1. His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Laos, planned personally to head the Laotian delegation to the nineteenth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. Unfortunately, at the last moment circumstances beyond his control kept him at Vientiane. He very reluctantly had to turn over to the Vice-President of his Council the chairmanship of the Laotian delegation in New York.
2. Accordingly, Mr. President, it is I who have the privilege of tendering to you the warmest congratulations of Laos on your election to the Presidency of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. Your election by unanimous acclamation on 1 December is an impressive confirmation of your personal abilities as a dynamic and able diplomat. This election also honours your country and, through Ghana, the entire African continent.
3. Your forceful and inspiring opening address gives ground for hope that, under your guidance, the work of this session will make an effective contribution, founded on wisdom and reason, to the search for solutions to the serious problems of our time. I am convinced that further achievements in the pursuit of the lofty purposes of the Charter and in the application of its principles will be recorded at the nineteenth session and that they will accord with and supplement those of the foregoing sessions.
4. It is in this sense, that my delegation expresses its confidence and faith in the future of the United Nations and in the continuity of its work, despite the difficult beginning of this session. The United Nations has already more than once experienced constitutional crises which have threatened its existence. It has survived them, thanks to the patient efforts of those who, at the decisive moment, have been willing to sacrifice some of the individual interests of their countries and Governments in order to safeguard the interest of the community as a whole. It would be- well if the present financial crisis arising from peacekeeping operations were resolved in the same way. For any other alternative would involve the risk of a profitless and hazardous undertaking which would lead straight to disorder and anarchy.
5. It should also be observed — and I do so with profound admiration — that the very worthy successor of the late lamented Dag Hammarskjold has not spared his efforts or his health in his endeavours to settle, with great tact and political wisdom, the serious difficulties which exist both within the Organization and elsewhere. I refer to U Thant, our respected Secretary-General. On this occasion I wish to express my very sincere wishes for his prompt recovery.
6. I wish also to express the Kingdom's gratitude for the United Nations experts and technicians who were assigned to Laos and who have proved both dedicated and competent.
7. I should also like to add the fraternal wishes of the Laotian people and Government to the brilliant statements of welcome to Malawi, Malta and Zambia — the three new States admitted to United Nations membership. The accession of a people to independence and the admission of a new State to the United Nations are, for us, a source of satisfaction, even as, for the Organization they are a practical illustration of the accomplishment of one of the purposes of the Charter — the emancipation and equality of peoples.
8. I wish these new Members a peaceful and prosperous future, in the conviction that they will make a vigorous contribution to the work of our Organization both in the promotion of its ideals and in the application of its principles.
9. I shall take the opportunity provided by the admission of these three States to explain my Government's views concerning the problem of the eventual admission of other States to membership in the United Nations. Its neutrality being confirmed by the Geneva Agreements of 1962, Laos favours the admission to the United Nations of all States, large and small, which fulfil the conditions for membership. At the same time, however, it does not desire the unwarranted withdrawal of other Members. This conciliatory attitude is dictated by my country's policy of strict neutrality and by its people's desire to retain the friendship of all peoples, whatever their political system. This is the spirit in which my delegation views universal representation in the United Nations — as a representation which should conform to the international realities of the times.
10. We have many problems to examine at this session. Some are both touchy and complex, especially when subjected to close scrutiny; but most of them are connected with the great questions of peace, disarmament, economic development and decolonization.
11. My delegation considers that the greatest problem of our time — the problem which our generation must resolve if mankind is to survive — is the problem of peace among nations.
12. We are not threatened in the immediate future with a general war which, unfortunately for the human race, would bring weapons of mass destruction into play. Nevertheless, the international situation as a whole remains disquieting, because of the trouble spots which still disturb a part of Africa, a Mediterranean island and a sector of Asia.
13. In most instances these localized conflicts, even when they take place within a country, are of concern to foreign Powers with different systems. That is the tragedy of foreign interference in a troubled country into which, supported by intensive propaganda, flow, weapons and munitions, obsolete in their countries of origin but spreading ruin and death among an innocent and formerly peaceful and tranquil population. This situation has for many years sustained an almost permanent state of tension and still disturbs the world. The efforts, even the sacrifices, of men of goodwill to reduce this tension have not always been successful. A relaxation has been occasionally noted here and there, unfortunately for short periods of time. That was the case in the Congo, Viet-Nam, Cyprus and Laos, to cite only a few examples. I shall, with your permission, Mr. President, speak at greater length about my country later on.
