80. It is, of corpse, not easy at this stage of the general debate to offer any ideas which are both original and constructive. The general situation in which we find ourselves has been adequately and useful described in a number of statements to whose high quality I must pay a tribute.
81. My delegation was even reluctant to intervene in the debate, but we feared that complete silence on our part might be misinterpreted and might appear to some to indicate a diminishing interest in the work of the United Nations. Nothing could be further from the truth. The faith and hope that we have placed in the Organization remain unshakeable. Our faith is of course sorely tried from time to time. Let us admit frankly that many of our hopes have been deceived. There have been abuses of the privileges and rights which the Charter reserves or grants either to the great Powers or to the Members as a whole.
82. Belgium has repeatedly raised its voice in protest against the restrictive interpretation which too many States place upon the provisions of the Charter concerning the non-self-governing peoples. At the last session I myself stressed the fact that to limit the advantages of such safeguards to a certain number only of those peoples was unjust to all the others. That is a mistake which the League of Nations never made. Our attitude on this point is well known and we had occasion quite recently to make it clear once again.
83. If we wanted to compile a list of complaints that have been made of the United Nations in one quarter or another, it would not be difficult. Worse still, however, is the fact that ever-increasing sections of public opinion are adopting a critical and sceptical attitude towards our efforts, our methods and our potentialities. We regard that, however, as one more reason for reaffirming our conviction. A universal organization working side by side with, as well as over and above, regional groups, is and remains a necessity in the narrow and divided world in which we live.
84. The fundamental principles on which this Organization is based -the peaceful settlement of international relations, and collective security — are today even more essential to human progress than they were before and will be no less so in the future,
85. At this moment the Organization is undergoing a decisive test. Its existence, its future, and the principles which it embodies are at stake, and everything depends on the solution which finally will be found for the Korean drama. By the grace of God, the conclusion of the armistice has made it possible at least to envisage a solution which will demonstrate that aggression has been thwarted, will strengthen the principle of collective security and will restore peace to at least one corner of the world.
86. But while we may be allowed to take comfort from such hopes, it would be folly to close our eyes to the obstacles, the dangers and the delays which still separate us from this goal. Let us have patience, let us stand firm on our principles and let us be broad-minded concerning the methods to be used, let us show understanding and even generosity. I am certain we shall have great need of all these qualities.
87. The political conference on Korea will endeavour to settle a specific problem in which the United Nations is directly and irrevocably involved. There is no doubt, however, that this problem, in common with all the acute issues arising in so many other parts of the world, forms part of a single whole. We have used the term “cold war” to describe this general situation. But we must beware, for beneath the cold surface the fire continues to smoulder — a fire which is neither more nor less than the danger of war. We shall not be safe from the explosion until we have succeeded in putting an end to the cold war, that is to say, until we have succeeded in defining and achieving the conditions — even empirical — under which the two great ideological camps into which our poor humanity is divided may live peacefully side by side.
88. The words I have just used — and I used them deliberately — make it impossible and even unthinkable for us to resort to aggression or to preventive war, in a word, to violence, in order to settle these problems. We know from experience that war never solves anything, that its price is always terrible and that, once the war is over, the edifice of peace will still have to be rebuilt, as should have been done before the conflict broke out. We know, too, that a single individual can sometimes bring about war, and that in that case the only thing free men can do is to fight, and to fight on until victory is won. We know, moreover, that it takes two to make peace or to maintain it.
89. In the last analysis, however, if war is to be avoided there must sooner or later be negotiation, for negotiation, after all, is the only alternative to violence. That is why we have always declared ourselves ready to negotiate with those who do not share our views; that is why we are still prepared to do so, and we show that we are by our deeds. How often, since the last war, have we not extended our hand, in all sincerity, to the Soviet Union! Nothing will destroy my conviction that if the other side had shown one-tenth of the goodwill that we ourselves have never failed to show, the world would already be much closer to real peace than it now is.
90. But we have not the right to grow weary; we have not even the right to grow impatient. Those who negotiated the armistice in Korea on our behalf have given us an incomparable example of patience which we have not the right to disregard. If it is our policy to negotiate, how should this be done? Let. us first ask ourselves whether or not the atmosphere in this debate in the United Nations is favourable to such an undertaking. I see both good and bad signs.
