I would like to begin by extending to the General Assembly
the fraternal greetings of the African people of Mali and its Transitional President and Head of State, His Excellency Colonel Assimi Goita. On their behalf and on my own behalf, the Malian delegation would like to warm congratulate the President on his election to the presidency of the General Assembly at its seventy- sixth session. I also congratulate his predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Volkan Bozkir, of the Republic of Turkey, for the outstanding manner in which he conducted the work of the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session. May I also reiterate to the Secretary-General, Mr. Antonio Guterres, our deep appreciation for his commendable ongoing efforts to achieve the noble objectives of our common Organization.
The seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly opens with the timely theme of hope — hope for building our resilience to recover from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in a spirit of responsibility, cooperation and solidarity; hope for a safer world, a world of human security; hope that the Sahel will regain stability and become a bastion of peace and a centre of growth and development; and hope to revitalize the United Nations. Mali fully subscribes to the letter and spirit of this theme, which perfectly summarizes the ideals of our common Organization.
It is a truism to say that Mali and the countries of the Sahel are today confronted with the hydra of terrorism, violent extremism and instability. This has been going on for more than a decade, with the risk of stagnation, trivialization or weariness, which may divert these problems from the international agenda. Our daily life of anguish and tragedy has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, with its negative impact on the economy and on the living conditions of our populations, which are already precarious due to the economic, political and humanitarian challenges. Rarely has a country or a region been more sorely tested by the accumulation of crises than Mali and the countries of the Sahel.
It is in this difficult context that the Malian people, after several months of popular uprisings, chose a different direction for our country and placed all their hopes in the political transition process under way, of which they are the main architects. The transitional Government I have been leading since 11 June 2021 includes representatives of the various stakeholders in Mali. It is noteworthy that, in the interests of inclusiveness, it also includes members of the signatory movements to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation on Mali, resulting from the Algiers process, as well as representatives of our country’s political and social sectors.
As soon as we were installed, we worked together to draw up the action plan of the transitional Government, which sets out a set of measures whose implementation will ensure that the major concerns of the population affected by the security, political, health and economic crises are addressed. The Government’s action plan, adopted on 2 August 2021 by the National Transition Council, the transitional legislative body, is based on four priorities. It includes a timetable for implementation and a provisional budget.
The first priority of the Government’s action plan is to make security a top priority. It responds to our people’s deep-seated desire for peace, tranquillity, coexistence, peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion.
Despite the undeniable successes of the Malian armed forces and their allies, to whom I pay tribute, the threats posed by terrorism and other forms of banditry and transnational crime continue, unfortunately, to plunge our people into mourning on a daily basis and to threaten the foundations of the State.
From March 2012 to 25 September 2021, as I address the Assembly from this rostrum, the situation in my country has hardly improved, despite international support and the presence on our territory of a United Nations peace operation, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as international forces — the French Operation Barkhane, the European Takuba Task Force and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.
The situation continues to deteriorate progressively to the point that entire sections of the national territory are beyond the Government’s control. My fellow citizens are living under the sway of armed terrorist groups and are being denied their most basic rights. Their access to basic services remains theoretical due to the weak presence of State services as a result of the growing insecurity.
MINUSMA, which I commend for its courage and its contribution to the stabilization of Mali, is operating in this vulnerable environment with all the threats it entails. Confronted with this worrisome situation, the Government is regularly and strongly challenged by the Malian people, who are increasing their demands
of the public authorities and international partners. It is well known that one of the fundamental rights of the population is the right to security and the sure guarantee of that is the legitimacy of the State in the eyes of the citizens.
I am recalling this situation to convey the full ordeal endured by the Malian people. I am also doing so to invite us all to truly reflect on how to change the paradigm of security in the Sahel.
Mali hosts a United Nations peacekeeping operation on its territory. I would like once again to pay heartfelt tribute to all the women and men who are working under the banner of MINUSMA in difficult, often perilous conditions in order to maintain peace and protect our civilian populations.
