26. Although this general debate may appear to be of a somewhat academic nature, in that whatever we almost unanimously declare every year we seldom see implemented in practice, I fully share the view, already expressed, that this does not diminish in any way the usefulness of our deliberations. The fact that in many important respects nothing, or very little, has been achieved does not mean that we should not once again state our views, register our apprehension of the existing dangers, and reiterate our convictions regarding the international situation and the various issues, general or specific, which are before us.
27. Last year all of us, in our own different ways, made no secret of our disappointment and our frustration at our collective inability to make any substantial progress towards solving the many serious problems which undermine and jeopardize international peace and security. And we all entertained the hope that some important progress would be made in our common effort to eliminate those sources of danger, and thus promote the cause of peace. But that hope has not been realized. There have been, true, some fruitful efforts in certain fields which deserve our praise, and in particular in the field of disarmament; but whatever the significance of those achievements, it is easily overshadowed by the considerable deterioration of the over-all international situation. It is indeed obvious that the frustration and the disappointment which marked our debates last year have, in fact, this year reached an agonizing degree.
28. We should not, however, allow our frustration and our disappointment to destroy the possibilities for a new and more vigorous drive in the pursuit of our goal, whatever the difficulties and the shortcomings, mostly due to our collective failures of the past. On the contrary, our frustration and our disappointment should make us, at long last, realize that time is not on our side. We must try, wherever we have failed to try or not tried enough, to fulfil our collective and individual obligations. Let us not hesitate, therefore, to express the same hope which we express every year, and let this renewed expression of hope be accompanied by a new determined effort to break through the barriers of the perilous stagnation. For one must, by now, have come to realize the imperative need to solve the problems and not merely to be content with living with them. It has been said that time is the great healer, but let us face it that it is not always so.
29. I do, therefore, express the hope, which is so obviously shared by everyone in this Assembly, that we shall be able this year to go forward and make effective progress. Your experience and knowledge, Mr. President, will prove, I am confident, to be most useful in our great task which lies ahead, and it is in this spirit that I should like to join with all the other colleagues who have preceded me to this rostrum in expressing our satisfaction at your election to the Presidency of the General Assembly. The assumption of this high office by you at this present juncture may well prove to be not so coincidental—not only because of your own personality, but also because of the contribution which your country is in a position to make in our concerted effort. Before I proceed any further I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, the representative of Afghanistan, Ambassador Pazhwak, for the exemplary way in which he discharged his heavy duties in most difficult and delicate circumstances.
30. The current international situation has been very aptly and accurately presented by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report. At the beginning he states:
"During the period under review the international political situation has not only not improved; it has in fact deteriorated considerably. It was only recently that I noted how the war in Viet-Nam has been progressively intensified during the last two and half years, how the number of men and the amount of war material involved in the actual fighting have immensely increased, how the savagery of the war has steadily escalated, and the casualties on the part of all parties involved in the fighting have reached frightening proportions. In addition, the flare-up in the Middle East in June of this year, which was sudden though not surprising, has led to a further deterioration of the international scene. The war in the Middle East has tended to overshadow the situation in Cyprus, which has shown no great improvement during this period." [A/6701/Add.1, para. 1.]
31. Last year the attention of all of us was mainly focused on the situation in Viet-Nam. Without the war in Viet-Nam being any nearer to an end, we are led this year, by the events, to focus our attention also on the situation in the Middle East. The recent war in the Middle East, and the situation which has developed as a result of that war, should lead us irrevocably to conclude that we must not be content to live with the problems. In my statement last year before this Assembly [1435th meeting], I ventured to suggest that we would deceive ourselves if we were to believe that the unresolved problems in that area no longer presented a threat to peace.
32. We are all aware of the history and the background of the Middle East crisis. The relevant facts are especially well known to this Assembly. However, we must admit that, despite our long debates over the years, we have not made any effective contribution towards the solution of the underlying problems. The Secretary-General in this respect states:
"There has been no enduring, persistent effort in any United Nations organ to find solutions for them. In my view, the failure of the United Nations over these years to come to grips with the deep-seated and angrily festering problems in that area has to be considered as a major contributing factor to the war of last June." [Ibid., para. 45.]