14. Fortunately, the dark picture which I have just painted is not likely to discourage those persons who are dedicated to the cause of peace and who continue to work for understanding and co-operation. The powerful leaders, who meet within this Organization and under its auspices, are fully aware of what they can accomplish by a common effort to attain the objectives of freedom, justice and peace.
15. Of course, the undertaking is not easy, for it implies a basic reappraisal of the concept of international morality and a renunciation of the drive for power and domination; it presupposes acceptance of the fact that one political system does not have to surpass another. So long as the desire for conquest and hegemony is not banished from the minds of men, so long as men remain convinced that one system is superior to another—whereas each has its advantages and its shortcomings—the peaceful coexistence and harmony preached by both sides will be merely publicity slogans at the service of a given policy. This is certainly not what we want. We want these words to have the same meaning for everyone and to become tangible and practical realities. If not, distrust and suspicion will prevail and will inexorably lead to the arms race and to the search for positions of strength.
16. This leads me to say a few words concerning general disarmament — a historic endeavour that twentieth-century society, which calls itself civilized, must undertake in order to prevent another world war. The development of means of mass destruction has made this endeavour a vital necessity for all mankind, for whom it is a question of life or death.
17. Immense advances in the technology of destruction have made the possessors of thermonuclear weapons stop and think. They realize that a nuclear conflict, far from benefiting anyone, would lead to virtually total annihilation of the opposing camps. The fatalistic view that war is inevitable therefore becomes absurd. Hence my delegation has always supported all plans for general and complete disarmament.
18. Laos, which for many years has suffered the misfortune of war and known ruin and sorrow, fervently desires the banning or, better still, the destruction of all conventional and nuclear weapons. For, as long as arsenals are piled high with arms, men will be tempted to use them. We also favour the total prohibition of all nuclear tests. In fact, as is well known, scientists have established that radio-active contamination arising from nuclear tests in the atmosphere is a danger to the health not only of our generation but also of future generations. The establishment of denuclearized zones, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the abrogation of military pacts and the elimination of foreign bases will also receive our support.
19. There is Indeed much to be done in the matter of disarmament. The task is difficult, but there are some indications that the problem is not insoluble. The Moscow Treaty partially banning nuclear tests, the frequent contacts between the major political leaders and the regular sessions of the special Conference are encouraging signs.
20. My delegation hopes that other steps towards general disarmament will be taken in the near future, so that atomic energy may gradually come to be used for peaceful purposes, to help mankind to a better life. This new power, mastered and disciplined, could be utilized to produce electricity and heat not only for industrial and household purposes but also for a thousand other worthwhile uses which would increase man's resources and enable them to be fairly distributed.
21. With regard to the sharing out among men of the resources of the earth and the benefits of science, my delegation earnestly hopes that the gap between poor and rich countries will gradually be closed by means of appropriate agreements which would raise the former without lowering the latter and from which, for the greater honour of mankind, any provision implying exploitation would be excluded. We are not going so far as to recommend the system of communicating vessels, which involves no effort, for the rise in a people's level of living is proportionate to the sum total of its labour and industry. It is, rather, mainly a question of providing adequate conditions of work and gain for the less favoured, so that they will be able progressively to better themselves, without any political or economic strings which might hamper them in their peaceful ascent.
22. It is difficult for developed countries to be completely disinterested when they conduct operations in an ill-equipped foreign country. It often happens in such cases that those who give cannot understand the resentment of those who receive, and that is liable to become a source of regrettable misunderstanding between them. This is why we consider that it would be better for technical assistance to developing countries to be granted, in the main, through a specialized body of the United Nations. The donor countries would then know the satisfaction of anonymity, while the beneficiaries would appreciate their tact, disinterest and discretion. The two sides will draw closer when they feel that such give and take is normal behaviour in members of the same human family.
23. Peoples which have known subjection understand the bitterness and suffering of those still enduring oppression or racial discrimination. We firmly believe, however, that the liberation of subject countries is a historical process which must inevitably run its course. This is why we hope to see the early disappearance of domination and racism, and we hope that the United Nations will, at session after session, welcome all the peoples of the earth when they have all attained independence.
