20. Comrade President, we have already had the occasion to congratulate you from this rostrum on your election, but I also wanted personally to say on my behalf, and on behalf of all my other colleagues in the delegation, that it gives us great pleasure to see in the Chair so distinguished a representative of a friendly country, socialist Romania. I should like at the same time to congratulate all the elected officials of the present session of the General Assembly, the Vice-Presidents and the Chairman of the Committees.
21. May I also be permitted to express our appreciation and gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Pazhwak, who so ably and tirelessly guided our work during a very busy and difficult year, His great experience as an old hand with United Nations problems assisted all of us. We do sincerely thank him and we are grateful to Afghanistan for having given us such a President of the General Assembly.
22. The United Nations is now facing the duty of pronouncing itself on the two current concepts as to how international relations are further to be shaped. A definite choice has to be made as to what should constitute the basis for the relations between States and nations: the affirmation of force and violence, or international co-operation based on respect for the right of peoples to independence, sovereignty and peaceful development. The one cannot be reconciled with the other.
23. The choice is not a matter of mere theory. It results from realities. It is seemingly, but only seemingly, simple. It is made difficult by the fact that, through demagogy and falsehood, basic notions and principles are being deprived of their true meaning.
24. Slogans of justice and respect for law are only too often Invoked to cover actions which glaringly contradict their true essence. A desire for peace and negotiations is being declared by those who, at the same time, indiscriminately use bombs, annex foreign territories by the use of force and escalate the arms race. Under slogans of equality, hate is being instilled against peoples struggling for their independence. Freedom is preached with napalm used as an argument. Let us consider the present international situation as against these general remarks.
25. We of Poland know Viet-Nam not from photographs taken by attacking bombers and not from the outside of the strategic hamlets established by American bayonets in the South. We know the people of Viet-Nam from their day to day life and struggle. We do admire their courage and patriotism, their determination and self-sacrifice in opposing a powerful aggressor, and their unshaken faith in victory. We fully understand and entirely support their aspirations.
26. We have listened here to an "appeal" of the representative of the United States for a solution of the problem of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. But, were it not precisely for the United States and its attitude towards those international Agreements, the problem of Viet-Nam would have been solved long ago, in 1956, through free elections provided for by those Agreements, The undeniable historical fact is that it was the United States which then prevented the holding of the elections.
27. American intervention began to undermine and violate the Geneva Agreements. It began with the so-called military advisers in South Viet-Nam; it went on, meddling with internal affairs, imposing changes of governments, eliminating from governments people who advocated rapprochement with the North; it acquired new dimensions of lawlessness and violence when an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was unleashed. This very intervention constantly threatens Cambodia and Laos. It has drawn into its orbit new States whose Governments are eager to serve the United States. May I say that a bare few miles of land, sea and air space separate it from exploding into further incalculable dangers.
28. It was American aggression that paralysed the activities of the International Commission on Supervision and Control, established to supervise the implementation of the Geneva Agreements following the withdrawal of French colonial troops from Indochina, Today the Commission is not able to deal with the armed intervention of the United States forces in Viet-Nam. At the same time attempts are being made to use the Commission against the victims of the American aggression: the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Front for Liberation.
29. My country is a member of that Commission and cannot accept that its activities be thus distorted. In spite of the fact that as a result of the American intervention the Commission is at present unable to discharge its functions properly, our representatives on the Commission remain at their posts. That is so because we believe that one day the Commission will be able to fulfil the role, indeed the useful role, that was assigned to it by the Geneva Agreements, And we do deeply trust that one day the Vietnamese people will be able to decide its own destiny on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. That, however, cannot happen in present conditions.
30. Let no one here attempt to put behind the defendants' bench the victims of aggression — the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam or the National Front for Liberation — even if he has at his disposal all the American information media. It was the United States that started it all, under circumstances which the eminent American jurist Quincy Wright characterized as follows. Permit me carefully to quote a pertinent passage.