33. How true this is. And how wrong have proved to be those, if any, who believed that the problems of the Middle East would be solved by themselves, as time went by. But it is not enough simply to take cognizance of the facts of a situation. We must also determine what can and what should be done. My delegation has had the opportunity to state fully our views on the situation in the Middle East in the course of the fifth emergency special session of this Assembly. I do not, therefore, propose to go again into the details, but there are certain basic aspects to which I should like to refer.
34. Has the problem been approached in the proper manner? Have we learned from our past failures that problems cannot be solved unless we apply to them those principles and criteria which we have ourselves established as the corner-stone of the United Nations and of international relations, and which we all every year fervently uphold in this general debate? I do not suppose that there is anyone in this Hall who does not genuinely wish to see peace prevailing on a lasting basis in that troubled part of the world. I am convinced that we can be true to our principles and at the same time realistic.
35. Would any State be prepared to consider regulating its relations with another State when part of its territory had been occupied, through war, by that other State? Is any Government represented here prepared to accept, in its own case, the thesis that the international community could tolerate and sanction, directly or indirectly, the retention by a State of another State's territory, even if retained temporarily for bargaining purposes? Because if we take the view that a complete withdrawal of the occupying forces to the positions they held before the war of last June should not necessarily take place before an over-all settlement is achieved, it will surely mean that we are neither realistic nor true to the principles which we profess to cherish. We may, in this Assembly, hold different views on the positions taken by the parties to the dispute. But whatever our views on the merits of the problem, we are not entitled to different views on the question of unconditional withdrawal.
36. This should be the starting point for a persistent effort, so much lacking in the past, for a satisfactory settlement of the underlying issues, foremost among which is that of the Palestinian Arab refugees—which has been further aggravated as a result of the recent developments. Such an effort must be guided by the principles of the Charter and directed towards securing lasting peace in the area. The lesson we must have derived from the recent war in the Middle East should make us realize that we cannot any more afford to take the attitude of employing time to work on our behalf. This should, in particular, be taken into serious consideration by the great Powers, which bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
37. The same lesson must by now have been derived from the steadily worsening situation in Viet-Nam. Shall we go on merely expressing our sympathy for the sufferings of those involved in the conflict, whether it be South or North Viet-Namese or American? Is it really too difficult to make a start in tackling this seemingly intractable problem? There seems to be unanimity that the war must stop, and that for this purpose a start must be made towards de-escalation; there seems to be complete agreement that the battlefield should be replaced by the conference table. There seems to be a general consensus that the Geneva Agreements should constitute the basis upon which to build a peaceful future. Where, therefore, does the difficulty lie in making a start?
38. The United States, while reiterating its genuine willingness to negotiate, takes the view that there should be some concrete evidence of a positive response prior to the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. A number of other States, friends and allies of the United States among them, believe that there is a very good chance that the road to negotiations may open if the bombing of North Viet-Nam is stopped. Irrespective of whether the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam might by itself pave the way to the conference room, such action seems to be the obvious first step in the process of de-escalation. Someone has to take a really positive initiative, without any qualifications or conditions which would destroy its very essence. The initiative in such circumstances must come from those who are in a better position to take it. The Secretary- General, in his concluding observations contained in the introduction to the annual report, states:
"I continue to feel that it is within the bounds of possibility, provided certain first steps could be taken, to bring this problem to the conference table." [Ibid., para. 148.]
39. We are convinced that the United States has very little to lose and a great deal to gain if it decides to take the initiative, even if no positive response were to be readily forthcoming from the other side after the first step is unconditionally taken. Many, however, are confident that such an initiative will be followed by other positive steps. This view we should also not ignore.
40. In the part of the Secretary-General's statement which I quoted at the opening of my speech, there was a reference to the question of Cyprus to the effect that no great improvement has been made during the last year. The situation on the island itself has been, I am glad to say, on the whole quiet, without any major incidents. But, again, we cannot take the view that we should learn to live indefinitely with the problem.
41. Our position on the Cyprus problem has been repeatedly stated in this Assembly, and it is fully on record. I do not, therefore, propose to go into the details again. The General Assembly has had the opportunity to discuss and consider all the aspects of this question at its twentieth session, and as a result of its deliberations the Assembly pronounced itself upon the merits of the case in its resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965.
