1. Mr. President, I should like, personally and on behalf of my delegation, to offer my warmest and heartiest congratulations upon your unanimous election to the high office and great responsibilities of President of the General Assembly.
2. I think there can be no doubt that certain favourable and extremely significant changes have taken place in the international situation during the past year. This is particularly true to the most important sector of practical politics, namely, the relations between East and West. The start of political negotiations between the great Powers is the most striking feature of the present international situation as compared with the past. It implies the recognition by both parties of the virtues of the method of mutual concessions and, let us hope, their application of it. The positive effect of this new departure has already been felt in a certain improvement in the atmosphere, in better mutual understanding and in the easing of certain tense situations. If this trend could be stabilized and transformed into a long-term policy, which would lead to whole series of political negotiations, including negotiations among top-level representatives of a larger number of countries, present events might prove a turning point in international relations. The visit of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Khrushchev, to the United States is an extremely important step in this direction. May I quote here what President Tito said in this connexion a few days ago: "We hope that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, as representatives of the two greatest Powers in the world, will keep their responsibilities towards the world constantly in mind during their conversations, for it will to a large extent depend on them whether there is a relaxation of tension and whether mankind may look forward with greater confidence to the future."
3. Such a prospect calls for fresh and better efforts from us all. The changes which have occurred stem from the general conviction that if the cold war were to continue, it would ultimately lead us to an explosion, which is in fact becoming increasingly imminent. Moreover, this realization has brought about a gradual abandonment of the hitherto prevailing tendency to base the solution of, political problems on military criteria. The experience of the last few years has amply shown that no international problem can be solved by this practice; on the contrary, it can only lead, as the facts have demonstrated, to an increasingly dangerous deterioration in the international situation.
4. Military reasoning is directed towards one end only; to obtain an advantage over the other side at any price. What is the outcome of such an essentially military approach to political problems? Instead of the complete security which the method is designed to achieve, it results in total insecurity and anxiety, and less and less possibility of controlling and guiding the natural course of events.
5. The inevitable consequence of such an approach is a policy based upon and therefore backed by force, both as regards the relations between the great Powers and their relations with other countries. Such a trend or policy inevitably involves a struggle for spheres of influence, constant attempts to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries, the imposition of unequal status upon weaker countries; it is in a word the negation of everything set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time, as we all know, enormous sums are spent on the production and development of ever more devastating weapons of mass destruction, in fact on preparations for war.
6. In circumstances in which military force plays a key part in international politics and the difference between offensive and defensive weapons is becoming less and less, no ideology can, in itself, constitute a guarantee against the outbreak of war. On the contrary, in such circumstances ideological arguments are often put to a perverted use as instruments of day to day politics in order to justify actions which conflict with universally accepted international principles.
7. Some people affect to believe that a balance of armaments between the great Powers or the existing Power-blocs is the surest safeguard against the outbreak of war. We cannot share that opinion if it presupposes a continuation of the armaments race. Even if the assertion was valid in the present situation, there is the question of ensuring that this balance will be constantly maintained in such general conditions. It is obvious that it can only be maintained on the basis of an agreed plan, that is, if it is based on gradual and agreed international disarmament. It might be objected that this implies the acceptance of a certain risk in the meantime. It is worth taking such a risk; first, because it will tend to strengthen peace, which already implies a measure of understanding and also an agreement on limiting the risk; and second, because such a risk is certainly incomparably less than the risk of continuing a headlong arms race.
8. It would appear that one factor to which we have drawn attention on many other occasions is still not perfectly understood by people who continue to think in terms of the cold war. In point of fact, it is useless to look for any improvement in the present state of international relations without any change in attitudes or positions, or even in the criteria by reference to which the necessary changes are assessed. With a prospect of peace, criteria of judgement would naturally be different and more objective than they could be in an atmosphere of complete distrust and war.
9. In the face of these new positive developments and scope of action in international relations, there are also some people who claim that the role of the United Nations will be diminished by the fact that negotiations are beginning to take place between the great Powers. We do not share this point of view either, even when it does not reflect the hostility of those who cannot or will not understand that the abandonment of the cold war has become an urgent necessity and that agreement between the great Powers is an essential and integral part of this important process. We believe that the role of the United Nations in the world neither will nor can be diminished if the situation changes for the better. In the last analysis the state of international relations always has its effect upon the United Nations. Our Organization has been prevented from making its full contribution precisely because its action on behalf of peace has often been hampered or limited by the relations and the differences of opinion between the great Powers. The more the actions of the great Powers are in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, the more they will contribute to the consolidation of peace and the strengthening of international co-operation, and the more, that will facilitate constructive and concerted action by the Members of the United Nations. This assumes that the United Nations will be ready to accept increased responsibility, which l am sure is the case.
