1. May I, in the first place, offer you, Madam President, my sincere congratulations and those of my delegation on your election as President of the Assembly, an honour well deserved by the services that you and your country have given to the United Nations. As the President of the preceding Assembly, and for two long hours and six. minutes the presiding officer of this one, I can assure you that my congratulations and good wishes are not coloured, even faintly, by envy.
2. The eighth session of the Assembly takes place at a time when many think that the successful negotiation of some of the outstanding differences between the two major power groupings may be possible. If there is any such happy possibility, it would be due, I think, not only to the armistice in Korea or to changes on the other side of the Iron Curtain, but even more to the fact that in recent years a large part of the free and democratic world has learned to cooperate in purpose, policy and action for the defence of peace. Gradually, and not without difficulty — because we are speaking now of free and independent States — a unity and strength is developing which is based on more than economic and military power. It is based also on a common belief in freedom and a determination to defend it against any reactionary and subversive forces which may threaten it.
3. Our co-operation is not synthetic; our unity is not imposed, nor is it of that monolithic type that Mr. Vyshinsky proudly ascribed the other day [438th meeting] to Soviet society. Honest differences openly expressed are bound to exist within and between free governments. Not only do we acknowledge them; at times we seem almost gratuitously to advertise them. But anyone who seeks to divide us in the United Nations or elsewhere by misinterpreting or exploiting these differences will soon find that the things that hold us together are far stronger and more enduring than those which at times seem to divide us.
4. If there are opportunities now for easing in some degree international tension, I hope that this eighth session of the General Assembly will use them to the full. We may not be able to change the facts of international life by resolutions in our Assembly. But by omission or commission, by what we say or do not say, we can lighten or darken the international atmosphere in which our problems must be solved.
5. The spirit of reason and conciliation, which has for long animated the free peoples in approaching these problems, was given eloquent and sincere expression in this Assembly on 17 September [434th meeting] by the Secretary of State of the United States. He reaffirmed our will to peace, which is deep and abiding. On our side, that will to peace exists, but does it coexist?
6. The Soviet bloc deny that our policies make for peace. They claim that our coalitions and our associations, particularly what they call the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, are a menace to their security and are designed for aggressive war. Nothing could be more remote from reality than that charge. It may be that their fear on this score is manufactured by propaganda as a cloak for plans and policies of their own, which in turn rouse deep and anxious fear in us. But even if the communist fear were genuine, it is unfounded. The peoples of our free coalition are passionately pacific, and its leader, the United States, as Canadians have special reason to know and appreciate, is one of the least imperialistically minded Powers that ever had world leadership and responsibility thrust upon it.
7. But even if anyone were tempted to believe these 'untrue communist charges of American war-mongering imperialism, does anyone really think that the United States could decree aggressive or provocative collective action by, say, the North Atlantic, the Inter-American or the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand and United States] groups? Furthermore, this friendly association of other countries with the United States, some of which have had as tragic an experience of the miseries and destructions of war as the Soviet Union itself, should be a reassuring rather than a disturbing factor to all those who seek peace. As Mr. Dulles put it on 17 September: “The Soviet leaders ... should know, and probably they do know, that community arrangements are the least likely to be aggressive. Military force which is within a single nation can be used offensively at the dictation of one government alone, sometimes of one man alone. Military force which is distributed throughout several countries cannot be used effectively unless all of the countries concerned are in agreement.” Then Mr. Dulles added, and his words, I assure the Assembly, apply to my country: “Such agreement would be totally unattainable except for operations responsive to the clear menace of aggression.”
8. We of the free democratic countries, then, must not and will not adopt any policy or take any action which could give any other State valid reason to fear for its security or for its legitimate national interests. Such interests, however, do not include as making for peace — and here I quote with complete agreement from Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech of 21 September [438th meeting] — “a policy directed at destroying the social and political structure of any other country”.
9. But communist doctrine, in our eyes, professes just that, and that is one reason why we feel a deep, genuine- fear, not one as Mr. Vyshinsky put it, artificially stimulated by the Pentagon, but a fear which flows from the loss of freedom in Eastern Europe, from the Berlin blockade, from aggression in Korea, from the awful dangers of totalitarian tyranny, and from the 175 Soviet divisions, if that is the figure, ready to march.
10. Mr. Spaak, the then Foreign Minister of Belgium, put our feelings as eloquently and succinctly as they have ever been put when he said to the General Assembly in 1948: “The Soviet delegation need not look for complicated explanations of our policy. I will tell him what is the basis of our policy — in terms which are perhaps slightly cruel, but which only the representative of a small nation could use. Do you know what is the basis of our policy? It is fear of you, fear of your Government, fear of your policy.” Then Mr. Spaak went on to say: “Do you [the delegation of the Soviet Union] know why we [the Western European countries] are afraid? We are afraid because you often speak of imperialism. “What is the definition and current notion of imperialism? It is usually the idea of a nation, generally a great Power, that makes conquests and increases its influence throughout the world. “What is the historic truth that has emerged from recent years? It is that one great country alone has emerged from the war having conquered other territories — and that great country is the Soviet Union... “The empire of the Soviet Union stretches from the Far East to the Baltic Sea and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and is now also felt on the banks of the Rhine ... and then the Soviet Union wonders why the other nations feel anxious.”
