47. I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation on your unanimous election as President. We all feel that the fact that the General Assembly was able to agree on its choice of President is a happy augury for the success of our proceedings. We are conscious that the unanimity was made possible by the respect which your personality has inspired in the whole Assembly, and we trust that under your dignified and courteous presidency the fourteenth session will indeed make the necessary progress to deserve the title that you have indicated, that of the "Assembly of Peace".
48. Since our last session a number of conferences and contacts have taken place between the leaders of the two great-Power groups. The Irish delegation heartily welcomes these meetings, and prays that God may guide all who take part in them and inspire them with wisdom, fortitude and perseverance. We believe that these leaders, so heavily burdened by the grave and intricate problems bequeathed to them, and by the tremendous responsibility which rests upon them to save the world from destruction, will have the understanding and support of all peoples for the success of their labours.
49. We trust that a continuation and expansion of discussions among these leaders will eventually result not only in a clear definition of what is required to keep the peace in the short run, but also of the major steps which must be taken on the road to stable peace. Now that they have been established, the chief danger is that, if these contacts should break down without agreement having been reached, the tension in the world might well be greater than if they had never begun.
50. On the leaders of the nuclear Powers lies the primary responsibility of reaching preliminary agreements on which the decisions of the United Nations may be based. But the ultimate responsibility must rest here with the United Nations.
51. In the search for solutions of immediate problems we must keep ever clearly before our minds that peace, if it is to be stable and lasting, cannot be secured unless it is based on justice to all nations great and small, and unless the application of the principles of the Charter can be secured by effective guarantees.
52. We realize, much as we would wish it otherwise, that effectively controlled world disarmament and the universal rule of law cannot be attained in a single spectacular bound. But we can start moving towards these desirable ends with assurance of success-even if it takes many decades to attain them — if 11 Members of the United Nations sincerely recognize and agree upon them as our ultimate objectives, and if each is determined to work for them as if the fate of mankind depended upon its sole will. As a first step and as an earnest of our good faith, Member nations ought, we suggest, to be prepared to co-operate in securing the firm application of Charter principles in certain restricted areas, particularly in the areas where the interests of the two great-Power groups are entangled and where there is the greatest danger of stumbling into war.
53. What we have in mind is a system whereby a group of nations in a defined area would be invited to give guarantees of their intention to abide by their Charter obligations to uphold the rule of law in their international relations, in return for corresponding guarantees by the other Member nations in relation to the area in question.
54. The non-nuclear nations in such an area would undertake, firstly not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of blitzkrieg or mass destruction, and secondly to subject themselves to United Nations inspection to ensure that they are keeping to that agreement. In return the nuclear Powers, and all the other Members of the United Nations, would bind themselves in advance, by specific engagements, to defend the members of the area from attack, by means of a standing United Nations force.
55. The terms of the Charter, of course, provide in theory for action by the Security Council in all such cases in every part of the world. In view, however, of the unhappy history of deadlock in the Security Council, it would be necessary to provide an additional, firmer, guarantee for the nations in a defined area who would be invited to limit their own means of defence. There is little need to emphasize that such a beginning could not be hoped for without the clearest understanding between the nuclear Powers and without convincing proof of their determination to co-operate with the United Nations in enforcing the principles of the Charter in the area concerned. Such a guarantee might take the form of a resolution of the General Assembly providing for a standing United Nations force to. ensure the security of these countries, and providing for an advance payment of their quotas by all Members for the establishment and maintenance of the force.
56. Nuclear war arising out of tensions and violence in vital areas can by no means be excluded until the rule of law is universally in effective operation; and even with the best of good will this may take many decades. The nuclear Powers should therefore, we suggest, begin to work towards that objective by encouraging, groups of nations to accept the rule of law, area by area, throughout the world. They should also be prepared to support a permanent United Nations force designed to protect one such area for a beginning. In this way they would give the world concrete evidence of their determination to uphold their Charter pledges, and of their determination to build a world order based on justice and law, co-operatively defended by a common force.
