New Zealand

I should like, first, to congratulate Mr. Amara Essy of Côte d’Ivoire on his well-deserved election as President of the General 24 Assembly at its forty-ninth session and to convey to him our good wishes for every success in his work. The general debate is our chance, as Members of the United Nations, to undertake together an annual review of the Organization’s work - its successes and its failures - and to identify collectively the issues we want to focus on. With the fiftieth anniversary next year, there is a pressing need to do so. That will be the occasion to chart our new priorities for the twenty-first century. Our responses to some of today’s challenges and tragedies have ranged from excellent but often under-reported to woefully inadequate and, consequently, defiantly reported. The peoples of the world want to believe in the United Nations and what it should achieve. If, however, within some parts of the Organization we are bereft of purpose and intentions this golden anniversary threatens to be less joyous and more muted than many of us anticipated. New Zealand has a strong vested interest in the United Nations success, as do most small States. The New Zealand people have always believed in the United Nations, in a collective approach to the resolution of global and regional problems. This has been demonstrated by strong support for the United Nations by successive Governments. From our experience of - and I do not hesitate to say this - a turbulent two years on the Security Council and as a committed founder Member of the Organization, I would like to take this opportunity to offer some observations about the problems we see as players in the collective decision-making process. When New Zealand took part in the founding of the United Nations we and many others saw our primary purpose as providing for a system of collective security. Until very recently that was little more than a vision. With the end of the confrontation between two super-Power blocs, the goal of "the organized common peace", of which President Woodrow Wilson spoke so eloquently three generations ago, presents itself. We must not let it slip from our grasp this time. It will, however, take real effort and real determination. Collective security, or working together, is the cornerstone of the security of small States. Today they are the overwhelming majority of the membership of this Organization. New Zealanders recognize that peace is indivisible, that remoteness is certainly no safeguard: a problem in any part of the world can ripple to the Earth’s farthest corners. While we are the country probably most distant from the Balkans conflict, we have sent an enhanced company of soldiers to help in efforts to ease suffering and, I earnestly hope with the will of the parties involved, one day bring peace throughout the former Yugoslavia. For the same reasons, our defence personnel can be found engaged in peace-support operations in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and most recently Haiti. And there are New Zealand nurses, firefighters and aid workers spread around the globe in support. Against this backdrop, however, New Zealanders are puzzled at times by the way in which the United Nations carries out some of its important tasks. In Bosnia, despite the employment of what is by any standards a large, well- armed and well-trained force, people see on their television screens nightly the frustration of the United Nations Protection Force by small groups of irregulars, a single policeman or even small groups of non-combatants. In Haiti they witnessed a boat full of Blue Berets turned away by a small group of pistol-toting thugs unconvincingly called "attachés". And what can one say about the appalling tragedy in Rwanda? How can so much hatred have been unleashed so viciously, killing hundreds of thousands? What we watched with horror on our television screens was destruction on a scale we thought only megaton bombs were capable of. The systematic slaughter of men, women and children simply because of their ethnic origin leaves us all outraged. There are no easy answers. But the first key to unlocking the possibilities for a genuine collective security must be the proper application of the United Nations Charter. We have to decide at exactly what point the United Nations should get involved in the peacemaking operation. Do we recognize a problem, and, if we do, is the preventive diplomacy that we so firmly believe in occurring? In my view, we have to follow the intention of the Charter. First, at the outset of a crisis, or even the signs of a crisis, we have to make more serious efforts through that preventive diplomacy to resolve problems and conflicts by negotiation. Efforts must be made at an early 25 stage to address the root causes of conflicts by the Security Council’s exercising all its responsibilities under Chapter VI of the Charter. However, on some occasions, in these days of modern media technology, we face the dilemma caused by the divergence between what the public perceives as happening and what is the reality. Extensive media coverage puts pressure on for immediate response. In the case of Rwanda, that was appropriate. In other circumstances, the media oversimplify and ignore the fact that conditions on the ground are chaotic and United Nations resources are over-stretched. A second area where the Charter could be more carefully applied is when disputes are first placed before the Council. I believe it should give affected States an