24. Let me now describe the situation in my country. I think I am justified in quoting the substance of the White Book which has just been published by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his foreword, Prince Souvanna Phouma, our Prime Minister, writes: "Laos has complained for a long time about North Viet-Namese interference in the conflict between the Neo Lao Halisat and other Lao political groups. Yet public opinion has always received these complaints with scepticism, as indeed have certain Governments. "Nevertheless it is true that North Viet-Namese troops have played a leading part in the fighting during the civil war which has been going on-for more than twenty years as I myself can confirm from the time I spent in Khang Khay. The Pathet Lao who at the start had only two battalions or about 1,200 men at their command can hardly claim they were in a position to overcome Government forces of more than 20,000. Indeed, if the Pathet Lao have not disappeared from the scene it is because of the support they have received in their guerilla activities. Here lies the secret of the interminable crisis of Laos. There is no need to look any further for the reasons why a political party, originally made up of an insignificant handful of Marxist revolutionaries, should have survived. "This White Paper published today gives an account of North Viet-Namese interference in Laos, interference which the Government of North Viet-Nam has always categorically denied. At Geneva during the 14-Power Conference the North Viet-Namese delegate publicly denied the participation of Viet-Minh troops in the internal affairs of Laos and defended this view with vigour and the most cynical insincerity. Today we bring conclusive evidence of their participation. "It is easier to do this now than it was formerly because the large number of defections from among the Pathet Lao ranks during recent months has provided us with indisputable proof: Lao soldiers, themselves former comrades in arms of the Viet-Minh, have come to understand that this war is not a war of 'national liberation' but a communist takeover of their country. "We hope this White Paper will convince world public opinion that the situation in Laos is not just an internal affair... The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 would have succeeded long ago had communist interference ceased completely and had the Democratic Republic of North Viet-Nam been content to set its own house in order... "This situation accounts for the troubled history of Laos ever since independence. While East and West carry on their conflict in this country, Laos will never be a neutral and independent State in accordance with the Geneva Agreements... "But the Laos themselves have one wish and one wish only: to be left in peace... "I hope this White Paper may help world opinion to understand better the grievous problem of Laos, which only exists because the 1962 Agreement has not been scrupulously observed by all its signatories. Peace in South-East Asia, indeed in the world, and the neutrality of Laos do not depend on Laos herself. They depend on other countries."
25. North Viet-Namese interference in Laos is not a new problem. Ever since the signature of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has not ceased its aggressive activities aimed at undermining the successful implementation of those Agreements.
26. On 16 January 1959 the Royal Government of Laos protested to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that North Viet-Namese forces had moved into occupation of certain Lao villages in the area north of the 17th parallel; and on 4 September the same year the Laotian Government appealed to the Secretary-General for United Nations assistance on the grounds of North Viet-Namese participation in attacks on Lao military posts along the north-eastern frontier.
27. The Geneva settlement of 1962 took specific note of the question, stating in article 2 of the Protocol that: "All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible."
28. Although the military advisers from other countries had been openly withdrawn by 7 October (the date laid down in the Agreement), the International Control Commission reported that only forty North Viet-Namese technicians had left the country through its check points at Nhommarat and Xieng Khouang. The total number of North Viet-Namese at the peak of the fighting had been estimated by reliable observers at several thousands.
29. The Government of National Union which had taken office on 23 June 1962 had proclaimed ceasefire throughout the country the following day.
30. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 provided for an International Commission, not only to supervise and control the observance of the cease-fire, but also to investigate violations of article 2 of the Protocol, in particular those concerned with foreign military intervention. Unfortunately the vague terms of reference of the Commission coupled with the refusal of the Pathet Lao to allow the Commission to make meaningful investigations in the areas placed under its control, prevented the Commission from substantiating repeated charges by the Royal Government that North Viet-Namese soldiers and military supplies were constantly entering the country, not only for the purpose of supporting the Pathet Lao, but also for supplying the Viet- Cong in South Viet-Nam by means of the "Ho Chi Minh" trail running through Eastern Laos. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has denied these charges, but conclusive evidence of North Viet-Namese interference has been found in the last few months, as will be shown below.
31. Beginning in February 1964 and following a preconceived plan, the Pathet Lao forces launched a large scale offensive to drive the Neutralist forces from the Plain of Jars. The purpose of these attacks, which were supported by North Viet-Namese units was to destroy the Neutralist forces under His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and consolidate the Pathet Lao-Viet-Minh hold on the so-called "liberated zone". It was clear that the Pathet Lao could not have launched the attack on their own: they had neither the resources within their territory to produce the sophisticated weapons used in the offensive, nor the trained technicians or soldiers to serve these weapons.
