1. We all remember the inauspicious omens which attended the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly on 14 October 1952. Few, if any, among us can have forgotten the sad prognostications on the outcome of an international gathering so unhappily placed under the sign of the Korean war and, above all, of the “East-West” conflict. The political atmosphere was at that time surcharged with electricity and we were harried with fears and misgivings. Who can deny that the eighth session opened in better circumstances?
2. After many previous disappointments, the truce in Korea has at last been signed — on 27 July. Greece, which sent many of its children to make the supreme sacrifice in order to contribute to the repulse of the unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea, cannot but rejoice at an armistice that we have every right to greet as an unqualified victory for the principle of collective security.
3. Our deepest gratitude goes to the gallant members of the armed forces who, under the banner of the United Nations, fought to achieve this gratifying result. We fervently hope that their blood and their sufferings have not been in vain. We do expect that those three years of grim struggle and costly sacrifice will teach us that the most effective defence lies in the strengthening of our collective security system. Singleness of purpose and unity in action have permitted the achievement of an honourable armistice. Only if we remain united can we see the political conference envisaged in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement get off to as good a start as is humanly possible. Only then can we achieve a lasting peace. Only then can we reach our basic objective of the establishment, by peaceful means, of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.
4. But the war in Korea, however tragic and terrible, represents, in our opinion, only a chapter in the so- called “East-West” conflict. This conflict, thank God, appears somewhat less acute and there is, no doubt, a milder air blowing from the East. Nor can it be denied that our colleagues of the Soviet bloc have lately managed to avoid expressions, words and epithets which they used commonly until March 1953. This fact constitutes a real progress and may have the value of an object lesson. The moral to be drawn from it is that the distance between the views expressed within the various organs of the United Nations, starting, of course, from the General Assembly, cannot be bridged by violent altercations and words full of sound and fury. Quite on the contrary, such opposing views as may exist — or, rather, as are bound to exist — among representatives of various Member States, can be smoothed out only if expressed in a tone befitting the dignity of international bodies. Then and only then will it be possible for the United Nations to become, to quote the Charter, “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”; that is, the maintenance of international peace and security.
5. Peoples and governments, it is true, are wondering about the real meaning of these conciliatory gestures and friendly words which have been coming of late from Moscow. They have set in motion a train of speculation as to their actual intent and scope. Do these hopeful signs go to the heart of the unsettled and pending problems, or do they only scratch their surface? Or, to put it otherwise, have the Soviet Union and the "democratic peoples' republics” reached in their political evolution the necessary maturity for fair dealings and earnest co-operation with the non-Cominform States?
6. It is certainly not for the representative of a small nation to provide the answer to so crucial a question, fraught with such far-reaching consequences. The bitter experience of the seven-year cold war which, in some cases — as in Korea and, before Korea, in my own country — turned hot, has taught us to assess the problem with the utmost caution. Yet our yearning for a lasting peace is such as to impel us to relegate the recent past to the recesses of our memory and to look forward hopefully and optimistically. What is more, our fervent hope, generated by our unswerving attachment to the cause of peace, encourages us to take certain manifestations of policy as indicative of real intentions which, we confidently expect, will be translated into facts. We do not believe, of course, in the virtues of the magic wand in international politics and do not, therefore, entertain the hope that all outstanding international differences can be solved overnight. Nor do we visualize a Utopia in which all the major world Powers will toe the same line in matters of policy.
7. There are, however, in our uncertain world of today a number of questions which do not affect in the least the political interests or the prestige of the Soviet Union and the “democratic peoples’ republics” — questions, therefore, which could provide the touchstone of the genuineness of their political professions. I refer to questions whose settlement will bring a new reason to live and to hope to thousands of families — to thousands of simple folk, helpless victims of the “East-West” conflict and of some kind or other of Weltpolitik.
