51. I know of no better way to begin my statement, Mr. President, than to convey to you the very sincere congratulations of my delegation on the honourable and well-deserved appointment conferred upon you by the General Assembly. The exemplary manner in which you have been conducting our debates and the judicious words of your opening statement testify to the wisdom of that appointment. My delegation entirely agrees with the point which you made on that occasion, namely, that more than ever before, the present international situation calls for the intensification of efforts by small and medium-sized countries to foster regard for morality and respect for the rule of law in relations between States and between peoples.
52. I should also like to extend our congratulations to Ambassador Pazhwak, who with such distinction and ability has presided over, not only the twenty- first session, but also the two special sessions of the General Assembly which dealt with problems whose seriousness and importance it would be difficult to overstate.
53. The year 1967 will not be outstanding in the annals of the United Nations so far as concerns international peace and security, responsibility for the maintenance of which was placed upon the Organization, as its main task, by the Charter signed at San Francisco.
54. The truth of this statement is so self-evident that there is no need for me to try and substantiate it. In the first of the two parts of my speech, I should merely like to make a few general remarks about my country’s position on the questions of Viet-Nam and the Middle East, and with regard to one of the fundamental principles of the Charter.
55. In addressing this Assembly in the general debate at the twenty-first session [1418th meeting], the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico expressed our Government's deep concern over the war in Viet-Nam. He said that the war undoubtedly constituted the most serious threat to world peace since the Korean War in 1950. For reasons known to all, he went on, it would appear that the United Nations is not now in a position to take action to settle that conflict. He repeated that Mexico is nevertheless ready to lend its moral support to any practical proposal that will enable the parties directly involved to begin negotiations as soon as possible to end this war, in which the principal victims are the Viet-Namese people, who have been shedding their blood year after year. The conflicting forces, interests and ideologies are such, he continued, that the co-operation which countries not involved in the conflict can offer, especially those without great material power, lies not so much in suggesting practical measures, as in solemnly exhorting the Powers with major responsibility to keep open all channels of communication that may lead to a peaceful settlement. He concluded by recalling the Secretary-General's untiring and patient efforts, and declared that "although he has not yet achieved what we all desire, all men of goodwill are in debt to U Thant".
56. It is just over a year since those words were uttered before the General Assembly, but the time that has elapsed since, far from diminishing their validity, has increased — if that were possible — the extreme urgency of the exhortation contained in them. Today more than ever, therefore, it is essential that the Secretary-General — who is at the head of the only principal United Nations organ which for the time being seems in a position to take effective measures to remove the conflict from the battlefield and bring it to the conference table — should receive the loyal and sincere co-operation of all Members of our Organization SO that his work of reconciliation may finally bring forth the results which all men hope for.
57. The unstable situation that has existed in the Middle East for two decades as a legacy of what was originally called "The Palestine question" deteriorated in the spring of this year to the point where it broke out into armed conflict of grave proportions.
58. Mexico did its utmost to help to restore peace in the region in accordance with the principles of justice and international law as laid down in the Charter. The unselfish objectives we were pursuing and the principles which guided our actions have been summed up in the annual report presented by President Diaz Ordaz to the Congress of the Union of Mexican States on 1 September 1967, in which, inter alia, he stated:
"In the turbulent world in which we live, we frequently have to face emergency situations. At times they endanger universal peace and cause moral and material demage difficult or impossible to repair in countries whose geographical remoteness from our own does not exclude them from the close fellow-feeling we have for all men everywhere.
"At the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, we expressed our hope that some means could be found of channelling action along paths leading to peace.
"Subsequently, in the United Nations, the Latin American countries set up a negotiating group consisting of the representatives of Mexico, Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago. They submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution which, although it obtained the largest number of votes of all the draft resolutions of a general nature that were submitted (57 votes out of a total of 120), did not obtain the two-thirds majority required by the United Nations Charter for adoption. It was closely followed by the draft formulated by Yugoslavia and a group of so-called 'non-aligned' countries. Both drafts were united in their condemnation of the use of force and in pointing out the need for Israel to return all the Arab lands which it has occupied since 5 June last. The fundamental difference, as we see it, between the two drafts lies in the fact that the Latin-American text specified that the withdrawal of Israel forces should form part of a programme leading to the establishment of a lasting peace.
