119. In his introduction to his annual report [A/4132/Add.1] the Secretary-General has drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the position of the International Court of Justice, which offers opportunities for constructive progress that have been seriously neglected. The Secretary-General recalls that, on previous occasions, he has noted with regret the failure of many Member States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In his report he further stresses that the development and acceptance of international law impartially administered by judicial tribunals is essential to progress towards a more just and peaceful international order.
120. In a recent statement, the Prime Minister of Canada has expressed similar opinions. He strongly emphasized the importance of the International Court getting the opportunity to play a larger and more dynamic role in the international field. It may be added that the United Nations Charter explicitly provides that the Security Council, in making recommendations concerning the settlement -of a dispute, should take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.
121. In view of this principle, which is embodied in the Charter, the attitude of the Member States to the Court is undeniably not very encouraging. While eighty- five States are parties to the Statute of the Court, only thirty-eight States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, of these thirty-eight States, sixteen have laid down restrictive conditions which, in some cases, are equal to reservations of such a far-reaching nature that very little remains of the “compulsory” jurisdiction. No fewer that forty-seven States have failed altogether to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court,
122. It has attracted attention that no States with Communist regimes have been prepared to accept the Court's jurisdiction. The question has often been asked whether there is any principle embodied in the Communist ideology that prevents these States from accepting international jurisdiction in disputes of a legal character. In the course if a previous session of the General Assembly, I had occasion to point out that the Swedish Government had in vain suggested arbitration in connexion with a serious controversy of a legal character with the Soviet Union.
123. If, on the one hand, it might be asked whether the negative attitude of the Communist States to arbitration be dictated by reasons of principle, we could, on the other hand, point to the fact; that these States have not taken a wholly negative attitude to arbitration proceedings in connexion with disputes arising out of contracts of a commercial nature. Furthermore, lawyers from some of the Eastern European States have accepted mandates as judges of the International Court.
124. Perhaps I may be permitted to express the hope that further developments will open the eyes also of the Governments of the Communist States to the fact that peaceful coexistence will benefit from agreements on arbitration, in case of controversies between States for example regarding the interpretation of agreements, the establishment of facts, the denouncing of violations of accepted principles of international law.
125. It seems obvious, however, that arbitration cannot be a universal means of solving international disputes. Many such disputes are not of a legal character but call for the application of political methods. Some disputes, although by their nature of a legal character, can be so impregnated with political explosives that legal solutions will not prove durable. But there remain large categories of disputes which could be successfully solved by legal means, if the parties would show a certain measure of good intentions.
126. It is a regrettable fact that a considerable number of States have taken a completely negative attitude toward the value of following legal procedures in international relations. This fact need not, however, prevent other States, holding a different opinion, from accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and this without far-reaching reservations, as the acceptance is binding only in case of reciprocity.
127. As we know, the International Court also has the function of giving advisory opinions upon the request of the Security Council, the General Assembly and certain other United Nations organs. It should be recognized, the Secretary-General points out in this connexion in the introduction to his annual report, "that there are many international disputes which involve legal questions along with the political elements and that submission of such questions to the Court for judicial determination would clear the ground for processes of peaceful negotiation in the political organs of the United Nations" [A/4132/Add.1, p.4],
128. This observation undoubtedly is correct. It leads to the question whether that controversy of many years standing between Israel and Egypt, now the United Arab Republic, concerning free passage through the Suez Canal, could not be brought to a solution by having recourse to the International Court. I am, however, not quite convinced that an elucidation of the legal aspects of this controversy would touch the principal point of the dispute. The Government of the United Arab Republic is basing its alleged right to establish a blockade against Israel ships and cargoes on the thesis that a state of war exists between the two countries, and that the 1888 Constantinople Convention, regarding the Suez Canal, as it has been applied in practice, does not prevent the United Arab Republic, in a state of war, from taking blockade measures for security reasons.