"There is no evidence of any action by North Viet-Nam which could be regarded as an armed attack upon the South prior to 1958, after Ho Chi Minh had engaged in four years of fruitless effort to carry out the resolutions of the Geneva Conference. In these circumstances Ho Chi Minh's action in support of the Viet-Cong did not constitute aggression or armed attack in international relations but civil strife within the domestic jurisdiction of Viet-Nam, similar to the action of the North against the South in the American Civil War. Whether called 'intervention’, 'reprisals’ or 'collective defense’, the United States response by bombings in North Viet-Nam, which began in February, 1965, violated international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Geneva Agreement, if the latter were in effect."
31. Thus the world awaits the necessary moves to be made by the United States — first of all, the undertaking to end unconditionally all hostile acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. And we do not mean empty declarations, multiplying missions and soundings, dramatized for reasons of political expediency — sometimes of internal political expediency — whose actual purpose seems to be to explore the possibilities for further escalation rather than for meaningful negotiations. We of Poland have had some bitter experience in that connexion. Indeed, it has been known to the United States well enough, and for a long time, that the road to political solutions can be opened only through the unconditional ending of all hostilities against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.
32. It is not for the victim of an attack to take the first conciliatory step, and it is not for the one who attacks to present conditions. As for the friends of the Viet-Namese people, nobody should expect that they would undertake to persuade the Viet-Namese leaders to accept any demands under the threat of bombs. Moreover, one cannot bomb a nation into submission, which still seems to remain the American illusion, tragic as it is.
33. We cannot refrain from emphasizing that complete disregard for international agreements — in this case the Geneva Agreements — and trampling upon the rights of a small nation by one of the world Powers have a detrimental, destructive influence on international relations as a whole. And the world feels it.
34. It was the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria who so rightly said here yesterday that "the aggression of the United States against the Viet-Namese people casts its shadow on the international situation and poisons relations between States". [1575th meeting, para. 82.] That applies equally to Asia, Africa or Europe, as a matter of fact.
35. At the same time, it reduces to nothing the moral foundation of international order; it accustoms people to methods that ought to be firmly renounced. It is also bound to deprave the minds of individual human beings. Secretary-General U Thant refers to this in the introduction to his annual report with well-founded concern which everyone cannot but share. I quote his wise words:
"When violence is highlighted and even glamourized by mass media, thus instilling in society, and particularly in the young, an appetite for solving problems by force, the turbulences of today are dangerously fanned and the seeds of larger and deeper troubles at national and international levels are sown for the future." [A/6701/Add.1, para. 151.]
36. Permit me to turn now to the Middle East, Our attitude towards Israel's aggression against its Arab neighbours was expounded from this very rostrum by the Prime Minister of my country three months ago. The developments that have since taken place add strength to our basic attitude. The statement made last Friday [1573rd meeting] by Mr. Riad, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, very precise in its detailed presentation of historical facts, was the most authoritative document on the true course of events. There is not much I can add, except to draw some additional conclusions.
37. The very same forces without whose encouragement and support Israel would not have dared to start its military adventure prevented the United Nations from taking unequivocal, formal decisions. That is our first conclusion emerging from the fifth emergency special session.
38. The second conclusion is that, at least on one matter, the emergency special session showed an overwhelming majority. Most delegations were firm in stating that Israel has to withdraw to the positions held before 5 June, and that aggrandizement of national territory through armed aggression cannot be condoned: it simply is not national territory. The same attitude has been expressed by the majority of the speakers who have preceded me in this debate — if I may be permitted to sum up the statements that have been made up to now from this rostrum in the general debate.
39. A third conclusion is to be underlined, emerging not only from the debates of the special session but from the attending circumstances as well: the Government of Israel clearly refuses to respect the decisions of the United Nations. It does so even in the case of such unchallenged and unanimous or almost unanimous resolutions as those on Jerusalem, on the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian population, and on the right of Arab refugees freely to return to their homes. And now Israel begins to colonize the lands grabbed from its Arab neighbours.
40. Hence the fourth conclusion: the lack of a sufficiently firm reaction against any aggressive war and of a speedy elimination of its consequences serves only to encourage those Governments and quarters which, in pursuance of their own narrow goals, are pushing the world into new crises. For acts of aggression, wherever perpetrated, always create a climate that encourages retrograde forces, suppression of the rights of nations and of human rights, and defiance of the United Nations.