32. On 13 May 1964 the Prime Minister addressed a letter to the Chairman of the International Commission asking the Commission, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, to keep in readiness mobile inspection teams which could "investigate on the spot and bring immediately to the knowledge of the Co-Chairmen, by virtue of Article 8, all violations of the various provisions of the Protocol".
33. The Prime Minister also addressed a letter on 16 May 1964 to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference protesting at "the attacks launched since this morning by the Neo Lao Haksat-Viet-Minh troops against the Neutralist forces in the area of Muongphanh".
34. On 20 June 1964, the International Commission, in its Message No. 31 to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, set out its findings on the situation.
35. The Pathet Lao had rejected the charge of North Viet-Namese intervention claiming that they themselves were not even involved and that the fighting was only between different Neutralist factions. This was not the view of the Commission, which reported as follows: "The Pathet Lao capture of Phoukhe on 25 February 1964 and Phou Sann on 27 April 1964 respectively afforded them domination and observation of the Neutralist positions in the Plain of Jars from southeast as well as from the north. The capture of Phou Theneng and subsequent operations on 16 and 17 May KS4 clearly bring out Pathet Lao forces' co-ordinated actions."
36. The efforts of the Commission to investigate the responsibility for the violation of the cease-fire were frustrated because the Pathet Lao would not allow the Commission access either to the Plain of Jars or to other combat areas, so that it was unable to observe the operations or establish the presence of Viet-Minh support troops.
37. According to the Commission's team at the Plain of Jars, the extent of the military action of 16 and 17 May 1964 was sufficient to justify the assumption that it had been launched not by the small number of neutralist dissidents but by Pathet Lao-Viet-Minh units.
38. It is interesting to note in this connexion that on 24 October 1964 Radio Peking broadcasts, quoting the New China News Agency, announced that the Pathet Lao had awarded medals to some fifteen of its units fighting in the so-called liberated Xieng Khouang region. The unit which had seized Phou Kout, a position in the very centre of the Plain of Jars, was specifically mentioned as one of the fifteen units decorated.
39. The Pathet Lao has never granted facilities for access to the zones it controls to the International Commission to enable the latter to determine responsibility for violations of the cease-fire. Evidence of the obstacles put in the way of the Commission's investigative work by the Pathet Lao has been emphasized in the Commission's report, in which the following will be found: "Because of limitations placed on its freedom of movement by persistent Pathet Lao denials of ready access to Pathet Lao controlled territory the Commission is unfortunately not able to produce irrefutable evidence to show where responsibility lies for violations of the cease-fire; it is difficult, however, to avoid the inference that the Pathet Lao has something to hide. "As to investigating the allegations regarding the presence of Viet-Minh fighting alongside the Pathet Lao, the Commission is again hampered by the persistent refusal by the Pathet Lao to permit it to enter its territory except under very strictly controlled conditions. Again this denial leads the Commission to infer that the Pathet Lao has something to hide, otherwise freedom of entry and movement within the Pathet Lao area would be readily granted. "The Commission permits itself to observe that Pathet Lao insistence on tripartite agreement to investigations, an agreement that is so seldom granted, contains a logical absurdity; no guilty party will ever of its own accord permit the offences of which it is guilty to be investigated. The presumption of guilt therefore when access is denied in the circumstances of the Laotian situation ought to be recognized as a legitimate inference for the Commission to make." One wonders what the Pathet Lao wants to hide from the International Commission, if not the presence of North Viet-Namese troops in its ranks.
40. Although the Commission went far towards vindicating the Royal Government's contention about North Viet-Namese armed interference, it could not give outright support to this view. Given the limitations imposed on its operations, the evidence required was not available to it.