57. A United Nations force guaranteeing the security of an area of law would greatly increase the moral authority of the United Nations. It would also free resources for other uses by reducing tension, fostering international esprit de corps, and reducing the necessity to maintain large national armies. The resources of men and material thus freed from military use would be available for domestic improvements and for the investments necessary to eliminate the appalling poverty in many countries. Even if there was no net saving, a common United Nations force in an area of law which had previously been an area of contention would, we submit, give the nations of the world more effective security against war than if all were to increase their expenditure on their individual defence forces, particularly if nuclear weapons continued to spread.
58. Security, we submit, cannot be achieved separately in the nuclear age, even with unlimited diversion of national resources to military uses and even if all nations were grouped in two or more cohesive power blocs. It can only be achieved gradually through a common effort. Such an effort ought in our view, to begin in limited areas. A collective effort in such areas would be a far more effective safeguard for the security of individual members than military competition can be, and would involve far less consumption of national resources.
59. The principle of collective effort, rather than hostile competition, is one that could usefully be applied to all areas of tension, including areas which have recently been, or still are, under some form of colonial rule. But collective effort implies equality of status. A people which has been under colonial rule can co-operate with its former rulers and with other countries on a footing of equally. That has happily been demonstrated in many areas. If, however, the colonial Power attempts to prolong its rule without the consent of the governed, then the conditions for collective effort do not exist, and what ensues is a bitter and sterile struggle, wasting the human and material resources of ruler and ruled alike. There, as elsewhere, what is needed — and what we hope is coming — is a burst of imaginative energy to shatter this vicious circle, and release for creative purposes the powers which mankind is now abusing for purposes of self-destruction. If this is achieved, as it can be by wise and daring leadership and increasing enlightenment of public opinion, then territories which are at present scenes of tragic strife can become fields for development through common effort under a law whose strength is in its acceptance by free men.
60. As the Assembly is aware, agenda item 67 [Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons] has been inscribed at the request of my delegation. I hope to have an opportunity of setting out our views in detail on this question when it comes before the First Committee, and at this stage 1 shall only touch on the aspects which have a specific bearing on the suggested areas of law.
61. Briefly what we would hope for is an agreement between the nuclear Powers not to give the weapons to non-nuclear Powers, and an agreement between the non-nuclear Powers not to make or accept nuclear weapons.
62. These suggestions fall far short of immediate and total nuclear disarmament, for our delegation regrets to say that it must accept as inherently probable that the nuclear Powers will continue to keep nuclear weapons until the United Nations has built up a system of international law and law enforcement which will guarantee these Powers to their satisfaction that such weapons are no longer necessary for their defence. The area-by-area approach takes account of the probability that nuclear weapons will be retained by the nuclear Powers until we perfect the art of living in peace, until in the ordering of our mutual relations we have effectively excluded all force, except force exercised in common by the United Nations in accordance with law.
63. The approach suggested is, we submit, in accordance with common sense. For common sense rejects the fatalistic argument that, because we cannot at once by force or persuasion secure total disarmament and the universal application of the rule of law, we should make no attempt to apply the law as and where we can, and no attempt to prevent nuclear weapons becoming the normal equipment of an ever-increasing number of armies and more easily obtainable by revolutionary groups.
64. Apart from the obvious threat that long before they became universal the world would have been destroyed, we believe that the wisdom of the nations represented here will induce them to agree to the non- dissemination of nuclear weapons upon the basis of a reasonably practicable system of inspection and control.
65. We hope that eventually the present nuclear Powers themselves will agree to abolish testing, to cut off production, to accept effective inspection of their reactors and territories, and to start using nuclear stockpiles for peaceful purposes. We do not intend these proposals as in any way a substitute for general disarmament subject to effective inspection and control. That remains our goal. But, in view of the history of disarmament negotiations since 1919, it is hardly realistic to expect an early agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapons. There is danger, therefore-very grave danger — that, while proposals for general disarmament are being discussed, the problem may become far more difficult as smaller States compete among themselves to acquire these weapons. The main danger is that, failing regulation by specific international agreement, a sort of atomic sauve-qui-peut may go up in which States, despairing of safety through collective action, will seek safety for themselves by getting their own nuclear weapons as quickly as they can. Among States as among individuals, panic has its own logic leading to the same terrible results.
