31. At this beginning of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, I think we all have feelings of relief and pleasure that we are here at all. The last session was an abortive one, condemned to stagnation and frustration by the failure to reach agreement on the applicability of Article 19. But today the United Nations is here, it is working and it is still being used.
32. Only this month we have had an impressive demonstration of the virility of the United Nations in the action it has been able to take in the dispute between India and Pakistan: first the energy and initiative of the Secretary-General himself and then the action of the Security Council, made possible by the unanimity of the great Powers. This is a demonstration of the determination bf the Members of this Organization to keep the Organization going. I think it is also a demonstration of their determination not to let military incidents, even considerable fighting, broaden into wider conflicts chat might engulf the whole world.
33. The agreement reached, just before this session began, on the non-applicability of Article 19 (see 1331st meeting, paras. 3 and 4) is a further demonstration of that feeling. As I have said, we have grounds for some gratification; but we must be realistic. We must recognize that the agreement on the applicability, or non-applicability, of Article 19 creates as many problems as it solves.
34. In the first place, the deficit of the United Nations remains, and we still need concrete action to wipe it out. Those of us who have in the past contributed what we thought were our assessments, and who have contributed to voluntary funds or to loans, are now watching what the countries that were regarded by us as being in arrears are going to do. Because we too are expected to pay more, we are watching them. That is an important practical problem. The second practical problem is one of principles: the question of what operations can be conducted henceforth, how they are to be authorized and now they are to be financed. We cannot proceed as if things were the same as before. We cannot act as though the slate had now been wiped clean and start afresh.
35. The whole point of the discussion about finances is that it was not simply a financial discussion but more deeply a discussion of the practical points of principle to which I have referred. Consequently, some lines of thinking — the views that many of us, the majority of us, have been holding — may have to be abandoned. Now that it has been decided that Article 19 is not to be applied against certain Members in respect- of certain operations, it follows inevitably that the same principle is going to apply in respect of all Members and all future similar operations. So we have somehow to tackle, during this session if possible, the consequences of that.
36. Australia had contributed in the past to all the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Sometimes we have contributed men, as in the case of Kashmir and Cyprus. In other cases we have contributed finances, as in the case of the Congo and United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operations. In some cases we have contributed both. But now, like all the Members of this Organization, we have to stand back and look at the positions we have taken in the past in the light of these recent developments.
37. I have referred to basic constitutional problems. There is, for example, that of the respective authorities of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Indeed the question arises whether the General Assembly has powers and what they are. We have to face the question of how peace-keeping operations, when they are authorized, are to be financed. We have to face the questions of composition and control of United Nations elements in peace-keeping operations.
38. Then there are all the problems of voluntary financing. The Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report (A/600l/Add.1, section I) has referred to the difficulty of planning operations when they are dependent on voluntary contributions. To that I would add the question of equity. If each of us knows that some countries are going to contribute money to finance operations, will there not be a temptation, for some of us at any rate, to hold back and say that, as somebody else is going to pay, there is no obligation on us under the Charter and that therefore we shall not contribute?
39. These various questions will come before us in various ways during this current session. There are several items on the agenda referring to them directly or indirectly. There is one specifically referring to peace-keeping operations which has been inscribed by the delegation of Ireland, envisaging certain new voting procedures. It is an attempt to relate the voting and authorizing of peace-keeping operations to the degree of responsibility, financially or otherwise, that individual countries will accept in respect of those operations, and also the degree of responsibility of those countries for world security in general.
40. One may or may not agree with the actual suggestions made by the delegation of Ireland or with some of the other suggestions that have been current among us this week, but at least these and other questions are questions that will have to be faced. For this is not an academic matter and it is not something that can be left for the future. There are operations under way now — for example, UNEF. There is a new operation being undertaken at this moment, authorized this month, on the India-Pakistan border.
41. Thus these things come up for immediate attention. Decisions are being made, either consciously or by default. In this, the smaller and middle Powers among us, including Australia, are looking to the great Powers to give the lead, because we need to know to what extent the great Powers are prepared to accept responsibility and what their views are on their respective roles.