42. As was reported to the General Assembly last year [1426th meeting, paras. 40-43], an effort was undertaken, on a bilateral basis, between the Governments of Greece and Turkey, with a view to improving the relations between the two countries and facilitating the finding of a solution to the Cyprus problem. Despite the fact that our position has always been, and continues to be, that the problem of Cyprus is not a dispute between Greece and Turkey, we did not raise any objections to these bilateral talks being carried out; we, in fact, did our utmost not to create any obstacles or undermine them in any way. We have patiently awaited the outcome of this effort, and we sincerely regret that it did not succeed.
43. In the light of the outcome of the recent meeting between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, we are at present in the process of reappraising the situation and considering what should be done next in the pursuit of a peaceful solution. We are, as I have often said in this Assembly, in so far as it depends upon us, committed to a peaceful solution. We do not want war and we do not want bloodshed. This does not, of course, mean that we shall not defend ourselves if the necessity arises.
44. As far as the substance of the problem is concerned, the position of the Cyprus Government remains unchanged, namely, that the future of Cyprus must be, and can only be, determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of Cyprus, without any foreign intervention or interference and in conformity with the universally accepted democratic principles enshrined in the Charter, as spelled out in General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965.
45. During the past year, as it has done since March 1964 when it was set up [Security Council resolution 186 (1964)], the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus has performed a useful role in the discharge of its functions as laid down in the Security Council resolutions. In this connexion, I wish to express our sincere appreciation to the countries which make the functioning of this force possible through their contributions in men and finances. Our appreciation goes also to the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Cyprus, Dr. Osorio-Tafall, and to the Commander of the Force, General Martola, and those serving under them, as well as to the officials in the Secretariat who deal with the peace-keeping operation in Cyprus. It is, finally, my duty to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts and the keen interest and deep understanding he has always shown towards Cyprus and its problems.
46. In view of the present situation, it is evident that the presence in Cyprus of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force continues to be necessary, but I quite agree with the Secretary-General that “a United Nations force ... should not be called upon to maintain indefinitely an obviously unsatisfactory status quo” [A/6701/Add.1, para. 40]. This statement by the Secretary-General, I am sure, represents the wish of all in this Assembly that a new, determined effort should be undertaken for peace-making parallel to that for peace-keeping.
47. As long as peace-making is not possible or successful, whether in Cyprus or in the Middle East, or in other parts of the world, the United Nations must be in a position to discharge effectively its peacekeeping mission and responsibilities. A way must very soon be found for the United Nations to overcome its financial and other difficulties in this respect. It is disheartening to see that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has not been successful in its efforts to find a solution to the problems connected with peace-keeping. Is this failure due to the existence of technical difficulties, or does it represent a political conflict? If the former, a way should easily be found to overcome the difficulties; if the latter, we must all strive hard to resolve that conflict. I must, in this connexion, and without underestimating in any way the valuable efforts of many others, praise the admirable determination with which my distinguished friend the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland has been endeavouring conscientiously to promote a solution to this important problem.
48. Having dealt specifically with the Middle East crisis, the war in Viet-Nam and the problem of Cyprus, it is not my intention to minimize the importance of nor underrate the dangers involved in other existing problems which continue to be high on our agenda. On the contrary, it is essential that we not belittle the existence of these problems, nor overlook the potential dangers inherent in them.
49. In Europe there is a detente. But this reduction of tension should not make us forget the realities nor overlook the still-existing dangers. On the problem of Germany we find ourselves in agreement with the views expressed by the distinguished Foreign Minister of France [1571st meeting]. It is a problem that once presented an even greater threat to international peace and security than Viet-Nam and the Middle East do today. The possibilities for a recurrence have not been eliminated. And the detente should not make us believe that the solution to this problem can wait indefinitely. In Asia there are other unresolved problems in addition to Viet-Nam. We cannot; deceive ourselves that we can permanently live with them, though they may not at present appear to be sources of imminent danger.
50. In Africa too there are unresolved problems which are a permanent threat to peace and security. It is in Africa that we see clearly that the process of decolonization has not yet been completed and that, therefore, one of our basic objectives has not been achieved. It is mostly, though not exclusively, in Africa that racial discrimination is still being exercised and human rights have not yet become the basis of human relations, despite our declarations, to which we have recently given the concrete form of covenants. The situation in South Africa, despite the declarations and the resolutions of the United Nations, is still unchanged. It is not enough to express our sympathy and give assistance to the victims of the policy of apartheid. Similarly, we must not forget the question of freedom for the territories under Portuguese administration, because unless all territories become free, the United Nations will not have completed its task of decolonization and a major source of danger in the world will not have been removed. The problem of Southern Rhodesia, let us remember, remains unresolved. We should not, as time goes on, tend to minimize in our minds the dangers inherent in this situation. Those of us who did not believe in the effectiveness of economic sanctions have unfortunately been proved to be right.