41. We cannot and should not forget that Israel is a creation of the United Nations. That State would not exist were it not for the decisions of the United Nations. Today the Government of Israel is opposing our Organization. It even attempts to exclude it from the solving of the controversial problems of the Middle East by demanding direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. Can the United Nations remain passive and helpless?
42. Poland has always expressed itself in favour of the existence of the State of Israel. However, we shall consistently oppose any expansionist policy of Israel. We shall not desist from our efforts to seek through the United Nations a solution to the Middle East crisis that would deny premium to the aggressor, liquidate as promptly as possible the consequences of the June aggression, and ensure the sovereign right to free and secure national development for the countries of that region: first of all, security for the Arab countries, since they were the victims of aggression last June as they were in 1956.
43. Let us say firmly that the authority of the United Nations, already put to the test as it is by the conspiracy of reactionary forces in the southern part of Africa, is at stake. The Republic of South Africa and the illegal white minority régime in Rhodesia, hand in hand with Portuguese colonial authorities, flout the unanimous attitude of the rest of the world, flout all formal decisions of the United Nations, and ignore universal condemnation.
44. There too, the forces without whose support neither apartheid nor the last bulwarks of colonialism could survive should be strongly exposed; the very same forces but for which there would be no blood bath in Viet-Nam and no Israeli extremism. It was not by chance that, with regard to the problem of Viet-Nam, the statements made here by Mr. Goldberg [1562nd meeting] and Mr. Eban [1566th meeting] revealed an identical approach.
45. It is true that in Europe we note certain encouraging positive developments: increased contacts and the easing of barriers that had divided our continent. No country could feel more sincere satisfaction with this trend than Poland, Security and international co-operation in Europe are indispensable conditions for the further successful development of my country. I think that we are not alone in this respect. For many years we have been trying to contribute actively to the creation of such conditions. We do it by expanding our bilateral relations, so successfully developed with almost all European countries. On the part of all who hold dear the peaceful development of Europe we meet with understanding and joint efforts, which we highly appreciate.
46. In another sphere, our efforts have led us to advance the well-known Polish initiatives on détente and disarmament in Europe. We are, of course, concerned with the whole of Europe and not merely with some parts of it, as was the case with the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Brown, who in his statement here tried incorrectly to identify the Common Market area with the whole continent. We do not accept such pars pro toto. Europe is a much wider concept than its fragment west of the Elbe. I do hope that the British Foreign Office will grasp this one day. However, in Europe too, forces are at work that obstruct and attempt to scuttle such efforts towards the easing of tension, for the creation of better conditions of security. While a new approach and a spirit of understanding are being advertised, in practice claims that constitute an insurmountable obstacle on the road to true normalization are not abandoned.
47. What is the essence of the problem of normalization in Europe? In our opinion, it consists in the acceptance, as a point of departure, of the status quo resulting from the dearly bought victory of the great anti-fascist coalition in the Second World War, It consists further in the renunciation of the use of force and in undertaking not to interfere with the internal affairs of other States; and it consists in building security based on the existing real situation. Only with the creation of conditions in which European nations will have a feeling of real security, and not merely of its appearance, shall we be able to proceed with the solution of the outstanding political problems. Required are not only conditions of security; there is also a need for patience, time, realism, good sense and, finally, the chasing away of the demons of the past, if I may recall here the words of the Foreign Minister of France [1571st meeting].
48. These basic premises seem to be recognized by the overwhelming majority of the countries and Governments of Europe; I hope that we are not over-optimistic. They are, however, undermined and ignored by the West German Government. This is why the declarations from Bonn — so far, in our opinion, unsubstantiated - still meet with a more than sceptical reaction in Poland. Can one wonder when, at the same time, extremist revanchist forces are acquiring more influence west of the Elbe — and particularly at a time when we see that in another NATO country a retrograde military junta has taken over?