91. One of the good signs is the moderation that has characterized many of the speeches. It was to be noted in the fine speech with which the United States Secretary of State opened our general debate [344th meeting]. And did it not impress you, as it impressed me just now when listening to the moving speech made by the representative of France? It reflected moderation and good will from beginning to end. And I feel that this attitude of moderation has been maintained in most of the other speeches. I myself would even say that despite the excessive language and individual criticisms which we deplore, the USSR representative’s speech [438th meeting] was not altogether an exception to the rule if we compare its tone with that of his previous interventions. Is this sufficient? Certainly not. But we cannot disregard any factor, and, unless I am mistaken, we may conclude that the debate as a whole has shown that most of us, without attempting to delude ourselves, are nevertheless eager to keep every door open, or at least ajar, just in case. I am happy to see in this an indication of goodwill and perhaps a reason for hope.
92. But this same sincerity and this desire to see things clearly compel us to other, less comforting observations. We listened attentively to Mr. Vyshinsky, and we have carefully perused his speech. We would have wished — and perhaps we had even hoped — to find in it a new concept, an opening, no matter how small, in short, something different from what we had heard heretofore. As he spoke, however, we had the impression of listening to the echo — fainter, and almost inaudible — of ideas, statements and proposals that we had already heard so often from this rostrum in recent years. Equally often we have put forward our arguments to the contrary, and we believe that our reasoning was decisive. To proposals which we considered illusory, we have each time replied with other proposals which were sounder and more equitable in our eyes and in the eyes of most of the non-Soviet nations.
93. But despite these unfruitful and irritating discussions, it is obvious that a lie does not become the truth by being repeated twenty times over; it is not by repeating the same ideas ad museum that any progress can be made in an exchange of views; and, most important of all, it is not by holding rigidly to an idea or an attitude that we can keep pace with reality, which changes and develops as does every living thing. The least that can be said is that such an attitude is made completely obsolete by facts and events.
94. I should like to state our views on this subject. All negotiations imply and presuppose a minimum of goodwill on both sides — a minimum, I say. There is surely no need to refer once again to the sincerity, the complete good faith and the fervour with which the free peoples long for peace and loathe war. But is such an attitude to be found on both sides? During the early years after the defeat of nazism, we fed our hopes on illusions, and when we were compelled to give up those illusions and launch upon a policy of rearmament, a sine qua non of the balance of forces and therefore of peace, our was a cruel awakening. But the lesson was not in vain. Today we shall not run the risk of being mistaken.
95. Does that mean that we should go to the opposite extreme and believe in nothing? Certainly not. We must do neither the one nor the other. But we mean to act henceforth with prudence or, I prefer to say, with realism.
96. In that spirit, how should we judge the gestures which Moscow has been making for the past few months? Are they really indicative of a relaxation of tension? Do they reveal a complete change of attitude, in short, a new policy? I must admit that I cannot answer those questions. I cannot enter into the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union. How often have I not been completely baffled by their reactions! I myself do not think that the general line of communism has changed. I think it is still unwaveringly directed towards the ideological purposes and practices at which it has always aimed.
97. That, however, is not the question. We do not intend to abandon our principles either; we consider them right and we shall uphold them, come what may. The question now before us, the question of sovereign importance, is whether we can avoid war. It seems to me that the reasons which have prompted the Soviet Union to make such gestures are of little importance; whether those gestures are based on diplomatic tactics or on a more long-term strategy matters little. What is important is whether they constitute a new element, an opportunity for resuming discussion on a wider or on a newer basis. We are therefore prepared, until the contrary is proved, to accept all manifestations of goodwill at their face value, and we are prepared to respond to them in the same spirit.
98. We have therefore welcomed the manifestations of a more conciliatory spirit which have appeared in the course of the past few months. We have noted with satisfaction that the keynote of the spokesmen of Soviet policy has been action with a view to decreasing international tension. That is the object of our hopes and endeavours too. But we have no illusions; we shall not achieve any concrete and lasting results in this direction unless we find a remedy for the underlying causes of the tension which has been created by a long series of events, of which the division of Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean and Indo-Chinese wars have been only the most outstanding.
