1. Mr. President, the tribute Belgium pays you as you assume the presidency of the General Assembly is no mere formality, for our two countries co-operate with each other; they are both dedicated to bringing about a European rapprochement, in a spirit of respect for their different regimes, and in the course of this joint endeavour to buildup peace through a relaxation of tension we have come to know the spirit by which you are animated and the talents with which you are endowed. We accordingly rejoice, for you are a happy choice for one of the loftiest tasks life has to offer - presiding over the General Assembly, whose mission it is to bring the peoples closer together and teach them how similar and interdependent they are.
2. We have no illusions in the matter: the political context in which this session will take place will be forbidding; and your work will be difficult. Our delegation will therefore assist you to the best of its ability.
3. We also wish to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Mr. Pazhwak, whose name will be preserved on the roster of Presidents who have stood for peace.
4. The question is raised regularly, in my country at least, whether the general debate with which the General Assembly traditionally begins its work is useful or even necessary. Let me say at once that I do not share this sceptical attitude, for once a year each of our Governments, in pondering the Secretary-General's annual report and particularly the introductory chapter, is forced to make its own appraisal of the international situation and of what the United Nations has done about it. We can thus measure the progress made and also, unfortunately, the difficulties that are still with us.
5. On behalf of Belgium, I shall devote my analysis to what we regard as the twin pillars of peace: settlement of the conflicts which endanger peace, and cooperation between the countries which are in a privileged economic position and those which are not.
6. As regards the first subject, although there is no overt crisis threatening security in Europe, I should nevertheless like to outline the situation briefly. As everyone knows, our States, mindful of their duty towards the international community, are endeavouring to establish a system of security which would guarantee tranquillity and peace in Europe. We are doing this to protect ourselves, but also to protect the rest of the world from the consequences of confrontations of which there have been several in our continent in the past twenty-five years.
7. Fresh hopes have arisen since the advent of the policy of peaceful coexistence. We for our part have redefined, in what we believe to have been both a realistic and an imaginative manner, our relations with European States whose régimes are different from ours in order to overcome, with mutual respect and understanding, difficulties stemming from the Second World War.
8. Although some progress has been made in that regard, thanks to a broadening and intensification of exchanges of every kind, we are not yet in a position to present a list of specific gains.
9. I must say in this connexion that I read with some disappointment the statement made in this very hall by Mr. Gromyko [1563rd meeting]. He ascribes political intentions to the Federal Republic of Germany which are belied by its actions. He also oversimplifies the problem of European security, telling us that we should simply do away with the two defensive alliances, but failing to explain how our security would be safeguarded. Yet it is precisely because the arrangements we have made have dispelled our former fears that we can now envision with confidence a dynamic policy of rapprochement.
10. Despite my somewhat disillusioned comment, we shall certainly not be discouraged from persevering in our efforts. We know that the policy of rapprochement will not yield instant results. That very knowledge moves us to even greater endeavours, with good will and unfaltering faith.
11. In the past twelve months, unfortunately, security in several regions of the world has not improved; the contrary is true. A serious conflict, which had been brewing for a number of years, broke out in the Middle East. The events in Viet-Nam continue to perturb Asia and the rest of the world, The problem of Cyprus remains unsolved.
12. It is needless to repeat Belgium's political positions on these various conflicts, for they were stated here earlier. They have not changed, and that fact is In itself disappointing, for it indicates that there has been no progress. I shall devote myself rather to seeking the causes of this stagnation, of our being powerless to find the means of pacifying the troubled areas.
13. Should we not, perhaps, begin by asking ourselves whether the dynamic element without which the difficulties cannot be surmounted nor the proper reconciliation methods found — by which I mean the political will to achieve durable solutions — is sufficiently strong and wide-spread? Later, when negotiations are underway, we can also ask ourselves whether States always prefer reality, i.e. a genuine agreement, to the appearance of a diplomatic victory. For we have repeatedly seen parties to a dispute setting prior conditions the acceptance of which would make negotiations meaningless. Lastly, can solutions be found if States agree to discuss only those points which are of interest to them and reject out of hand those of interest to others? To find a reply to these questions, we need but examine some of our basic conflicts.