I recall that our common Organization, the United Nations, was well advised in April 2013, when it decided on the very timely deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Resolution 2100 (2013), of 25 April 2013, which established MINUSMA, determined, in its twenty- third preambular paragraph, that “the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” and therefore decided to take action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
In paragraph 16 (a) (i) of resolution 2100 (2013), it was established that the initial mandate of MINUSMA is, inter alia,
“In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas”.
In the twelfth preambular paragraph of resolution 2164 (2014), of 25 June 2014, which renewed the mandate of MINUSMA for a one-year period for the first time, it is stressed that
“terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat”.
Accordingly, in paragraph 12 of the same resolution, MINUSMA is authorized “to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment”,
and in paragraph 13 (a) (iv), the Mission is directed in particular
“[t]o expand its presence, including through long- range patrols and within its capacities, in the North of Mali beyond key population centres, notably in areas where civilians are at risk”.
Eight years after the deployment of MINUSMA, the paragraphs I just cited from resolutions 2100 (2013) and 2164 (2014) are clearly and critically relevant. The Malian people are today fed up with mass killings, villages being wiped off the map and innocent civilians being mowed down, including women and infants, who are often burned alive. Malians have the distinct feeling that the mission conferred upon MINUSMA has changed along the way, especially since 2015, following the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers process, although the challenges that motivated the Mission’s deployment persist.
Indeed, to the disappointment of the Malian people, the prevailing terrorist environment in which MINUSMA was deployed in 2013 has continued to deteriorate. Over time, it has even metastasized, since the armed terrorist groups that invaded nearly two thirds of our national territory in 2012 have been dispersed but not completely eliminated. They have regrouped and become stronger. In the context of that worrisome threat, French forces, first through Operation Serval and subsequently through Operation Barkhane, were authorized to support MINUSMA and our States in combating terrorism in Mali.
In that same context, the French Operation Barkhane suddenly initiated its withdrawal, reportedly with a view to transitioning into an international coalition, the complete details of which are as yet unknown — at least they are not known to our country and people. The unilateral announcement of Barkhane’s withdrawal and its transition did not take into account the tripartite agreement that binds us, that is, the United Nations, Mali and France, as its partner on the front line in combating the destabilizing forces. Mali regrets that the principle of consultation and conferral, which must prevail as the rule among the primary partners concerned, was not upheld prior to the decision by the French Government.
The new situation created by the end of Operation Barkhane has presented Mali with a fait accompli and effectively abandoned it in mid-stream, prompting us to explore ways to ensure better security independently, together with other partners, so as to fill the void that will inevitably result from the closure of a number of Barkhane sites in the northern part of Mali. The situation should also encourage the United Nations to adopt a more offensive posture on the ground from now on.
There is no anti-MINUSMA sentiment in Mali, just as there is no anti-French sentiment in our country — no, I say that unequivocally. Our people have never been an ungrateful people. At the highest level of the State and within the Malian population, the desire for peace and the thirst for security echo the demand for the effectiveness of the established political and military instruments and mechanisms, which make Mali an overmilitarized country that is at the same time extremely vulnerable to terrorism — a paradox that has become a factor in the disintegration of States and societies and the destabilization of their foundations.
What should we do in the face of such a paradox? What should be done to respond to the anguish, exasperation and anger of the Malian people? What should be done to respond to the frustration of both Malians and Mali’s partners?
I humbly believe that, in addressing such questions, we must have the courage and vision to scrutinize the instruments and mechanisms that I just mentioned. Above all, we should also reconsider the request for a more robust mandate and a change in the posture of MINUSMA, which the Government has regularly made to the Security Council. That will make it possible to adapt MINUSMA’s mandate and provide it with the means to carry out its mandate properly and respond to the aspirations of the Malian people, without which neither the Mission nor the other international and regional military partnerships on our soil will have any credibility in the eyes of my fellow citizens.