"The experience of recent years shows us that any proposal, if it is to be truly effective, must establish norms that would permit those peoples to live as good neighbours, fully respecting one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity and rights.
"We believe that Mexico has discharged a historical and political duty in condemning the use of force for the solution of international conflicts, and in once again repeating that war confers no rights and that to base law on the amoral use of physical violence would be tantamount to destroying the very foundations of what mankind has always understood by law. We refuse to recognize the alleged validity of so-called victories on the battlefield."
59. My delegation regrets that the efforts of the fifth emergency special session of the Assembly have proved fruitless. We are prepared to give our support to any attempt to resolve the conflict, as long as it complies with the basic principles enunciated by the President of Mexico in his annual report, to which I have just referred.
60. We are convinced that it is in times of crisis, when international events or situations may cause some of us to doubt the validity and immutability of the fundamental principles of the Charter, that it is most important to restate them and define them precisely. Accordingly, at the recent session in Geneva of the Special Committee on Principles 'of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperations among States, Mexico not only reaffirmed its unqualified support for the principle of nonintervention, as defined in General Assembly [resolution 2131 (XX)], but at the same time submitted to that Committee a joint proposal [A/6799, para. 27], in sponsoring which it was joined by Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Venezuela — that is to say, all the other Latin American States represented on the Committee — on the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force in international relations. I shall take the liberty of explaining the content of that proposal in some detail, both because of its intrinsic importance, and because the General Assembly will be called upon to consider it at its present session.
61. The draft, which is drawn up in the form of a declaration, begins by reaffirming the duty of every State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. After adding that "such threat or use of force shall never be used as a means of settling international issues", it goes on to spell out a series of specific corollaries and obligations which derive automatically from the foregoing fundamental principle without limiting its generality. Since the complete text of the principles, corollaries and obligations can readily be consulted in the report which the Special Committee is to submit to the Assembly, I shall refrain from reading them out, although I consider it indispensable that they should be known to all delegations. I would merely mention here that they include the principle that:
"In accordance with the United Nations Charter, no territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized".
62. The joint proposal, after enumerating all the various specific prohibitions which should be regarded as included under the general prohibition of the threat or use of force, proceeds to define the only three cases in which, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the use of force is lawful, setting out the conditions that must be fulfilled in each case.
63. The use of force shall be considered lawful, solely and exclusively:
(1) When it is undertaken by or under the authority of a competent United Nations organ in accordance with the relevant provisions of the charter;
(2) When it is undertaken in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter, on the very clear understanding, as the proposal specifies in this respect, that this right "may be exercised only in confronting armed attack, without prejudice to the right of a State which is subject to subversive or terrorist acts supported by one or more other States, to take reasonable and appropriate measures to safeguard its institutions";
(3) When it is undertaken by a regional agency, with reference to which case the proposal, as in the previous instance, adds a highly important condition — that "the use of force by regional agencies, except in the case of self-defence, requires the express authorization of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter".
64. Of course, the codification of the obligations entailed by the principles of the Charter would serve little purpose if it resulted in the compilation of documents which, however high their quality, were of purely academic interest. My delegation believes that, if our Organization is to avoid the sad fate that befell its predecessor, the League of Nations, it is essential that each and every Member should scrupulously observe the principles of the Charter in its relations with other States, and that it should fulfil, with equal scrupulousness and in good faith, the obligations deriving from them.