129. Let us assume that the arguments put forward by the United Arab Republic would be held invalid by the Court for the reason that the present situation could not be characterized as a state of war. If this were to be the case, could it not be feared that the United Arab Republic would take sharper measures with a view to justifying the alleged "state of war"? As far as I can see, this problem, in its essence, is hardly a question of juridical subtleties in connexion with the interpretation of the conception of "state of war"; instead, the question really is, whether it could be considered reasonable that two Members of the United Nations for years find themselves in a warlike relationship. If there is a war, it should be the duty of the States involved to make peace. This is simple common sense, so much more so because the blockade cannot be of any practical value for the United Arab Republic, while it does harm the shipping interests of many other countries. Sweden too is suffering from the blockade. As evidence of this, I should like to mention that the Swedish Seamens' Union has requested their Government to work for the cessation of the blockade.
130. I should also like to say a few words about another ever-recurrent controversial question that the United Nations has to deal with, that is the question of the representation of China. The General Assembly recently rejected a proposal to inscribe this item on our agenda [803rd meeting]. The Swedish delegation voted in favour of its inscription, as it has done already for a number of years.
131. The opposition of the majority against dealing with the question is founded mainly upon the opinion that Communist China has committed many sins or crimes and, therefore, does not deserve to be accepted as a Member of the United Nations community. This feeling is understandable, bearing in mind the Korean war. There is, on the other hand, a wide-spread practice in international politics, according to which when a new government has been formed following a revolution, other States by and by recognize it when such a government has proved itself to be firmly established in the country in question. Such an attitude is justified by the argument that the recognition ought not to be seen as an expression of approval of the new regime, but means only, in effect, that for practical reasons it is desirable to maintain normal relations with all countries.
132. This standpoint found an expression in a statement made by the late Mr. Foster Dulles in a book published before the outbreak of the Korean war. He said in this connexion: “I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all the nations should be Members without attempting to appraise closely those which are 'good’ and those which are ‘bad’. Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership of the United Nations. "Some of the present Member nations and others that might become Members, have governments that are not representative of the people. But if in fact they are ’governments’ — that is, if they 'govern' — then they have a power which should be represented in any organization that purports to mirror world reality. "
133. It should be admitted that recognition is no obligation under international law, but is a political decision that every State can take or not. In some cases, many years have gone by before a new regime has won general recognition from other State's. The United States Government has perhaps been more restrictive in this sense than many other Governments.
134. As far as the present regime in China is concerned, it has been recognized by quite a number of States. Among them are Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. From the Swedish point of view, it is a natural act of political logic that our country should, adopt the same attitude as a Member of the United Nations which it adopts in its direct relations with China.
135. The Charter of the United Nations does not give an answer to the controversial question that I am now dealing with. The conditions for the election of new Members cannot be applied in the case of China, which, according to the Charter, is one of the founding Members of the United Nations and also a permanent Member of the Security Council. No election is necessary.
136. As far as the United Nations is concerned, there are no legal obstacles to a recognition of the Communist regime in China. The question of whether the Peking Government should be recognized or not as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations is a political one. After numerous debates in this Assembly we are well aware of the arguments that are usually put forward against recognition, as well as of those that have been advanced in favour of such recognition. I shall limit myself to emphasizing the fact that important problems, such as disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear arms tests, are dependent for their solution upon co-operation with the Government that rules in Peking. Also, other negotiations that deal with peace and security in this world require that the seat of China in the Security Council as well as in the Assembly should not be left vacant. That seat cannot be filled by the Government of the small island of Formosa.
137. A regular item on the agenda of the Assembly is [agenda item 61] the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa. In the debate on this question we hear now and then new facts which indicate a rigorous continuity in the pursuit of these policies. There are no signs which indicate a softening of the attitude of the Union Government. On the contrary, it seems as if the methods had been further tightened up.
138. The Association of University Students in Sweden has drawn the attention of the Swedish Government in 1959 to the worsening situation of the coloured students in the Union of South Africa and has requested action through the United Nations. The Swedish Government is well aware that the Union does not attach any significance to the opinions expressed by this Assembly. Nor does it attach any authority to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the question of South West Africa. The Assembly, on its part, has no power to influence the Union's race policies. What the Assembly can do is to follow developments attentively and to express its opinion.