49. The Polish Government and the Polish people fully appreciate the importance — more, the indispensability — of normal, good, extensive relations between the Polish and the German peoples. And, what is even more important, we have given in this respect clear proof not only of our desire, but also of our determination, by establishing close neighbourly relations and broad co-operation with one of the two existing German States, our neighbour, the German Democratic Republic. We contend that this is a very important and valuable contribution on the part of our two States, the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic, to the consolidation of peace.
50. Poland is also prepared to establish normal relations with the German Federal Republic once its policy is based on new, realistic foundations. We have repeatedly formulated what premises we deem indispensable in that connexion. First of all: the recognition of the existence of two German States, the renunciation by the German Federal Republic of territorial claims, and the renunciation by it of aspirations to exercise control over nuclear weapons.
51. The existence of a peaceful, democratic, sovereign German State between the Elbe and the Oder, is a fact. It is also a fact that the established western frontier of Poland is final and cannot be changed. It is a fact, too, that after the well-known historical experiences of the past the creation of a nuclear arsenal under the control of West German militarism cannot be tolerated.
52. The ignoring of realities, just as any other unrealistic premise of policy, can breed only harm. Our demand that the German Federal Republic recognize the realities which now exist in Europe is an appeal to good sense. Against the dynamic and constructive policy of Poland, the German Federal Republic sets its own policy of immobility. The western part of Germany has been pushed into that immobility by a combination of American anti-communism and the revanchist tendencies of the heirs of German imperialism, as our leader, Mr. Gomulka, once put it.
53. All Polish initiatives — which, I hope, are known to a large degree here in this Hall — concerning European security originated from the conviction that one should begin, first of all, by halting the armaments race and then by gradually reducing the huge pile of weapons and military effectives accumulated in the heart of Europe during the years of the cold war.
54. It was not by chance that in the well-known Rapacki and Gomulka plans attention was principally directed towards the freezing and gradual reducing of the nuclear war potential. Indeed, it is the atomic war that threatens mankind with the greatest dangers and losses, beyond the limits of the average man's imagination; just as imagination seems to fail American statesmen, unable to visualize a world not armed to the teeth. Well, it is hard, indeed, to imagine the Pentagon turned into a museum.
55. Ten years have just passed since the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs announced [697th meeting] from this very rostrum the Polish plan for the denuclearization of Central Europe. That Idea slowly but effectively worked its way through diplomatic chancelleries, ministerial talks and various social and political discussions as one of the effective methods for starting the process of establishing collective security in Europe. We consider that it has lost nothing of its timeliness. It can be taken up at any moment for Implementation — exactly like the Gomulka plan as well — once the understanding of the true interests of European security prevails over the obstructions that still remain. In the meantime my Government will not weaken in its quest for solutions conducive to fostering an increasing co-operation of a Europe unperturbed by fear.
56. I feel that historians will one day in the future seriously ponder over many initiatives of the socialist countries not taken up by the West as other examples of great opportunities lost. For East-West relations have followed — and regretfully still show — a pattern in which it is easier in the West to throw invectives and spread suspicion about the real intentions of the commonwealth of socialist countries than properly to grasp their essence and profound meaning, to understand sincerely that Warsaw, Minsk, Kiev, Berlin, Dresden and other destroyed towns, villages and hamlets, were not rebuilt in order to be once again levelled to the ground, and that we seek in all earnestness constructively to realize the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems — which is the basic principle of the foreign policy of my country and of all the socialist States.
57. The Polish plan for an atom-free zone gave inspiration to the creation of similar zones on other continents. Notwithstanding the shortcomings that we discover in the process of implementation of those concepts, they constitute a certain step forward in the struggle for general and complete disarmament; and the contribution of statesmen and politicians applying their goodwill to the implementation of those plans — by no means utopian — should be given due appreciation.
58. As far as disarmament is concerned, we are now awaiting the results of the Geneva discussions on an agreed treaty on non-proliferation. The sooner that treaty is signed, the better; the larger the number of States acceding to it, the more advantageous It will be for humanity at large. The risk of an unbridled process of new States coming into possession of nuclear weapons in ever-increasing numbers is alarming enough to impose the need for co-operation by all in the interest of a greater and better sense of security for everyone.