42. Peace-keeping leads, me to think of a related field, the field of disarmament. There has been some progress in the past year in this field. We are all disappointed that there has not been more; but it is progress that the great Powers and the other Powers associated with them in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have been talking, have been putting forward proposals, have been clarifying some of their basic interests and their basic objectives. One thing that has emerged clearly in this past year is the great degree of unanimity that exists among most Members of this Organization on the necessity for speedy, practical, enforceable measures to control and prevent the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons. As I say, this had been recognized by most Powers. The United States introduced a draft treaty at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and the representative of the United States has already reiterated, in this general debate [1334th meeting], his Government's belief in the importance of progress in this question. The Foreign Minister of the USSR also referred [1335th meeting], to the importance of some agreements on this, and has introduced a draft treaty for consideration by this General Assembly (see A/5976). Further, the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report (A/6001/Add.1), also refers to the urgent need for progress in this field.
43. So there is a fairly wide area of agreement — fairly wide but not complete, because there are some countries in the world that are not agreed yet on the necessity of ending all nuclear tests and of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. France, unfortunately, has not signed the nuclear test-ban Treaty and, I regret to say, is continuing tests. More disturbing is the fact that Communist China has embarked on a programme of nuclear tests. I say this is more disturbing because that Government has been adopting, and is still adopting, an aggressive posture in the world together with a denial of the conception of peaceful coexistence. It therefore cannot but disturb all of us, and particularly those of us who are in that region, that it is arming itself with nuclear weapons. Unfortunately also, the Government of Indonesia has not accepted the belief that most of us share that the wider dissemination and proliferation of nuclear weapons is a bad thing. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia said, on 4 August, that Indonesia had no objection to all nations and countries in the world having nuclear weapons; "The more countries that are in possession of atomic and nuclear bombs, the stronger the guarantees that would be given that these weapons of the modern world would not be used”; he said; "We have no objections to all countries having atomic and nuclear bombs".
44. I have referred to these three countries to indicate the urgency which has been referred to by earlier speakers, the urgency felt by the rest of us as we try to get a universal and water-tight agreement while we still have time.
45. In this general respect, I agree with the following statement made by the Foreign Minister of the USSR earlier in this debate:
"It goes without saying that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons cannot be an aim in itself. This is a step, and a major one, towards the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons, and not simply a method of restricting the number of nuclear Powers, or, as some people say, of formalizing the nuclear monopoly of the present five great Powers." [1335th meeting, para. 70.]
46. Now, I agree with that. But we go a stage further, and the Foreign Minister of the USSR himself, I think, would also do so. We say that it should also go a step towards wider disarmament in the nonnuclear field, because it is most important for the security of all of us that progress in nuclear disarmament be accompanied by progress in conventional disarmament. After all, many countries today are facing threats, or fear that they are facing threats, to their security from countries that are not nuclear Powers. Conventional weapons, themselves, after all, can do great destruction. Conventional weapons in the hands of a large Power can cause great unease to its neighbours, and this unease is shared to a very great degree by many of the countries situated around China.
47. This leads me into a discussion of the security of the region of South and South-East Asia which is so important to Australia and to the problems of living with China. The task of living with China is not a simple matter that can be solved by the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Our relationship is much more complicated; it needs handling in. many ways, and United Nations membership is only one part of it.
48. When we come to consider the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, we must have very much in our minds the effect on the United Nations itself. Look at the Peking régime today — Communist China and what its record is, and what its current objectives and its outlook are. There is the act of aggression against India in 1962 and the threats that have been made in the last few weeks against India and against Sikkim. There is the threat, direct or indirect, against many neighbours of China to the north, to the east, to the south and to the west. All its neighbours, in one degree or another, directly or indirectly, have come under threats. It is a régime that is against peaceful coexistence. It is a régime that contemplates nuclear war without viewing it with the horror with which the rest of mankind views it. It is a régime that advocates for forcible overthrow, by violence and revolution, of most of the Governments represented in this General Assembly.