adequate hearing before addressing the problem behind closed doors. Our experience on the Security Council suggests the investment in openness that would be achieved by developing a practice of collectively hearing directly from the parties involved would be worthwhile, even if it were done only informally. In the same vein, the Charter specifically contemplates the involvement, without vote, of troop-contributing countries in significant decisions. New Zealand has pressed this issue for some time, but so far with limited success. The time is coming, in fact, when the General Assembly will have to address the question if the Security Council does not respond adequately to the concerns that have been raised. Under the Charter, much is expected of the Council’s permanent members. There is no doubt that they can and do contribute greatly to the work of the United Nations. Leadership and sacrifices by the large Powers were, for example, instrumental in successfully challenging aggression against the small State of Kuwait three-and-a- half years ago. I emphasize again, however, the importance of the collective nature of decision-making in the Security Council. Making distinctions between the views of the "P5" and the rest is not really healthy. The Council is a team of 15. It must work together, and by that I mean giving full weight to the views of all its members. The strength of the Security Council is enhanced each year by the vigorous enthusiasm brought by new members on 1 January, testing what may have become an accepted second-best. I would remind the Assembly that the Charter clearly envisages that the norm for operations to maintain international peace and security will be United Nations operations. National operations are not ruled out, of course. I wish therefore to highlight and question recent trends toward coalitions under national command, and the implications for the collective security needs of small and distant countries where no strategic interest is involved. However, the Security Council will be judged on its effectiveness. Successes, hopefully, will outweigh failures, but we all have an obligation to improve the success rate. I am an enthusiastic supporter of improving our success rate, but much of that will come down to the way in which issues are managed. And it is that question of the management of issues that I wish to address. In our experience, the key is to use management tools based on proven modern public- and private-sector experience. This is very valuable. What are these tools? And how do we apply them to the conduct of peace- keeping operations? I would suggest that there are six critical elements: first, a sustainable financial system; secondly, a transparent political accountability; thirdly, clear objectives that incorporate regular reviews; fourthly, a clear, unambiguous command and control structure; fifthly, a credible legal regime that guarantees the security of United Nations personnel; and, sixthly, the availability of resources so that objectives can be met quickly and efficiently. Let me go back to that first point, a sustainable financial system. There is no doubt that the Organization is facing a financial crisis that cannot be ignored. We have had serious problems with reserves and we have significant debt to contributing countries. The largest contributor has indicated that it will unilaterally reduce its share of funding from October next year. The situation is not sustainable. It requires urgent action. Why do we have this crisis? There are some simple answers. Some members cannot pay; others will not pay; and some are arguing the legitimacy of their assessment. The General Assembly, this body, must confront this issue. The United Nations must stop extending credit to non-payers. There is enough evidence emerging to suggest that there may be serious inequities in the present system. 26 Some countries with extraordinarily strong growth over the past 5 to 10 years appear in the revised scale issued by the Committee on Contributions with a constant or even reduced contribution level. That is not acceptable. It must be remedied. We do not want a hollow celebration on the fiftieth anniversary with a cash crisis hanging over the Organization. We must make a commitment to resolve this crisis before the conclusion of the forty-ninth session. The next point is the need for political accountability. There is in my view a parallel priority to develop and improve the Organization’s capacity for undertaking its collective security responsibilities. To do that we need to put in place more transparent procedures throughout the Organization. The management of peace-keeping operations is allocated to the Secretariat. This is necessary and appropriate in the same way any Government delegates responsibility for a complex operation to its public service. However, and I speak as a politician and as a Minister responsible for the management and oversight of Government departments, the days are long gone when a public service mandarin could run a department or major operation without detailed political oversight. This is not a promotion of micro-management, nor am I implying any criticism of the Secretariat staff. But as any politician holding executive office in today’s democracies knows, the classic recipe for a failed project is for those who are politically accountable to lose track of implementation or to lose the game plan. We saw that all too clearly in the past year in Somalia. Ironically, the Security Council had, in resolution 