Burma

When I was giving thought to the form which this statement should take, I naturally looked over the address which was delivered by the then Chairman of the delegation of Burma at the sixth session of the General Assembly [347th meeting], one year ago. I received a shock. It seemed that time had stood still, for everything that was then said applied with equal, and perhaps even greater, force today. My predecessor opened his statement by saying that he wished merely to express the hopes and fears of a small country. After briefly setting out our fears, my predecessor concluded with this passage: “The Burmese delegation, even if they represent a very small nation, are no less sincere in their desire for peace. They therefore make a fervent appeal to the representatives of the major Powers, who can shape the destiny of the world, to endeavour to effect a change of heart which will pave the way for a spirit of compromise — which, again is the basic ingredient of the remedy for misunderstanding and the means of steering the world away from the horrors of a conflagration.”. That must unfortunately remain our fervent prayer in the fateful year 1952. 100. I wish to turn now to a problem which occupies the mind of every single representative in this Assembly and millions of persons all over the world. I refer, of course, to the terrible conflict in Korea. Anyone who has followed the discussions In the First Committee must feel extremely, despondent. My delegation is no exception, but we feel that it is possible to paint the picture blacker than it actually is. 101. On going through the documents furnished to us, we were greatly impressed with the degree of agreement which had already been reached at Panmunjom on so many controversial issues, each of which seemed at one time to be just as difficult of solution as the one remaining issue which still is deadlocked. The substantial concessions made on both sides seem to indicate that there exists the basic mutual good will and sincerity required to produce an overall settlement. It is easy to overlook all this or to belittle the substantial achievements already made, while all our attention has been focused on the prisoner exchange issue. 102. It would also be understandable if patience were beginning to wear a little thin on both sides. But understandable though this may be, it is the last thing that we can afford to let happen. The issue is peace or a continuation of bloodshed, with the ever-present threat that it may develop into something very much worse. These being the alternatives, my delegation feels in duty bound to plead for continued patience, 103. We are perfectly aware that the First Committee has ten heavy items to dispose of and that it is still stuck on the first. The way we look at it, however, is that this session of the General Assembly will have been more than worth while if we do not do anything at all except reach a settlement in Korea. 104. We have heard it said that Korea is just a symptom, that a satisfactory treatment of this symptom would still leave the disease uncured and that the tensions would still continue. We do not see it quite in that light. We feel that the present world situation is like a car tire which has been inflated almost to the bursting point. Even a small puncture in that tire would, in our view, help to remove the danger of a blow-out by gradually reducing the pressure Inside. An armistice in Korea would, we feel, represent a pretty sizable puncture in the tire. 105. Apart from this overall effect, we must never forget that an armistice would bring an end to the terrible destruction which has enveloped the Korean peninsula during the last forty months and to the sacrifices being made daily by the brave men on both sides of the battle line. As Some of our colleagues have already pointed out, the number of casualties suffered by both sides in the course of the few weeks during which we have been discussing the Korean issue here must, by now, exceed the number of prisoners whose immediate future Has given, rise to this deadlock; and the number will keep on increasing, steadily if the war goes on. In these circumstances, surely it behoves all of us to keep on trying to find a solution acceptable to both sides, so that this slaughter will be stopped. 106. It may be possible to secure a majority of votes on a resolution. But what good is this going to do unless all the parties to the conflict accept that resolution. As at least one previous speaker has said we should aim at solutions, not resolutions. Any impatience exhibited: at this time is only going to result in the prolongation for an indefinite period of the suffering and devastation. I should therefore like to conclude this passage of my statement by pleading once again for patience and understanding. 107. While on the subject of world tensions, I wish now to refer to another Contributory factor in building tap tensions. This arises from the failure of certain Powers to appreciate that some of the peoples over whom they continue to exercise domination have now reached a stage of development which fits them to govern themselves or, at any rate, to be given a greater share in the government of their countries. The statement made yesterday [392nd meeting] by the Foreign Minister of France seemed to me to reflect exactly such a lack of appreciation. I do not propose to go into it in detail at this stage. I wish, however, to touch on one or two matters which caught my attention as the statement was being delivered, 108. The first was the claim that France had, during its stewardship, introduced economic and social changes in Tunisia, as a result of which the people there were now better off than in the independent countries which have been critical of France. This may or may not be true, but it seems hardly relevant to the issue. Our general view is that good government is no substitute for self-government. And if it be true that the people of Tunisia have reached a stage of development which is ahead of that of some of the neighbouring countries, it seems to me all the more reason that they should be given a larger share of responsibility than they now have in governing the country. 