49. We must therefore ask ourselves what this régime would do if it were seated among us today in the United Nations. We have to face the probability that the admission at this moment of time of Communist China would destroy the effectiveness of the United Nations and might very well end its existence. Its whole policy would be to drive a wedge between countries of differing social and political systems that are now trying somehow to work together and bring about the evolution of a peaceful world.
50. What our decision will be is very important for the United Nations. I can conceive of no question more important at present than the question of Chinese representation.
51. Having said that about the general overhanging problem for most of South and South-East Asia, this great land of between six and seven hundred million people overhanging us, let me refer fairly briefly to three current problems of political and military concern — Malaysia and Singapore, Viet-Nam and the India-Pakistan troubles.
52. With regard to Malaysia and Singapore, I shall say simply that as Members of the United Nations they are entitled to have their territorial integrity respected and not to be subjected to force or the threat of force. In resisting force or the threat of force, Malaysia and Singapore have received and will continue to receive the active support of their friends, including Australia.
53. I shall turn now to Viet-Nam, and say something at more length on that, because it is a matter that has been raised in the course of the general debate here by several speakers. In South Viet-Nam, Australia is very directly concerned. In addition to the forces of the South Viet-Nam Government itself, and now, on some scale, of the United States, there are other countries participating with forces, including Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, I wish to state why our Governments have taken this decision and why we consider it important to all of us that a proper outcome emerge in Viet-Nam.
54. In Viet-Nam in 1954, a modus vivendi was reached whereby the country was divided into two, and there were provisions looking towards the unification of Viet-Nam. These provisions have never been fully carried out. As in most of these cases, there is argument as to responsibility and as to what should be done. So far as the Australian Government is concerned, we accept the view of the South Viet-Nam authorities that it was not possible to have free nation-wide elections of the kind envisaged in the Geneva Agreements at the time, because free elections were not possible in North Viet-Nam, in addition to some other reasons. That is our view; some other Governments take different views, but whatever view is held on this point, I should have thought that we would all feel that it is in our interest that in Viet-Nam, just as in the other divided countries in the world today, unification should not be brought about by force.
55. I think it is most important for world security generally that unification in any of these unhappily divided countries should not be attempted by force, if only because of the grave dangers that this would hold for world peace. In fact, this modus vivendi jogged along in one way or another for some years, and then, gradually, it became upset by armed subversion in South Viet-Nam, directed and supplied from outside, particularly from North Viet-Nam. This has been stepped up. There have been, over the period of the last two years, deliberate killings of officials in villages and the elimination of national, cultural and other leaders in South Viet-Nam with a view to disrupting government, and with the inevitable consequences, of course, that the Government had to become more rigorous and that moves towards greater liberalization had to be checked. There has also been, over a period of years, the deliberate destruction of economic facilities — bridges and so on — with a view to slowing down and reversing the economic progress that was taking place in South Viet-Nam.
56. The scale of this outside intervention increased to a point where, late last year, actual regular military units started to be moved into position and some of their members went into South Viet-Nam. In these circumstances, the Government of South Viet- Nam asked its friends for assistance in repelling what is clearly a case of aggression. Indeed, the Government of South Viet-Nam might have been open to criticism for hesitating and delaying for so long in replying to these attacks upon it, because for years it sat back and took it. It fought where the infiltrators chose to fight, and for years there was no attempt to hit back at the places from which aggression has been directed, launched and supplied. So it is only comparatively recently and after, I believe, a great deal of restraint that the escalation has reached its present point.
57. What is the nature of this self-styled national liberation front? It is not a genuine freedom movement. It is not like the African freedom movements. It is not directed primarily against foreigners. The Government of South Viet-Nam is an indigenous Government; it is a Government that functioned for several years with no outside direction or support, other than the normal supports of economic assistance. The self-styled liberation front is linked with subversive movements in Africa. It is part of a movement directed not to achieve national independence, but to achieve certain political objectives of a world revolutionary nature.