814 (1993), already foreseen the need in the case of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a detailed political accountability and provided for a committee to follow the operation closely. But the committee was never established. New Zealand has proposed in the Security Council that a committee or an ad hoc working group should be established to fill this gap and enhance the accountability of the Organization to its politically responsible representatives. I certainly remain hopeful that progress can be made in this area. The third point I draw to the attention of members is the need for clear objectives with regular reviews. Clearer mission objectives must be developed and kept under review. I am delighted that some progress has in fact been made. The Council is now identifying more closely the terms of mandates for United Nations operations, and it is becoming usual to build a specific review cycle into its mandates. But there are still two areas of weakness. First, there is a great deal of mythology about and very little sound analysis of the circumstances in which force should be used by United Nations operations. Many believe this is governed by the use or non-use of the words "Chapter VII". This could well be a false conclusion. The rules of engagement rather than abstract reference to the Charter are much more likely to determine actual behaviour in the field. I am not alone in believing that there is a need to develop greater commonality in military doctrine for United Nations peace-keeping operations. This is especially relevant when so many peace-keeping contributors are regularly placed side by side in the field. It is, however, particularly urgent in the face of new-style operations of the intra-country type where the use of force by factions, not necessarily Governments, is the challenge for this body to overcome. It is clear that common principles are necessary to guide peace-keepers on the appropriate use of force when they take part in operations in pursuit of an agreed United Nations strategic objective. As for the review, while there are plenty of mid-term reviews there is, as yet, no systematic process of review at the end of an operation. The budget of every peace-keeping operation should include provision, as a principal line item, for the preparation of a comprehensive review of the operation’s achievements relative to the mandate set. Such reviews should be separate from the financial performance review and should address the substance of the operation and seek to identify all relevant lessons for the conduct of future operations. I address now the question of command and control. There is a weakness in the command and control structures and they do need attention. It is true the personnel of national defence forces which contribute forces to the United Nations legally remain in their country’s national service. But as I see it, parallel to the allocation of responsibility to the United Nations Force Commander must be a recognition that the national command structure will not seek to direct their forces in operational matters. If the national command authority has serious difficulties, then the appropriate course of action in all cases - except an emergency - is for the issue 27 to be resolved with United Nations Headquarters. If resolution is not possible the unit should be withdrawn. I come to the question of the safety of peace-keeping personnel. A major requirement for effective collective security is that countries contributing troops and civilian personnel should have confidence that their personnel in the field will have the best possible support to ensure their safety and security. That is an issue which, as many members know, New Zealand has pursued relentlessly during its time on the Council. It bears on the level of equipment with which the forces are outfitted and there is plenty of room for improvement. In addition, the legal regime under which peace- keeping operations are conducted needs to reflect the extraordinary personal risk which United Nations personnel are undertaking on behalf of us all in carrying out collective security operations. It is right that such personnel should be differentiated from soldiers in an armed conflict and that there should be a higher standard of legal responsibility for anybody who attacks them. I urge all members of the Assembly to support New Zealand’s initiative on this issue currently in the Sixth Committee, that the necessary flexibility be shown on outstanding issues and that we make a really determined effort to complete work on the draft convention this year. The question of resources is always before us. In my sixth point I would say that a critical tool for effective collective security is a strategy for resource availability. The situation we all saw recently in Rwanda is a classic case. Human resources were available but they lacked training and they lacked equipment. But there is also the need for a capacity in all peace-keeping operations for a forceful response in self-defence. There are important lessons to be learned from the troop losses in Rwanda last April and again I draw attention to the linkage between mandates, rules of engagement, doctrine and planning. The United Nations will have to go beyond the current work being done on stand-by forces to address this problem. We believe that there is a case for redirecting a substantial portion of bilateral military assistance into forms of training that would better assist defence forces with the