11. The echo of those words of Mr. Spaak, spoken five years ago, has not faded from our minds. With these fears still haunting us, and with the sure knowledge that weakness in this world is a provocation and not a protection, we intend to become strong and remain strong until security can rest on a better and more lasting foundation even than strength.
12. I am aware, of course, that fear on one side often results in action which causes new fear on the other side; and that this provokes counteraction, which, in its turn, brings about even greater fear. And so a vicious circle is begun, which goes on and on until it is either cut through in the right way, by sincere negotiation and wise political decisions, or in the wrong way, by war, which now means atomic annihilation. If these are, then, the alternatives, and if by our policies we should make the latter choice inevitable, then George Bernard Shaw was certainly right when he said: “If the other planets are inhabited, the earth is their lunatic asylum.”
13. Yet it is all too apparent that the tide of world affairs for the past seven years has been flowing in one direction, sometimes faster, sometimes slower, but always, unhappily, in the direction of an eventual catastrophe that might leave in the rubble little worth salvaging from what we are still able to call civilization.
14. The growing unity and strength of the Western democracies, however, and the confidence that is beginning to come from this, the events of the last few months and, in particular, the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, may give us now a chance to move away from possible co-destruction and towards a coexistence which will be more than a word. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that an era of sweetness and light is just around the corner. Nor will it be ushered in merely by changes of tactics or paper promises of peace. But it does seem that there is at least more hope now for progress towards real peace than there was when the seventh session of the General Assembly opened almost a year ago. Whether this is wishful thinking or not, such progress is the fundamental purpose to which our United Nations is dedicated, and we are, in all conscience, bound to keep everlastingly trying to bring about a better state of international relations; for if we fail in this we fail, sooner or later, in everything.
15. Faced with this task, then, we should ask ourselves, among other things, if our present methods of diplomacy, inside or outside the United Nations, are adequate and effective enough for the purpose of negotiating differences when the opportunity for such negotiation presents itself.
16. The United Nations is a place where we can meet either to settle problems or to make settlement more difficult. It is a place where we can try to find collective solutions, or one which we can use to get support and publicity for purely national solutions. It is a place where we can talk to each other with a view to securing general agreement, or to television and radio audiences in order to explain that disagreement is the fault of somebody else. In any event, whatever face the United Nations now presents to the public is enlarged to alarming proportions by all the media of information which now carry our words, our attitudes, even our appearances, to the ends of the earth.
17. I know of course, as the Assembly knows, that without the active participation of world agencies of communication and information this experiment in world organization could not succeed because it would not be able to secure popular support. But the United Nations has, or it should have, a private as well as a public face. There should be opportunities here for other than public appearances. A television panel discussion can be instructive, and at times entertaining, but it is surely no substitute for direct consultation or for that old-fashioned diplomacy which is becoming more respectable by comparison with some of its gaudier successors.
18. It is, of course, essential that all free peoples should know and understand the great issues of policy which may mean life or death to them. But it is not essential, as I see it — indeed it is often harmful — for the negotiation of policy always to be Conducted in glass houses which are often too tempting a target for brickbats. It is all too easy to strike attitudes in public, only to find later that we are “stuck” with them. Open diplomacy now tends to become frozen diplomacy.
19. I am sure that we can all think of subjects that have come before us in recent sessions of the Assembly that could have been more constructively discussed and more easily settled if there had previously been quiet and confidential discussion of them between delegations and governments, especially between those which were in disagreement over the matters in question. It is my feeling that the opportunity for consultation of this kind at United Nations meetings is, or seems to be, diminishing, and that a kind of “bloc” or “group” discussion is, on the other hand, increasing, the results, in one form or another, often being made public almost before the discussion itself has taken place. If we are not careful, therefore, these “publicly confidential” discussions, useful and perhaps essential as they often are, may cause the United Nations to lose prestige as a place where opposing views can be constructively considered and where their reconciliation can at least be attempted in an efficient and businesslike way.
20. But whatever methods we adopt, the fear and tension which now grips the whole world will not be reduced until some of the current international issues which divide us are successfully resolved, either by the United Nations or by those States — acting, if necessary, outside the United Nations — which have the main share of responsibility for international peace and security.
