In this general debate, each of us, in his turn, tries to make his contribution by throwing as much tight as possible on the conditions and prospects of world peace and on the welfare of the peoples of the United Nations whom we represent.
56. I have no hesitation in expressing my belief that the leaders of the world are sincerely endeavouring to serve and to bolster world peace and world prosperity. Nevertheless, I doubt whether in this endeavour they have chosen the best and the most effective way to attain the worthy goal which is both theirs and that of all human society.
57. We are still as far as we could be from agreeing on the control and regulation of arms, in accordance with the stipulations of the Charter. The result has been an appalling increase of the burdens of an already overburdened world, with no prospect in sight of putting an end to the mad race for armaments, which, in addition to its damaging effect upon the economy of the world, is a source of more and more tension and anxiety among the peoples of the United Nations and of the world at large.
58. My Government, therefore, welcomes all constructive suggestions and efforts, with a view to carrying out the stipulations of the Charter in this respect, and to quote from Article 25 of the Charter — promoting “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources "and the formulation of plans" for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”
59. We are, furthermore, as far as we could be from translating into reality the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations by giving it the moral and material strength provided for in the Charter, so that it could fully shoulder its responsibilities and ensure the prevalence of the rule of law in international relations.
60. I still hope, however, that the United Nations will make another try, or even, if necessary, try again and again until it will have found the right road to peace and the effective means to preserve it.
61. Among these means, and, in the light of the clear and inspiring stipulations of the Charter, the “Uniting for peace” resolution [377 (V)] which was adopted during the previous session of this Assembly, can usefully be drawn upon. It is, indeed, a resolution which aims at the establishment of robust areas of strength and, Charter-wise, provides for ways and means to discourage and thwart aggression.
62. I feel certain that the Members of the United Nations as a whole and, behind them, the hundreds of millions of human beings whom they represent, share with me a feeling of disappointment that, until now, the spirit and the letter of the Charter are mostly unimplemented, and the resolution on “Uniting for peace" is still a mere resolution.
63. It grieves me to report to you that recent events in the part of the world from which I come are very discouraging to all those who have world peace at heart, to oil those who have enough insight and enough foresight to realize the dangers which are increasingly besetting the. road to peace in and around the Middle East.
64. No doubt, you all know' a great deal about present conditions in the Middle East, and how they ate becoming more and more explosive, because of the obstinate attachment of some colonial Powers to methods and relationships which, even if they had a place at all in the dark ages of the past, have no place whatsoever in our life today, and are in complete and screeching dissonance with the Charter of the United Nations and with what should have been the free and soulful tone of the first year of the second half of the twentieth century.
65. The world knows too well how grave the situation, the disputes and the events are in that sensitive area, ranging from the west coast of North Africa on the Atlantic Ocean to as far east as at least the eastern boundaries of Iran. Many a question in that extremely sensitive area is calling loudly for an urgent solution and insistently appealing to the conscience and the foresight of the wise of the world.
66. Among these questions I mention, as an illustration and in geographical sequence, some to which I have just alluded: Morocco, Libya, the Nile Valley, Palestine and Iran.
67. Of the questions of Morocco, Libya and Palestine, you will hear during the present session of the Assembly. You have already heard some mention of the question of Palestine by several speakers who preceded me, and you will hear some more about it. Most of you will have read, in this connexion, the article in the New York Herald Tribune on 10 November by Stewart Alsop, after his visit to Egypt. Mr. Alsop wrote, among other things: “It is a political fact that the creation of the Israeli Suite has left a festering political wound here, and that the shameful treatment of the hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees from Israel acts like a permanent irritant in the wound."
68. The stand of my Government in relation to this question and to the martyrdom of the people of Palestine, right under the eyes of the United Nations and of the civilized world, is too well-known. My delegation will in due course, express the views of the Egyptian Government as to the long-awaited rightful solution of the question of Palestine.
