127. On this, the first occasion on which I address the present session of the General Assembly, I should like, Mr. President, to reiterate on behalf of my delegation our warm congratulations on your election to the Presidency, These congratulations have already been conveyed to you by the distinguished representative of France in the name of all members of the group of Western European countries.
128. The personal qualities which so eminently fit you for this high office are well known. And the nation you represent has made an unparalleled contribution over two millennia to world civilization — a contribution not confined to the development of public institutions, to the concept of freedom and to culture in all its forms, but one which embraces also the spiritual field. My country, which has had close ties with yours during more than fifteen hundred years, is particularly happy that such a distinguished member of the Italian Government should preside over this session — a session which will have the historic honour of being addressed by His Holiness Pope Paul VI, whose actions and pronouncements recall so strikingly the solicitous concern of his beloved predecessor, Pope John XXIII, for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
129. I should like also to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the outgoing President, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Foreign Minister of Ghana. As you well said in your opening statement, Mr. President, his conduct of a very difficult session showed a happy combination of abnegation and wisdom.
130. In addition, I wish to join with previous speakers in expressing again the satisfaction of my delegation at the admission to the United Nations of three new Member States. We warmly welcome the entry of the Gambia, the Maldive Islands, and Singapore, whose presence will, we have no doubt, add to the vigour and effectiveness of the Organization. We wish their Governments all success in their work for their peoples.
131. I desire now to offer my best thanks to the delegations which supported the inscription on the agenda for this session of the subject entitled "The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations". The purpose of the Irish delegation in seeking an early discussion and decisions on this matter is the urgent need to restore an effective peace-keeping capability to the United Nations. Like many other delegations, we feel very keenly that this Organization should always be in a position to fulfil its primary purpose, which, under Article 1 of the Charter, is to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures to that end. We consider, therefore, that if a small State under threat of aggression urgently seeks assistance from the Security Council and fails to obtain it through lack of unanimity among its five permanent members, the Assembly in these circumstances should be able promptly to recommend the establishment of a peace-keeping force. At the same time, and having regard to the way in which the peacekeeping authority of the Organization has been undermined by the financial veto, we deem it essential that, when the Assembly — through the failure of the Security Council — is obliged to have recourse to peace-keeping measures, the conditions should be such as to ensure that its recommendation rests on the broadest possible foundation and that the financial requirements for effective implementation are fully covered. We would thus have the assurance that any peace-keeping operation initiated by the General Assembly would be both firmly established and reliably financed, and that we could carry out our word and our promised assistance to a State when it turned to the United Nations instead of elsewhere for the help it needed.
132. We are, of course, aware that the Committee of Thirty-Three may be asked by this session to continue its study of the organization of peace-keeping operations. We believe that in that case the Committee is entitled, in order not to waste time on conjecture as to how the Assembly would decide upon various proposals, to know definitely and beyond any shadow of doubt how the Assembly stands upon these two basic questions: the method of authorizing, and the method of financing, future peace-keeping operations.
133. Before dealing with our proposals [A/5966/ Rev.2] I wish to refute the suggestion that the Irish delegation introduced them for the purpose of undermining the special position of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The records of the United Nations for many years past contain full and adequate proof to the contrary. Indeed, I had occasion, on 8 December last [1295th meeting], during the general debate at the nineteenth session, to say something on this subject.
134. As representatives may recall, I argued on that occasion that, while we might all be inclined from time to time to cavil at the right of veto possessed by the permanent members of the Security Council, we should accept "the present division of power and responsibility between them and the other members as a realistic division and a reasonable compromise in the circumstances of the world today". [1295th meeting, para. 21.]
135. I went on to suggest that it would be well if the ancient nation of Taiwan were admitted in its, own right to the Assembly, and that subsequently the Peking Government took the China seat in the Security Council, provided it accepted to be bound by the principles of the Charter and were warned that it would be open to criticism if it did not desist from imperialist expansion in Tibet, India and elsewhere. If this solution of the representation of Taiwan and China in the United Nations were accepted, the five nuclear Powers would thus occupy the seats of the five permanent members of the Security Council. And if, following this solution of the question of representation in the Security Council, an agreement against the further dissemination of nuclear weapons were concluded — and the Irish delegation has done its best for the last seven years to have such an agreement negotiated — then the five permanent members would not only retain their special Charter powers — which we are said to be trying to undermine — but in addition they-would be ceded the monopoly of nuclear weapons.
136. My delegation has, of course, never pretended that we regard as ideal arrangements to last for all time either the present division of power in the United Nations or the existence of nuclear weapons under the independent control of their owners. But we live in a far from ideal world. And if we were to spend our time and energy in abortive attempts to amend the Charter, and were to fail to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons without delay, the outlook for mankind would indeed be grim. Whether we all like it or not, the United Nations will be compelled, the Irish delegation is convinced, to win or lose the struggle for peace in our time, and perhaps in the time of our children, within the four walls of the Charter as it exists today and in a world in which nuclear weapons are in the hands of at least five Powers. But, so that the other 112 Members can carry out the duties imposed upon each of us in Article 1 of the Charter to take effective collective measures for the maintenance of peace, we must not let our Charter rights be filched from us. We must, I submit, stand firmly by the rights given to us in the Charter which are the counterpart of the obligations which we have assumed.