10. Awareness of the dangers which a catastrophe such as war would involve, the practical effect of the growing interdependence of peoples and States, the progress of the modem world towards unity and the inevitable trend towards the emancipation of peoples from the various forms of dependence or subjection all these are factors which impel us to make the maximum use of the increased possibilities within our grasp and to support, in all spheres of activity, the present favourable development in international relations. The trend, towards liquidating the cold war by means of negotiations constitutes, in our view, an excellent point of departure.
11. We have already seen that almost everyone now recognizes this necessity. Our Government has upheld this view for many years, and has made every effort to draw the appropriate practical conclusions. It has been guided by this principle in its stand on the various problems and proposals that have arisen within and without the United Nations. Such efforts have sometimes been criticized and condemned by those who, particularly in tense situations, believe that everyone should take a stand in favour of one or other of the two blocs. The recent improvement is also largely attributable to the persistent efforts of many countries which do not belong to any military alliances and with which my Government has collaborated very closely, because their point of view resembles its own. We see now that, to an increasing extent, representatives of the great Powers are using similar arguments, in favour of peace as the essential and sole solution.
12. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations has still not been settled in a positive manner, because of the obstinate opposition, in particular, of the United States, and that it. has proved impossible even to attempt a settlement. However, this year once more, a comparatively long debate has taken place on this question. I think it has re-emphasized the arbitrary, unjust, and undeniably harmful nature of this negative attitude. If the present dispute on the frontier between China and India is invoked as a fresh argument in favour of this negative attitude, my answer is that Yugoslavia has always considered that such disputes should be settled peacefully by joint agreement. However, even if there have been acts committed on the Chinese side which are not in conformity with this procedure — the only one which is constructive — it merely reinforces our conviction that, apart from the question of principle, the full participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations would help to avoid and to settle disputes of this kind and to prevent other similar disputes from arising.
13. I should like now to touch briefly upon a number of questions to which my Government attaches special importance.
14. First, disarmament. Clearly, this question is of vital importance from the point of view of peace. Its complexity is attributable to the cold war, the present distribution of forces of the various military alliances, the special positions of different countries, conflict of interests, mutual mistrust and the understandable anxiety of the various Powers to preserve their national security in view of present conditions, and other similar factors. The technical aspects, which have been the chief topics of discussion so far, are of course an essential element in the problem, but in our view, the chief difficulties do not lie in this direction. We believe that it would be comparatively easy to solve the technical problems if political conditions were favourable. We cannot be convinced that the complexity of the problems and the different philosophies of the parties concerned constitute an insurmountable barrier to agreement.
15. We recall that, only a few years ago, it looked as though there was very little chance of bringing about the practical cessation of nuclear tests and still less of making any progress towards an agreement through negotiations. Nevertheless, it so happened that the general interest won the day, and that the nuclear powers themselves found, when they came to analyse their own interests more closely, that it was also to their advantage.
16. The present situation can only be interpreted as an improvement in conditions which ought to enable an agreement to be worked out in the decisive field of general disarmament in which, so far — save in the case of the nuclear tests already referred to — no progress has been made despite all efforts, chiefly because of the failure of the great Powers to come to terms.
17. At a time when the realization of a complex general agreement could obviously not have been expected, my Government, as is known, adhered to the principle of initial and partial agreements. I believe that it was right. This has been confirmed by events and also by the holding of relatively fruitful negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, though those negotiations have not yet been concluded.
18. In the meantime, while awaiting the continuation of the proceedings which apparently are already following a satisfactory course, we shall of course support all endeavours to reach a general agreement. Thus we welcome and shall support the radical proposal [799th meeting] on disarmament submitted to us here in the name of the Government of the Soviet Union by Mr. Khrushchev, its Head. This proposal is exceptionally radical in nature. Yet we should not allow that fact to disconcert or surprise us, since the situation in which we find ourselves and the dangers inherent in it are equally exceptional. We realize that the proposal might appear unrealistic unless there were to be a substantial improvement over the whole field of international relations. The conclusion to be drawn is that, instead of delaying disarmament on account of the situation in other fields, we should on the contrary endeavour immediately to improve relations in all those other fields so as to enable a radical solution of the disarmament problem to be reached in the near future. In any event, negotiations are in themselves the surest way to assess the realism of the proposal. Moreover, if to be realistic means to continue in the course which has systematically led the world into constantly increasing international tension, I think it would be worth while at least to give idealism a trial, on the understanding that during subsequent discussions, we can confine ourselves to what is practicable,
19. While maintaining this view, we attach due importance to the proposal [798th meeting] submitted to us by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, which in our opinion is designed for the same purpose. In any case we consider that it is our duty to do our utmost to find the common features of all these proposals, in order that the process of disarmament should begin without further delay and should, if possible, rapidly be brought to a successful conclusion. We will deal with the substance of these proposals in detail when they are debated in Committee, but I should like to make a few observations of principle here and now.