09. The policy adopted in relation to this and to other questions of the Middle East by some Powers which are still enmeshed in antiquated systems is a policy which clearly demonstrates that they say one thing and do another; that they speak peace and intentionally or unintentionally endanger peace.
70. It is obvious that we cannot possibly create an area of strength, in the Middle East or elsewhere, on the basis of earning the distrust of the people of that area; of denying them their rights and begrudging them any serious, effective, honourable comradeship in the building up and in the preservation of peace.
71. The people of my country and of the Middle East will continue adamantly to refuse a status in any way less than that of comradeship, less than that of equal sovereignty with all the peoples of the earth. This is our right and our due. We maintain, and we will continue to maintain, that this comradeship should be real and not mere words. We are entitled to expect that the stipulations of the Charter relating to the equal rights of nations, large and small, be carried out and be translated into palpable, constructive realities. This equality of rights and the very peace and survival of the free world necessitate the fullest possible co-operation in the building up of the bulwarks of peace, so that aggression be discouraged and the peace and the security and the freedom of the world be really safeguarded. In all this we must remember and keep in mind that there can be no strength where the people are deprived of the means of strength, where they are denied their rights, and where some among the mighty Powers maintain a policy of covetousness, of encroachment, of suppression and of aggression.
72. This dark picture could indeed have been much brighter and more encouraging, and the sources of trouble and instability could have been made into fountain-heads of comfort and security. This is attainable through the respect, by all, of their pledges under the Charter of the United Nations and through the action of some Powers by ceasing to cling to the disruptive, domineering systems of dark ages gone by.
73. We certainly can all build together for peace; we can discourage aggression and circumvent it. We can live confidently surrounded by righteous power and proud of our stand on justice and on the freedom of the peoples of the world. Is not all this worth trying for? I wish to trust that we all think so, although I am not encouraged in this thought by some of the recent, extremely distressing events, events which are continuing to take place even while I am addressing myself to you in this common forum of the United Nations.
74. When this Assembly was convened in New York in September of last year, heaviest among the shadows cast over the world was the war in Korea. This year we have two wars, one in Korea and the other in the country on whose behalf I have the privilege of speaking to you today. It is a real war, waged upon Egypt by a country claiming still to be an ally.
75. British land, sea and air reinforcements were rushed to the Suez Canal Zone to swell the occupation forces which had already exceeded by far the number allowed under the 1936 Treaty. These forces have taken full possession of the whole of the Suez Canal area, placed it under martial rule, and practically cut it off from the rest of the country. They took control of various public utilities, such as communications, electricity and the water system.
76. Public authorities, including the judiciary, have been direly molested. Judges have been prevented from discharging their serious and sacred duty in that part of the homeland. Some were even interned and deprived of food for two days.
77. Customs authorities and coast guards have been prevented from exercising their functions, with the result that the smuggling of narcotics appreciably increased.
78. Health authorities have been prevented from doing their work, and it is seriously feared that epidemics might ensue and spread from this area to other parts of the country.
79. The British have also prevented the administrative authorities from discharging their essential duty of maintaining internal public security, whereas the responsibilities of these authorities have greatly increased owing to the provocative attitude taken by the British.
80. Egyptian labourers who, prompted by their patriotism, unanimously resolved not to co-operate any longer with the British forces, were brutally subjected to all sorts of coercion and intimidation. Some were even forced to work at bayonet point. Caterers, in their turn, resolved to stop supplying foodstuffs to the British armed forces, which retaliated by commandeering all kinds of supplies. British forces repeatedly fired at Egyptian military and police forces and shot down peaceful citizens, not even sparing women and children. Egyptian newspapers have been banned, and the British went so far as to ban the “Egyptian Gazette”, a British paper controlled by a Briton in Egypt.
81. Mr. Churchill seemed ill at ease when, a few days ago, he made the following answer in this respect before the House of Commons: “ Here is a local paper, published in English, which is owned by an Egyptian registered company, and the controlling interest among the shareholders is held by an English woman resident in Alexandria. This paper has only been presenting the Egyptian side of the case, and I do not think it fair that troops should be left for several days before the news arrives from all the papers of all the parties in the country, and should only receive this anti-British dope.”