14. To start with, look at the crisis in the Middle East. The dialogue is not being begun. The parties have taken up diametrically opposite positions and each of them is setting pre-conditions for the over-all settlement of the problem. Should not the Assembly, rising above these possibly understandable but dangerous positions, provide a general framework for negotiations? The search for precise solutions would be facilitated if both parties knew for certain that the United Nations as a whole wished the solution — the only solution possible — fully to meet the following two requirements: first, respect for the sovereignty of the other party, as established by its membership in the United Nations; and, secondly, rejection of any territorial changes based solely on the right of conquest. Starting from these two premises, and with the aid of States which have taken praiseworthy initiatives and whose influence may be helpful, the Security Council should be able to work out the details of agreements whereby peace would be restored in the region.
15. One thing, at any rate, should be clear to all Members: no solution can be found without action by the United Nations, and particularly by the Security Council. In the present circumstances, it would be vain to count solely on what might emerge from an encounter between the parties concerned; and to believe that matters can be arranged by some friendly intervention alone, unless the fundamental principles I have cited are used as the basis for any future arrangement, is to believe in fairytales. The only way to prevent another outbreak of armed hostilities is — such, at least, is our profound conviction — for the Security Council to take strong and definite political action, with the support of all of our States and within the framework of the principles we all share.
16. Turning to Viet-Nam, I must admit, that, as my Swedish colleague said a little while ago [1563rd meeting], it is hard to imagine that the United Nations should take no interest in a problem which so closely concerns world security. Here again, the search for a solution is greatly complicated by exclusions and intransigent declarations made by both sides. Some States claim that the United Nations is not competent to deal with the matter. These same States frustrate attempts to convene the Geneva Conference, which laid down the legal foundations for the recognition of the independence of the States of what once was Indo-China.
17. In our view, it is deplorable that it should be possible, on procedural grounds, to prevent the convening of the organ best suited to find a political solution to this conflict. The upshot of such total rejection of multilateral gatherings is that the major opponents, that is to say, North Viet-Nam and the Viet-Cong on the one hand, and South Viet-Nam and the United States on the other, continue to face each other, while our States are forced to hover on the edges of the arena as anxious spectators. Peace itself is at stake; yet, far from promoting it, additional obstacles are set up in the way to peace.
18. How is peace to be brought about if the places where solutions might be found are rejected? We take a particularly serious view of this, for our common desire that the fighting and the bombing should cease will be very difficult to achieve until we can offer realistic and imaginative guidance by tracing the broad outlines of the political future of a pacified Viet-Nam.
19. The third, and perhaps the clearest, example of the failure of our multilateral action in bringing about the requisite conditions for peace, is Cyprus. The United Nations stepped in to separate the opposing parties. In so doing, it accomplished its mission, and we must congratulate it. But what has it done since then? Apart from spontaneous but weak attempts, it has undertaken no organized and continuing action to find a lasting settlement acceptable to all the parties concerned. The Secretary-General, in the Introduction to his Annual Report [A/6701/Add.1, para. 40] stresses that it is not the mission of the United Nations to maintain indefinitely an unsatisfactory status quo. We can only say that he is right.
20. Why, then, are we unable, in all these matters, to play the role within the United Nations that is ours under the Charter? We have the means at hand. If we reread the Chapters of the Charter which confer pacifying functions on the Security Council, we shall see that they give it the right and the necessary authority to initiate action. They give it the means for continuing action. They authorize it to investigate, recommend negotiation, propose mediation and arbitration, have recourse to judicial settlement and, lastly, if these methods of conciliation fail, consider enforcement measures.
21. In fact, no use is made of these possibilities. To see how true that is, we need merely to read the report prepared by the Security Council for the General Assembly, Hence the frustration felt in some of our countries with regard to the action of the United Nations and the crisis of confidence mentioned by the Secretary-General; both result from that inability to take decisions, that reluctance to take action, because of which the countries sitting in the Security Council and therefore bearing a special responsibility under the Charter cannot achieve what public opinion, what world opinion, expects of them.