20. We know that the question of so-called priorities has been the principal obstacle to the success of the negotiations so far held with regard to disarmament. I have in mind the following questions: Does the question of nuclear tests come within the field of disarmament? Can it or can it not be dealt with separately, before the other questions? Which comes first — control or disarmament, nuclear disarmament or disarmament in conventional weapons, intercontinental missiles or bases?
21. It is clear from the facts that the question of test explosions could be settled without delay and |part from the other problems. Furthermore, when u» tests are suspended, the status quo is maintained, so to speak, automatically, without the existence of a control organ, and without any doubts being felt on either side concerning the mutual implementation of the undertaking not to carry out such tests entered into separately by both parties. I am merely stating a fact. I do not deduce from it that Control is unnecessary. In our view, with the introduction of a healthier international atmosphere, less importance should be attached to so-called priorities than in the past.
22. We have often had the impression that the rigid insistence on certain priorities revealed, on the one hand, a feeling of doubt regarding the possibility of reaching any agreement and on the other, because of the existing circumstances and from a fear of prejudicing their own interests on the part of the parties concerned, a lack of any wish for or even a desire to prevent an agreement.
23. For example, let us lake the question of control. Every rational individual understands clearly, as we have already stated on various occasions, that the problem is not that of disarmament as a consequence of control, but of control as a consequence of disarmament. Hence, to insist upon giving absolute priority to control can only mean one thing: the prevention of the realization of an agreement. Nevertheless, we are aware — and we do not think anyone can deny it — that appropriate forms of control can and should be established simultaneously with the process of gradual disarmament. This is no vague or indefinite formula. We are firmly convinced of the possibility of and the need for a reasonable and specific agreement in that field. We think, too, that agreement has already been reached at Geneva on the question of control and inspection of nuclear tests and that the differences of opinion which remain are not insurmountable. Bearing in m ad certain ideas contained in the plans which have already been submitted to us, and considering that there has already been a genuine reconciliation of views on many points, we urge only that the problems which previously appeared insoluble should be reconsidered in the light of the present favourable prospects.
24. Although we do not know whether all the parties concerned are really prepared to accept a general disarmament plan, and hence when such a plan can be put into effect, it seems to us, as in the case of nuclear tests, that there are other problems also on which agreement might be sought and obtained without delay. I am thinking now of an agreed reduction in military budgets and the allocation of ail or a percentage to be determined of the resources so obtained for assistance to underdeveloped countries to be organized on an international basis. I can see no convincing argument against such a plan. Its general advantages are obvious; it would involve no danger to any country. It would be relatively simple to carry out.
25. The second question which, in our view, could be solved in the immediate future is that of the establishment of what might be described as a "disengagement area" of limited armaments in central Europe; indeed, responsible political circles and large sections of public opinion in. Eastern and Western Europe have already declared their support for such a solution. The arguments which have been adduced against the idea have not convinced us, since they are based on reasoning of a strictly military nature. This solution would provide a means of solving part of the world disarmament question in certain well-defined areas and would open the way to a political solution which would go far towards improving international relations. The disengagement area would not relate only to disarmament; it would also form part of efforts to achieve in Europe, today torn in two and in conflict over the question of divided Germany, a wide basis of cooperation between the peoples on both sides of the line which now separates them.
26. We have already expressed our opinion in the Disarmament Commission (65th meeting) regarding the functions and membership of the Ten-Power Committee. Obviously, there can be no question of excluding the United Nations from the consideration of the disarmament problem, and we do not think anyone would wish to do so. In view of the questions involved and of the situation in which we are at present, we think it would be wise to avoid any artificial antagonism between the Ten-Power Committee and the Disarmament Commission. Since the great Powers have reached agreement regarding the renewal of negotiations, and since the problem cannot be solved without their agreement, we shall naturally do our utmost to exercise, together with all other countries, a positive influence and assist the Committee in its work.
