14. The United Nations was founded to maintain international peace and security in the widest sense of that term. Peace-keeping remains the fundamental task of our Organization. Its primary purpose is to serve as an instrument for peaceful settlement of disputes and situations caused by a clash of national interests and policies. In the world of today armed conflict anywhere may spread and lead to great-Power intervention and, indeed, ultimately to atomic extinction of us all.
15. Over the last few months we have, however, seen the very functioning of the United Nations endangered by a divergence of views affecting basic principles. There is as yet no agreement on how to overcome the immediate financial crisis. A solution has nevertheless to be found. In this very grave situation we must unite our efforts to find a solution which will re-establish the financial solvency of the Organization and thus enable it to continue its activities with renewed assurance in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
16. It has been our great fortune that two such outstanding personalities as our President and our Secretary-General have, in devotion to the cause of the United Nations, joined their efforts to assist the Organization to get over the present impasse. I can assure you that my Government will join with other Member States in responding to an appeal by the United Nations to help re-establish its financial solvency.
17. In this situation of grave crisis for the Organization we are seriously disturbed over the recent decision of a fellow Member State, party to a local dispute, to place itself outside the continuous processes of peaceful adjustment and settlement going on within the United Nations. On behalf of the Norwegian Government I address an urgent appeal to the Government of Indonesia to reconsider its position.
18. Under the Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security rests with the Security Council. This principal role of the Council may in practice be further enhanced by the increase of its membership, which there is every reason to expect will enter into effect before the opening of the twentieth session of the General Assembly. By this long overdue reform all regional groupings will be assured more equitable representation on the Council, thus enabling it to exercise its authority through discussions and decisions representative of the membership of the United Nations as a whole.
19. The enlargement of the Security Council will, however, not basically affect the constitutional position of its permanent members. There are today indications of a wider understanding amongst us of the justification and, indeed, the need for the special responsibilities of the five permanent members of the Security Council, notwithstanding the fact that their right of veto entails the power to prevent substantive decisions. But the acceptance of their special position does depend on the permanent members exercising their rights with restraint, thus making the Security Council an effective body. We welcome the fact that the permanent members have of late shown a measure of restraint in exercising their privileges. It would, of course, be highly unrealistic to expect any of them to adopt such an attitude when they feel that their direct security interests are at stake. Neither would I advocate resignation in regard to proposals to apply means of enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter. Here effective and meaningful action would clearly require the positive support of the great Powers and an active willingness on their part to assist in enforcing a decision.
20. There is, however, a wide range of steps, short of enforcement measures, which the Security Council may take to promote peaceful settlements in situations falling under Chapter VI of the Charter, and in particular in cases where the security interests of the permanent members are not immediately involved. An attitude of moderation in this regard by the permanent members might also be hoped for in the future with regard to an agreed system for financing peacekeeping activities.
21. A reaffirmation of the principal responsibility of the Security Council will not reduce the competence of the General Assembly under the Charter. It seems to me inconceivable that this Assembly would sit idly by observing a conflict developing into a great conflagration if the Security Council is unable to take action. In return, the Security Council may expect a more strict adherence to the Charter provision that the Assembly, unless requested to do so by the Council, shall not make any recommendation with regard to disputes or situations under active consideration by the Council.
22. During the sessions of the General Assembly in 1962 and 1963, the view was expressed that many rules of traditional international law were the result of efforts on the part of colonial Powers to maintain their privileged positions in the world. Consequently, it was indicated that the time was ripe for revision, taking into account the changes which had occurred in the world in the course of the last two decades. It goes without saying that international law cannot remain static in a rapidly changing world. Changes have indeed led to and must necessarily continue to lead to adjustments. My country, for one, will certainly co-operate in good faith with a view to bringing about such adjustments.
23. There are, however, obvious hazards involved in proceeding too rapidly in this respect. These hazards are particularly manifest when we are dealing with those basic principles of international law — enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations — which directly concern friendly relations and co-operation among States.
24. War has become inacceptable as an instrument of policy and it may be tempting for Governments, individually or collectively, to apply in peacetime measures which traditionally have been associated with a state of war. Boycott and other economic sanctions should not be excluded as means of rectifying injustices. Indeed, the Charter itself envisages such actions under certain specified conditions, but these are means to be used with great caution; lest the rectifying action produce more havoc and human suffering than the situation one is trying to rectify. These considerations are all the more relevant in situations where individual nations or groups of nations advocate such measures outside the established framework of the United Nations Charter.