51. Do we honestly believe that we can, or that we must, indefinitely live with these problems? Can we convince ourselves that these problems will not, sooner or later, erupt and destroy, to some degree if not completely, what we have been working for and hoping for? We must all resolutely agree — for there is no alternative — on practical steps to implement our principles if we are to secure the prerequisites which we all agree are necessary for the attainment of our goal of lasting peace.
52. Against this gloomy and frustrating background we would not be presenting a completely correct picture if we were to ignore the progress which has been made in certain fields, in particular in the economic field and in that of disarmament. Although we are not in a position to hail any great achievements in the economic field in this United Nations Development Decade, we must, however, be satisfied that, despite the grave political situation, some not unimportant progress has been made. We are all hoping that the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at New Delhi will prove successful and contribute towards greater progress in this field. Furthermore, we should not underestimate the importance of the success of the Kennedy Round negotiations, despite the fact that we cannot but admit that the outcome has not been as satisfactory in certain respects as it should have been to the less-developed countries. Finally, the United Nations Development Programme has been working more effectively than in the past, and with more tangible results. This, I might add, has strengthened our beliefs in multilateral assistance through the United Nations, which, among other advantages, is free from the implications of political considerations. What has been achieved in this respect, although not striking, is an example of what can be accomplished through a determined and collective effort. Any progress towards our targets in the economic field is by no means unrelated to the cause of peace. It is, on the contrary, one of the most important factors.
53. With regard to disarmament, there have been some important steps towards our goal. In addition to the test-ban Treaty, which was signed in Moscow four years ago, it is hoped that we are now near a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and it should not be beyond our expectations that this present session of the General Assembly may find itself in the happy position of welcoming such an event. The conclusion of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [resolution 2222 (XXI)], as well as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [see A/6663], are achievements of no less significance. Despite the fact that we are still far from the point of controlling the arms race, we should get some encouragement from these successes. In fact, instead of minimizing their importance, in view of the existing over-all explosive and dangerous international situation, we should emphasize them.
54. As I said at the beginning of my statement, this general debate may appear to be of an academic nature, because whatever we declare to be right and just and proper we seldom see it implemented in practice. This is, in fact, the basic reason and the gist of the anomaly of the international scene. If we are to solve the problems and ensure world order we must translate our declarations and our principles into a living reality. Otherwise we are bound to continue failing, and our failure, as time goes on, will have graver and graver consequences.
55. Our declarations are not academic in themselves. They are, on the contrary, very real conclusions which we have reached as a result of wars and destruction and of the suffering of the past and of the present. Our declarations are lessons — not lessons that we teach but lessons that have been taught by these realities. What makes them sound academic or theoretical is our own failure and inability to be realistic.
56. If we apply in practice, and without unnecessary delay, the principles in which we believe, it is only then that we shall be realistic. A realistic approach is often referred to in contradistinction to an approach based upon principles and ideals. This represents nothing else but a tendency to run away from our real task and our responsibilities. It is, therefore, high time that we became truly realistic, and in so doing we cannot, in relation to any problem, turn our backs on our principles. We must apply them in all cases, and in this effort, however hard and difficult, we must utilize to the greatest possible degree our collective strength, the United Nations.
57. Taking advantage of the occasion, I ventured to express my views on the general international situation and on some of the specific issues. I have done that not because I have any illusions as to the very limited role that my country can play in our collective efforts; nor has it been my intention to give advice to others who can speak with more authority. I have done it with the conviction that we all, irrespective of the degree of importance of the countries which we represent, can contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations. In fact, we have a duty to do so.
58. The United Nations is not only a forum in which to express our views freely; it is our collective organ in our endeavour to secure peace. We all have our share of responsibility, which may lie either in our strength or in our weakness, in our smallness or in our greatness. Whether our responsibility is great or small, it is still our responsibility, which we are committed to discharge. It is only then that the United Nations will succeed, and it must succeed, If it fails it will be our collective as well as individual failure, and not necessarily in proportion to the degree of our responsibility. But what is worse is that the failure of the United Nations might mean disaster, whereas its success will mean the happiness and the prosperity of humanity in peace.