27. In other words, we agree to the Ten-Power Committee’s being composed of an equal number of representatives of each bloc because we regard that as a practical measure and not one of discrimination against other Members of the United Nations, because the Committee is a temporary body set up for a specific purpose and because the results of its work, which we shall follow with sustained attention, will contribute not to the perpetuation of the present division into Power-blocs but to its gradual abolition.
28. As has been stated, many of the political or economic, long or short-term problems which are awaiting solution are interdependent and interconnected to such an extent that it is now scarcely possible to classify them in this way. These problems reached their present acute stage largely as a result of the cold war, but they have all deeper roots in the world situation and in particular in the profound imbalance find instability of the world economy. We feel that today there can be no question of achieving a lasting policy of peace unless a rational and effective solution can be found to that fundamental question.
29. Although the scope and nature of the question have been largely obscured by ideas and practices arising out of the cold war, I believe that it is almost universally recognized that one of the causes and principal sources of this instability is the backward economic state of a large part of the world. It is becoming more and more widely realized that a satisfactory solution to that problem would be as much in the interests of the highly developed contributing countries as in that of the beneficiary countries. Yet although we agree on that point, it is obvious that we have not yet succeeded in drawing the necessary practical conclusions. In any event, there is a wide gap between the recognition of the importance of the problem of the under-developed countries and the practical steps so far taken to solve it, whether by providing the necessary means or by finding the most appropriate forms of assistance.
30. There is, I think, no need for me to quote figures which are familiar to everyone and which reveal the appallingly tow economic level of these countries compared with that of the highly-developed industrial countries, and the manifest inadequacy of the aid they have so far received through bilateral, or multilateral programmes. There are, however, two or three salient features to which I should like to invite your attention. Thus, it is a known fact that more than 1,000 million human beings in under-developed countries have an annual income of less than $120, and that the annual increase in the national income in many of these countries scarcely keeps pace with the rate of population increase. Furthermore, the capital and economic aid flowing into under-developed countries totals about $3,000 million a year, a figure which would have to be at least trebled in order to narrow the existing gap.
31. In present circumstances, under-developed countries are obviously not in a position to finance an adequate rate of economic growth from their own resources. Up to now, most of the aid given to underdeveloped countries has been provided under bilateral, regional and multilateral programmes. It has frequently been made subject to various conditions which have nothing to do with economics and those who bestowed it pursued certain special objectives, a state of affairs that has further reduced the effectiveness of such aid in related to the real needs of the countries concerned.
32. At this point I think it worth recalling the following explicit statement by so great an expert on the question as Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Managing-Director of the Special Fund. "...the industrialized countries have to a large extent failed to undertake economic development in the less developed countries as something good, desirable and rewarding in itself; too often they have extended economic aid to 'win friends and influence people' and as an instrument in the cold war".
33. For all these reasons, and without wishing to deny the fact that all these programmes will continue to make a useful contribution, it is our view that, where aid is concerned, increasing emphasis should be placed on the United Nations. We have always held that the United Nations should have at its disposal a powerful executive body through which it could exercise a practical influence on the solution of all these problems. That is why we have pressed so strongly, and still do so, for SUNFED to be set up as soon as possible.
34. I have laid so much stress on the urgency and importance of this problem because we realize that progress towards a solution can be achieved only with the full co-operation of the great Powers. Their consent, as regards both the means and the form of assistance, is essential and cannot, of course, be obtained through a majority vote. In the present favourable international situation, such consent may perhaps be more readily forthcoming.
35. In that part of my statement in which I dealt with certain disarmament problems, I already referred to the idea' — which, in our view, is entirely realistic — that, without waiting for the conclusion of a general agreement, a suitable proportion of existing military budgets should be devoted to providing aid for the under-developed countries. In this connexion, I think it should be borne in mind that, in the majority of under-developed countries, per caput income is only one-quarter of the per caput expenditure for military purposes alone in certain industrialized countries. Of course, the question of aid to under-developed countries is not one which can be put down as yet another item on the agenda and solved immediately, finally and completely by the General Assembly. It is obviously a complex, long-term problem, for the permanent solution of which constant study and research is required.
36. It might perhaps be advisable to consider the possibility of suiting up for this purpose a suitable, permanent special organ of the United Nations, the sole function of which would be to deal with this vast and complicated problem.
37. In considering all these problems, my Government also takes into account the experience gained different though the circumstances were — in the economic and political development of our country. In our endeavours to extricate it from the backwardness in which we found it, we realized that the development of democratic institutions and systems of administration was closely linked to material progress. The simultaneous development of self-administration in social matters and of a system in which the actual producers control the means of production and exercise a decisive influence on distribution was, however, a most important factor in mobilizing the domestic resources of my country and in firing the enthusiasm of the workers.
