Ceylon

36.Mr. President, it is deeply gratifying to the Government and people of Ceylon that you should be occupying the Chair at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly. On behalf of my Government and my delegation, I offer you our cordial congratulations and sincere good wishes on your election to this high office. We are confident that the Assembly will, in its deliberations, be well served by your experience and ability. 37. I wish also to take this opportunity of expressing our high appreciation of the contribution made by your predecessor in office, His Excellency Mr. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan. He had to preside over this Assembly during a most crucial period. We should like to express our admiration of the equanimity, patience and conscientiousness with which he discharged a most onerous task. 38. It has taken the United Nations twenty-one years to bring to this podium, as its President, a representative of one of the socialist group of countries. This is significant and symbolic. The United Nations has come of age and has demonstrated that degree of political maturity necessary to appreciate the process of political and economic evolution that has resulted in two principal political and economic ideologies establishing themselves in the world, each with its right to exist and to compete for recognition and acceptance without resort to violence and compulsion. Each of the systems has its own efficacy and value, and the lesson that twenty-one years of the United Nations existence has taught us is that the two political and economic systems must exist in a spirit of mutual tolerance if peace and harmony are to prevail in the world. 39. We meet also at a time when an event of epochal significance is to be celebrated. Fifty years ago a country that was little more than a gigantic feudal estate, with a backward agrarian economy, underwent a revolutionary transformation, politically and economically. Today we salute the Soviet Union and acclaim the phenomenal scientific and technological progress and the impressive economic achievements which have made it one of the two most powerful nations in the world. 40. We trust that the spirit of mutual tolerance which enables the two systems and the two blocs to exist side by side will, in turn, engender a spirit of mutual respect that would lead them towards closer co-operation in the use of their power and influence for the good of all mankind. There are, happily, signs of increasing co-operation between the two superpowers. The hope of the future lies in the promotion and acceleration of this process. 41. The Secretary-General’s annual report for 1966 [A/6701] makes depressing reading. The fault, however, lies not with the author but with the material — that is, ourselves. Every reference to achievement, whether in the political or economic sphere, is followed by an unambiguous expression of disappointment. These are the thoughtful reflections of the Chief Executive of this world Organization, a man whose patent sincerity, moral integrity and honesty of conviction are beyond doubt and whose faith in the Organization has not wavered in the face of repeated discouragement. His complex task in the course of which he is often called upon to reconcile irreconcilables is not made easier by criticism, which, however well meant, takes no note of the fact that there is no room for expediency where conscience must prevail. 42. There are two main areas of crisis — Viet-Nam and the Middle East. In each of these areas the situation is grave and portentous. Although our main attention is necessarily directed towards Viet-Nam where fighting is still in progress, the Middle East crisis should not be relegated to a position of secondary importance. The fighting has stopped there but the Organization has yet to find an answer to Israel’s continued defiance of the principles on which the Charter is founded as well as of United Nations resolutions that have received overwhelming support. 43. The origins of the Viet-Nam situation as it exists today lie with the end of the struggle of the Indo-Chinese States to free themselves from colonial rule. As it was the Geneva Agreements of 1954 that brought French colonial rule to an end in Indo-China, they alone can provide an appropriate framework for an abiding settlement in Viet-Nam and for the restoration of peace in that area. Those agreements were not merely an epitaph on French colonial rule in the East. They were meant to be a prologue to a new era and a new order. 44. In any objective assessment of the course of the Viet-Nam conflict we must recognize the fact that at the end of the struggle for national liberation from colonial rule in the former Indo-Chinese States, the outcome of which was the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the balance of advantage lay with the liberation forces of Ho Chi Minh. That balance of advantage was renounced by Ho Chi Minh in the faith that elections would be held to determine the wishes of the people of both parts of Viet-Nam, The provision in the Geneva Agreements calling for elections in July 1956 for the reunification of Viet-Nam was, like the other provisions of those agreements, unexceptionable. 45. The Geneva Agreements, after an interval of thirteen years, still command universal respect. The havoc of war has only reaffirmed their validity. It is, therefore, imperative that we seek to restore conditions as nearly as possible approximately to the situation that existed in 1954 immediately after the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements. This requires the unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. 46. It is most encouraging to note that a military solution is not being sought in Viet-Nam and that a political settlement is the professed aim and desire of the United States. It is also encouraging to note that even in the United States the opinion is very widely held that the bombing of North Viet-Nam is no longer a military imperative. What is left now is to translate into concrete action the desire for a cessation of the bombing and for a political settlement. It is the duty of all those who are outside the conflict to use their influence to close that gap between desire and fulfilment. It is equally our duty to remain loyal to the substantive principles of the Geneva Agreements. 