109. But something that Mr. Schuman said later seemed to indicate that political development had perhaps not been permitted to keep pace with development in the economic and social fields. Referring to the detailed programme of reforms which the French Government had submitted to the Bey, the Foreign Minister said: “We are trying to spread democratic organization at all levels, starting at the bottom in the municipalities and other local communities.” I must confess that this came to me as something of a surprise; that in 1952, seventy years after France assumed responsibility for Tunisia, the French Government was only just beginning to think of introducing these reforms. 110. I could not help comparing the situation immediately with that which obtained in my country while it was governed by the British. By a strange coincidence, Upper Burma — that is, the larger part of what is now the Union of Burma — was annexed to the British Empire in 1885, just about the time that the French assumed responsibility for Tunisia. But local self-government of the kind referred to by Mr. Schuman was introduced in Upper Burma as early as 1900; and by 1925, most of our municipalities and district councils had been put on a fully representative basis. Simultaneously with this last change, Burma had a full-fledged cabinet at the centre, a cabinet whose members bad complete control over all internal matters, including law and order and finance. 111. As everybody knows, we became entirely independent in 1948. Yet in 1952, the French Government is considering the introduction of municipal self-government in Tunisia. Here we seem to have hit at the root of the Tunisian problem. It is perhaps right here in Tunisia itself and not in the extraneous sources that he mentioned that Mr. Schuman will find the cause of the current discontent In Tunisia. In Morocco it seems that such reforms have not even been considered. If past performance is any guide, it seems that the Moroccans will have to wait until 1982 for them, since Morocco became a French Protectorate thirty years after Tunisia. 112. It seems to us that the great French nation, famed for its devotion to freedom and the dignity of individual and nations, has failed to apply the same principles and standards to its subject peoples, Like Rip Van Winkle, the French nation has suddenly awakened to find a changed world, The experience is naturally disconcerting and readjustment is difficult. It remains our fervent hope that it will be possible for France to make the readjustment demanded by the times without too much difficulty or delay, 113. Another factor contributing to world tension stems from the racial policies adopted by certain governments, notably the Government of the Union of South Africa. One does not have to read only the newspaper reports coming out of the Union of South Africa to notice that these measures have in them the seeds of serious trouble for the future. Of much greater significance is the reaction in the Press of all the newly-independent countries of Asia and of Africa. This in itself indicates how spurious is the claim that this is a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Government of the Union of South Africa. It is something which no world organization can afford to ignore. 114. Finally, I turn to the last of the factors contributing to world tension. It is perhaps not as acute as the other factors I have just mentioned, but from the long-range point of view it is probably as important as the rest put together, Recent surveys have indicated that the gap in the living standards between the highly developed and the under-developed areas of the world is widening and widening fast. This is dangerous in itself, but what makes it doubly dangerous is the fact that the people of the under-developed countries are no longer prepared to do without certain things which they know exist in the world. This revolution of rising expectations, as it had been so aptly called, is bound to grow with the passage of time. Unless the world as a whole takes steps to meet this challenge, possibly by diverting part of what is now spent on armaments to more productive purposes, it seems that we shall all be heading towards disaster, 115. We all know that this challenge would have come forward even if the ideological conflict had never come into existence and that it will remain even after this conflict is dissipated. Yet there is a very strong tendency to merge this problem with the ideological conflict and to gauge its importance strictly in relation to the extent to which it can be so merged. What seems to be required is a fuller realization, particularly in the more fortunate countries of the world, that this is a problem which has come to stay, regardless of any other conflicts or problems which have already developed or may develop in the future, 116. We are aware of the steps which have already been taken to meet this problem. Unfortunately, progress so far has been slow and the results extremely meagre. Obviously what is required is that a much more imaginative programme of economic development should be introduced and, since such programmes are inevitably slow to produce results, that such a programme should be brought under way as early as, possible. We are aware of the difficulties which exist and have no desire to belittle them, but we are by no means convinced that everything that is possible within the means now available is in fact being done to meet this challenge.