65. We venture to hope that this requirement, though obviously difficult, will be safely realizable since a calm and objective analysis of the lessons of history demonstrates conclusively that such a course is in the long run the best way of defending the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the world, whether the States they belong to are large or small, weak or mighty. Suffice it to recall what was so rightly stated in this respect by Grotius as long as three centuries ago, in the Prolegomena to his Treaty on the Law of War and Peace:
"For since, by his own admission, the national who in his own country obeys its laws is not foolish, even though, out of regard for that law he may be obliged to forego certain things advantageous for himself, so that nation is not foolish which does not press its own advantage to the point of disregarding the laws common to nations. The reason in either case is the same. For just as the national, who violates the law of his country in order to obtain an immediate advantage, breaks down that by which the advantages of himself and his posterity are for all future time assured, so the State which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace".
66. As I implied at the outset, this year has witnessed, and continues to witness, international events and situations which offer precious little encouragement to those of us who consider that the United Nations Charter should be the ultimate criterion in relations between States. This is perhaps a further reason for singling out, as a means of warding off pessimism, an undertaking of transcendental importance, which it was the good fortune of Latin America to bring to a successful conclusion in February 1967, and which has already been referred to in complimentary terms by so many distinguished representatives in their statements. I shall speak of this undertaking now, in the second part of my statement.
67. On 27 November 1963, a few minutes after the General Assembly had adopted, without a single opposing vote, [resolution 1911 (XVIII)], entitled “Denuclearization of Latin America" [1265th meeting], I had occasion to come to this very rostrum to explain briefly the significance that Mexico attached to the decision which had just been adopted, and which I ventured to term historic.
68. I said at that time that the resolution was both a challenge and a testimony:
"a challenge to the ability of the Latin American States to work together and to achieve unanimous results that reflect the intense desire for peace with which, we are sure, all their peoples without exception are imbued" [ibid., para. 78];
"a testimony that Latin America has now come of age and is able to assess correctly the real desires of its peoples" [ibid., para. 81];
and I added by way of conclusion:
"We do not intend to act rashly or hastily. We shall follow the advice of the wise Latin adage and make haste slowly, but we shall make haste.
"Today, with the historic resolution adopted by this Assembly, Latin America starts along the road to denuclearization. We are convinced that sooner or later we shall achieve that goal, for we can count upon the unreserved and enthusiastic support of all our peoples", [ibid., paras, 90 and 91.]
69. These words were to prove prophetic. In fact, only three years and a few months later, on 12 February 1967, the twenty-one member States of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, meeting at the offices of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Tlatelolco, unanimously adopted the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is already known by the name of that historic district of my country's capital.
70. It was no less a person than the Secretary-General of the United Nations who make a point of stressing the overwhelming importance of the Treaty — a truly Latin-American contribution to disarmament and peace. In his message to the Preparatory Commission that same 12 February, U Thant stated emphatically:
"The signature of this Treaty on the 14th of this month will be an event of historical significance in the world-wide effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to curb the nuclear arms race.
"The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America marks an important milestone in the long and difficult search for disarmament. It takes its place together with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and the Outer Space Treaty of January 1967 in establishing limits to the nuclear arms race. It provides the statute for the creation, for the first time in history, of a nuclear-free zone for an inhabited portion of the earth.
"The provisions of the Treaty also mark a major step forward in the field of verification and control. Among the treaties I have mentioned, the one you have today approved is the first and only one that establishes an effective system of control, under a permanent and supervisory organ ...
"The success you have achieved in your work here will stand not only as a landmark but will be an encouraging example, and I trust also an important stimulant, for progress in other disarmament measures of world-wide as well as of regional significance. The importance of your work also goes beyond that of the field of nuclear disarmament; it contributes in a concrete way to the promotion of international peace and security.
"The nations of Latin America can, with ample justification, take pride in what they have wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts."
71. Of course, the Treaty of Tlatelolco — the first example of the unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons in inhabited portions of the earth, which Latin America offers to the world as testimony of its desire for peace and its unequivocal repudiation of such weapons of mass destruction — was not concluded on the spur of the moment, and this is one of its principal merits. In fact, it was the outcome of steady and continuous joint efforts by the Latin American States, by which it was patiently discussed, drafted and approved.