47. The intention of the Geneva Agreements was not that there should be two Viet-Nams but that there should be one. And yet we find a school of thought contending that the decisive question is not whether North Viet-Nam will come to the conference table, but whether it comes to the conference table genuinely prepared to negotiate a compromise peace in which the people of South Viet-Nam can freely determine whether it wants to be governed by the Communists or not, allowing North Viet-Nam to go its own way. That thesis is based on a proposition completely at variance with the intentions of the Geneva Agreements and with the objectives of enlightened policy relating to divided countries — the proposition that they must remain divided according to whether one section wants Communism while the other does not want it. Such propositions and such assumptions can only perpetuate the division of countries and are not calculated to promote peace. If they are to be strictly applied it would mean that every country should be partitioned on ideological lines. 48. My Prime Minister has himself explored the possibilities for bringing the hostilities in Viet-Nam to an end and for starting negotiations to establish peace in that area. Fundamental to my Prime Minister's proposals was the principle that the internal affairs of a country were primarily a matter of exclusive concern to the people of that country and that no interference by outside parties could be justified. Acceptance of that concept implies acceptance of the principle that the people of a country should not only determine how its internal affairs should be handled but also be free to determine the nature of the political system which it wishes to establish and maintain for itself. There is nothing novel about this proposition or this concept. We all avow it. 49. In accordance with that principle, my Prime Minister's proposal was that the internal affairs of Viet-Nam should be settled by discussion among the three parties concerned, namely, the Saigon regime, the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam and the Government of North Viet- Nam, and that they should meet without interference from outside sources to discuss, in the first instance, the pre-conditions for a cease-fire. It was his hope that, if such a conference could take place, any agreement emerging from it would have definite prospects of being binding on other countries too, as it would represent the wishes of the people of Viet-Nam as a whole. 50. First among the pre-conditions for a cease-fire was the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, to be followed by an agreement on interim procedures for ensuring a status quo and by the cessation of belligerent activity by all parties. Other requirements, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel and the suspension of military aid, followed the provisions of the Geneva Agreements closely. We found, in the course of our discussions with the North Viet-Namese, that they recognized the possibility of dealing with the two situations separately — the situation in North Viet-Nam and the situation in South Viet-Nam — although the two situations constituted one problem. 51. In regard to the South, the North Viet-Nam Government's refusal to recognize the status of the Saigon regime and its insistence that the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam be regarded as the sole representative of the people of the South would appear to present some difficulty but should not prove to be an insuperable obstacle. It is another manifestation of the hardening of attitudes that takes place when hostilities are prolonged. That should not make us despair of some easing of the situation resulting from the cessation of the bombing, and in turn producing just that slight change of temper which could lead to the determination of a formula that would permit all those concerned with the situation in the South to be brought together in negotiations. 52. In South Viet-Nam we find many countries with which we are on the friendliest terms engaged in activities of which we have expressed explicit disapproval. We have done so because we consider the cause of peace to be of transcendent importance. 53. I turn now to the other and equally serious area of crisis, the Middle East. For the third time in the life of the United Nations, fighting erupted in that area. With each outbreak of hostilities the fighting has been heavier, the scale of casualties has been greater and the toll of misery has increased. But whereas on previous occasions some measure of stability was restored and the authority of the United Nations was established despite Israel's refusal to accept a United Nations presence within its own territory, the situation that exists today is infinitely more disturbing. 54. The efforts of the Security Council and the General Assembly in emergency special session to bring about a peaceful settlement have so far failed. Far from respect being shown for the General Assembly's appeals and decisions we find that, even when they have received a measure of support constituting the nearest approach to unanimity attainable in this Organization, such appeals and decisions have been completely ignored. Worse still, the most disturbing feature of the present situation is Israel's unabashed determination to retain control over the vast areas of territory that it has acquired through military operations and to absorb them, or some of them, permanently within its borders by establishing permanent Israeli settlements in them. Here we are being treated to the latest exercise in colonization, confirming the worst fears of the Arabs. Actions such as those are not calculated to promote a settlement. 55. The refugee problem has been aggravated. Thousands more Arabs have lost their ancestral homes and are treated like so much human flotsam. The Suez Canal remains closed to international traffic. Its closure not only inflicts continuing and cruel loss on the United Arab Republic; it also imposes a severe financial penalty on all the developing countries east of Suez, which depend so heavily on the smooth movement of traffic through the Canal and which are now compelled to draw on their depleted foreign reserves to pay the higher freight charges resulting from the diversion of traffic around the Cape. 56. Ceylon has always supported Israel's right to exist in peace and security. We still support that right. But Israel's demand for recognition by the Arab States as a condition precedent to all negotiations is, in our opinion, imprudent, ill-timed and insupportable. Recognition must be the culmination and not the commencement of the process of reconciliation. 57. If we have correctly understood the Israeli argument or excuse, it is that it cannot withdraw from the territories that it has seized in war unless its security is guaranteed, and that such a guarantee can come only through a settlement reached directly between itself and the Arab world. 