66. It is for that reason, in order to substitute peaceful and orderly co-operation for ruinous nuclear competition, that my delegation suggests that, simultaneously with an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to transfer these weapons, the non-nuclear Powers should agree not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons. If they so agree, they should open their territories to detailed United Nations inspection to ensure that they are abiding by their pledges. In the case of those who also belonged to an area of law such as we have envisaged, they would also accept inspection in regard to other forbidden materials and equipment.
67. It may be argued that the proposed system of inspection and control is not sufficient to guard against the secret giving of nuclear weapons to the allies of nuclei Powers. As far as we know, no perfect system of detection covering this risk is yet available. We would point out, however, that there is a much greater risk of secret transfer in the present situation, in which there is no international control or inspection at all. The best guarantee against the risk of secret giving is the enlightened self-interest which the nuclear Powers would have in the maintenance of such an agreement. If no such agreement is made they may well be forced, by mutual fear and the pressure of their allies, to distribute these weapons, and so increase geometrically the danger of nuclear war.
68. The risk of nuclear war will, of course, remain so long as nuclear weapons exist, but it seems to us that nothing we can do will eliminate it entirely, until we change the political conditions which caused the nuclear stockpiles to be built up. What we can do, however, if we concentrate upon it, is to reduce the risks which the spread of these weapons involves for this generation, and not to hand on to our children a problem even more difficult to solve than that with which we are now confronted. Our main effort, therefore, we suggest, should be to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to interpose insulating areas of law between the existing stockpiles. If we succeed in this most difficult task, their ultimate dismantlement for peaceful uses, warhead by warhead, will become practical politics in a world that will have gradually become accustomed to abide by the rule of international law and learned to trust in the machinery for its determination and enforcement.
69. Therefore, we join with those who have appealed to the leaders of the great Powers to look not only at the Immediate problems which are causing great tension in many critical zones, but also at the major steps in the years and decades ahead which must be taken if our will to live in peace is to dominate our ever-growing power to destroy. We urge them not to be content with stop-gap solutions, but to seek broad comprehensive settlements in areas where their interests are dangerously interlocked. Each such area should be sufficiently large to afford room for give-and-take agreements and for positive and significant progress to be made in the. rule of law and the enforcement of law.
70. Perhaps we may take Berlin as an example of the approach we suggest. The problem of Berlin and the reunification of Germany is not only a heartbreak for the German people but a cause of great distress to their friends and to all who abhor the division of historic nations. If a just and lasting peace is to be made in Europe, the problem of German reunification must be settled in accordance with the will of the majority of the German people and with the right of nations to unity and independence.
71. There is, as far as we son see, no peaceful and permanent solution for Berlin except as the capital of a united Germany. We wonder whether there can be any peaceful solution for the reunification of Germany unless its people can make of a reunited Germany a mainstay of peace and a barrier to war, under some system of international guarantee. Nor can we see, even in the distant future, any peaceful solution acceptable to both great power groups for the problem of European security, unless a reunited Germany together with Poland and other European countries agrees to become an area of law, free from foreign troops, free from weapons of blitzkrieg and mass destruction, and subject to United Nations inspection and guarantee. And if this heart-land of Europe were to become an area of law it would be a much needed prototype for similar areas elsewhere, particularly for areas of great tension. In these areas the nuclear Powers, in co-operation with the nations concerned, would make the principles of the Charter a reality on the Central European model suggested, as part of a combined effort to establish the rule of law progressively area by area throughout the world.
72. The present conjuncture in the relations between the great Powers is clearly one of reappraisal. How fundamental that reappraisal will be, and how far- reaching its effects, those of us here who represent smaller countries have no means of knowing. We do know, however, that our own destinies are likely to be affected by the decisions reached, when great Powers agree, as when they fail to agree, all our peoples will undoubtedly be touched by the consequences for good or ill. That implies, we submit, that we may properly raise in this Assembly questions that trouble us about policies at present being pursued by the major Powers, and express our opinions as to the character of the settlement which we would hope to see emerging from agreement between the great Powers. Indeed, it has often been emphasized that one of the valuable functions of this Assembly, and in particular of this General Debate, is to afford a setting and an occasion for the discussion of such questions.