137. Since the United Nations Charter was adopted in San Francisco twenty years ago there have been revolutionary changes in the dimensions and in the number of problems with which the United Nations has to cope. Some of the changes which should be noted are:
In 1945, there were 51 Members of the United Nations; today there are 117. And all of the other 112 Members have the same interest, and the same moral obligation, as the five permanent members of the Security Council to save their own peoples and the world from the scourge of war.
In 1945, the five permanent members of the Security Council held one seat in ten in the Assembly, were in military occupation of a great part of the world and could intervene unilaterally to keep the peace without risking more than a local military defeat.
Today the range and power of nuclear weapons systems and the delicacy of the strategic balance have reduced the area in which a permanent Member can intervene to keep the peace without risking a holocaust of its own people.
Today, in many sensitive areas, it is only the nonnuclear States in a United Nations force, carrying no threat of a change in the strategic balance between the nuclear Powers, which can with acceptable risk intervene to keep the peace.
The Charter was completed and signed three weeks before the first atomic explosion took place. Today there are five nuclear Powers; two of them have large stocks of nuclear weapons and near instantaneous intercontinental delivery systems, and some other States have the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Since 1945, some permanent members of the Security Council, instead of constantly striving to prevent aggression and to build a reliable system of collective security, as they pledged themselves to do when they signed the Charter, have on occasions been guilty of aggression and condoning aggression, and of fomenting armed conflicts.
In 1945, the five permanent members claimed the right to one veto — when they cast a negative vote in the Security Council. Today some of them are attempting, in defiance of the Charter, to assert a right to a second veto — a veto upon Assembly assessments for peace-keeping.
138. I have asked the Assembly to note some of the changes which have occurred since the Charter was adopted, not for the purpose of fostering an attempt to amend the Charter or of fomenting recrimination, My purpose was rather to plead with the Assembly to face the situation without rancour but with our eyes open, and to emphasize that some permanent members of the Security Council are attempting to exceed their Charter rights and that, while they have not made war upon one another, they have not steadfastly united in compliance with the Charter to keep peace between other States.
139. In the opinion of my delegation, what is needed essentially is not an amendment of the Charter but the active promotion of the principles and purposes of the Charter by all 117 Member States. What is needed is a firm determination by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and by the other 112 Members of the United Nations as well, to eschew the use of force in pursuit of individual national aims. What is needed is a practical combination of the resources of all the Members of the United Nations to keep the peace. But what is most urgently needed is that, when the five disagree, a majority of the Assembly should be able firmly to authorize and reliably to finance a peacekeeping operation in response to an appeal for assistance to the United Nations by a small State in danger of aggression.
140. Much as all reasonable men desire peace, they realize that, with the world's history of bitter wars and oppressions and with present injustices, fears, tensions and rivalries, a perfect peace based on law and justice is unlikely to be established in this generation. Peace cannot be established and maintained merely by wishing for it or passing resolutions condemning aggression. It must be worked for wisely and patiently with all our energy. If conflict threatens, we must avoid being compelled, through lack of agreed peace-keeping procedures, including authorizing and financing peace-keeping operations, to stand idly by while the situation gets out of hand. We must be organized and ready, we submit, to conciliate and keep conciliating and, if necessary, to provide an effective peace-keeping force.
141. My delegation is convinced that disastrous conflict and prolonged wars can be prevented if the anxiety of the nuclear Powers to avoid a direct conflict between themselves is matched:
First, by their determination to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons;
Secondly, by their agreement to combine in resisting an attack by a nuclear Power upon a non-nuclear State;
Thirdly, by their willingness to refrain from blocking by a financial veto a peace-keeping operation recommended by the Assembly when the five permanent members have been unable to agree;
Fourthly, by their efforts to promote areas of peace or areas of law and limited armaments, particularly in strategically sensitive parts of the world. My delegation has often described what we mean by an area of law.
It is an area in which a group of States will agree not to attack each other, to settle their differences peacefully and to restrict their armaments to police level, on the condition that the United Nations, backed by the nuclear Powers, guarantees them against aggression from outside or inside the area.
142. All Members of the United Nations, it should be remembered — all of us whether we are members of the Security Council or not — are bound by Article 1 of the Charter to take effective collective measures to maintain peace. And I submit that our suggestions for the authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations represent a fair, reasonable and practical division of our Charter responsibility between the five permanent members of the Security Council and the other 112 Members of the United Nations.