8. Take, for instance, the purely humanitarian question of the repatriation of the members of the Greek armed forces still lingering in detention camps far from their homes. The General Assembly, on 17 March 1953, addressed through its resolution 702 (VII) an earnest appeal to the detaining governments to repatriate those among the Greek military personnel under their control who wished to be repatriated. The President of the General Assembly was at the same time requested to consult to this end with the governments in question and to report back to the General Assembly before the close of the seventh session. Unfortunately, all the replies that Mr. Pearson received were stereotyped in their repetition of the allegation that the Greek detainees were political refugees and, as such, had been granted the right of asylum. Even those most favourably inclined towards this version ^ are bound in fairness to concede that the international standing of the “harbouring States” could only benefit from a reconsideration of the cases involved, were the findings of such a reconsideration to substantiate the view that the Greek military personnel concerned consider themselves as political refugees, that they are opposed to any idea of repatriation and that they have voluntarily ceased to correspond with their families for over three years.
9. May I be permitted to refer to another question of a purely humanitarian nature: the question of the civilian hostages who were driven by force from their homes in the province of Epirus into countries north of Greece. In this connexion I should like to mention the concrete case of 616 of these civilian hostages whom the Hungarian Red Cross proposed, of its own accord, to repatriate in September 1951. As a result of that proposal the International Committee of the Red Cross, in co-operation with the Greek Red Cross, took the necessary action for the repatriation of those hapless persons via Trieste. Suddenly, however — and without any apparent reason — the Hungarian Red Cross became less responsive, until it ceased even to acknowledge receipt of the communications on the subject from the International Committee of the Red Cross. Who can deny that the Hungarian Government would only contribute to the improvement of the international climate by releasing 616 human beings, in long-overdue execution of an initiative by the Hungarian Red Cross?
10. What about the abducted Greek children? My delegation did not oppose the resolution [618 (VII)] adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1952, providing for the discontinuance of the mission entrusted to the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies — the mission to repatriate those Greek children before it was too late, that is, before, as we have every reason now — alas — to fear, they ceased to be Greeks in conscience and children in age. We felt obliged to admit that a new resolution once again inviting the “harbouring States” to return the children to their families would neither help to redress the situation nor contribute to enhancing the prestige of our Organization, already sorely tried by the fact that four previous resolutions on the matter, adopted unanimously or without opposition, had failed to elicit any positive response from countries other than Yugoslavia.
11. In the last analysis the fate of the three humanitarian questions that I have briefly outlined hinges on the goodwill of the Eastern European countries. We shall never tire of scanning the political horizon for evidence of such goodwill, convinced as we are that the governments concerned can offer no more adequate and no less onerous proof of their change of heart than by restoring to thousands of Greek families their dear ones. Without cost to their political interests, the countries to which my remarks are earnestly addressed will thus score many points in the moral and psychological fields.
12. The restraint we showed last year when the question of the abducted Greek children was debated represented, I submit in all humility, an indirect contribution to the improvement of international understanding within the United Nations. Such, indeed, is our will to co-operate — with our limited means — in the furtherance of this Organization’s aims and purposes that we very often do not hesitate to suppress our emotions and fears, however justified, if by doing so we feel that we are serving the over-all mission of the United Nations. For we regard the United Nations as the only international forum capable of bringing about the much-sought-after clearing of the international atmosphere. It is in this frame of mind that the Greek delegation will participate in the work of the eighth session of the General Assembly and will consider the questions on the agenda. We shall always be prepared, in an open-minded and unbiased spirit, to tackle the problems confronting us, and we shall always have this ultimate end in view — the strengthening of our Organization’s prestige and authority in order to bring about real international peace and collaboration.
13. The Cyprus question is not to be found among the items on the agenda of the present session. It is true that, on 10 August 1953, the spiritual and national chief of four-fifths of the Cypriot population addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a memorandum requesting the inclusion of that question in the agenda and. the adoption of a resolution recommending that the United Kingdom should accept the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, in compliance with the provisions of the General Assembly resolution [637 (VII)] of 16 December 1952.
14. One may therefore ask why my Government, although under very heavy pressure from Greek public opinion, has not sponsored this request or taken a direct initiative in respect thereof.
15. This matter has, so far, assumed the aspect of an oft-repeated, spontaneous manifestation of the enormous majority of the people of the island, a people whose past is intimately linked with Greece’s history and who ardently desire to become, politically also, part and parcel of the Greek motherland.
16. We do not and shall never forget the United Kingdom’s contribution to our national resurgence. On the other hand, we venture to hope that that country has had no cause since to regret that act of, statesmanship and political prescience, as Greece has constantly been the United Kingdom’s staunch friend in its hour of need. The United Kingdom, in turn, has responded generously and a bond of mutual affection and esteem has been created that far — very far — transcends the importance of the most far-reaching bilateral agreement couched in terms of cold juridical undertakings.