58. Therefore, the objective of countries such as mine and New Zealand and the United States that have forces in Viet-Nam is to deter and repel aggression. Many efforts have been made by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and others, to open the way to negotiations, but so far none of these has been able to get anywhere. But it is not our objective to eliminate North Viet-Nam. Indeed, President Johnson, in his proposals last April to contribute $1,000 million to a co-operative effort for the development of South-East Asia, specifically envisaged North Viet-Nam taking its place in this common effort if the Viet-Namese situation developed so that there could be co-operation instead of warfare. We do not seek to destroy the Government of North Viet-Nam. North Viet-Nam must not destroy South Viet-Nam.
59. I shall now turn to the question of India and Pakistan. This is something that is particularly distressing to Australia, because we have close and friendly relations with both Governments and peoples t and the very thought of fighting between them is repugnant to Australia.
60. Consequently, we threw our whole weight behind U Thant’s efforts when he began them. In a public statement and in personal messages to President Ayub and Lai Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, indicated that U Thant had the full support of the Australian Government in his efforts. He asked the two Governments to be forthcoming in their reactions to the efforts of U Thant and to do everything within their power to make these efforts fruitful.
61. Now that things have moved a stage further, the Australian Government welcomes the cease-fire that has been achieved. We hope it will stick and be made effective. Australia has contributed military observers in Kashmir since 1950, and we hope to provide more now in response to the Secretary-General's request. The unanimity with which the Security Council acted is most gratifying. It has enabled effective action to be taken in bringing about a cease-fire and it has also helped to restore faith in the ability of the United Nations to contribute to the maintenance of peace. We hope that this unanimity will be maintained in dealing with the difficult task that still remains under paragraph 4 of the Security Council resolution of 20 September.
62. In view of what I said a few minutes ago about the general attitude of Communist China and the attitude that it would be likely to adopt if it were a Member of this Organization, it is interesting to look at what it has done, in the last few weeks. Communist China has sought to exploit the recent hostilities between India and Pakistan with a brutal disregard of the principles of the United Nations Charter. By threatening violence against India, the Peking Government deliberately sought to increase tension and widen the scope of the conflict. Communist China's attitude was in marked contrast with that of the world community in general. All the members of the Security Council joined in a resolution aimed at stopping the fighting and at seeking to end the threat to the happiness and welfare of millions of people in the sub-continent. One may conclude with certainty that if Communist China had been a member of the Security Council it would have used its power of veto to prevent the passage of such a resolution.
63. A task of considerable delicacy now remains in giving effect to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 211 of 20 September. Ultimately the two countries, India and Pakistan, will have to find the solutions for themselves to the many problems of varying degrees of importance that unfortunately exist between them. But the United Nations and other countries can sometimes help by bringing the parties together, by stimulating lines of approach or by contributing to the establishment of conditions in which settlements can be found and put into effect.
64. I do not think that it would be useful for me to be more specific on this occasion. The fighting that has just occurred is fratricidal and harmful to the stability, progress and security of both India and Pakistan, and, indeed, of the whole region of South-East Asia. Therefore, quite apart from our feelings on grounds of humanity, Australia feels a direct concern in the outcome. We want to see relations between India and Pakistan develop along lines of friendship and co-operation. The solution of as many as possible of the individual problems existing between them would contribute to this atmosphere, and might make less possible or less abrasive those problems which might still persist.
65. Up to now, in discussing South and South-East Asia, I have referred to specific problems of a security nature. But it is most important that we also have clearly in mind, and take measures to meet, some of the needs of economic and social development and well-being in the region. I draw the Assembly's attention to the Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1964, which has been circulated among us in the last few days. One of the conclusions of the Survey is that agricultural production in the region of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East [ECAFE] showed a significant recovery for the first time since 1961. The increase in food production from 1961 to 1964 in those countries was considerably below the rate of population growth, and the per capita food production in 1964 was below the 1961 level.