25. I now turn to the problem of nuclear armaments, the most agonizing of all international problems of our time. I shall speak about it with humility, because 1 realize how heavily the burden of atomic responsibility is felt by the nations which have it in their power to decide the future of mankind.
26. It so happens that the five Members defined by the Charter as the permanent members of the Security Council are now also the members of the atomic club. My Government regrets that the club has become as large as that. We doubt that the more recent members have added to their own security or to the security of the rest of the world. But their nuclear position is a fact — a fact about which, for the time being, at least, it seems that little can be done.
27. My plea — and that is why I stand here today — is that we should all agree that the club is now large enough. I believe we are all aware that countries which do not have world-wide security responsibilities or possess the capacity for distant military action might feel less inhibition in actually using nuclear arms than the five permanent members of the Security Council, and above all the two super-Powers which today between them possess more than 95 per cent of existing nuclear power.
28. A balance of terror implies more security than imbalance of terror, but no one would pretend that the existing balance, is a lasting solution to the most awesome problem of our time. The only consolation is that nuclear power does not necessarily give added freedom of action to a major Power. It rather, I believe, tends to limit it, because if a big Power should ever use nuclear weapons it is likely to engage nuclear power against itself.
29. But what would the world be like if, five or twenty years from now, we should have ten or maybe twenty nuclear Powers? It is the most terrifying perspective I can imagine. Countries, large and small, would live in permanent fear, and might act nervously in times of tension. Uncalculated catastrophe might occur. The temptation to take pre-emptive action might be irresistible. And yet, this gruelling, situation can be foreseen quite realistically if the developments towards a multiplication of nuclear Powers are not arrested,
30. Some three years ago what is known as the "Irish resolution" was unanimously adopted by this Assembly. It calls upon present nuclear Powers not to relinquish control of atomic arms to any nation not possessing them and calls upon all other Powers not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. It is my profound conviction that our greatest challenge today is to implement that resolution. Time is about to run out. In a few years more countries may be well advanced along the catastrophic road, one country bringing the other along. Can any responsible Government resign itself to this situation? Can we simply note that the road to nuclear catastrophe, involving the very existence of civilization, if not of humanity itself, becomes ever broader, ever easier?
31. The Norwegian Government believes that the first step to be taken in implementation of the resolution already adopted is for all countries not now possessing nuclear weapons to assume clear and firm treaty commitments not to produce or otherwise acquire national control of such weapons, and for nuclear Powers to accept treaty commitments not to relinquish control over the weapons they possess and not to transmit information that will enable States not possessing such weapons to manufacture them.
32. To be of real value, such a system must be universal. If commitments were made solely by countries which have no capability or desire to produce nuclear arms anyway, it would give only the illusion of peace-making without the substance of it. If certain countries remain outside a new non-nuclear club, it might even add to present dangers.
33. Such a system must also be under effective control. I do not believe, however, that treaty commitments need await the establishment of a final and comprehensive control system. Initial treaty commitments might be contingent upon a control system being implemented within a certain period of time. It would hardly be reasonable to expect that nations which consider themselves to be on the threshold of developing a nuclear capability would accept a prolonged period of negotiation. Therefore, negotiations should be started forthwith and be pursued with vigour. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna is at present close to completing a control system for verifying that ostensibly peaceful nuclear activities are not used by any nation to further military purposes. This effort is indeed an encouraging contribution towards the working out within a reasonable span of time of a comprehensive control system.
34. It may be claimed that we are already too late and that the whole idea of establishing a universal nonnuclear club of all countries which do not today possess nuclear weapons is unrealistic. But I, for one, refuse to believe so until I have seen it proved. I cannot see how any responsible Government can refuse to do its utmost to find a solution to a problem of such crucial importance to us all.
35. With regard to practical procedures and methods for implementing the Irish resolution I hold no definite views. The Assembly might charge the Disarmament Conference at Geneva with the task. It might set up a special committee for the purpose. Or it might request the Secretary-General to set the proper machinery in motion. I would also have an open mind with regard to any other procedure that might be suggested. The task itself is of supreme importance. Any procedure which ensures that we move from the lofty world of resolutions to the practical task of working out a treaty that could solve the vital problem of non- dissemination of nuclear weapons would be acceptable to my Government.