22. We nevertheless believe that the antagonism between the USSR and the United States, which has lasted throughout the existence of the United Nations, most fortunately is on the wane. It is inconceivable that the dialogue now in progress between these two great States should not be reflected in their interchanges in the Security Council. It is there that the spirit of detente and tolerance should find its most fertile soil and its best testing ground. For, as Mr. Brown said here yesterday [1567th meeting], no group in our Assembly can impose its will upon others if positive results are to be expected. In consequence, we can at last ask that the Security Council should stop confining itself to separating the combatants without trying to eliminate the causes of the combat.
23. We are well aware that it is far easier to bring out the errors and criticize the action of the United Nations than to make positive suggestions. I shall nevertheless advance a few.
24. To begin with, we should like the General Assembly to appeal to the Security Council and, more particularly, to the Council's permanent members, to use their powers of conciliation and the broad range of measures set forth mainly in Chapter VI of the Charter.
25. Secondly, we support the Secretary-General's suggestion in the Introduction to his Annual Report [A/6701/Add.1, para. 159] that the Security Council should hold closed meetings. This suggestion is far more than a mere matter of procedure. How can one possibly endow an organ with executive responsibilities on the one hand and, on the other, expect it to find, in public, under the eye of the cameras, solutions to the extremely difficult problems which are referred to it and which concern the prestige of some countries and the interests of others? None of our Governments would be able to bring off this tour de force in their domestic decision-making. How, then, can we ask a number of States to work together under such conditions?
26. Thirdly, we should like the meetings of the Security Council to be held, as provided for in Article 28 of the Charter, at the Government member level. The proposal made yesterday by the Secretary-General that a meeting of this kind should be held with the Ministers of the principal countries members of the Security Council has, I must say, aroused great hopes on our part.
27. Lastly, I should like to recommend once again a serious study of what last year [1432nd meeting] I called the strategy of peace. In that connexion, I cannot but regret the particularly unsatisfactory and cursory manner in which the Special Political Committee considered the problem of the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is also most deplorable that the Netherlands representative's suggestion was not taken up. How can it be claimed — as it was claimed — that there is no need to formulate conclusions on the best ways of preventing armed conflicts from arising? Would it not be useful to define the best procedures for obtaining and ensuring a truce, when we see that it is in this very area that the assistance of the United Nations has been the most often sought in the past twenty-three years? Truly, it is by performing such an analysis that the General Assembly can make suggestions which would be of help to the Security Council, the organ responsible for the prevention and settlement of crises.
28. I also wish to support the Secretary-General's efforts to bring about the conditions and general operational framework for the maintenance of peace. Here again, what we must have is political agreement on the need for specific action. Once such agreement has been demonstrated, the constitutional and financial problems will be readily solved, as they are within our countries when a political will is manifest. If such an affirmation of principle can be had, then, and only then, we should like a special committee to be set up to settle the practical details. We think it would be a mistake to go ahead and set up a committee which would not know its exact terms of reference and scope of activity.
29. These considerations, which relate to highly important subjects, bring us to the following conclusion: we firmly believe that the pessimistic views we have formed in examining certain specific threats to world security should prompt us to revise the methods of action used by the United Nations. It would not be a drastic revision. There is no question of amending the rules and principles inscribed in the Charter, but simply of returning to a painstaking and scrupulous discharge of the obligations contained in it. We must emphasize once again the obligations of the Security Council, its permanent members' responsibilities towards the rest of us, and also the heavy if temporary responsibilities assumed by States which ask for our votes for election to the Council. Surely it is for the General Assembly to support the Security Council's efforts and, if need be, remind the States which sit in it of what we expect and hope from them.
30. For it is only through such fresh awareness of our responsibilities, a spirit of detente and an unremitting effort at mutual tolerance that our Organization — which everyone recognizes to be indispensable - can accomplish what our peoples expect of it.