41. It was not until last September that irrefutable proof was discovered. On 15 September 1964, the Royal Government announced that various documents had been taken from the dead bodies of North Viet-Namese soldiers in the Xieng Khouang province. Included among these were a number of letters from these soldiers to their families in North Viet-Nam. At a press conference called on 15 September, journalists were able to examine these letters for themselves; translations were also available. Handwritten, on cheap paper or on sheets taken from an exercise book, these letters express the feelings and recount events in the life of North Viet-Namese soldiers far from their families and homeland. In the White Paper you will find a translation of a letter sent by a Viet-Minh soldier to this wife, Tran-thi-Lan; this is a specific example illustrating the facts I have cited. Other letters speak of present dangers and difficulties. An excerpt from a letter from Le Xuan Hao to his parents is also reproduced in the White Paper. Any impartial person would accept the authenticity of such letters, for they have the stamp of truth.
42. Shortly afterwards, further and even more convincing proof was supplied by the capture of North Viet-Namese soldiers. Three North Viet-Namese, Nguyen Khanh, Dang Son Hai and Tran Van Sinh, were taken prisoner, the first two on 15 and 16 September 1964 at Phon Xang Noi and the third on 19 September at Ban Ngiou Noi.
43. Nguyen Khanh, 19 years old, was called up for military service on 29 February 1964 and enrolled in the second topography company of No. 168 Artillery Regiment at Son-La in North Viet-Nam. On 23 June, his company, composed of about 100 North Viet-Namese soldiers, was ordered to proceed to Laos. A convoy consisting of nine lorries had left Son-La and taken the troops as far as Muong Sen, close to the Laotian border. There they were transferred to Pathet Lac lorries and taken to Khangkhay and were then divided into several units which participated in ground operations. Nguyen Khanh, lost and starving, was finally captured. Members of the international press were allowed to question him on 17 September.
44. The second prisoner, Dang Son Hai, had been called up on.3 January 1962 and had received infantry training. He entered Laos with a convoy on 1 March 1964, met with the same misfortune and was captured in the same way. Tran Van Sinh, the third Viet-Minh soldier, who had been in Laos for only one month, suffered the same fate. Particularly significant is the second prisoner's admission that on 28 April his battalion received the order to reinforce the Pathet Lao attack on the Plain of Jars. Ho personally took part in the battle which ended with the capture of the Plain of Jars by the Pathet Lao.
45. Among the documents found on the prisoners was a diary belonging to Nguyen Khanh. The entries in it provide striking corroboration of Nguyen Khanh's own account of his movements. This diary, which is reproduced in the White Paper, was kept from 23 June to 15 September 1964, the day of his capture. It is a very human document; written on squared paper, with notes on range-finding and ballistics at one end, it describes the day-to-day routine of a North Viet-Namese soldier with the Pathet Lao. Entries taken at random give an idea of the life of Viet-Minh soldiers in Laos.
46. The Royal Government of Laos has informed the Commission of the capture of the North Viet-Namese prisoners and granted it facilities to interrogate the said prisoners so that it may inform the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference about North Viet-Namese armed interference. The interrogation is under way, but the Commission's report had not been made public when the White Paper went to press.
47. The Royal Government contends that the capture of the three North Viet-Namese prisoners provides proof beyond all doubt that, as it has always claimed. North Viet-Namese have helped the Pathet Lao not only with war materials and food, but by units of their regular army. It also provides conclusive evidence of the extent to which the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has been guilty of interference in the internal affairs of Laos, an action which constitutes a flagrant violation of both the Geneva Agreements and the United Nations Charter.
48. Further overwhelming corroboration of Viet-Nam's guilt is provided by the numerous soldiers from the Pathet Lao ranks who have defected to the Royal Government because they could no longer bear the increasingly ruthless grip of the North Viet-Namese.
49. The Royal Government has protested strongly to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has asked it to cease its hostile acts forthwith. It also appeals to all those nations which believe in peace and justice to bear witness to this North Viet-Namese interference in the internal affairs of Laos and seeks their support in its attempts to put an end to this aggression. The aim of the Royal Government is, as in the past, to build a peaceful, independent and neutral Laos — an aim that cannot be achieved while North Viet-Namese armed interference continues.
50. I apologize for this long account of Viet-Minh activities as reported in the White Paper, which moreover is going to be Circulated. I consider that this information may serve to enlighten international opinion about the origin of the persistent difficulties faced by the Laotian Kingdom, difficulties which, because of foreign interference, have lasted for more than twenty years. In doing this, my delegation hopes for an impartial judgement on the case of Laos, whatever its source. Then perhaps suggestions and strong recommendations will be made which will influence the guilty and lead to the peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem, thereby introducing a measure of tranquillity in seething South-East Asia and in this troubled world.