33. I have already spoken at some length about the role of the five permanent members of the Security Council. One of those five Powers, the People's Republic of China, is not represented in the United Nations. We understand the difficult position of Formosa, but the Government of that island does not represent China as a whole. I am furthermore aware that some countries with large Chinese minorities might experience difficulties through a change in China's representation in the United Nations. Such considerations must, however, be weighed against the disadvantages of keeping the most populous State of the world outside universal multilateral diplomacy.
37. In the view of the Norwegian Government, the international community stands to lose by continuing to ostracize a major Power with active influence outside its own borders and now in the process of developing its own military atomic potential. All of us who are Members of the United Nations have experience of how national policies are influenced by the diplomatic processes of the Organization. Sometimes Member States feel compelled to expose their views and policies in situations where they might have preferred not to do so. Realizing that such exposure cannot be avoided, they may find it advisable to adjust their policies so as to move closer to the mainstream of opinion within the Organization. By being kept outside the United Nations, the People's Republic of China is exempted from this sort of moderating influence.
38. During the last year, certain aspects of the tense situation in South-East Asia were brought before the Security Council. In the view of my country —at that time a member of the Council — it was clearly demonstrated during those discussions that efforts on the part of the United Nations to ease the situation were seriously handicapped by the absence of the People's Republic of China.
39, But above all, I think it is generally accepted that disarmament negotiations will never become fully realistic without the participation of all great Powers. It is inconceivable that any major Power would be willing to sign agreements on measures in the field of general and complete disarmament if China's adherence to such agreements were not secured. It is even more inconceivable that China itself will adhere to any agreement if it has not participated in the preceding negotiations. Here, I believe, lies the most decisive argument in favour of accepting the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and engaging it actively in multilateral diplomacy.
40. The unanimous resolution setting up the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development with subsidiary organs, as a permanent institution, may well prove to be one of the signal achievements of the present General Assembly. Countries like mine look upon the outcome of the Conference as the opening of a new chapter, the start of a process through which we shall go on and on searching for solutions to basic economic and social challenges to all of humanity.
41, Some of the speakers who have preceded me in this debate have expressed a certain measure of disappointment with the outcome of the Trade and Development Conference in Geneva. It may well be that the more industrialized countries, and Norway among them, have to some extent brought about this disappointment by the words they have used over the years. It may be that by too many general declarations about their keen interest in the problems of development, industrialized countries have created the impression with Asian, African and Latin-American Member States that we were ready to take more rapid and far-reaching action than we have actually been able to do, or, to put it differently, than it has proved politically possible to do. Through concerted action it should, however, be possible in the future to do more to create a one-world economy than has been done in the past.
42. At Geneva, the developing countries spoke with frankness about what they felt the industrialized countries ought to do in regard to tariff policies, fiscal policies, financial transfers, maritime transport and a number of other matters. In the discussions to come in the Trade Conference, my Government feels the industrialized countries should, in their turn, honestly and openly, make known their views to the developing countries on the need for economic and social reform. The developing countries may be assured that the great efforts so many of them are making under the most difficult conditions are fully recognized. Frankness in this respect should, therefore, not be regarded by the developing countries as an attempt to intervene in their national policies. Agrarian reform, political and administrative stability, measures to curb steep population increases, should also be considered in an international context. In saying this, I simply state the fact that the ability of Governments in industrialized countries to rally political support for the efforts needed on their side, to a large extent depends on the will of developing countries to carry out the reforms on which modern economic development depends.
43. It is essential that the Trade Conference develop practical machinery and procedures. If a Government is called upon to take measures with a direct impact upon its economy and which may, temporarily at least, cause unemployment and dislocation, it will do so only after specific, realistic negotiations. I think this holds true for countries large and small. Only as a result of practical negotiations can they be expected to adopt policies disadvantageous to their economy, but which are required to meet the needs of developing countries.
44. My Government is fully aware that upon the success of the Trade Conference hinges the very question of a decent life for hundreds of millions of human beings. I am profoundly convinced that we all stand to gain much more from practical co-operation than from general resolutions. When dealing with problems affecting important economic interests we deal with matters which cannot be legislated; they have to be negotiated,
45. I conclude by underlining once more that a way must be found to overcome the present financial predicament of our Organization. There is an urgent need to press on with working out an agreed and orderly procedure for peace-keeping operations, We cannot continue to rely on improvisation and voluntary contributions in this vital field.
46. A determined effort should be made to work out, as a matter of urgency, a universal agreement to prevent the emergence of new nuclear Powers.
47. Finally, the time has come for the United Nations to grapple in earnest with the problem of economic development. The gap between the rich and the poor countries must be narrowed and ultimately it must be bridged.