 to 20
years or more. In other words, half of the 67 items are
permanent incrustations on our agenda. Further analysis
reveals that 15 of these have been putting in a persistent
appearance and reappearance for from 5 to 10 years. Eight
others have been relentlessly haunting this Assembly for 15
years, while 10 have been with this Organization longer
than have most of us, having grown up with the Organization
for 20 years or more.
104. I fully appreciate that the grave and momentous
issues that come before this Assembly should not be hastily
disposed of. It is right and proper that some important
questions are worth sleeping on, but 20 years to sleep on
questions makes one wonder whether a metaphor is not
being taken too literally. There may be valid reasons why
many of these problems have become permanent fixtures
on our agenda, but the mythology of achievement is one
important reason why they have achieved near-immortality status.
105. As the President correctly pointed out, there appears
to be a belief among some of us that a resolution adopted
by this Organization is synonymous with a solution
achieved. When this august body is confronted with a
problem, its instinctive reaction is to begin a frantic search
for an appropriate resolution — not a practical solution. Not
problem-solving but resolution-making becomes the game.
This is not to underestimate the importance of resolutions
in any organization. They have a proper function to
perform in any organized activity. However, they have their
limitations too. But it would appear that some of us
harbour the illusion that their powers are unlimited, that
once we have publicly declared our resolve on a matter,
then a resolution can be relied upon, without any further
assistance or action on our part, to resolve the problem for us.
106. The fact that it does not has not shaken our faith in
this particular form of witchcraft. That is why an increasing
number of problems, which we hopefully dispose of each
year with appropriately worded resolutions, reappear,
bloody but unbowed, the next year and succeeding years.
One would have thought that this persistent reappearance
of somewhat battered and battle-scarred resolutions would
have caused us to re-examine, with some scepticism, the
efficacy of the ritual of resolution-making. However, it
would appear that ‘with successive reincarnations of a
persistent resolution our faith in this particular form of
black magic is proportionately reinforced. One could not
otherwise explain the presence of what I would call veteran
questions which do not show signs of ever dying on their
feet. If there are doubts about the efficacy of resolution-making,
it is attributed not to the procedure of resolution-making
but to its phraseology. So, we spend a great
deal of time phrasing and rephrasing resolutions through an
endless permutation of words. We become so preoccupied
with the phrasing of a resolution that the problem which
gave rise to the resolution is lost sight of and even thrust
aside as being something of a hindrance to the formulation
of an agreeable and well-balanced resolution.
107. I would, therefore, humbly suggest that this Assembly
shift its attention from resolution-making to problem-solving.
True, we cannot do without the making and passing
of resolutions. They are the necessary rituals of organized
activity. But resolutions are declarations of intentions and
not substitutes for action. In fact, every resolution which is
not acted upon weakens an organization. Where resolutions
are formulated primarily with a view to pleasing friends or
discomfiting enemies, internationally or domestically, then
resolutions become impediments to action, That is why
attempt must be made to relate a resolution to the realities
out of which the problem first arose. Our failure to do this
explains why some of the resolutions passed by our
Organization have an air of unreality and impracticability
about them. They were never in the first place put through
the sieve of what is possible and not possible; what is
practical and not practical.
108. My observations so far might appear to be unnecessarily
querulous and in accord with the current fashion of
denigrating the United Nations as an expensive white
elephant the world could do without. Let me assure you
that this is not my intention. It is because I sincerely
believe the United Nations is indispensable for the peace
and security of the world, and has such great potentialities
for good that even if the present Organization were to
collapse it would be necessary for mankind to erect another
one, that I experience a sense of exasperation at our
inability to put the existing Organization to better and
more profitable use.
109. I would like to stress here that a vigorous and
effective United Nations is more vital to what are described
currently as the less developed countries, the LDCs, than it
is to the more developed. This is not to suggest that the
developed countries are uninterested in the United Nations
or have no further use for it. But they need its services far
less than we of the less developed countries do. The
advanced countries can and often de operate, in regard to
world affairs, without reference to this Organization. In
fact, the less developed countries should wake up to this
new and significant development in international affairs,
which is that the advanced nations, and in particular the big
Powers, are setting up a separate international network of
their own, where decisions of greater consequence than
resolutions passed by this Assembly are being made and
implemented. While we of the less developed countries
delude ourselves into believing that our perorations, admonitions
and resolutions are influencing the course of
world events, the reality is otherwise. Increasingly, it is in
this separate international network, this new freemasonry
of big Powers and advanced nations, that the significant
decisions on world issues, whether they be political,
economic or military, are being taken.
110. If this is true, as I believe it to be the case, then the
less developed countries, which constitute roughly 80 per
cent of the world’s population and a majority of Members
of this Assembly, should seriously ask themselves what role,
if any, they would be allowed to play in world affairs? Is
there not a real possibility that world problems, a great
many of which would undoubtedly affect our future and
which will have an impact on our domestic affairs, will
more and more be settled over our heads by this free-masonry
of advanced nations?