139. It seems to me that the race policies of the Union of South Africa are a strange anachronism in an Africa where the coloured population gradually becomes rightly more and more conscious of its human dignity and its right to freedom and to equality with the white elements of the African peoples.
140. The truly fantastic progress that mankind has achieved in the course of the last year in its efforts to widen i^ knowledge about outer space has, I am sure we all agree, made international co-operation for the peaceful use of outer space, as envisaged by the Assembly at its thirteenth session, all the more imperative. The work accomplished in this field by the ad hoc Committee appointed [resolution 1348 (XIII)] by the Assembly a year ago constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, a good beginning. But new efforts are now called for in order to arrive at a fully international participation in this work., My Government, noting with satisfaction that the ad hoc Committee has refrained from all action that might have made such participation more difficult, wishes to express the hope that it will be possible for us in the course of our deliberations here to reach such agreements that all parties, and particularly the two main Powers in this field, will make their contribution in common to these new and daring endeavours.
141. Unfortunately, the conference in Geneva on the Berlin question, though of long duration, did not lead to a solution and had to be adjourned. The problem of Germany as a whole has been dealt with outside the framework of the United Nations and I do not intend to examine here the disputed questions connected with this problem which have been discussed on different occasions between the Powers most immediately concerned. As representative of Sweden I would only like to stress that we sympathize with the inhabitants of West Berlin, living as they do in an exposed position isolated from the territory of Western Germany. We have a deep understanding of the apprehensions which they must feel in respect of every solution that may allow a situation to develop in which West Berlin is swallowed up in Eastern Germany. It is our sincere hope that the new discussions which it is planned to hold may lead to an agreement that offers a fair degree of satisfaction to the parties concerned even though it may still have to be of a provisional character.
142. After the adjournment of the Geneva Conference, Mr. Eisenhower took the initiative in having a personal meeting with the most prominent representative of the Eastern bloc, Mr. Khrushchev. This, as we all know, resulted in Mr. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, which has attracted so much attention.
143. I am sure that there is in this Assembly a widespread feeling of gratitude to Mr. Eisenhower for his initiative in trying to establish, in the deadlock that had arisen, personal contact with Mr. Khrushchev, thus making possible political discussions on the highest level. It is still too early to form an opinion of the results of these discussions but the mere invitation to the chief of the Soviet Government is considered to have brought about a certain improvement in the political atmosphere. Thus, in his speech before this Assembly, Mr. Khrushchev said: "The ice ill Soviet-American relations has undoubtedly begun to break up and we are sincerely glad of this." [799th meeting, para. 25.]
144. Perhaps not many of us in this hall reckoned with such a sudden breaking-up of the ice as the one announced as possible by Mr. Khrushchev in his speech here. Of course, I shall not go into detail in regard to the sweeping and far-reaching plan for a general and complete disarmament outlined by Mr. Khrushchev, nor shall 1 dwell upon the more limited programme presented as an alternative. It will be incumbent upon the Ten-Power Committee, established through agreement between the big Powers members of the present Disarmament Commission, to examine the Soviet plan as well as other proposals that may be submitted. However, it seems a Utopian scheme that our heavily armed world could be transformed, in a period of four years, to a completely disarmed world where the people would live in security, trusting that no armed intruder would be in a position to threaten their independence and the territorial integrity of their countries. But perhaps the length of the period is not an essential feature of the scheme. Even if the plan had taken into account a period of transition to complete disarmament many times as long and envisaged a partial and proportional disarmament during, for instance, a first period of ten years, its realization would have been greeted as a great stride towards relaxation of tensions — yes, as a miracle against the background of the fruitless negotiations regarding disarmament which have taken place since the end of the Second World War.