99. The armistice signed two months ago in Korea is of great importance in our eyes because we hope that it constitutes a halt in the sinister course of events to which I have just referred, and perhaps the first step in a systematic and continuous action which will enable us to regain the ground we have lost. We are well aware, however, that if we enter into negotiations, they will be not only long and difficult, but they must inevitably, if successful, result in a compromise formula. Does acceptance of the idea of a possible compromise mean that we are ready to sacrifice principles? Not at all, quite the contrary. There are lines drawn by convictions which are more precious than life itself or than any other good. Beyond those lines there are inscribed but two words, to which there is no reply and from which there can be no turning back: non possumus, “we cannot”. Never, at any price. We have clearly shown that that is our attitude every time we have taken up the challenge and repelled aggression, whether in Europe, Korea or elsewhere. But once principles are preserved, there is always a place for empirical solutions, based on a happy medium which must be found by dint of patience, tenacity and ingenuity. The whole life of democratic, free and orderly States is based on that conviction.
100. Of course, if negotiations are to be pursued and to be fruitful, they must first be organized. They need careful preparation. There can be no question of rushing headlong into something which can have no successful outcome. Negotiations without proper preparation are sometimes liable to do more harm than good. We still have disappointing memories of the Palais Rose. If, however, there is a real desire for negotiations, we do not think there should by any question of laying down in advance conditions whose acceptance by one of the parties at the outset would make it appear that the other party was in the right, even before the discussions had started.
101. A word of warning, however: although we must enter into negotiation with free hands and open minds, we must also do so with our position firmly determined and our main points beyond dispute. Just as it appears to me useless to lay down preliminary conditions, so does it seem necessary to determine with clarity and strength and with all the decision that arises from consciousness of a goon cause the positions upon which the exchange of views will be initiated. In the meantime, that is, until the negotiations have clearly led to final agreement, there can be no question either of abandoning any point or, above all, of changing policy or, more particularly, of relaxing the defence effort. The negotiations will have no chance of achieving favourable and lasting results unless both parties speak the same language, as between equals.
102. We find here some of the leading considerations which decided the Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to combine their efforts to organize a common defence in the face of growing threats. I am sure that no one will be surprised if we take this opportunity to declare once more, with all the conviction and sincerity of which we are capable, that, in both its letter and its spirit, the North Atlantic Treaty has and can have one purpose only — to avert war by restoring the balance of power which renders aggression impossible or at any rate fruitless. It will never be put to any other purpose. It is our right and our duty to say that it is a work of peace; it is an indispensable safeguard for peace as long as the threats which it was designed to meet have not entirely disappeared. If the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were to be weak enough to break off or to slow down their defence effort before the negotiations had begun or had produced any result, they would in my opinion be making a very serious mistake, because they would be robbing the negotiations in advance of one of their principal chances of success — that chance which always stems from approximate equality of strength among the parties concerned.
103. Once that has been said — or rather, repeated, for it is certainly not the first time that these self-evident truths have been proclaimed — would it not be agreed that the time had come to seek new formulas? Without going beyond the framework which we have just outlined, we think it is possible to find solutions adapted to the requirements of the moment. The international situation seems to us today more fluid than it has been for a long time. It doubtless conceals^ quite as many dangers, but it also offers more possibilities. Now is the time to bring constructive imagination into play. We should like concrete and positive proposals to be placed before international opinion. They would doubtless be criticized by some and rejected by others, but they might produce useful reactions; they might even produce possibilities hitherto unknown or unrecognized. They might perhaps place the negotiations on a realistic plane.
104. I should like to say here that I was happy to hear Mr. Schumann speak as he did today, because I thought I discerned in his statement certain signs which I felt were already pointing in the right direction. As far as the Belgian delegation is concerned, we are making a similar effort: we are trying to express scattered ideas and to synthesize them. But it seems to us desirable that such an attempt should from the outset be a joint venture; the sooner that becomes possible, the better it will be.
105. I shall now conclude. I think that I have said enough to inform the Assembly of the spirit in which the Belgian delegation will participate in the work of the various committees.
106. Until such time as the wishes and hopes which I hive just put forward can take shape the United Nations will go on striving to bring to a successful issue the work of faith and courage which it has undertaken in Korea. Preparations for the political conference alone will demand an enormous amount of goodwill, skill and perseverance. We have to do no less than to restore peace in the East and thus build up peace in the world. No effort can be too great to achieve such a purpose.
107. Risks must be taken, it is true. But our sincerity is so deep, our desire to restore order, equilibrium, justice and love throughout the world and in face of all obstacles is so strong and so ardent, that we shall endeavour, all of us, I hope, together, in the future as in the past, to make ourselves equal to the tasks before us, whatever may be the demands of destiny.