Clearly, the United Nations must help Mali effectively fight transnational organized crime in order to create the necessary conditions for its stabilization, which is key to the success of activities involving political and humanitarian support, development and the protection of human rights. If the situation in Mali in fact poses a threat to international peace and security, it is therefore incumbent upon us to find the appropriate means to continue confronting that threat in a comprehensive, united and resolved manner until it is eradicated.
In the unrelenting war it wages against terrorism, the Government of Mali will spare no effort to fulfil its international obligations in terms of respect for human rights. It attaches the utmost importance to coordinating our partners’ actions on the ground and to ensuring regional cooperation in order to take account of the regional dimension of the security crisis in the Sahel. That is the basis of our commitment within the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). It is also the purpose of our joint request within the G-5 Sahel for a robust and appropriate mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and for the provision of predictable and sustainable funding to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.
In the interest of coherence and effectiveness, the Government of Mali is working under my authority to establish a structure for monitoring and coordinating the activities of MINUSMA and to develop an integrated management strategy for the crisis in central Mali. We do not absolve ourselves of our own responsibilities in the stabilization process in Mali. The transitional Government is clearly aware that such stabilization also requires the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers process.
In addition, the Government and the signatory movements, as well as the inclusivity movements, are pursuing the implementation of the Agreement in a spirit of trust and responsibility within a new framework, known as the inter-Malian framework for the implementation of the Agreement.
In that spirit, we are pursuing the intelligent implementation and consensual review of the Agreement with a view to its finalization. The goal is to promote national ownership and strengthen the inclusiveness of the Agreement, while ensuring the necessary political and social conditions for the consensus that is required to review a number of its provisions, under the mechanism provided for in the Agreement.
With regard to defence and security issues, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme involving 3,000 former combatants from the signatory and inclusivity movements has been put in place, through which 1,840 former combatants have already been integrated. The Government
has also expressed its willingness to integrate the remaining 1,160 former combatants by 21 August, at the latest, despite the slowness of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad in providing the list of names of its members.
The Government of Mali is also prepared to integrate ex-combatants into the security forces, the State civil service and other paramilitary forces in the near future, as soon as the quotas linked to national budget capacities are fixed. The Government is determined to overcome the technical obstacles posed by the other parties to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in particular the signatory movements, which are required to adhere strictly to the DDR process. With regard to the socioeconomic reintegration component, activities will commence by the end of September, with the support of MINUSMA and the World Bank.
I cannot neglect to mention the situation of the Malian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries and of the internally displaced persons, which remains a major concern for our Government. We will endeavour to create, with the support of bilateral and multilateral partners, the appropriate conditions for the safe and dignified return of our people and to ensure their participation in the forthcoming elections.
The transition under way in Mali is intended to be a turning point that brings hope for healing Mali of the troubles that have afflicted it, including political and institutional instability and the collapse of State institutions, which are the direct consequences of corruption and impunity. In order to succeed in overcoming that challenge, our country has decided to embark on the path of reform, which is the second pillar of the Government’s action plan. Those reforms go beyond political and institutional issues and are ultimately aimed at rebuilding the State, the progressive disintegration of which has been at the root of Mali’s extreme vulnerability to the political, economic and social challenges it faces.
My country wishes to be a solution to the crises that threaten the Sahel. Mali aspires to live in peace with its neighbours, to strengthen its unity and stability and to restore full sovereignty over its entire territory. Mali wants to guarantee human security within its borders by consolidating its constitutional institutions. To that end, Mali is committed to its transformation, through reforms, into a stable and prosperous State that is oriented towards ensuring the well-being of its inhabitants.
Those reforms have been postponed for too long and for various reasons by the political regimes that have assumed power over the past two decades. The current transition, under the leadership of His Excellency Colonel Assimi Goita, has seen Mali decide to make a firm commitment to them. The Head of State has instructed us to convene, in the coming days, a national refoundation conference, the recommendations of which will be binding both for the current transition period and the pursuit of future public policies.