58. The six-day war of June this year provides the most telling rebuttal of these arguments and pleas. A nation that could have succeeded in equipping itself with sufficient material, and in preserving in its economy a sufficient measure of strength to invest it with the power and the capacity to inflict such heavy destruction on others, and to acquire and retain such vast territorial gains through military operations as Israel succeeded in inflicting and acquiring in the course of the June war cannot claim that its existence and security were imperilled. We are fully aware that Israel has had, in the past, to face a barrage of threats; but if oral threats over the press and radio could be regarded as aggression to which the only possible deterrent is pre-emptive force, war would be endemic today in this world. Israel's present attitude creates the uncomfortable feeling that it seeks to cling to its acquisitions by stipulating exacting terms for a settlement. 59. The continued closure of the Canal, the reopening of which could be achieved without in the least endangering Israel's security, is a blow directed not merely against the Arab Stales but, in its effect, against all those countries in Asia which rely on this waterway for the movement of commerce vital to their economic interests. A nation that looks to the world for understanding should not hold such a large section of the world to ransom. But let me make it clear that, however severe the strain imposed on us by the closure of the Canal, we would not want to barter away an iota of Arab interests or Arab rights or any important principle in order to secure the reopening of the Canal. 60. Those rights and the principles we are called upon to defend in this instance have been clearly stated by us in the emergency special session. The United Arab Republic is entitled to and must have complete administrative control over the Canal, and sovereign territorial rights over it. This Organization should never acquiesce in, nor condone, the taking-away or circumscribing of those rights by the use of force. As regards Israel's claim to the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Ceylon's position has been and still is that the events of 1956 and thereafter did not alter and could not affect the status quo before 1956 so far as the legal rights of any party are concerned. The position prior to 1956 was that the United Arab Republic had the right to, and did in fact, control traffic through the Strait of Tiran. In the absence of international adjudication on Israel's claim to the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the question remains yet to be settled. The use of force as a means of settlement cannot, however, be countenanced by this Organization. 61. If the principles of the Charter are to be vindicated, the United Nations must bring all possible pressure to bear on Israel to withdraw to the positions held by it prior to 5 June 1967, and must insist that that withdrawal should not be subject to negotiation or any prior condition. 62. The Middle East crisis represents the gravest threat to the prestige and moral authority of the United Nations. A great deal, it might be said the very future of the United Nations as the custodian of international peace and security, depends on its capacity to act, and act promptly and effectively, in the Middle East situation. If it fails, it would be reduced to the position of a moral refugee. 63. The simultaneous presentation by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty presents heartening evidence of the desire of the two super-Powers to cooperate with each other to limit the dissemination of nuclear terror. But the draft remains only an expression of intent. It is incomplete without agreement on the paramount problem of international inspection. It does not bring us any closer to general and total disarmament. It does not preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons by those who already possess them. The draft treaty limits and reserves a privilege without imposing any restraint on the exercise of the privilege by those for whom it is so reserved. 64. More urgent than a non-proliferation treaty such as has been drafted is the extension of the existing ban on nuclear testing to cover underground nuclear tests as well. This would have the same effect as the present draft non-proliferation treaty and, in addition, would arrest the process of nuclear-weapon development by the nuclear Powers. 65. The other imperfections of the present draft non-proliferation treaty are the omission of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in general against non-nuclear-weapon countries and the absence of any provision for the security and protection of non-nuclear countries from nuclear attacks. 66. Although the political crises that continue to threaten international security claim our immediate attention, the economic problems that beset the developing countries are of equal concern and interest to us. It is a truism to say that sharp economic disparities only accentuate political discontent, whether it be on the national or international scale. 67. The United Nations and its associated organizations have been called upon in recent years to assume an ever-increasing responsibility in this sphere. The declaration of the United Nations Development Decade was meant to marshal world opinion and to serve as a psychological force in support of concerted international action to stimulate the economic growth and development of the developing countries. 68. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in December 1964 as a separate organization to deal with all matters relating to international trade which had a bearing on economic development, with the objective of removing such inequalities and such restrictive practices and policies as hampered economic growth and substituting for them more positive forms of international economic co-operation. 69. The Development Decade has become the slogan of the new impetus, while UNCTAD has come to be the main hope of the flagging and faltering economies of the developing world. The combined result of the declaration of the Development Decade, with all that it implies, and of three years of effort by UNCTAD has, however, been disappointing. The Development Decade, with only two years more to run, might pass into history as the "Disenchantment Decade" unless the achievements in the second Development Decade redeem the unrealized hopes and promise of the first. There would have to be something amounting to a miraculous change for the better, both in regard to the trading terms of the developing countries and the volume and terms of the capital aid they receive, if the 5 per cent annual growth rate to be achieved by the end of the decade were to come even within reach of most of the developing countries. 