82. I could hardly expect that Mr. Churchill would tell the House that the real reason for banning this newspaper, which he himself admits to be British-controlled, is but an understandable worry, lest the British armed forces in the Suez Canal area should know the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
83. This is only a brief account of British atrocities and of British aggression in Egypt. If all this is not war, then I do not know what war is.
84. In his eloquent statement during the present debate, the representative and Secretary of State of the United States expressed his great concern for human rights. He told us of certain happenings in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, which he described as a brutal crush of freedom. I wonder what description he would give to the atrocities committed in the Canal Zone by his British friends and allies. I, for one, have no hesitation in calling them a shameful, treacherous aggression by the United Kingdom which constitutes not only a menace, but also a breach, of international peace and security. They are, indeed, a complete repudiation by the United Kingdom of the principles and the decencies of the Charter of the United Nations.
85. It can and it should be asked why all these happenings are made to take place in the Nile valley; why the United Kingdom obstinately refuses to evacuate its armed force from Egyptian territory; why it extends its armed aggression against Egypt to ever widening areas; why the United Kingdom intensifies this aggression against a country of whom it still claims to be an ally. Is it because Egypt has resolved to live freely among the free? Is it because the people of Egypt refuse to be under the clumsy heel of foreign domination? Is it because the people of Egypt claim their right to a life worth living and want to honour their pledges under the Charter of the United Nations? Or is it that the United Kingdom is desperately clinging to the crumbling system of imperialism, of spheres of influence and of encroachment which, as President Roosevelt said, has been tried once again and failed?
86. The answer is obvious.
87. Nevertheless, our colleague from New Zealand has found fit to point the blame at the wrong party, at the wronged party, at Egypt. He spoke to us on 9 November about “the duty winch falls upon all of us to honour our international engagements”. He indulged in the luxury of condemning Egypt for what he called the unilateral overthrow of freely concluded agreements, and went on to say that “the repudiation of treaties might have appeared more understandable, although still inexcusable, if done at the expense of a country which rigidly opposed all change and never listened to arguments for the revision of agreements in the light of circumstances".
88. Our colleague concluded his intervention in this respect by donning clerical robes, piously praying for Article 1 of the Charter, and asking God Almighty to preserve this world of ours from becoming an international jungle.
89. It was no surprise to any of us that the representative of the United Kingdom readily subscribed to the intervention of his associate from the South Pacific, briefly pointing, in his turn, to the respect for the sanctity of treaties as an obligation which hinds all States both small as well as great.
90. It was not my intention to deal at length with the historical, political and psychological reasons which impelled my Government to announce on 16 October 1951, the end of the agreements of 1899 and 1936. In face, however, of the statements made by our colleagues of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, I have no other choice but to take up the challenge.
91. In doing so, I deem it necessary to look, if only for a moment, into the past and in the light of it, survey the present; though I well understand that the standard bearers of expansionism, colonialism and imperialism dislike a retrospective survey of history which will prove to be embarrassingly too revealing.
92. The British occupation was first forced upon Egypt on 11 July 1882, in the wake of a long-schemed and contrived conspiracy. Since that date, the British have endeavoured, through an endless chain of one pretext after another, to prolong that occupation. Thus the world was made to hear from the British such things as — the protection of the Khedive, the protection of foreigners, the protection of the poor, the protection of minorities, the protection of so-called vested interests and the protection of British communications.
93. Today, the British resort to a pompous but empty pretext which has nothing whatsoever to do with the world of the. Charter of the United Nations and the life and thoughts of 1951. They self-appointed and set themselves up as the defenders of the Middle East. This is what Mr. Morrison called the other day “the responsibilities of Great Britain in the Middle East on behalf of the Commonwealth and the Western Allies as a whole". Has this anything to do with our Charter?