59. We do not consider the treaty to be an end in itself. We do consider it again as only a step forward, but still a substantial step in a series of measures that are supposed to and can bring us closer to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. We hope that the next steps will follow also as soon as possible in order not to lose the impetus.
60. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union has presented to our session a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [A/6834], Initiatives in that direction have already been taken by Ethiopia, as we remember. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a solemn Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons [resolution 1653 (XVI)]. The draft convention, if accepted and ratified by a considerable number of States, can become a logical step, following the non-proliferation treaty. In the course of the debates in the Political Committee of this Assembly, the Polish delegation will have the opportunity to give broader consideration to this valuable proposal of our Soviet friends. We shall approach with the same attention the other proposition of Minister Gromyko concerning the need for accelerating the work of the United Nations on the definition of aggression [A/6833 and Corr. 1].
61. With equal interest we are awaiting the report to be submitted by the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, as well as on the influence of nuclear armaments upon the security and economy of individual countries. We shall welcome this report with particular satisfaction; it follows the initiative advanced from this very rostrum by Mr. Gomulka in 1960 [874th meeting], and elaborated in the proposals made last year by U Thant. Due importance should be attached to this document so that it can be used properly in the interest of the noble cause which it is to serve. The Polish delegation is of the opinion that the paper should be widely popularized. Knowing that this opinion of ours is shared by many other delegations, we declare our readiness to co-operate with them in submitting in due time a corresponding draft resolution.
62. U Thant's report, worked out by competent experts of many countries, undoubtedly will contribute to a fuller understanding of the threat of nuclear war and of the destruction it could bring about. At the same time it will, indeed, throw some light on the economic effects of nuclear armaments which, through rapidly soaring costs, may undermine seriously the economic development of countries entering heedlessly upon this precipitous road. This leads me to a few remarks on the economic problems with which the United Nations is dealing.
63. The process of the institutional formation of what we call the United Nations family seems to have been completed with the establishment of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The need for the most precise co-ordination of the activities of United Nations agencies and organs now emerges as one of our more important tasks.
64. The question is not only that of avoiding a duplication and overlapping of their work, which occurs only too frequently at present. There also arises the problem of the best possible use of the growing budgets of international organizations so that their operational efficiency can match the increasing needs within what are, after all, limited financial means.
65. In the Second Committee my colleagues will have an opportunity to present in greater detail our views on some of the other economic problems confronting the session. From this rostrum I wish to say only that the assessment of the world economic development for the current year is far from optimistic. This problem was touched upon by the speaker who preceded me, the Foreign Minister of Finland, and similar observations have already been made by other speakers in this debate. They were made against a background from which our own observations cannot depart either.
66. The question should be asked over and over again: how much larger would he the means devoted to the economic development of the world if the thousands of millions of dollars spent on American aggression in Viet-Nam were released for productive and not destructive purposes? As a matter of fact, the United States people themselves could profit from it. How harmful to the economy of Asia is the destruction by fire and chemical poisoning, by the policy of scorched earth, of the resources of that great rice granary that South Viet-Nam had always been? What would the economy of all countries look like should it be possible to cut the burden of military budgets of individual States?
67. But a mechanical decision to appropriate a given percentage of armaments budgets for aid to developing countries can hardly be the solution. What we need is a meaningful action for a decisive change in the whole international situation. Economics and politics condition each other. A world free from war would mean a world of economic growth. International tensions always have a negative effect upon international economic relations. Economic blackmail and discrimination in trade, which are inseparable from international tension, undermine economic co-operation. I am uttering a truism, but one that is disregarded.
68. The latest world economic survey indicates that the developing countries now have the lowest rate of growth in industrial, commodity and agricultural production. The terms of trade continue to deteriorate. The only positive exception here is the trade between the developing and the socialist countries, which in the short period from 1960 to 1965 doubled in volume. This is the background against which the United Nations has to act.