21. In his penetrating address on 17 September, Mr. Dulles pointed to certain of these problems. If concrete progress, and not mere talk about peaceful intentions, can be achieved in solving some of them, here in the United Nations or elsewhere, we will then, but only then, have some real ground for hope; for only then will our words have been confirmed by actions.
22. The two principal issues which will test the reality behind all our talk are, of course, Germany and Korea. The latter issue, which is before us, has now narrowed down to the political conference to be held under paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement.
23. The countries which fought in Korea on the United Nations side sent their troops there for no other purpose than to help repel aggression, declared such by United Nations decision.
24. So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, we will not support any military action in Korea that is not United Nations action, and we would, of course, be opposed to any attempt to interpret existing United Nations objectives as including, for instance, the unification of Korea by force. On the other hand, we are aware that the signing of an armistice does not discharge us from obligations we have already undertaken in Korea as a Member of the United Nations.
25. To convert this armistice into peace, the political conference must meet. There is no other way. Less than a month ago, the seventh session of the Assembly, it will be remembered, made provision [resolution 711 (VII)] for the United Nations side of this meeting. It is quite true that this was done in a way which did not meet the full wishes of certain delegations. including my own. But the decision was made, and made after long and exhaustive debate, and the composition of the conference on the United Nations side was decided — decided in a way which, if not perfect, should be satisfactory for the purpose we have in mind, namely, making peace in Korea. Surely it would be wrong at once to reopen the whole matter and to try to reverse our decision after such a short interval merely because the communist governments of Peking and North Korea demand it.
26. Insistence, for instance, by the communist side — and this is mentioned in their notes [A/2469 and A/2476 and Corr. 1] — that the Korean conference cannot convene unless the United Nations agrees that the USSR should be present as a “neutral” member, would throw serious doubt on their desire to have the conference convene at all. So we have the right, I think, to expect that the communist governments concerned, to which our resolutions have been forwarded, should now without delay designate their own representatives, and express their views regarding the time and place. Once the conference meets, there will be ample opportunity to iron out other difficulties which may arise. But are these of sufficient consequence to justify the other side in boycotting this necessary first step in peace-making, not only in Korea but perhaps over a broader area?
27. For it is surely not too much to hope that if we are successful in negotiating on' a specific and defined range of questions we may succeed also in strengthening the prospects of the settlement of wider Asian issues, although not necessarily through the same mechanism which we have recommended for the Korea Conference. But for this wider objective to be achieved, or even approached, we must first succeed in making peace in Korea. If — and I recognize that this is a big “if” — there is good faith and good will on both sides, a settlement here should be possible.
28. I suggest that any such settlement must provide for a free and united Korea, with a government resting on the will of the Korean people, freely expressed through an election held under United Nations supervision. All foreign forces should, of course, be withdrawn, and Korea’s security might be provided for under an international and supervised guarantee.
29. The Korean problem is certainly not an insoluble one. If a fair and lasting solution is desired, it can be found. It certainly is desired by the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations, I am sure. If the communist side, or anyone else, by obstruction and inadmissible demands, makes a peaceful solution impossible, then the responsibility for failure will be clear, and the United Nations, at least, will have done its duty.
30. Korea, in short, will provide an acid test for the hope and claim that successful negotiations can and must be conducted now, not only on the future of Korea, but also on European and cold-war problems generally, in order to bring about an easing of fear and tension, and a peace that will be something better than cold war.
31. There is one other respect in which Korea is an acid test — the assistance we give the Korean people to restore and rehabilitate their country, ravaged and devastated by war. I am certain that this Assembly will agree with the Secretary-General that it is of high importance that this collective responsibility for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Korea — and I quote from Mr. Hammarskjold’s report — “should be carried out honourably, vigourously and generously by the United Nations and with the widest possible participation of its Members [A/2404, p. xiii]”.
32. In referring to Korea as a supreme test, I am well aware that the obstacles to agreement, like the present divisions of our world, may seem great. Yet we can remind ourselves, as has been said, the longest journey must begin with a single step. It is the belief of the country which I represent, and I am sure of the overwhelming majority of the countries represented here, that, if this all-important first step — to co-operate in bringing peace to Korea — is taken by those who speak in the name of the world community in this Assembly, the long journey towards a wider peace will have begun.
33. This is a general debate, but I do not propose to comment on other issues, many of them very important, which will come before us. There will be time enough for that in the weeks ahead. This eighth session, like its predecessors, now faces a long and complex programme of work. The problems before it, in the formal enumeration of our official agenda, reflect the basic conflicts and high tensions of our divided world. Ultimate judgments on the utility or the futility of this Organization will be based on the extent to which we make these items on our agenda the signposts to action and practical achievement.
34. The Canadian delegation will do its best to make a worthwhile contribution to this essential result, and thereby serve the high purposes of peace that bring us together here.