145. Moreover, Mr. Khrushchev himself has taken into account the probability that a more limited programme for disarmament may have greater chances to be carried out. In his speech he said that the Soviet Government is ready to come to agreement with other States on the appropriate partial steps on disarmament and the strengthening of security, and he has listed the major steps in the order that they are recommended by the Soviet Government.
146. Both the Soviet plan and the programme outlined just recently [798th meeting] by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, will serve as a basis for the discussions which now will be resumed after an interval which began in 1957. Considering the slow pace with which earlier disarmament negotiations have been conducted, I venture to express the hope that the participants will not dig themselves into fixed trenches from which to fight a long war of positions. It is necessary, I think, to agree on certain general principles for the consideration of different sections of the problem of disarmament and then to entrust to groups of experts the working out of the details.
147. I also wish to suggest that an expert study be initiated regarding the merits of agreements on regional zones where nuclear weapons would be banned and restrictions applied to conventional armaments. It is well known that the idea of establishing such zones with reduced military potential as a step towards disarmament has been put forward in different contexts and has been the object of much discussion and interest. A study of this matter under the auspices of the United Nations should include also the so-called Rapacki Plan for Central Europe.
148. In the course of the thirteenth session of the Assembly, the question of suspending nuclear tests was very much debated. In spite of differences of opinion between the atomic Powers as to the prerequisites for a mutual agreement regarding this question, unilateral decisions on the part of the three Powers concerned have brought about the result that tests have been suspended since November 1958.
149. The decisions of the United States and United Kingdom Governments were limited to a period of one year only. Recently, however, Mr. Eisenhower announced that the one-year unilateral ban on tests which the United States voluntarily undertook in October 1958 would be continued to the end of 1959; and United States Secretary of State Mr. Herter added in his recent speech to this Assembly [797th meeting] that his hope was that if a reasonable extension of time was allowed for the negotiations to proceed, significant progress could be made. A spokesman of the United Kingdom Government declared in the House of Commons on 30 July of this year: "So long as useful discussions continue at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Her Majesty’s Government would not propose to authorize the resumption of testing." The Soviet Union has decided not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not resume theirs. Only if they resume tests of nuclear weapons will the Soviet Union consider itself freed from this commitment.
150. Thus we have three unilateral decisions to suspend nuclear tests. One may well regard these decisions as constituting, taken together, a provisional agreement. The United States and the United Kingdom have not yet made it clear for how long a time they would be prepared to pledge themselves. The Soviet Union has declared its willingness to observe the ban on nuclear testing as long as the Western Powers do not carry out any experiments. Thus it depends on the Western Powers whether the experiments really have come to an end. The wording of the Soviet declaration does not, however, give any clear indication whether in this connexion among the Western Powers are included other Western States than those two negotiating in Geneva and until now the only producers of nuclear weapons.
151. It is with the greatest satisfaction that I note in this connexion that the atomic Powers seem to entertain good hopes that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests shall result in an agreement between them. The remaining divergencies can hardly be of such importance as to stand in the way of a settlement. In particular, I would like to draw attention to a statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in an article written by him and published in the review Foreign Affairs. There he says that the progress achieved in this matter justifies the hope that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests will shortly be reached.
152. In his speech before this Assembly on 18 September 1959, Mr. Khrushchev said the following: "The Soviet Government believes that the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament should not hold up the solution of such an acute and fully mature question as that of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for all time. All the prerequisites for such a solution are now at hand. We hope that the appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of tests will be concluded and put into effect without delay." [799th meeting, para. 81.]
153. The Swedish Government, for its part, would like warmly to concur in this hope. It is of the utmost importance that the three atomic Powers at least reach an agreement regarding a final ban on all kinds of nuclear weapon tests. The next step should be that those States which have so far not produced any nuclear weapons adhere to the agreement. My Government wishes also to express the hope that, pending a more final agreement, the actual existing ban against nuclear weapons tests will be prolonged for as long as necessary, and that it will be observed as also establishing a rule for those States which have not yet produced nuclear weapons.