69. In a few months' time we shall participate in the second session of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. A number of targets set forth by the previous session, but never attained, have to be discussed. I am sorry to say there were too many targets unfulfilled. The Conference will also have to discuss ways and means of eliminating the existing barriers and discriminatory practices in international trade.
70. Trade is an entity. Any restrictive measure or closed preferential arrangement can only have a negative effect upon our common effort undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to establish a new international division of labour, more just and economically better founded. We also face the important task of preparing the United Nations Development Decade. We would wish to adopt towards it an attitude of optimism, and thus to assume an accelerated rate of economic growth. Our own socialist experience shows that this is possible. Countries can solve their problems, given the necessary conditions, if they are no longer treated as intrusive clients or merely as markets for post-colonial exploitation. They can, indeed, solve their problems once they are no longer considered only as objects for political subordination. They too, however, must wish to help themselves since the sources of international aid are not and will never be unlimited.
71. Approaching the end of my remarks, I should like to make a few observations concerning a problem which has already been raised in the general debate, namely, the question of the universality of United Nations membership. Much attention has been paid to this problem, and rightly so. Accumulating international problems call for a joint effort from all the countries of our globe, and especially of those which hold a key position in their respective geographical regions and whose exclusion from our midst, as we all know, has already brought about definitely unfavourable international consequences.
72. I refer, of course, to the People's Republic of China. But the two German States should also toe mentioned. One of them, true enough, enjoys the right of maintaining an Observer at the United Nations; the other one, the German Democratic Republic, is not even admitted to observe our work, in spite of the fact that it is a country with one of the world's highest industrial potentials, a country with which a large number of Member States either maintain diplomatic relations or have established extensive commercial, scientific and cultural contacts, and a country whose contribution, particularly to the economic work of the United Nations, seems indispensable.
73. Anachronisms, one might justly say. But are there no other anachronisms in our Organization? Is It not still haunted by remnants of the cold war? We shall, for instance, discuss at the present session matters connected with the future of Korea. But how has it happened that the United States forces occupying South Korea are still allowed to use the flag of the United Nations? And this in spite of the fact that their Command submits no reports whatsoever to the United Nations and that it is not from this building that directives are issued to them.
74. It is high time to do away with such remnants — one might even say such ignominious remnants — of the past. But it is necessary above all to overcome here the resistance of the big Power whose equally anachronistic policy now weighs heavy on our Organization's freedom of action.
75. In the course of the general debate a number of problems have been taken up concerning the shortcomings in the functioning of various organs of the United Nations, especially in the sphere of peacekeeping. The Polish delegation has also much to say on these matters and we shall not fail to present our views in the Committees. However, the best possible blue-print will not help as long as there are Members that do not observe the principles of the Charter and believe that theirs is the right to subordinate the vital interests of other nations to their own global strategy — and occasionally even to subordinate United Nations activities to it.
76. The present session coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution. A great many sacrifices and efforts, and much hardship, blood, sweat and tears, above all on the part of the Soviet peoples, were needed to consolidate and expand the achievements of that historic event. Abortive were the attempts of reactionary forces which tried first to strangle the revolutionary upsurge, and afterwards to treat the Soviet State per non est — as non-existent — and to isolate it from the rest of the world. All this failed, and so did similar attempts directed against other socialist States.
77. Socialism has now come to be a force sharing in the responsibilities of the world of today. No great problems of our time, whether in Europe, in Asia or in other parts of the globe, can be solved without the participation of the community of socialist countries.
78. Proper conclusions ought to be drawn from this historic and often dire experience. From what great number of conflicts and losses, of disappointments and sacrifices we would thus now be spared. And the stakes are now much higher than in 1917. At stake now are the indivisible cause of peace in the whole world and, in the final analysis, nothing less than the destiny of mankind.
79. The year 1917 opened a new era. The socialist countries, my own country and people among them, will remain faithful to the great ideas of the October Revolution and to its historic achievements in the service of peace and progress. We shall follow these ideas in our contribution towards the future of the United Nations—and peace and progress do not seem to be hollow phrases in the meaning of our Charter, either.