94. Throughout the last seventy years the British have made a considerable number of solemn promises to withdraw their armed forces from Egyptian territory; more than sixty of them. In 1949 the British conceded that they should completely withdraw their armed forces from Egyptian territory not later than September 1949. If I am not mistaken, we are now well past September 1951, and far beyond September 1951. Yet the British, instead of with-drawing, are maintaining on Egyptian territory tens of thousands of their troops and are almost everyday adding to them; whereas even the late treaty of 1936 limited the number of their troops which could be allowed on Egyptian territory to no more than ten thousand.
95. The core of the scheme which took expression in the stationing of British armed forces on Egyptian territory has always been to keen those forces on our territory for ever. The British nave constantly maintained this objective of theirs and have, on purpose, created one of the most vicious of all the vicious circles on record. They kept in mind that the Egyptian army must never become strong. They did this in order always to be able to say that the Egyptian army is still weak and that, consequently, British troops must stay on Egyptian territory.
96. Many an event, many an upheaval, have taken place in the world. The League of Nations came into being. The League of Nations faded away. The United Nations was set up while the smoke of the guns and the detonation of the bombs of the Second World War were still in the air. The Charter of the United Nations was formulated, and the system of collective world security was instituted. Kingdoms and empires crumbled and others arose. Armies have risen and have fallen. Generations succeeded one another. More and more new armies, well equipped and well trained, came into existence. Even in Korea, which had for many a century been completely cut away from all martial life, we have seen created in less than five years two mighty armies — one in the south and one in the north. Yet, seventy years have not been long enough for the British to set up, equip and train an adequate army of Egypt — of the same Egypt which, less than forty years before British occupation, had an army so strong as to call for the combined action of Great Britain, Russia and France to restrain what seemed to them to be Egyptian excesses.
97. Had the British been sincere in their claim that they occupied Egypt for the good of the Egyptians; had they honoured their commitments under the treaty of 1936 and of the period before 1936, the Egyptian army would have been today a force to be reckoned with and relied upon in the defence of peace, capable of bearing its full share of responsibility under the United Nations Charter.
98. But the British have never lost sight, not even for a single moment, of their objective, namely, indefinitely to delay all real strengthening of Egypt and the Egyptian army. They did everything possible and imaginable to make a sham of the Egyptian army and to make a shambles of all their commitments to equip and train it. Moreover, whenever and wherever Egypt tried to secure arms from other countries, the United Kingdom always platted to deny to Egypt access to such arms. Nor was this the only violation by the British of the letter and the spirit of the now extinct treaty of 1936. They had no scruples in trampling over it in tearing it to shreds. Never was it felt by Egypt that the United Kingdom lived up to its commitments or respected the so-called alliance established between the two countries.
99. One aggression after another was committed against Egypt; one attempt after another against its sovereignty, by no other party than that which claimed, and still seems to claim, to be an ally.
100. To give only a few illustrations, I would recall that they went beyond the areas assigned under the 1936 treaty for stationing their armed forces, just as they exceeded the number of troops allowed under that treaty. They refused to comply with the health and customs measures required by Egyptian law. In the Palestine question they took, and are still taking, a hostile course which has exposed Egypt to grave dangers; though, according to the treaty, the British are bound not to take in their foreign relations an attitude inconsistent with the alliance. They have pursued in the Sudan a policy calculated to separate it from Egypt and to separate Southern Sudan from Northern Sudan.
101. Indeed, the happenings in the Sudan, before and after the 1936 treaty, have been typical of British imperialism. They constitute nothing less than a repudiation of solemn pledges and a betrayal of trust. Allow me to present some salient facts.