The third priority action of the Government is devoted to the organization of transparent, credible and inclusive general elections, which should mark a return to constitutional order in Mali. Those elections are particularly important since they will serve as a barometer of the transition’s success. We know that their quality and credibility will determine the future of our democracy and the legitimacy and stability of our institutions.
Drawing lessons from our recent democratic practice, the Government will institute a single independent election management body. That single independent election management body will lay the political, legal and institutional foundations for restoring the confidence of political actors and citizens in electoral processes. It is a major innovation that will strengthen the democracy and legitimacy of our institutions. We are aware of the deadlines set for the transition and of our international commitments, which we are working tirelessly to respect.
In that connection, the single independent electoral management body will follow an accelerated implementation process through a review of electoral law and the installation of a national directorate, with branches at the regional and local levels as well as in Malian embassies and consulates. To that end, the round table to review the proposed terms of reference of the national refoundation conference began its work yesterday in Bamako. Beyond the issue of the single independent electoral management body, the Government will work to reform the electoral system by revising the fundamental texts governing elections.
Finally, the fourth axis of Government action will consist of establishing good governance and adopting a pact on stability. In that regard, the Government is committed to ensuring exemplary and transformative
governance. A determined effort is already under way to combat corruption and impunity, which are at the root of the decay of the State. The measures being taken in that regard will be continued and intensified.
Our transformative governance is already reflected in a drastic reduction in State spending habits in order to free up budgetary funds to improve the living conditions of the population and ensure an equitable distribution of national wealth. The President of the Transition and the Government have already set good examples in that regard, and the resources thereby freed up will be reallocated to basic social services. In order to achieve greater justice and equality among workers, after harmonizing salary scales within the civil service, the Government will initiate a social dialogue as soon as possible, in consultation with social partners and actors in the world of labour.
As a Sahelian country focused predominantly on agriculture, livestock and fishing, Mali remains deeply concerned about climate change, which presents one of the major challenges for the survival and development of humankind. Indeed, my country suffers the full force of the effects of climate change, characterized by the advance of desertification and its impact on flora and fauna, the drying up of our rivers and streams, higher temperatures and more floods, and so on. That is why I would like to reaffirm Mali’s commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.
I would like to conclude by recalling that the actions of the transitional Government in Mali are based on three pillars that correspond to Mali’s three vital needs — the need for security, the need for justice to fight against corruption and impunity and the need for reform, or rather for refoundation. It is imperative to continue to work to improve the security environment in Mali, with the help of our friends, in support of the efforts of the defence and security forces.
It is equally imperative to carry out the reforms necessary to rebuild the State and adapt the regulations governing elections in order to meet the needs of Malian society and reflect the changing times. There is no alternative to those reforms, which are essential in the light of the devastation of Mali, if we want to ensure that our great country can stand on its own and become stable once again.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has fully grasped that notion and as early as October 2018, based on its fact-finding mission on the post-electoral crisis, recommended carrying out reforms as follows:
“Taking note of the extension of the current legislature according to the opinion of the Constitutional Court and in view of the dysfunctions widely recognized and evoked by all interlocutors during past presidential elections, it is imperative that the Government and all sociopolitical actors agree, in a consensual manner, to undertake bold reforms of the legal frameworks, including the Constitution of February 1992, and of the electoral system before embarking on the next electoral events that the country intends to conduct.”
However, that important ECOWAS recommendation has not been followed up to date. The transitional Government, I have the honour to lead, is working towards its diligent implementation.
I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the gratitude of the President of the Transition, the Government and the people of Mali to the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government for their leadership and their constant presence at Mali’s side in these difficult and complex times. We urge them to continue to pay close attention to the situation in Mali, a vast country with seven borders that constitutes a buffer for the entire West African region.