143. All who have studied the problem of peacekeeping in the nuclear age recognize, I believe, that while the great Powers have the capacity to destroy each other and the world as well, they can, so long as they are united, exert a powerful influence on restraining local wars, as they have done in the India-Pakistan conflict. But we recognize also that the unilateral use of force by a great Power to restrict a local war in a sensitive strategic area may be the first step to general war.
144. My delegation believes that, as long as it was based on the expectation of being financed by Assembly assessment, the Uniting for Peace resolution [resolution 377 (V)] operated to restrict the number of nuclear Power interventions in other States. It did so not only by dispatching a United Nations peace-keeping force to the Middle East, but its very existence may be claimed to have influenced the Security Council, released it from its sterile cold war deadlock, and led to its agreeing to the establishment of other United Nations peace-keeping operations in Africa and the Middle East. The resolution may thus have prevented other armed interventions by great Powers. Indeed, if the Uniting for Peace resolution is not revitalized, and cannot be effectively invoked in case of Security Council deadlock, what alternative, may I ask, has a small State threatened with aggression but to call for help from a great Power?
145. We trust that the draft resolution we have circulated [see A/5966/Rev.2] will be studied carefully by all who wish to see the United Nations gradually build up a system of collective peace-keeping which will give to States the national security some now seek by diverting from productive uses, calculated to improve the lot of their peoples, an ever-increasing proportion of their national resources to acquiring conventional and nuclear weapons.
146. My delegation is satisfied, from careful study and inquiry, that our proposals are clearly within the competence of the Assembly, without in any way infringing the Charter. We are aware, of course, that the 112 other Member States, even if unanimous, cannot extract from one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council their 70 per cent collective share of the expenses of a peacekeeping operation recommended by the Assembly. At the last session, the Assembly was not disposed to apply the sanction of Article 19 to the permanent members who refused to pay their assessments for peace-keeping. After our experience of the past few years, however, I am convinced that, if our proposals for amending the Uniting for Peace procedure are accepted, none of the five who hereafter vote for a peace-keeping operation in the Assembly would refuse to pay its appropriate contribution under the system of assessments we suggest.
147. I wish to make a special appeal to the five permanent members of the Security Council to support the proposal that, as a group, they should be responsible for paying 70 per cent of the cost of a peace-keeping operation. I submit that the honour and moral authority of the United Nations demand that, when the Assembly, in the circumstances contemplated, recommends the sending of a peacekeeping force in response to an appeal from a small State, the force should be dispatched and not be withdrawn through lack of funds until it has successfully completed its mission. The amount involved, even if one permanent member alone had to pay the total 70 per cent assessed on the group for another operation as large as the Congo, would be insignificant in relation to its national defence budget. For example, in the case of the United States, it would amount to no more per head of the population than the cost of a packet of cigarettes - or less than one-sixth of 1 per cent of its defence budget. The obverse of the obligation on a permanent member to pay the total assessment due by the group, if it alone votes for a peace-keeping resolution in the Assembly, is the concession of not having to pay anything when it votes against or abstains, And, of course, no Member of the United Nations would vote for a peace-keeping resolution if it is not convinced that in the interest of world peace and in its own interest it should support it.
148. I do not recommend the financing proposal as an ideal solution. But it is the only system of reliable financing my delegation sees which has a reasonable chance in present circumstances of being implemented by the permanent members of the Security Council and of securing that peace-keeping expenses are assessed by the Assembly under the sanction of Article 19. I submit to the other 112 Members that it is vital for their safety and welfare that the Assembly should be placed in a position to finance in a reliable manner United Nations peace-keeping activities. Failing a dependable system for providing help from the United Nations, a small State under threat of aggression can turn only to a great Power — with, of course, the inevitable danger of drawing in another great Power to assist the other side.
149. The system of voting on a Uniting for Peace resolution, which we suggest, would call only for amending the rules of procedure which were adopted by the early sessions of the Assembly. Since then, the rules of procedure have often been amended by the Assembly, and its right to do so by a simple majority is clearly set out in rule 164, which of course accords with Article 21 of the Charter. The suggested amendment of rule 89 provides that the five permanent members of the Security Council shall vote first on a Uniting for Peace resolution. This would give the other 112 Members the opportunity of knowing how the five had voted before they are called upon to cast their votes. My delegation strongly recommends this amendment, as we feel that, before they vote, many of the 112 Members will wish to be sure of what support the draft resolution has from the five permanent members.
150, In concluding, I wish to record the satisfaction of my delegation at the emergence of two draft treaties, tabled by nuclear Powers, to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. There are, of course, important divergencies in the two drafts, but the first step to agreement on a complex problem is to know precisely the points of disagreement. We all fervently hope that the Governments of the nuclear Powers will get to work at once on these drafts with a view to reconciling their differences and presenting the world with an agreed text open to the signature of all States. I can think of no single step which would he so conducive to stable peace and fruitful cooperation in the economic and related fields as the conclusion of a world treaty to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons.