60. It is not simply to conform to convention that I open my speech with a reference to Mrs. Pandit’s election as President of the General Assembly. It has given the United Kingdom delegation great satisfaction and pleasure that she should be elected to this high and honourable office, not only because of the honour which is thereby conferred upon her country, but also because of her own outstanding qualities. We congratulate Mrs. Pandit and the Assembly and wish her a most distinguished term of office.
61. I should also like to join in the good wishes which have been extended to our new Secretary- General upon his assumption of his most important office. The United Kingdom Government is very happy that Mr. Hammarskjold should be the chief officer of this Organization.
62. May I also state that I deeply regret that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, is not here to speak to the Assembly in the general debate on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. He is happily in the concluding stages of his convalescence, and I say without fear of contradiction that the whole world will have cause to rejoice when his wisdom and experience are once again at the service of the cause of peace.
63. I agree with those speakers who have pointed out that we meet for this session of the General Assembly in circumstances substantially different from those of the last three sessions. In 1950, 1951 and 1952, large-scale hostilities were taking place in Korea at the time of our meetings — large-scale sea, land and air operations causing heavy loss of life and great destruction. We all rejoice that after these three years of warfare and two years of negotiation the fighting has stopped. The toll of human lives has ended and the risk of the conflict’s spreading has been avoided. It would be wrong to forget how real has been that risk, certainly since February 1951.
64. But our heartfelt thankfulness at the armistice does not blind us to the fact that there are still many difficulties ahead. Fighting nourished from behind the Iron Curtain continues in Indo-China. Terrorist activities on a large scale are taking place in Malaya and other parts of the world. We here already know something of the difficulties of translating a Korean armistice into a Korean peace. Certainly there is no shortage of problems still to be solved.
65. I would weary this Assembly indeed if I attempted to state our views upon all the interesting points raised in the speeches made in this debate. I do, however, wish to say something about what we regard as the roles of the United Nations and then to examine some of the dangers to peace at the present time and to consider what this particular session of the General Assembly can do to help.
66. To my mind, the primary responsibility of the United Nations is to work for a situation in which aggression will be unlikely or impossible. If, in spite of these efforts, aggression should nevertheless occur, it is of the utmost importance that the United Nations should be prepared to take, or to authorize, action against the aggressor. Small countries and, indeed, large countries will be encouraged to stand up to pressure only if they know that there is a world authority, backed by powerful States, able and willing to go into action quickly should an acknowledged act of aggression be committed.
67. It was in accordance with this conception that the great decision of 27 June 1950 [474th meeting] was taken by the Security Council — one of the decisive decisions, in our view, in the history of the world — and it was in discharge of this obligation to resist aggression that fifty-three nations subsequently endorsed that decision in the Assembly, declaring North Korea to be an aggressor; that sixteen nations sent combatant forces to Korea; and that various other Member States helped in a variety of ways.
68. In our debates in the First Committee, at the last session, Mr. Vyshinsky spent considerable time in attempting to prove that South Korea had committed the original. aggression in Korea. On 21 September [438th meeting], he said he was not going to reiterate all his old arguments but simply wished to produce one piece of evidence to show that South Korea had intended to attack North Korea. Well, whatever may have been said by Korean leaders on either side before the attack took place, the fact is that North Korean troops in large numbers did cross the thirty-eighth parallel at many places on 25 June 1950. This was reported by the United Nations Commission. Frontier incidents are one thing, but a full-scale offensive of this nature, which could only have been planned months ahead of the moment when it was staged, is quite another. However, like Mr. Vyshinsky, I do not intend to develop this theme. The facts are well known. If anyone has any doubt, I advise him to read again the report of the United Nations field observers dated 24 June 1950 [A/1350, annex 4],
69. What matters is that the aggression has now been repelled and the aggressors driven back whence they came. The United Nations, thanks chiefly to the outstanding leadership and sacrifices of the United States, has functioned successfully. As Sir Winston Churchill said in his speech to the United States Congress on 17 January 1952: “... I am sure our soldiers and your soldiers have not made their sacrifice in vain. The cause of world law has found strong and invaluable defence, and the foundations of the world instruments for preserving peace, justice and freedom among the nations have been deepened and strengthened. They stand now; not on paper but on rock. Moreover, the action which President Truman took in your name and with your full support in his stroke against aggression in Korea has produced consequences far beyond Korea, consequences which may well affect the destiny of mankind.”
70. But the nations of the world will certainly not be able to enjoy a full sense of security unless it is made clear that any similar aggression in the future will be met by similar action recommended by the United Nations itself or taken by organizations, based on Article 51 of the Charter.
71. It is wrong for the Soviet Union representative to think that this conception is directed against the Soviet Union. It applies equally, in our view, to all acts of aggression, whether or not the aggressor is a member of any particular bloc. The repression of aggression, as I have suggested, is a primary task of this body.
72. Another vital role of this body is to mediate, and indeed to intervene, in disputes threatening peace, in the hope that such intervention will prevent those disputes from developing into hostilities. If I may give a topical example of a case in which I think the Assembly has tried to act in this capacity, it is the case of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma. We have tried, and I hope will continue to try, in that case to remove something which is causing friction and might lead to hostilities between States.
73. It is not inappropriate to remember in this connexion some of the successes of this Organization. It was due in large measure to the conciliatory processes of the United Nations that fighting was stopped in Greece, in Kashmir and in Palestine. Other disputes which could have led to breaches of the peace, such as the dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union, were settled partly in consequence of the activities of the United Nations. Other disputes have been the subject of decisions by the International Court of Justice. This Organization, I claim, has played a much larger part in the post-war years than is commonly recognized in preventing controversies between nations from developing into something very much worse. What I have said shows how wrong it is to suggest, as is sometimes done in certain quarters, that this Organization has accomplished nothing.
74. A third role of the United Nations is to provide a forum in which the issues of the day can be debated. We believe that a debate such as this annual general debate is of value. Also, on occasion, a debate such as that in the First Committee, at the last session, on the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea, can be of great help in creating an international public opinion or an atmosphere in which some deadlock can be resolved. This is not always the case; it is not true that a problem has only to be debated in the United Nations for it to be solved. Sometimes public debates can only exacerbate hard feelings. Parties to a controversy may be forced to take up publicly rigid positions and to indulge in acrimonious propaganda speeches for domestic consumption.
75. Anyone who has attended our proceedings during the past two or three years at least will readily be able to call to mind debates to which what I have just said unfortunately applied. That also affects the timing of a debate. I feel that nothing will cause us as an Organization to lose ground more than year after year to debate particular controversies in the same acrimonious, unproductive and inconclusive manner. If anyone has any doubt as to what I mean, let him survey the list of items on the agenda of this session of the Assembly.
76. Parallel with these roles of the repression of aggression, of conciliation and peace-making, and of constituting a forum for international debate, there is the social, economic and humanitarian work of the United Nations, and in particular that carried out by the specialized agencies operating under its auspices. We believe that that work is complementary to the political work of the United Nations; that hunger, poverty and disease will impair the best of political solutions and that the progressive raising of living standards throughout the world will of itself contribute to political settlements.
77. We shall be debating these matters fully in the proper committees. I do, however, want to pay a special tribute to the work of technical assistance now well launched. We think that the last session of the Economic and Social Council did valuable work to improve and give firmer direction to the administration of technical assistance. I should also like to say a word of praise for the United Nations Children's Fund, whose efficiency has deservedly won genuine admiration.
78. In a different field, I hope that the proposed five years’ renewal of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees will, with improving world conditions, see an end to this tragic human problem.
79. One of the considerations which must drive us on in our efforts towards a relaxation of international tension and the reduction of armaments is the knowledge that progress in those directions should enable substantially greater resources to be devoted to improving living standards.
80. Finally, there is the role of the United Nations with regard to dependent peoples. There is a difference of opinion, which I am not going to develop here, as to the extent or scope of that particular role. Mr. Eden made the position of the United Kingdom Government on what is called “colonialism” abundantly clear in his speech to the General Assembly last year [393rd meeting]. I quote one brief passage: “Either these lands can continue, with the help of countries like my own, their orderly progress towards self-government. Or they can be prematurely abandoned by us and exposed to anarchy or despotism, so that all liberal tendencies are smothered, perhaps for generations. There is no question in my mind as to which of these courses most closely fits the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations.”
81. Having restated these views on the role of the United Nations and the way in which it can discharge its responsibilities under the Charter, I wish to turn to the matters now threatening world peace. I shall begin by referring again to the basic problem already touched upon by several speakers. It is the ideological split between the countries on each side of the Iron Curtain, the split running along the line of the Iron Curtain. I shall try to put the position simply and not offensively.
82. We, on our side of the Iron Curtain, believe in progress by gradual evolution, by reform, by compromise, and in the preservation of the liberties of the individual to worship as he pleases, to associate as he pleases, to speak, to write, to vote as he pleases. We believe that this process of gradual evolution should apply not only in our own societies but also in the political development of the dependent peoples for whose well-being we are responsible. These peoples must be allowed to develop, to build up the political institutions which best suit them, and to establish with our assistance the economic and social functions of self-government.
83. On the other side of the Iron Curtain there has been the belief in the suppression of human liberties in the interests of the State, in monolithic unity at home — to use the phrase we heard on Monday [438th meeting] — and in the forcible overthrow of existing systems of society in the rest of the world; to put it shortly, in the classic communist aim of world revolution.
84. The problem which we have to consider is: is it possible for these two systems to exist side by side? Is peaceful coexistence possible? Or is war inevitable? That is the question we have to try to answer, the riddle or conundrum which must perplex many hundreds of thousands of people in the free world.
85. Mr. Malenkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in his speech of 8 August 1953, made the following statements: "We firmly maintain that at the present moment there is no disputable or outstanding issue which could not be settled in a peaceful way on the basis of mutual agreement between the countries concerned. This refers also to those issues under dispute which exist between the United States and the USSR. We stood and stand for a peaceful coexistence of the two systems.” Again, later, Mr. Malenkov said: "... the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of two systems is an obligation not only of the countries of the democratic camp, but the obligation also of all countries; any other way is the way of hopeless adventures and inevitable failures.”
86. On the other hand there has been plenty of evidence in the past to support a contrary view, the view that coexistence should continue only until the Soviet leaders consider that the time is ripe for them to pursue another policy. George Dimitrov, when he was Secretary-General of the Communist International, put it quite clearly. He used these words: “We are sometimes accused of departing from our communist principles. What stupidity, what blindness! We should not be Marxist and Leninist revolutionaries, nor disciples of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, if we were not capable of completely altering our tactics and our mode of action as circumstances may dictate. But all the deviations and all the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of our tactics are directed to a single end — the world revolution.”
87. That is a rather different view from the view that peaceful coexistence is the desirable end, and this is a perplexing riddle. Where does the truth lie with regard to that? Which view are we to accept today? What are really the basic purposes of the rulers in the Kremlin? Have we had any further indications of the answer to that question at this session of the Assembly?
88. In the General Committee, on 16 September [87th meeting], Mr. Malik welcomed the improved international climate and Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that the improved climate was conducive to the resumption of co-operation among States.
89. I confess with regret that I was not clear from his speech in the Assembly on 21 September [438th meeting] where Mr. Vyshinsky stood on this issue. Much of what he said seemed to me to be in conflict with the spirit of Mr. Malenkov’s speech of 8 August. Surely if we are to make progress we must get away from the stereotyped language of abuse and the dreary reiteration of the slogans and catchwords which have so long bedevilled these public international discussions. We thought that there was a new note of realism to be detected in Mr. Malenkov’s speech of 8 August, but I do not see how anyone could say that the speech made on 21 September on behalf of the Soviet Union delegation contributed very much towards the relaxation of international tension.
90. Nevertheless, in spite of Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech in this debate the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation is one of cautious optimism. No one should blame us for our caution. Deeds and the passage of time are needed to convince us that this coexistence of which Mr. Malenkov speaks is not just coexistence during an armistice or a lull — a sort of armed truce — but that it means living side by side in a state of peace which is genuinely intended on both sides to be lasting. Deeds and the passage of time are needed to throw light on the answer to that.
91. It would therefore be the height of folly for the countries of the free world immediately to cast aside their defences or to relax their efforts to maintain their strength.
92. Mr. Vyshinsky made the stock allegation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an aggressive military alliance which constitutes a major threat to the cause of peace. It is hardly necessary, in this Assembly, to refute such allegations. This defensive alliance came into being solely because of the surge westwards of Soviet power and military might. Rather than be swallowed up one by one, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began to concert measures for common defence. We believe that the leaders of the communist world are realists who respect facts. We have no intention of being put in the position of having to negotiate with them from weakness. That would not help to bring real peace. That is why the United Kingdom Government remains determined to play its full part in maintaining the strength of this defensive and non-aggressive alliance within the framework of the Charter, an alliance which, so far from threatening the peace of the world, is in present circumstances one of its main buttresses.
93. We have therefore to be cautious. On the other hand, are we to be censured for our optimism? Since the death of Stalin there has been a certain change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union. There have been changes at home and to some extent abroad, in domestic and in external policies. The United Kingdom Government has welcomed these changes and we wish to avoid in any way checking any favourable reactions which may be taking place. Of course, as I have just said, it is the deeds and not just the words which really count. That has always been our view.
94. The most significant deed of the Soviet Union in the field of foreign affairs since Stalin’s death was the abandonment of the position taken up last November by their representatives on the subject of the forcible repatriation of Korean prisoners of war. We welcomed that change. It made possible the Korean armistice. It contributed towards an easement in international tension.
95. Sir Winston Churchill said in May that we believed it to be a mistake to assume that nothing could be settled with the Soviet Union unless and until everything was settled. A settlement of two or three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace-loving country. That is why we favour taking outstanding problems one by one and seeking to negotiate settlements. Above all, we desire to maintain some momentum behind the improvement which has been perceptible during the past few months. In this connexion I should like to pay my tribute to Mr. Dulles’ temperate and statesmanlike speech of 17 September [434th meeting] which, in our view, set an admirable tone for this debate and made it possible for what I have described as this momentum behind the improvement to be maintained in this discussion.
96. One matter on which we are very ready to try to make progress is Germany. In his speech on 21 September the Soviet Union representative stated that as early as March 1952 the Soviet Union Government had submitted for consideration a draft of the bases for a peace treaty with Germany, but that the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom had not yet submitted their comments or counter-proposals. That is not really in accordance with the facts. The Government of the United Kingdom and the other two Governments associated with it have repeatedly addressed the Government of the Soviet Union on this subject since March 1952. They have emphasized that no lasting settlement for Germany can be negotiated until there is an all-German government based on the will of the German people as expressed in free elections. No other government would be qualified to take vital decisions concerning the future of a united Germany.
97. As recently as 2 September, following upon other offers, Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, together with the United States and French Governments, invited the Soviet Union Government to participate in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries which, it was suggested, might take place on 15 October at Lugano. We suggested that this meeting should devote itself to the German problem and should concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German government. There has not yet, so far as I am aware, been any answer to that invitation but we sincerely hope that it will be accepted and that some progress can be made upon this matter.
98. Before I leave the topic of Germany I should just like to add one word with regard to Mr. Vyshinsky’s criticism of the proposal that the Federal Republic of Germany should be a member of the European Defence Community. As Mr. Dulles pointed out in his speech, the European Defence Community will merge German military strength into the structure of a non-aggressive European community. That should be welcomed by the Soviet Union because neither Germany nor any other member of the Community will be able to take independent military action to serve national ambitions. There is in this plan really much greater security for the Soviet people against the risk of another German aggression than in the sort of peace treaty which the Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward, under which an independent Germany would have national armed forces.
99. Austria also provides a problem which we think is capable of very speedy solution. I will not repeat what Mr. Dulles said on that matter except to remind the Assembly that the offer of the three Western Occupying Powers to conclude an Austrian treaty at a meeting of Foreign Ministers has so tar met with no response; but that offer is still open.
100. A region of the world where undoubtedly there is danger to international peace is Indo-China. All our sympathy goes out to the soldiers of the French Union fighting in Indo-China where, under the guidance and inspiration of France, a cruel and exhausting war against an internal enemy, financed and supported from abroad, is being fought in the territory of the three Associated States. There can be no lasting peace in Asia so long as the war continues in these three States, whose admission to the United Nations has been recommended by the General Assembly. The ending of the war in the Associated States of Indo-China is an essential step along the path of pacification and conciliation in Asia which began with the armistice in Korea.
101. That brings me to the most immediate and pressing problem, that of Korea. The armistice has been achieved in spite of differences which at one time appeared to be insoluble, and the next step is to set up the political conference called for by the Armistice Agreement. The opinion of this Assembly on the way in which that conference should bet set up was made clear less than a month ago, and proposals were made and communicated to the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the North Korean authorities. These were reasonable and helpful and in no way prejudiced the right of the other side in the Korean conflict to be fully and adequately represented at the conference.
102. It is, of course, well known that the United Kingdom Government, among others, thought that the participation of India would benefit the work of the conference, but I repeat the view which I expressed in the General Committee on 22 September [88th meeting], to which I invite the Assembly’s most earnest attention: that the setting up of the conference is of more importance than the participation of particular Member States which were not parties to the conflict.
103. We have learnt to our regret that the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the North Korean authorities are not in full agreement with the proposals of the United Nations. This, however, is certainly not the appropriate moment for the Assembly to debate again issues on which they have so recently taken decisions, and we fervently hope that the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the North Korean authorities will on reconsideration find themselves able to accept the proposals which we have made and to join in a conference next month. For the urgent and important thing is to get the conference started. The longer we delay, the more we debate publicly and discuss the formation of the conference, the more extraneous and irrelevant issues may be brought in and the harder it may be to get agreement in the long run. So let us get the conference started, and started quickly, in the most simple and straightforward manner possible.
104. I hope that very careful consideration will be given to the new and constructive suggestions which were put forward by Mr. Lodge on 22 September in the General Committee [88th meeting] and repeated in the General Assembly [440th meeting]. The first suggestion was that the question of the participation of so-called neutral States should be left to the political conference, without any country being committed beforehand to a rigid position on this matter. That seems to me to be a most sensible and statesmanlike way of resolving the present situation. The second suggestion was for a representative of the United States Government and a representative of the other side to meet as quickly as possible to discuss all arrangements for the conference. Attempts have been made to insist on an exact definition of that word “arrangements”. Why? Why not leave it at the word “arrangements”? Is it impossible ever to leave a little flexibility? It seems to us that that suggestion also is an initiative to be welcomed.
105. Mr. Vyshinsky ridiculed these suggestions without any pause for consideration. We regret that attitude. We hope that there will be second thoughts and that these proposals, when considered, will receive a favourable answer, because the verdict of history is going to be harsh upon all of us if, because of a difference of opinion on composition, we fail to get this vital conference started.
106. When the conference does begin, the participants will have a difficult task. The reunification of Korea by peaceful means will not be easy; at the same time we certainly appreciate the need for giving assurances of security to a reunited Korea and its neighbours. I agree with what the representative of Canada said in this connexion yesterday [441st meeting].
107. Towards the end of his speech, the Soviet Union representative made a reference to disarmament. I think that no one will disagree that one of the great dangers to peace is the uncontrolled expansion and development of national armaments and weapons of mass destruction. These have made the prospects of a war not only repugnant but appalling, and we now know that if it came it might well wipe life off the surface of the globe. We are presented with a challenge which we have to meet if civilization is to survive. We have to devise a system of disarmament sufficiently comprehensive and so well safeguarded as to command the confidence of all nations. For this to be achieved, we obviously have to create conditions of mutual confidence between nations, and the obvious way to do this is to remove causes of friction.
108. The representative of the Soviet Union argued that the reduction of armaments would of itself reduce international tension. That may be, but it is surely ingenuous to suggest that there can be any significant progress in putting a disarmament programme into effect until a greater degree of international confidence has been created or restored.
109. Nevertheless, we think that preliminary agreement on the requirements for a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament programme, which would include the prohibition and abolition of all weapons of mass destruction, would of itself contribute towards the easing of tension. As the United States Secretary of State said on 17 September, attempts to reach agreement on these requirements can and should be made concurrently with attempts to find solutions to the various political problems. Now it was precisely to meet this need and to make such preparations that this Assembly established the Disarmament Commission at the beginning of last year [resolution 502 (VI)].
110. The commission has made no progress in the last few months. I do not think that the fault lies with the United Kingdom Government or with the other governments associated with it. Last year we gave clear proof of our earnest desire to get the commission moving. I do not need to remind the Assembly of the series of working papers submitted in the commission by my delegation and the delegations associated with us. There is the United States paper on disclosure and verification, and on the essential principles of a disarmament programme; there is the tripartite working paper on the numerical limitation of all armed forces; there is the supplementary paper dealing with the distribution of men between the armed forces, the limitation of armaments, and other necessary aspects of a disarmament programme. There were several other suggestions put forward in the Committee’s discussions.
111. We do not regard these working papers as hard-and-fast proposals. We want to hear comments on them or constructive counter-proposals. But I think it is better to speak frankly. All that we received were general accusations from the Soviet Union representative that our only interest was in espionage and that our suggestions meant that we did not genuinely want disarmament; or else bald restatements of those slogans which are again set forth in the draft resolution [A/2485/Rev.1] submitted on 21 September.
112. The Soviet Union proposals do not seem to have evolved in any way since they were first put forward. At the sixth session, in Paris nearly two years ago, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control should be put into effect simultaneously and that inspection should be on a continuing basis. We have tried repeatedly in the Disarmament Commission to find out what these expressions mean in terms of practical arrangements. It really is up to the Soviet Union to tell us definitely whether it is prepared to agree to the minimum safeguards necessary to make a disarmament programme secure, and to discuss with us in detail those essential safeguards. We really cannot get anywhere without frank and detailed discussion about practical arrangements.
113. We have repeated again and again the reasons why we cannot accept these very general proposals of the Soviet Union as they now stand. A cut by one-third of the existing armed forces and armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council would produce an arbitrary and quite inequitable redistribution of strength, even if we could be sure, without some kind of supervision, that such a reduction would be made in fact by all, or even if we knew from what existing strength the reduction would take place. A decision to abolish atomic and other weapons of mass destruction seems to us to be impractical except within the framework of a system which will ensure that the dangerous material involved will be used only for peaceful purposes. Also this matter must necessarily be linked with the limitation of conventional armaments.
114. Mr. Dulles intimated that the views of the United States Government on disarmament were not inflexible. I only wish that we could have some indication of flexibility or novelty in the Soviet Union’s disarmament proposals. However, I sincerely hope that we shall decide to continue the Disarmament Commission for a further period. That, it seems to us, will provide the appropriate place where this particular matter can be discussed further, and the United Kingdom Government, for its part, is ready and anxious to take its share of the work. If we can get a conference upon Germany, if we can get the Korean conference set up and functioning, and if we can give some sense of reality and urgency to the work of the Disarmament Commission, then we shall indeed be beginning to make progress.
115. There is just one other subject, before I finish, upon which there are signs that tempers have been unnecessarily roused. We have on our agenda three items referring to Charter revision. It is obviously too soon for any Power to commit itself on any respect of this complicated subject. I think no one can claim that the Charter as drafted at San Francisco was in every way a perfect instrument. Little in this world is perfect, and we have all of us to consider between now and 1956 whether the instrument can be improved.
116. I feel that the best attitude for all of us at the present time is to refrain from taking up rigid positions one way or the other on any of the particular controversies, and to seek to prepare ourselves so that the discussions on this matter at the tenth session of the Assembly in 1955 can be fruitful. I am sure that all of us should ponder very carefully indeed the wise words spoken in this Assembly this morning by the representative of Sweden in this connexion. I fail to understand the extreme nervousness apparently shown by some delegations at any idea of any Charter revision. Surely this is one topic to which we should be able to give dispassionate consideration, and in any case, as the representative of Sweden pointed out, it must be remembered that any proposals for the revision of the Charter are subject to the exercise of the veto.
117. To sum up, I feel that it would be foolish to expect sensational results from this Assembly. No series of speeches, however profound, no batch of resolutions, however comprehensive, can cure the sicknesses afflicting the world today. But we have a decisive role to play. A great step forward was taken when the fighting stopped in Korea. A new hope was born and we are now at a critical phase in the development of relations between the free world and the communist countries. The future hangs in the balance. Much may depend upon the turn given to events during the next few weeks or months.
118. It has been proved that a limited agreement is possible and I feel that we must do nothing by our debates to forfeit that gain, to prejudice the possibility of further agreements. Let us, by the atmosphere we seek to create at this Assembly, help rather than hinder, and contribute to the maintenance of the momentum of the improvement — the relaxation in tension of which I have spoken.
119. As soon as any agreement with the Iron Curtain countries is mooted, there are some people in the countries of the free world who start to talk of “appeasement”, using that word as a term of abuse, denoting dishonourable surrender. I do not think it can be emphasized sufficiently that negotiation is not the same thing as appeasement. The twentieth century has had little experience of making peace by negotiation. The great wars of this century have been fought to a finish and the victors have dictated the peace terms to the vanquished. In older, and perhaps more civilized, times wars were usually ended by negotiation, by compromise, before one nation had completely tom the heart out of another nation. Perhaps this modern age of ours has more than a little to learn about the techniques of earlier and less destructive centuries.
120. Of course the thought can never be far from our minds of the terrible consequences of failure. However, I affirm by own belief that there is a real hope of further progress in the next twelve months. Cannot we, all of us, by our conduct at this Assembly, sustain and forward that hope, and so bring some comfort to the anxious and perplexed hearts in every land, poised between hope and despair and longing for the leadership necessary to guide the world towards a lasting peace?