72. It is not my intention to review those efforts in detail here; I shall have an opportunity later, in the First Committee, to refer to the most noteworthy milestones in their progress. For the time being, I shall merely recall that, immediately after the closure of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, the Mexican Foreign Ministry initiated active consultations with the foreign ministries of the other Latin American Republics with a view to determining what might be the most effective procedures for implementing the recommendations contained in General Assembly [resolution 1911 (XVIII)]. The outcome of those consultations was the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America, held in Mexico from 23 to 27 November 1964. That meeting saw the setting up of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, which also had its headquarters in Mexico City. I had the signal honour of presiding over the Commission, which, in the course of four sessions between March 1965 and February 1967, successfully carried out the task entrusted to it, namely, to draft the test of what was to become the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.
73. I do not believe that this is an appropriate forum for making a close analysis of the principal provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, although in due course I shall attempt to do so in the First Committee. I should merely like to draw attention to a few aspects of this international instrument and model which I believe are of particular significance.
74. First of all, because of the privileged conditions which fortunately exist in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been able to go further than a nonproliferation treaty, in that it is designed permanently to prohibit nuclear weapons from Latin American territories, irrespective of the State exercising control over those weapons, thus ensuring that Latin America will be completely free of nuclear weapons for all time.
75. Secondly, while it is true that the Treaty was preceded by two other treaties which are somewhat similar in their objectives, namely, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty on the Use of Outer Space, which was signed in January 1967, these latter relate respectively to areas covered by eternal snows, and to celestial bodies millions of miles removed from us. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is, therefore, the first to be concluded in respect of territories densely populated by man and covering almost the whole of one continent of the earth.
76. A third aspect which should also be stressed—as indeed it was by the Secretary-General in his message of 12 February 1967 to the Preparatory Commission and again in the Introduction to his Annual Report [A/6701/Add.1] — is that this is the first treaty to be concluded in the field of disarmament that establishes an effective system of control under a permanent supervisory organ. The system includes the full application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but it is much wider in scope. In the first place, it is intended to verify not only “that devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons”, but also to ensure that none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of the Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and that any explosions for peaceful purposes that may be carried out are compatible with article 18 of the Treaty. In the second place, the Treaty assigns important supervisory duties to the three principal organs — established under the Treaty — of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, namely, the General Conference, the Council and the Secretariat.
77. Finally, I cannot but make specific mention, even in such a general review as this, of what is undoubtedly one of the chief merits of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, namely, that it has succeeded in reconciling the comprehensive and absolute prohibition — without exceptions or reservations of any kind — of nuclear weapons with the right of the Contracting Parties to the peaceful use of the atom for their own economic and social development, Both principles, the principle of the prohibition. of nuclear weapons and that of the peaceful uses of the atom, are embodied in the Treaty. The prohibition, however, in article 1, is absolute and without reservations, whilst, under articles 17 and 18, the peaceful uses of atomic energy are, as could not be otherwise, subject to the condition that they do not entail violation or infringement of the unqualified prohibition of nuclear weapons. The control system to which I have already referred and the incorporation into the Treaty of an objective definition of what, for the purpose of the Treaty, shall be understood by the term ”nuclear weapon” constitute adequate and effective guarantees that the relevant provisions of the Treaty will not be violated either overtly or clandestinely and, in particular, that it will be impossible to test or manufacture nuclear weapons under the pretext of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
78. General Assembly [resolution 1911 (XVIII)] contains recommendations addressed to three separate parties: the States of Latin America, the nuclear Powers, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Put briefly, the purpose of these recommendations was threefold: to encourage the States of Latin America to initiate studies and take measures, as they deemed appropriate, in order to conclude a treaty designed to prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America; to recommend the nuclear Powers, once such a treaty had been concluded, to "lend their full co-operation" for the effective realization of the peaceful aims of the resolution; and to request the Secretary-General to extend to the States of Latin America such technical facilities as they might require in order to ensure the success of their undertaking.
79. The Latin American States are especially grateful to the Secretary-General for his help. Not only has he always extended, through the Chief of the Disarmament Affairs Division, all the invaluable technical assistance which was requested of him, but also in each of the introductions to his annual reports since the Preparatory Commission was set up, he has been good enough to include the stimulus of his encouraging comments on the Commission’s work.