73. There is a series of questions regarding the present situation in Central Europe which, we submit, needs fresh consideration. These questions concern the relevance to modern conditions of the policy of maintaining troops in forward positions in the heart of Europe.
74. What were the military, political or economic reasons which each Power had for keeping and reinforcing these troops in their present positions since 1945? Granted that these reasons were valid in 1945-1949, are they valid in 1959, in view of the great political and economic changes that have occurred in Europe and in the Far East, and in view of the capacity of the forward ground troops of both sides, with 1959 equipment, to destroy everything in front of them within 1,500 miles?
75. As far as we can see, keeping these nuclear armed troops forward in dangerous proximity, and keeping Berlin and Germany divided, serves no basic interest of either group of Powers or of the Central European countries. Indeed we believe that not only the national and personal rights and the lives and property of the peoples concerned, but also the security of the great Powers, the peace of Europe and the peace of the world, would all be better and more effectively served if these troops were drawn back until they were 1,000 miles or more apart, and if the area comprising all these countries became an area of law, without foreign troops, and with a restriction on armaments. Within such an area, Berlin would take its rightful place as the capital of an all-German federation.
76. These questions Imply a fundamental revision of the policies pursued by the major Powers in the last ten years. But do not the changes that have taken place over the past ten years clearly indicate the ineluctable necessity for such a revision, in the interests of all Members of the United Nations? How long can human beings stand the tension and the burden of the ever-amounting accumulation of destructive power without somebody somewhere making a mistake? Can we safely assume that the leaders and governments who may come into power, both in the present nuclear States and in those which may become nuclear during the next ten or twenty years, will all be wiser and more forbearing than those leaders who precipitated their countries into war in recent times? Is there not a danger that, within both great-Power systems, traditional military conservatism and professional infatuation with perfecting means of destruction may not be holding back changes which are overdue? Adaptation to change in environment is known to be the law of survival — and survival, after all, is basically what we are discussing here.
77. In suggesting the gradual application of the rule of law and the restriction of nuclear weapons, we are not proposing that either of the two power groups should trust the other blindly. The element of distrust is a grim reality which must be faced. What we do suggest is that both power groups should take certain steps which, it seems to us, are clearly in the interest of both, where an earnest of good faith must be paid by each at each step, where the risks involved through a breach of faith are limited and where a breach of faith would be quickly discerned and where the risks are as nothing compared to the supreme risk we are now running: that is, the risk of drifting into a nuclear war which neither group, we believe, wants, and in which both groups and a large part of the world would be utterly destroyed.
78. The cosmic energy which man has released from the atom has its own cold and inescapable logic: either we evolve the machinery to control it or it will eventually overwhelm us; either we harness it for the common good or it will destroy us in the end. The heavy responsibility of giving the generous and rigorous lead necessary to control it rests squarely on the leaders of the nuclear Powers. We appeal to them to act as wise and brave captains, whose call to action turns confusion into purposeful advance and threatening defeat into victory.
79. If this generation is defeated, if it fails to use its boundless power and wealth for the good of mankind, its defeat will be truly ignominious. Wars for conquest and for colonies made sense of a kind when there was less than enough for all, and the survivors enjoyed the fruits of victory. They make less than sense in the age of nuclear weapons, when the survivors would envy the dead and when all we need to provide abundance for mankind is the will to co-operate generously in the peaceful development and distribution of our fabulous resources.
80. The wars and shadows of wars, the revolutions and civil strife, the fears and confusions which surround us are all signs of our need for positive and inspiring leadership. Sooner or later these tensions can only have one end if the nuclear Powers should fail to reach agreement On a positive and progressive programme for the implementation of the Charter. Now that these Powers are in contact, we appeal to them to give the United Nations that courageous and generous lead which will dispel our confusion, spur us to action and carry us to victory.