66. The conclusion that I draw from figures like these, and from much of the other information in this Economic Survey, is that there can be no slackening in the efforts either of the Governments of the region or of the world community in their attempts to forward and assist the economic development of the region. The Australian Government wants to see the total amount of international assistance going to South and South-East Asia maintained and, if possible, increased. Australia, which is part of the ECAFE region, is playing a full part as a member of that Commission, in addition to its contribution to and activities in the region outside the Commission. The Australian Government welcomes some of the work that has been done by the Commission or under the auspices of the Commission in the past twelve months: for example, some of the assistance that has been given by ECAFE to member countries in their development planning, the work of the new Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning, the work of the ECAFE secretariat in providing useful statistical and other research material, the two meetings of the Conference of Asian Statisticians and the Conference of Asian Economic Planners. A most significant move in the past twelve months has been towards the establishment of an Asian Development Bank. This is a major step forward in regional economic co-operation and development. Australia is co-operating in an active and positive way in the planning and other steps to set up this bank. Subject to the final shape of the bank being satisfactory — and we have every reason to believe that it will be — Australia looks forward to being a member of and a contributor to it.
67. Having made those remarks about the economic situation in South and South-East Asia, in which Australia has so direct a concern, I should like briefly to touch on an economic matter of worldwide concern, namely the important developments in the past year in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. International trade is of special interest to Australia because we are still dependent in many ways on exports. We are in a special position, like one or two other countries. Australia is a country with a high average standard of living. But we are dependent for 80 per cent of our export earnings on primary products, in a sense, we have a foot in both camps, that is, with the developed countries and with the under-developed countries. I think that this has sometimes given us a special opportunity for insight into the concerns of both groups.
68. I shall sum up our general attitude to the Conference on Trade and Development in three propositions. The first is that this new organization is very important and that all of us should throw our weight behind it and make the biggest contribution we can in it and through it.
69. My second observation is to agree with what the Secretary-General said in his introduction to his annual report, namely:
"The new trade machinery is not just another forum for exerting pressure. It should be a centre for formulating new policies and for achieving specific solutions of trade problems. More specifically, it is an indispensable instrument for the adoption, by both developed and developing countries, of new approaches to international economic problems within the context of a new awareness of the needs of developing countries." [A/600l/Add.1, section IV.]
70. The third point I would make is that we are glad that the Conference on Trade and Development is part of the United Nations activities and machinery. This allows a two-direction form of influence. It allows the work of the Conference to be influenced by the general work done in international affairs — economic and non-economic — but it also allows the thinking here in the General Assembly, the other bodies of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to be influenced by what is being done and thought in the Conference on Trade and Development.
71. Before leaving the question of international trade, I would add that the Australian Government took the initiative a few months ago of introducing preferences into the Australian tariff for certain specified manufactures and semi-manufactures from less developed countries. The aim of the new preferences is to enable less developed countries to enter our market with products on which they could not be competitive with the highly industrialized countries at most-favoured-nation rates.
72. Leaving the economic area, I shall say a few words about Australian New Guinea, in respect of which Australia has accepted and is discharging international obligations. I shall not go into this at length because the appropriate United Nations bodies are kept informed, and there will be discussions in them at various stages during the General Assembly or at other times.
73. In respect of our territories, Australia enjoys good relations with the United Nations. I believe that there is a considerable degree of understanding on both, sides. The Australian Government and Administration understand what the United Nations is thinking and wants. I believe that the representatives here for the most part have an understanding of what we are trying to do. I can assure the Assembly that the Australian Government pays the greatest of attention to any recommendations, formal or informal, that are made by United Nations bodies.
74. During the past year the Australian Government has carefully studied a report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Australian Government, sent a mission to Australian New Guinea. The Australian Government has accepted the report of that Mission as a working basis for planning the economic development of the Territory, and the Australian Government has set actively in train measures to follow up that report.