31. I should now like to deal briefly with the second subject, which we have called "the second pillar of peace": co-operation. The fact is that peace is not merely the absence of war. There are other situations which endanger peace, because of the injustice and misrule they reveal. If we wish to know what these situations are, we have but to open the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization [A/6701, p. 95]. There, following an analysis of world economic trends in 1966 and the first months of 1967, we read that the over-all economic growth rate in the developing countries had already weakened slightly from 1964 to 1965; it dropped again from 1965 to 1966. For these countries as a whole — and that may be one of the most discouraging facts cited — total agricultural production, according to the report, diminished by more than 1 per cent in 1966. At the same time, of course, the total number of mouths to feed in those same developing countries rose by about 3.5 per cent annually, so that the combined effect of these two factors is that there is less food available per person from year to year.
32. These are brutal and to us cruel facts which show that, in the painful process of mankind's joint development, something is very wrong and growing worse.
33. We know that many efforts are being made to remedy the situation, and that they should be added up; yet their total falls far short of the needs. These efforts include the development programmes carried out by the Governments and peoples of the poor countries themselves in a courageous endeavour to further those countries' growth; the timely action of the regional economic organizations which they set up and which broaden the usually narrow markets in developing zones; the many kinds of assistance furnished by private initiative and marked by a high degree of generosity, for it comes from all countries, whether rich or merely less poor than the others; and also bilateral aid accorded by many States which enjoy a high level of living and multilateral aid given by groups of privileged States, of which the European Economic Community is an example, to certain African countries. Lastly — and I list them last, for they fit in with the rest — there are the world-wide programmes conceived and executed by the specialized agencies and organizations associated with or dependent on the United Nations.
34. All these things, which are being done in the name of a more just order, are juxtaposed, added and sometimes tangled together. But who is better qualified than the United Nations to determine how much and what kind of aid is required and distribute wisely the various efforts made throughout the world, so that the second development decade may succeed in altering the as yet tentative but so far disappointing rate of economic and social growth of many countries?
35. Here again, we would not merely criticize; we have three suggestions to make.
36. First, the Assembly should solemnly proclaim that it recognizes it to be a duty of the United Nations to put forward a global development programme and to co-ordinate all development efforts throughout the world.
37. Next, we believe that it should also note, emphasize and endorse the trend in the Northern Hemisphere towards a rapprochement between the economic and social structures of the market-economy and planned-economy countries. That trend, too, will reduce world tensions as it will reduce the drain on all national incomes caused by the steady rise in armaments. We hope and believe that the relaxation of tensions between the East and the West will enable the International organizations, which have for so long been semi-paralyzed by these tensions, vigorously to discharge their mission of practical co-operation, using in particular some of the resources liberated by parallel reductions in armaments.
38. Lastly, I want to say that while waiting for these goals to he progressively reached, the more fortunate countries, when undertaking bilateral or regional cooperation programmes, should he prepared to regard the United Nations regional or local representatives as the natural coordinators of any multiple development action in their area. It is to be hoped that such countries will consult them before delineating an aid programme. Belgium, for its part, announces that it is prepared to do so henceforward, being desirous of following the Secretary-General's suggestions and taking one of the steps that have to be taken towards the establishment of a world authority for co-operation and development. Belgium will persevere in its endeavour until this objective has been decided upon, accepted and attained within the United Nations.
39. What have we tried to do today, following the example of others? Not to conceal certain obstacles which lie in the way of the United Nations and hamper its action for peace. Not to conceal them; but also not to accept political crises and the distress of the many as inevitable; on the contrary, always to seek, together with others, rationally, energetically and stubbornly, to overcome them. This is no doubt what one of my compatriots meant to suggest in a message of encouragement which he sent me yesterday and which I want to share with you. He quoted a line of Paul Claudel’s which, I believe, applies to the situation in which we all find ourselves and to the work we have begun. It goes: "Belief in light is finest in the dark." Like many of us, and together with them, Belgium will persevere in its search for the lights of peace.