102. When the British occupied Egypt they had nothing to do with the Sudan, but they took advantage of their occupation of Egypt and of their control over its affair? to force the Egyptian Government to evacuate the Sudan, then force it to agree to a joint re-conquest of the Sudan and then again force it to sign the two agreements of 1899 for the joint administration of the Sudan. They did not claim then that the Sudan had a separate status or that they had responsibilities towards the Sudanese. On the contrary, they repeatedly affirmed that they were acting in the Sudan on behalf and in the interests of Egypt as illustrated by the Fashoda incident and by many of Lord Cromer’s reports. Contrary to their declared policy they endeavoured through the Sudan administration — dual in name but British in fact — to antagonize the Sudanese, by various manoeuvres, against their Egyptian compatriots preparatory to separating the Sudan from Egypt. This intention was clearly shown in 1924 when Britain took advantage of the assassination of the Sirdar and put Egypt out of the Sudan and went as far as to threaten interference with Egypt’s Nile waters.
103. Now that national consciousness has awakened in Egypt and the Sudan, the British adopted new tactics to meet the new circumstances. They repeatedly declare their concern for the welfare of the Sudanese and demand that they should be consulted and be given self-government leading eventually to self-determination.
104. It can be seen, therefore, that when Egypt in the early days of occupation could not question their actions, they made use of Egypt’s name and of the pretext of acting on its behalf to dominate the Sudan. When we asserted the right of Egypt and the Sudan to independence, the pretext of acting in the name of Egypt became of no use to them. The British had to turn to another pretext which was this time that they speak in the name of the Sudanese and defend their interests. It is obvious that the two pretexts are contradictory for indeed there is a great difference between administering the Sudan in the name of the Egyptians and demanding from Egyptians in the name of the Sudanese that the Sudan should ultimately have the right of self-determination.
105. May we ask who authorized the British to speak in the name of the Sudanese and who asked them to shoulder the responsibilities they claim in the Sudan? What historical, legal or moral right have they to interfere between the Egyptians and their compatriots the Sudanese who have been united from time immemorial by the Nile, by political, geographical and economic unity and by ties of race, language and religion?
106. In this connexion, I take leave to quote no less an authority than Mr. Winston Churchill. In his book “The River War”, he wrote: If the reader will look at the map of the Nile system, he cannot fail to be struck by its resemblance to a palm tree. At the top the green and fertile area of the Delta spreads like the graceful leaves and foliage. The stem is perhaps a little twisted, for the Nile makes a vast bend in flowing through the desert. South of Khartoum the likeness is again perfect, and the roots of the tree begin to stretch deeply into the Sudan. I can imagine no better illustration of the intimate and sympathetic connexion between Egypt and the Southern Provinces... The advantages of the connexion are mutual; for if the Sudan is thus naturally and geographically an integral part of Egypt, Egypt is no less essential to the development of the Sudan.”
107. I should like to point out that Mr. Churchill expressed these views at the time that the British used to affirm that they were acting in the Sudan on behalf of and in the interests of Egypt.
108. The fact is that, the British never had Egypt’s interests at heart when they acknowledged that they administered the Sudan in Egypt’s name and on its behalf, nor do they have now the interests of the Sudan at heart when they claim that they are endeavouring to give it self-government and self-determination. It is only a pretext to continue their administration of the Sudan for as long as possible so that they would have the opportunity of independent action under cover of the will of the Sudanese.
109. This is borne out by the fact that their repeated talk of self-government has resulted in an effete Legislative Assembly shorn of all authority whereas Egypt wanted the Sudan to have a truly representative Legislative Assembly endowed with real power.
110. When we asked the British about the period after which the Sudan might enjoy real self-government, their estimate was between fifteen and twenty years, while Egypt maintained that the Sudan should have self-government within two years, basing its estimate on the resolution [387 (V)] of the United Nations General Assembly in regard to Libya, for indeed the Sudan is no less deserving of self-government than Libya.
111. Let no one, therefore, be deceived by such manoeuvres as the statement in the British House of Commons yesterday by Mr. Anthony Eden. The statement is nothing more or less than an echo and repetition of the same old imperialistic formula to perpetuate the hold of the United Kingdom on the Sudan, and to defer for as long as possible all real self-determination for the Sudanese. Just read the statement of Mr. Eden and judge for yourself. Also read, if you will, the legislation which the Egyptian Government adopted on 16 October in relation to the Sudan, which in unmistakable terms sets up a truly representative body for the Sudanese and a real system of self-government of the Sudan.