38. Furthermore, our firm support for the principle of peaceful coexistence provides the most suitable climate in which to speed up the advancement of those countries which do not aspire to dominate other countries and which are faced with the problems of their own development. For that reason, we have endeavoured to promote the greatest possible co-operation, both in economic and in other matters, between ourselves and the various States in the world, regardless of their social or political systems.
39. We ourselves have received some international aid, but it should be noted that it formed only a very small proportion of our national income and no political strings were attached to it. But we had to grapple alone with the difficult problem of how to turn our own resources to account, a task which called for immense efforts. For years, our investments, including military expenditure and investments for social and cultural purposes, amounted to some 50 per cent of our national income. In the early stages, development had to be strictly controlled; later, the controls were relaxed. The results of these efforts are already apparent. In recent years, Yugoslavia has been able to achieve an annual increase of 12 per cent in production and of 8 per cent in personal consumption. Thus, today, it is to be found among the countries with the highest rate of development.
40. The fact that we are now able to give some measure of economic aid to other countries is evidence of the extent to which conditions in Yugoslavia have improved during the last fifteen years.
41. We realize that other countries, in which conditions at the outset are much less favourable than ours were, will be faced with graver difficulties than those which we encountered in the past. That, I think, provides further support for the view we have expressed here, namely, that it is urgently necessary to grant economic aid, in an organized and effective manner, to the countries which need it,
42. Another facet of this same problem of the uneven economic advancement of under-developed countries is the colonial question. It is, however, fundamentally the same problem; the only difference is that it involves people who have not yet achieved freedom and independence.
43. With the entry of an increasing number of Non- Self-Governing Territories into the family of independent nations, the process whereby the system of trusteeship is being eliminated is gathering momentum. The international significance of the problems of the Non-Self-Governing Territories will become greater as more and more countries in Africa, the last continent in which relationships of the colonial type are still widespread, become independent States. The progress of these countries towards independence and towards other methods of exercising their right to self-determination will confront the international community with a growing number of questions which, in one way or another, will come within the sphere of responsibility of the General Assembly and of its various organs. It is to be hoped that the comparatively speedy and peaceful advance of Nigeria towards independence together with the precedents set by Ghana and Guinea, will have a favourable effect on the Administering Powers themselves and will induce them to come forward with bolder and more realistic solutions to the question of the future of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Nevertheless, there is still some resistance to this inexorable process of the total liquidation of colonialism, and such resistance is a constant source of tension in the world. Here, therefore, we are faced with an urgent task; we must do everything in our power to facilitate the advance of colonial peoples towards independence and to help them solve the problems which will confront them even after they have achieved their independence, problems which affect not only those peoples but the whole of mankind. The proper and early solution of the colonial question is indeed part and parcel of the problem of maintaining and strengthening peace throughout the world.
44. In this connexion, the problem of Algeria, which is to be discussed at the current session, is of particular importance. We are in the presence of a legitimate armed struggle by the Algerian people for their independence and their right to self-determination. The mere fact that the war has lasted so long proves this and also demonstrates the illegal nature of the so-called policy of pacification. Moreover, this state of affairs has unfortunate and dangerous repercussions on international relations, even beyond the bounds of North Africa. The attitude of my country towards this problem is well known and is based on clear-cut principles which we shall continue to uphold.
45. Last year, most of the delegations in the First Committee adopted the same point of view. In the meantime, unfortunately, there has been no improvement in the position. The war still goes on. We continue to be of the opinion that the only proper way to settle the matter is for negotiations to take place between the two belligerent parties on a footing of equality. The recent statement by the President of the French Republic, recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, besides being and undoubted step forward in itself, indicates a readiness to adopt a more realistic and constructive approach to the prerequisites for a just and agreed solution. The abandonment of the policy of pacific action by force which is clearly incompatible with the recognition of the right to self-determination is also, however, required.
46. I come now to the conclusion of my statement. The course so far followed by the general debate makes it clear that the outlook for the development of international relations has improved. At the same time, however, it has revealed the great complexity of the international situation and has drawn attention to certain burning problems of the present day for which no solution has yet been found. The general debate on the questions included in the Assembly's agenda and the adoption of recommendations framed in the clearest possible terms will bring the solution of those problems closer and will help to strengthen the position and authority of the United Nations in safeguarding the peace of the world and in developing friendly co-operation between its peoples. As in the past, in accordance with the policy which I have just outlined, the Yugoslav delegation will do its utmost to contribute to the success of this session.