75. There have been constitutional advances; some of them have been made over a period of a few years and are now bearing fruit. There is in Australian New Guinea today a legislature, a majority of whose members are indigenous inhabitants. The legislature is responsible to all the people. Universal adult suffrage had been introduced. Australia is carrying out its obligations under the Charter. We hope that the principles and provisions of the Charter will be applied in respect of all other dependent territories in the world.
76. The final topic I want to touch on is the role of the United Nations in science. I refer to this because it is a field in which Australia has taken past initiatives and with which Australia has been particularly identified in the United Nations. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958, our then Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R. G. Casey, urged [759th meeting] that the United Nations do more in the field of science. This led to the production of the Auger report and subsequently to the establishment of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development.
77. Why is Australia particularly interested in this? Partly as a result of our own historical development. The history of Australian economic development is really the story of the application of science to the solution of our economic problems. Most of the animal and vegetable products on which Australia's prosperity depends — sheep, cattle, wheat and sugar, for example — were introduced into Australia from outside. They have had to be fostered in an alien and often harsh environment, and it is only the result of experiment over a period of years that has made them the successful and productive sources that they are for Australia today. Therefore, we are peculiarly conscious of the role that scientific research and its application can play in national development.
78. Furthermore, because we are on the edge of South and South-East Asia and have great contacts, official and personal, with the peoples of that region, we are, I think, very conscious of some of the needs of the countries of that region. We are conscious of the way in which these needs are sometimes overlooked in developing countries. Let me give you an example from my own personal experience.
79. I have visited the National Nutrition Laboratories in India and I have seen what is being done there on problems of nutrition. What are their problems? They are the problems of people who do not have enough to eat; the problems of poor people who even with a small income do not know how to spend that small amount in order to get the greatest nutritive value from the food they buy. Contrast that with some of the problems of nutrition that one finds in highly developed countries where scientists are sometimes worrying about the subject of obesity — the problems of people who have too much to eat and who have too rich food. More needs to be done to bring to the attention of the world scientific community and of governmental and private scientific organizations some of the problems of the underdeveloped and more remote countries that get overlooked by scientists in developed countries, who naturally give primary attention to the problems that are under their noses.
80. There are three lines of approach that are being tackled in the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development. The first is to create an understanding of science and its benefits in developing countries. We need to make Governments conscious of the importance of science and of its application. If we can do that, the effort becomes in a sense self-generating, because Governments themselves will keep things going and give a pressure regardless of what the United Nations does. We need particularly to create an indigenous science in developing countries. We need to train people form those countries. We need to have jobs for them in their own countries. We need to have them working in their own countries on the problems of those countries.
81. The second task is to have a concerted attack on some of the scientific problems in relations to under-developed countries. This Advisory Committee has, in its report this year to the Economic and Social Council, identified problems of scientific research and application which require particular attention from the point of view of under-developed countries. The Australian Government believes that this Committee should now develop a substantive programme to see that there is a concerted attack on these problems — a substantive programme that will bring in the United Nations itself, the specialized agencies, the great foundations, and the national and international scientific bodies. Developed countries must make an effort to help. The organization of science is a problem in all countries, even in the most advanced.
82. The third heading is the exchange of information in its widest sense. The problems of exchange of scientific knowledge are becoming more and more complex every year as new knowledge comes into being. The technical problems of organizing, disseminating and having readily available what is known, are becoming more and more difficult even in the highly developed countries. It is of enormous importance to have this sort of thing done in a form that can be used in developing countries.
83. I have spent a little time on this subject because, as I said, a lot of United Nations activity in this field stems from an initiative by Mr. Casey in this Assembly in 1958, and Australia has been peculiarly identified with this scientific activity. I have indicated what I believe should be done now so that there will be practical progress in the early future.
84. In my statement this morning, I began by discussing political and security problems that face us, and sometimes divide us, and I have finished by discussing economic, social and scientific matters. The latter are most important and call for positive and dynamic approaches from all of us. Economic development and progress will do something to make easier the reaching of political accommodations and will contribute to the effective exercise or attainment of basic human rights for everyone, regardless of race, colour or creed.