112. It should be clear by now that there is quite another side to the picture of the Sudan from that which the British have strenuously been trying to portray to the world.
113. With all the importance and the portent of the historical facts which I have just brought to your attention, they cannot match the significance and the eloquence of the present events in the Sudan.
114. Do go and see for yourselves the swelling tide of Sudanese enthusiasm for the withdrawal of British forces from the Nile Valley, for the termination of the present British Administration in the Sudan and for unity with Egypt. Go and see for yourselves what the British do to stem the rising tide: prohibition of public meetings, suppression of public demonstrations, persecution of patriots, closing of schools and flagellation of students. This is hardly convincing as a proof of the claim repeated so often by the British that they have at heart the welfare of the Sudanese.
115. The question of the Sudan has been subjected to the greatest imaginable amount of falsification and insidious propaganda. The British are now posing as the champions of the independence of the Sudan. Is it a real independence or is it a British independence for the Sudan that they mean? Does the United Kingdom agree to withdraw all British officials and armed forces from the Sudan in order to allow scope for a free plebiscite there, free from British pressure, British influence and British propaganda?
116. We know beforehand what our Sudanese compatriots would opt for. We know that they will reaffirm their loyalty to their King and their natural unity with the rest of the people of the Nile Valley. We know above all that the indivisibility of the Nile Valley cannot be validly contested; and we know as well that neither tradition nor law would countenance such a plebiscite. Nevertheless I do, from this rostrum, and before this common forum of the United Nations, declare as a challenge to the United Kingdom that, for our part, we would withdraw our officials and our armed forces from the Sudan on condition that the United Kingdom do the same, so as to allow the Sudanese freely to express their will through a plebiscite for which the necessary machinery, atmosphere and preparation could be provided with the co-operation of the United Nations. This is a frank, clear-cut challenge which I make to the United Kingdom and which I am more than sure the British will not dare take up.
117. I have recounted in brief outline parts of the ghastly record of British imperialism in the Nile Valley. It should by now be abundantly clear why Egypt denounced those agreements which the United Kingdom had so assiduously trampled over and torn to smithereens. When denouncing the now-extinct treaty of 1936, and the agreements of 1899, Egypt did nothing more than announce their death. They had already been murdered by the United Kingdom. Let no empty talk, therefore, about the so-called ignoring by Egypt of the sanctity of treaties deceive anyone.
118. There are three score or so Member States of the United Nations represented here. Does anyone or can any one of us accept to be forever bound by a treaty to which the other signatory would not be bound; and what would the answer be if the other party completely ignores the treaty and constantly violates it? I shall not here cite the many cases in which treaties have been denounced before and the many reasons for such denunciation which are, in the greatest part, extremely flimsy if compared with the reasons which have impelled my Government to denounce the 1899 and the 1936 agreements. The denunciation by Egypt of these agreements cannot fairly be described as being done on an impulse. For seventy years Egypt has been trying to correct the situation and get rid of British intervention in the Nile Valley.
119. Our colleague from New Zealand claimed that the United Kingdom did not rigidly oppose change and did listen to arguments for the revision of agreements in the light of circumstances. Allow me in this respect to recall the negotiations which Egypt has gone into, most patiently, year after year in recent decades. This should suffice to show how much Egypt held back and put on the brakes until they screeched. Ever since as far back as 1920 negotiations followed one another in dose succession. There have been the Saad-Milner negotiations, the Adly-Curzon negotiations, the Saad-Macdonald negotiations, the Sarwat-Chamberlain negotiations, the Mohamed Mahmoud-Henderson negotiations, the El Nahas-Henderson negotiations, the Sidky-Chamberlain negotiations, the Nahas-Lampson negotiations, the Nokrashi-Stansgate negotiations, the Sidky-Bevin negotiations, the Khashaba-Campbell negotiations, and, lastly, my negotiations through eighteen months with the late Mr. Bevin and with Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Egypt.