requirements of peace-keeping operations. There is also a role for the United Nations maintaining the physical equivalent of the peace-keeping reserve fund that it is supposed to have on the financial side now. A quick start-up capability, with owned or leased equipment immediately available to the United Nations, would have made a significant difference in the Rwanda situation. This is a practical and feasible step that can be taken to ensure that future collective security can in fact rise to the challenge. I have spoken about the factors that need to be taken into account in managing peace-keeping operations. I now wish to address the terms of their engagements. The United Nations should not be expected to take responsibility for a situation of up to 30 years because the parties to a conflict are unable or unwilling to summon up the necessary political will to reach a settlement. There comes a point when the parties must take their fate in their own hands rather than the Council avoiding the hard decisions just by rolling over the mandates. At the same time, a range of different considerations should prevail when the United Nations reaches the end of a successful peace-keeping process. The United Nations cannot simply walk away when a perceived end point - such as an election - has been achieved, because there may still be outstanding issues that need the ongoing support of the operation, such as humanitarian operations or local capability-building programmes to help provide the required sound administration. The United Nations deserves congratulations on its achievements in Cambodia, for example, but the future there is still not certain, and the United Nations must maintain its responsibilities. Rehabilitation in that country must continue. Another example of a situation in which peacemaking and peace-building have to be seen as a coherent whole is in the area of demining. This is a critically important humanitarian function. New Zealand’s military forces have had a lot of experience in helping the United Nations with demining in Afghanistan, Cambodia and, most recently, Mozambique. The Security Council Mission that visited Mozambique about two months ago reported its dismay at the delays and at the state of the programme generally. At the request of the United Nations, New Zealand stepped in early in August and began the rescue effort for the programme. The wheel should not have had to be reinvented. It is a concern that lessons learned from earlier operations such as Afghanistan and Cambodia do not appear to be retained. Having seen firsthand the 28 effects of mines in Cambodia, I do believe we should move more expeditiously than the speed of the present performance. New Zealand certainly looks forward to working with other delegations to improve performance in this area, and I would certainly add that my Government was most interested in the comments President Clinton made here yesterday about the proposal for the elimination of the world’s 85 million anti-personnel land-mines. This is an urgent task. No one who has seen firsthand the human cost of mines can offer anything less than full cooperation to this end. Finally, when we look ahead to what would really enhance proper use of the collective security powers, we have to conclude that reform of the Security Council is a major task waiting to be fulfilled. Many of the things I have discussed today require reforms by the Security Council, or at least in conjunction with it. But I cannot escape the conclusion that even if all of these were accomplished, the political legitimacy of the Security Council could still erode over a period of time. Ultimately it could lose the credibility vital to the role it carries out. Collective security requires the Council to be genuinely representative of the entire United Nations membership. We have, of course, as many others have done, followed the debate on Security Council reform in the Open-ended Working Group set up last year. We hear the case made for additional permanent members. We also hear overwhelming support for expanding the number of non-permanent members of the Council. There are shades of difference on the numbers for the total membership, but consensus does seem to be emerging around five or six new members. We consider that a limited expansion of the number of members, paying regard to an equitable geographical participation, is still a priority for the health of the Organization. It is time to do what is achievable and what benefits most Members. Given the need for 122 ratifications, we are aware that even a simple expansion, hopefully adopted next year, will take several years to come into force. It would not be unrealistic, therefore, for the year 2000 to see the first meeting of the expanded Council. There is no worth in being critical of some aspects of the United Nations without believing, as I do, that the problems can be cured. We, all 184 of us, are its doctors, and we need to act quickly. We need to apportion our costs fairly and systematically. We need to share peace- keeping tasks, peace-keeping funding and peace-keeping supplies. We need to accept the democratic decisions of this Organization. We also need to adjust to the more complex and interrelated United Nations agendas of the future. I therefore leave with the Assembly New Zealand’s assurance of a renewed commitment to this unique and essential body and of our willingness to work in that spirit to ensure the continued relevance of the United Nations for the next half-century.