70. Out of forty-seven developing countries for which comparable data is available, only seventeen have succeeded in achieving a growth rate of 5 per cent. But the thirty countries which failed to achieve this rate of growth together account for 75 per cent of the total population of the forty-seven countries. In fact, for most of the countries the growth rates for the first five years of the Development Decade were lower than the rates achieved in the five years preceding the Development Decade. 71. The average increase of gross domestic product per head of population of the developing countries during the first five years of the Development Decade was hardly $10, as compared with an increase of $300 per head in the developed market economies during the same period. 72. What these figures mean is that with hardly any sacrifice on their part the developed market economies can spare much more than they have hitherto done to raise the standards of living in the developing countries. It is by contributing to the reduction in economic disparities not by increasing them, it is by putting greater purchasing power in the hands of the developing countries in the shortest possible time through the adoption of bolder and more imaginative policies rather than by adherence to conservative practices, which give only partial relief in measured doses to the developing economies, that the richer nations can best serve their own ultimate interests. 73. Ceylon is one of those countries where improved productivity has brought no corresponding benefits. Although we have succeeded by improved methods in increasing agricultural productivity in the export sector, and particularly in the yields of tea and rubber, this improvement has been more than neutralized by a sharp decline in prices. For countries to which a progressive increase in their import capacity must make all the difference between stagnation and growth, it is not sufficient for aggregate export earnings to be barely maintained through increased production and improved productivity. In the case of agricultural products, for which the demand is inelastic, improved productivity results in increased total production and might serve to further reduce world market prices by increasing the supply. 74. Ceylon offers a perfect case study of the effect of adverse trends in world market prices on the economy of a developing country which relies preponderantly on agricultural exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings. Our experience, which is by no means unique, should establish an incontrovertible case for the stabilization of commodity prices. This is not the place for details. Those will be given in the Second Committee where they properly belong, but I should like your indulgence in this Assembly to state a few figures in support of the case for urgent action. I took the Development Decade as the period of reference because of the bright hopes and the bright faith that we had in it. The loss that Ceylon has sustained as a result of adverse trends in world market prices since 1959 has amounted to approximately $340 million over the seven years from 1960 to 1966, which works out at a loss of $48 million a year. In this figure no account is taken of the additional burden we have had to bear as a result of the higher prices of our imports. 75. During the same period of seven years, Ceylon's foreign exchange reserves fell steadily from a level of $138 million in 1959 to $59 million in 1966. Foreign aid can provide only very partial and inadequate relief and does not compensate us for the loss in export earnings. I have referred to the slow rate of growth in developing countries during the seven years of the Development Decade. If we take the per capita real income of the country into consideration — which is the most reliable index of the standard of living of a people — in the first seven years of the Development Decade there has been a drop of 3.2 per cent in per capita real income in Ceylon. This decline has been due to factors beyond our control and despite definite improvements in productivity. I mention these figures to emphasize the importance of some definite and positive measures to be agreed upon at the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to be held at New Delhi next year. 76. Permit me to make a brief reference to that spectre that haunts most of the poorer countries of the world: the population explosion. This is a real problem, but to lay too much emphasis on the population explosion is to divert attention from what is immediately practicable. It is not the population explosion that depresses the prices of our export products and increases the cost of our imports. It is not the population explosion that inhibits the developed market economies from adopting more liberal policies or from reducing interest rates, extending maturity periods and replenishing the coffers of a now impecunious International Development Association. The population explosion, admittedly, aggravates scarcity and increases privation, but while efforts to check it are being made, there is much more that can be done by the affluent section of the world. Ceylon is paying close attention to this problem and our efforts have already met with some success. In 1966 Ceylon's rate of natural increase fell to 2.3 per cent from the previous year's figure of 2.4 per cent. 77. We have referred to the fact that the United Nations has now come of age. In all these years, however, it has failed to repair its gravest omission: the proper representation of 700 million of the Chinese people. We associate ourselves unequivocally with those delegations which have preceded us in this general debate and which have urged the seating of the People's Republic of China in this Organization as the lawful representatives of the Chinese people. We have maintained in the past, and we still maintain, that this is a simple matter of credentials, that what we are called upon to approve is the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China and that the Government of the People's Republic of China is alone entitled to represent that country and its people. There should be no doubt as to our policy in regard to Taiwan. Ceylon does not subscribe to the theory of two Chinas. The recent events in China have no bearing at all on the right of the People's Republic of China to the seat intended for China in this Assembly and in the Security Council. They neither strengthen nor weaken that right. 78. We hope this Organization will not defer any longer the seating of the People's Republic of China. With this achievement to its credit, the United Nations would be better equipped to face the future with faith in its mission and with confidence in its ability to discharge its sublime trust.