120. In each and all of these negotiations, the British never wavered from their traditional imperialistic policy. They did not seem in the least aware of the high principles loudly declared and as loudly acclaimed in this twentieth century of ours: The Wilson Principles, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations.
121. Two points remain which the representative of New Zealand has raised and which I cannot leave unanswered. Referring to the 1936 treaty, he clearly implied that he considered it a “freely concluded agreement”. Need I recall that this treaty was concluded under the haunting and heavy pressure of the British occupation? Or shall I recall in an identical case the remarks of the late Ernest Burin, who stated in relation to the Soviet-Iranian dispute in 1916, that the British Government would regret: any arrangement which might appear to have been extracted from the Government of Iran by compulsion, whilst the Soviet Government was still occupying a part of Iran, adding that it was inadmissible to negotiate, attempt to negotiate, or seek to obtain concessions from a small Power in favour of a large Power through the occupation of that country by armed forces. He also stated: “We are powerful countries; we are what is sometimes described as the ‘Big Three’... But we do represent power, and power does count in negotiations.”
122. We all remember that the Security Council espoused the concept so forcibly expressed by the late Ernest Bevin, that the presence of foreign armed forces in. the territory of a country’ deprives it of its freedom of choice in negotiations.
123. The other point to which I alluded, and which was raised by the representative of New Zealand, is his reference to the Middle East as an area of vital importance to communications. It is indeed so. Our colleague has, however, overlooked the basic facts of the Middle East, Intertwined and wholly concerned with these facts and these problems are the teeming millions who are living in the area. An illustrious statesman of the East recently deplored the attempt by some to solve the problems of Asia without taking Asiatics into consideration. I do submit that it would be futile — it would be sheer folly — to attempt to resolve the problems of the Middle East without taking into consideration its people, their life, their aspirations and their rights.
124. May I recall in this connexion the resolution adopted on 3 February 1951 by the League of Arab States, which reads: “The Arab States cannot discharge the grave International responsibilities imposed on all nations by the Charter, unless they fully secure their national rights and have their problems settled in conformity with the principles of freedom, justice and equality. ”
125. Egypt can rapidly become one of the sturdy columns in the structure of international security. It can and should rapidly become the centre of an area of strength, which robustly stands for world peace and discourages all temptations to aggression. This would indeed be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and in line with the objectives of the “Uniting for peace” resolution. We all know what the Charter says concerning the setting up of a system of world security. We all know, equally, what the "Uniting for peace” resolution stipulates in this respect: namely, that each Member of the United Nations maintains within its national [armed] forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the _ Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence. I trust, moreover, that the Members of the United Nations have not completely forgotten the resolution [41 (I)] which the General Assembly adopted on 14 December 1946, which says that no Member States should have forces stationed in territories of any other Member States without their free consent.
126. Neither the Charter, nor any resolution adopted by any organ of the United Nations, said that the big Powers should stymie and stifle the growth and the liberties of the less big Powers. Nor did the Charter, nor any resolution of the United Nations, say that tyranny should brand our generation as it did brand some previous ones. Nor did the Charter of the United Nations give its blessings to such betrayals as those committed by the British in relation to Egypt and the Sudan, and to Palestine.
127. The Charter stipulates for the equal rights of nations, big and small; for the sovereign equality of all the Members of the United Nations; for the fulfilment by all the Members, in good faith, of the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, and for a system of world security.
128. Since the end of the agreements which Egypt had with the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom, in association with some other deluded Powers, tried to sell us the self-same dope-containing “broken doll” of imperialism, outwardly painted in a different colour. We will not buy it.
129. We will, on the other hand, stand by the Charter, by the resolutions of the United Nations, and for the prevalence of the rule of law in international relations.