17. To be willing to go before a judge or an arbiter is, of course, a commendable attitude of mind, especially when one despairs of achieving agreement through direct conversations or negotiations. But normally, no one appeals to a court of law or to an international forum such as this before giving a fair chance to the possibility of direct conversations.
18. My Government, therefore, does not at this moment contemplate bringing the matter before this Organization, since it is convinced that the close relations that, so happily, exist between Greece and the United Kingdom make it incumbent upon us not to underestimate either the resources of diplomacy or the political foresight of our British friends. My Government definitely prefers the method of friendly bilateral discussion, since that is warranted by the very nature of our long-standing cordial relations with the United Kingdom and by the felicitous identity of purpose which has always animated the peoples of the two countries. It is our ardent hope that these views are shared by our friends in the United Kingdom and that they, also, consider the task that lies ahead as a worthy object on which to exert their statesmanship. The door will always be open for us to go before a judge, if the ordinary processes of friendly conversations prove to be of no avail.
19. The behaviour of a country over a fairly long period of time usually affords a correct indication of its future conduct. The cruelly stricken Ionian Islands gave us a dramatic opportunity of testing this principle. Both at the time of their restoration to Greece by the United Kingdom and again quite recently, after the deadly tremors that shook those islands, our English friends lived up to their great tradition as humanists and philhellenes. We take a sad pleasure in thinking of those islands, and in doing so we derive comfort and confidence as we meditate on the implications of those noble gestures.
20. Speaking of the disastrous earthquakes that struck the Ionian Islands, I would be remiss in my duty were I not to reiterate from this rostrum my Government’s and the Greek people’s deep gratitude to the many other governments — most of which are represented here — and to the international organizations which so promptly and so generously responded to the call for help of the distressed populations.
21. As the General Assembly is aware, on 28 February 1953 the Governments of Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece signed a treaty of friendship and > cooperation based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and designed to help in the fulfilment of the United Nations aims. This tripartite treaty is the upshot of the common consciousness of the peoples of Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece that, by uniting their forces, they can better preserve their political independence and territorial integrity and thus, in the best meaning of Article 52 of the Charter, help in the furtherance of the purposes of the United Nations.
22. Furthermore, it should be noted that the agreement not only lays the groundwork for a better political future: it also actually provides the building material for it by promoting closer economic, technical and cultural ties between the contracting parties. The bridges which this tripartite agreement builds will encourage the exchange of goods as well as of ideas between them. The old dream of a political, economic and cultural community of the peoples of southeastern Europe may yet come true in our lifetime. By sinking their own differences in the past and becoming the standard-bearers of a better future, the parties to the Ankara Agreement — which, let me stress it, remains open to all other States in the area — have set an example to all small nations intent on the maintenance of peace and security.
23. It is also pertinent to emphasize the importance of the tripartite agreement between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece as a cogent factor in the improvement of the relations of these governments with their neighbours — who, it is true, at the time of the signing of the agreement, looked askance at it. This change for the better is more noticeable in the common efforts towards the prevention and the settlement of frontier incidents and in the recent offer by some of the neighbours of these three countries to restore normal diplomatic relations with them.
24. The dividends accruing from our course of action in this and in other fields have confirmed us in our unflinching faith in the rules and aims of the United Nations Charter. It is armed with this faith that we approach the task confronting us as one of the sixty Member States of this Organization.
25. Our faith in the Charter, however, does not imply any dogmatic immutability. As has often been said, the United Nations was conceived by its founders as a living reality, as a continuing process destined to attain its high purposes by a constant adaptation and adjustment to changing circumstances. This necessary flexibility cannot be achieved unless the constitutional statute governing our Organization undergoes such periodic revision as its trials and its errors dictate in order better to fit into the pattern of the every-day life of the international community.
26. My delegation will give the President its unreserved moral support in the finding of ways and means to make the United Nations successful. Let us all try continuously to make the spirit of human freedom triumph within this Organization and — to quote the words of our King, who, in the first days of November, will pay an official visit to this Assembly — “turn the form that our faith has produced into a radiant symbol of man’s inner maturity”.