80. So far as the Latin American States are concerned, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is included on the agenda of the present session as item 91 and which has already been signed by twenty of the twenty-one States that approved it, is the best proof that they have faithfully carried out the most arduous part of their task. It still remains for them, however, to see that the necessary steps are taken to enable the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is set up under the Treaty, to come into operation as soon as the Treaty has entered into force among eleven States, in accordance with the provisions of article 28, paragraph 2. We venture to hope that this will be within one year at the most.
81. My Government, which believes that example is the best preacher, has just deposited, on 20 September last, its instrument of ratification, to which it annexed the following statement:
"The Government of Mexico, in ratifying the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, expressly states that, for the purposes of article 28, paragraph 2, of the aforesaid Treaty, it waives in their entirety the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of the said article, in order that the Treaty may enter into force, with respect to Mexico, at the time when the instrument of ratification is deposited."
82. Lastly, as far as the nuclear Powers are concerned, we regret to note that, although eight months have already elapsed since the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature, the recommendation addressed to the Powers in General Assembly [resolution 1911 (XVHI)] has not yet been fully carried out. Nevertheless, we would like to think that, before we have concluded our consideration of agenda item 91, or, in any event, before the end of the twenty-second session of the Assembly, these Powers will have found it possible to affix their signatures to Additional Protocol II, which is addressed to them. We base this belief on our conviction that words should be matched with deeds. In fact, Additional Protocol II would place upon the nuclear Powers only two obligations, which the representatives of those Powers — with the exception of the People's Republic of China — have repeatedly stated that they are prepared to undertake. They have given this undertaking either in general debates in the United Nations and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or in correspondence reproduced in the documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. The obligations would be those set forth in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Additional Protocol II, articles 2 and 3, in the following terms:
”... not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies, in accordance with article 4 thereof."
And secondly:
"... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty...."
83. Before concluding, I should like to quote what a well-known historian, an acknowledged expert in international affairs has said recently about the terrible threat which nuclear weapons pose for mankind. The man to whom I refer is Arnold Toynbee. Early in 1967 he said that whenever a new weapon had been invented in the past, people had expressed the view that it was so terrible it must not be used. Nevertheless, it had been used and, terrible though it was, it had not caused the human race to perish. But men were now in possession of something which could actually destroy life on our planet. Mankind had not found itself in such a situation since the end of the Stone Age. It was then that we had succeeded in dominating lions, tigers and other such beasts. From that time on, the survival of the human race had seemed assured. But since 1945, our survival had again become uncertain, because we had, so to speak, turned into lions and tigers ourselves. The threat to the survival of mankind had in fact been far greater since 1945 than it had at any time during the first million years of history.
84. It is within the context of such considerations as these that we can best assess the importance of the contribution made by Latin America in concluding the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in prohibiting forever such terrible weapons of mass destruction from the Latin American sub-continent, with its 250 million inhabitants and its area of over 20 million square kilometres.
85. The United Nations is a world organization and, what is more, an organization that must of necessity be universal in its aims. Accordingly, the temporary set-backs that it may encounter in one area of the world will always be offset by achievements in one or more other areas.
86. What I have just been saying is well illustrated by the comprehensive review I have made of three subjects to which we think the General Assembly should give priority of consideration. Two of them are on the agenda, and the first, although not on the agenda, is undoubtedly of main concern to all the peoples of the world.
87. The fact that this initiative — the military denuclearization of Latin America — has been successfully concluded, and that the many and arduous difficulties inherent in any attempt at disarmament, even a very modest one — and this is not so modest — have been overcome, may encourage us to find, through mutual goodwill, frank negotiation and a sincere spirit of conciliation, constructive solutions to other problems which today it is more essential than ever to resolve, since the choice between war and peace is directly and immediately involved. We may then not have to reproach ourselves for relinquishing or failing to stand firmly enough on principles which, and not without good reason, are termed fundamental, for they are what holds our Organization together and justifies its continued existence.