111. I think this danger is a real one which, in the course
of the next decade or so, could reduce our so-called
sovereignty into a shadow without substance. Maybe some
of us have been prevented from facing up to this harsh
reality by the formal equality accorded to us in this august
Assembly. In theory, we are all equals in this Assembly
regardless of our size, our power, our effective economic
resources and the quality of our respective societies. Our
votes are equal and, therefore, mathematically speaking the
less developed countries should have a preponderance of
influence on world affairs through this Organization. But
we know now that this formal preponderance of power is
largely illusory because there is not the substance of power
behind this preponderance of mere numbers.
112. If I may slightly amend the phrase of the President,
we are also prey to yet another mythology, the “mythology
of the equality of nations”. Perhaps in the early days of this
Organization there was a greater approximation between
mythology and reality. There was a time when the more
advanced nations courted the less developed countries with
greater zeal than they do now.
113. Our exhortations, whether moral or condemnatory,
were listened to by the great and advanced nations with
apparent respect and rapt attention. There were then
solicitous offers of aid and great regard for our sensibilities
and even our whims. All these might have contributed
towards the great illusion that the big and small nations,
developed and less developed countries had an equal say in
the disposal of momentous world issues.
114. I would humbly suggest that the great deference
shown by the high and mighty and the special care they
took to extend to us the courtesies of equality were largely
due to a fortuitous combination of historical needs and
circumstances which, unfortunately, have now largely
vanished. In the years immediately after the end of the war,
the advanced nations, having just concluded a barbaric war,
were morally in a defensive, if not apologetic, mood before
the new nations, which, being new, had no comparable
record. Our moral strictures in regard to the iniquities of
imperialism probably instilled a guilt complex among the
advanced nations. In that frame of mind they were perhaps
a little more disposed towards placating their former
victims and even towards disbursing conscience money in
the form of aid and loans.
115. However, more than two decades have passed since
decolonization began and 20 years is a long time in which
to nourish a guilt complex. During that time, too, some of
the new nations have lost their innocent looks and built up
records which make our moral strictures less compelling to
the reprobates of the old world. We must also remember
that, in the intervening years, a new generation has grown
up in the advanced countries which has no guilty conscience
about imperialism because it did not participate in
its iniquities, and which believes that its guilty elders have
already performed due deeds of atonement. This new
generation of men whose influence is growing in their
respective countries is too interested in fighting poverty in
its own homeland to be concerned with eradicating it in the
third world. It is more interested in financing the second
industrial revolution in its own country than in initiating
the first in the less developed countries.
116. Perhaps the most pertinent reason why the advanced
nations once courted us with such flattering ardour was the
fact of the cold war. Those were the halcyon days when the
advanced nations, in particular the big Powers, believed that
the decisive battlefield of the cold war was the United
Nations. Both communist and anti-communist protagonists
believed that significant defeats and victories could be
secured by appropriate resolutions in the United Nations.
So the combatant who could mobilize the greatest number
of votes for his cause felt he had the edge over his rival.
117. It was not surprising that the less developed nations
were courted and humoured. Their speeches were listened
to with unrelenting attention by the advanced nations, not
so much for the pearls of wisdom which might be cast but
to determine whether it was the East Wind or the West
Wind which was blowing strong in this Assembly. I am not
making any moral judgement. Since the big Powers had
foolishly decided to convert the United Nations into an
arena for their cold war manoeuvres, the smaller nations,
understandably, tried to secure the maximum advantage for
themselves out of a situation which, after all, was not of
their making.
118. All this I am afraid is now in the past. Today a
somewhat different situation confronts the less developed
countries. The techniques of cold war have changed
significantly. The advanced countries and the big Powers no
longer need this Assembly — at least in the way they once
did — to resolve their differences or pursue their major
national objectives. The votes and the support of the less
developed nations are therefore not that vital; hence our
leverage against them is far weaker than it was two decades
ago. It will become even more feeble unless we of the less
developed nations begin a brutally frank reassessment of
our real position and our real influence. I do not propose to
suggest the lines along which that reassessment should
move. First, it is too complex and also too delicate a
question to be thrashed out in a single speech or even a
succession of speeches.
119. Second, I myself have as yet no specific and clear-cut
proposals as to how the less developed nations can carve
out for themselves a meaningful role in world affairs, other
than by passing resolutions which, like Omar Khayyam’s
philosopher, come out by the same door as in they went.
Perhaps when we meet next year to commemorate the
twenty-fifth year of the United Nations it may be worth
our while to undertake a positive and constructive approach
as to how small and developing nations can play a
satisfactory role in the shaping of world affairs.
120. But of one thing I am fairly certain. We cannot rely,
as we once did, on the advanced nations to be all that
concerned with our salvation. The advanced nations may be
taking a short-sighted view of their real interests, for in this
shrunken and interdependent world the widening gap
between rich and poor nations cannot, in the long run,
make for a peaceful, progressive or even a prosperous
world. Even if the advanced nations are prepared to lend a
helping hand this will, at best, be only a supplement to
what we should do for ourselves.
121. We have before us a number of undoubtedly important
issues. Most of these have been with us for a
considerable time and my Government has, on previous
occasions, expressed its considered views on those specific
topics. I shall not, therefore, tax your patience by repeating
them. They remain conveniently enshrined in the reports of
this Assembly and all I therefore need do is reaffirm our
attachment to views already proclaimed. I should, however,
like to make particular reference to three of them, not only
because my Government is specially concerned with them
but also because they involve grave issues of peace and war
for the world. These are the war in the Middle East, the war
in Viet-Nam and the manifestations of racialist imperialism
in South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia. My
Government has already made public its stand on these matters.
122. In the case of the Middle East conflict my Government
believes that no country, however big or small, should
be denied the right to exist; that the fruits of conquest,
however achieved, should not be forcibly converted into
fruits of war, and that peoples who have lived for long as a
settled community in a territory should not be made into
homeless wanderers. My Government believes that the
Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967
[242 (1967)] provides the basis for a peaceful solution and,
further, that the continued resort to force would only make
more difficult the resolution of that conflict.
123. In regard to Viet-Nam, our belief is that the future of
that country, for which World War II never really ended,
should be settled by the people of that nation through the
free expression of their wishes along the lines of the Geneva
Agreement of 1954.
124. As regards white racialism in South Africa and
Southern Rhodesia, its arrogance and confidence have
grown rather than diminished, despite the fierce postures
taken in this Assembly. Something more compelling than
the ritual of resolutions in this Assembly is required to
persuade the white Aryans of South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia, not that their doctrine is immoral — for they well
realize this — but that their long-term security and prosperity
would be in jeopardy were they to persist in their racial
arrogance. Until the white Aryans of South Africa and
Rhodesia can be convinced that racialism carries within
itself the seeds of their own destruction, through the
mobilization of black Africa, no less determined to end
racialism than the whites are to sustain it; moral exhortations,
by themselves, will not materially alter the present
convictions of the white racist minorities. If a determined
minority can impose its immoral doctrine on millions of
people, then it should be possible for a determined majority
to convince the minority of the utter futility of persisting
in its present course.
125. That is why my Government remains unconvinced
that these and other important issues will be settled wholly,
or even primarily, by the speeches less developed countries
make or the resolutions they endorse in this Assembly. The
ultimate and effective decisions must be taken by the
parties directly involved in such conflicts and by the big
Powers, which, we all know, have a special position in
regard to those conflicts. The big Powers and some of the
advanced nations are not innocent bystanders in regard to
conflicts involving less developed nations. The capacity of
the developed countries to determine at least the pitch and
intensity of expensive, mechanized, modern wars in other
peoples’ territories is, if not decisive, at least considerable.
126. The independent role that less developed nations can
play in these kinds of situations is, at best, marginal. Before
we of the less developed countries can play a more
independent role in world affairs, we must first build up the
political, economic and technological resources of a truly
modernized community. That is why calls to less developed
countries to jump into stormy seas to rescue friends, as
often embodied in Assembly resolutions, remain in fact
unanswered. When it comes to the decisive moment of
plunge, the potential rescuer makes a realistic appraisal of
his capacity to stay afloat himself, let alone rescue friends
True, there have been cases where valour has had the better
of discretion, with the result that very good friends, of
both advanced and less advanced nations, have regrettably
and irretrievably been lost.
127. In making this realistic, if somewhat unpleasant,
assessment of the capacity of under-developed nations to
play a role in world affairs, I am not suggesting total
incapacity or permanent impotence. On the contrary, I
believe that we have the potential to exert a substantial and
beneficial influence on the course of human affairs, because
we constitute the overwhelming majority of mankind. If we
can develop that potential, which in effect means undertaking
the difficult and painful process of modernization,
then, collectively, what are now the under-developed
nations can pass meaningful resolutions. The price of
modernization will be a heavy one, because the major
burden of the cost must be borne by us.
128. I do not propose to try your patience further by a
dissertation on modernization through self-help and mutual
aid between developed and under-developed nations. I
should like, however, to end with the warning that the
affluent countries have developed a more philosophical
attitude towards the widening gap between the rich and
poor nations. Maybe they hope that this widening gap itself
will afford them protection against the consequences of a
largely impoverished and desperate third world. But we of
the less developed countries cannot afford to take that
philosophical attitude, because the rate of progress — economic,
social and technical — in advanced countries is
reaching geometric proportions; and if we remain quiescent
in the face of this, then the difference between us and the
advanced nations may be as qualitatively different as that
between Stone Age man and modern man.
129. The validity of this contention is not something
which will be put to the test only many generations from
now. I think it will be put to the test when those now in
their teens in less developed countries reach maturity by
the end of this century. Whether this emerging generation is
put into new bondage will depend, to a great extent, on
what those of us now in charge do or fail to do.
130. That, in conclusion, is the measure of the real and
significant problem before the less developed countries.