115. The Lao delegation is happy to be able in its turn to offer Mr. Belaúnde its warm congratulations on his election to the presidency of the Assembly. My country is extremely pleased that this high office has been conferred upon a person whose exceptional qualities are recognized by this august assemblage and whose public life has been entirely devoted to the defence of the noblest ideals. As we all know, he has worked in our Organization since the day of its foundation, and, what is more, he was among the ranks of those who served its predecessor, the League of Nations. Therefore, his experience of men and things, and of our Organization and its operations, are without parallel. His competency, combined with his personal abilities and his rare qualities, make him today the person best suited to occupy the place of honour in our Organization. His unanimous election renders brilliant homage at once to his noble country, to the countries of Latin America and to himself for his unflinching pursuit of the cause of peace and international understanding. We are convinced that under his guidance the Assembly will be able, during its fourteenth session, to mark up to its credit further achievements towards the goals of the United Nations,
116. The Lao delegation also joins in the tribute that has been paid from this rostrum to the memory of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, whose tragic death has plunged his people into grief and mourning. The circumstances of the crime have roused indignation throughout Laos. The Lao people, who practise "Little Vehicle" Buddhism, which originated in Ceylon and which we call Lanka, offer their heartfelt sympathy to the Ceylonese people in this time of tribulation.
117. It is the custom at each General Assembly to cast a glance backward to measure the distance we have come in the course of the preceding year. Although customary, this practice is not the less important, for we must take stock of our position so as to know where we stand in our progress towards the goals we have set ourselves. Each obstacle overcome, each objective gained, is an incentive to further effort; every failure, omission or defect must be pointed out So that it may be remedied. The usual methods may be inadequate to meet the situation; if that is so then we must consider new methods. It is also important to make sure that all this activity is being carried on within the proper framework in accordance with the proclaimed purposes of our Organization.
118. My Government has been pleased to note that the positive accomplishments of the current year have been predominant, and this has strengthened our confidence in the work of the United Nations as regards not only conciliation and mediation but also such economic and humanitarian activities as assistance to the less developed countries and succour to the under-privileged peoples.
119. Among the Organization's achievements during the past year, there was in first instance its happy intervention in the Middle East, which served to prevent irrevocable actions and to create an atmosphere conducive to the easing of tensions, to peace and tranquillity in an area notorious for its extreme sensitivity to political events.
120. The United Nations Special Fund, operating within the framework of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and acting through the specialized agencies, has done important work in all spheres of economic and social development and has helped to improve public health, agriculture technology, etc. It is to be hoped that, in view of these spectacular results, it will be easy to secure aunanimous decision to increase contributions to the Fund.
121. Then again, assistance to refugees — which has in fact not been overlooked at any time since the very first days of the United Nations — received an impetus as sudden as it was unexpected. Compared with the immensity of the task and its increasing urgency, the routine methods were clearly inadequate. The conscience of humanity was stirred, and it is true to say that each individual felt ashamed, in the midst of the freedom, security and comfort which were his to enjoy, upon seeing the unjust, the pitiable fate befalling millions of men of whom the least that could be said was that they had as much right as any others to share in the good things of this earth. The World Refugee Year was thus instituted, and the results will no doubt be commensurate with the effort expended. My Government and my country have whole-heartedly supported this demonstration of universal brotherhood, but I should like to pay a special tribute to the country which, having conceived the idea and submitted it to the General Assembly, took the lead in getting it accepted by a large majority. I refer to the United Kingdom.
122. All these achievements can he entered to the credit of the United Nations, but it would be unpardonable not to associate with them the person of the Secretary-General, whose untiring activity must command the respect and gratitude of us all. Thanks to him, to his high qualities as a man, to his great culture, his competence and his devotion, the decisions of the United Nations are translated into concrete actions and results. Whether he is acting as the Secretary-General or in his personal capacity, his activity has always had a beneficial effect. His recent visit to the capital cities of a number of Member States is an excellent example. My country is happy to pay a public tribute to Mm from this rostrum.
123. We can, then, justifiably feel satisfied with the positive results achieved, but this does not make the negative factors any the less disquieting. Grave problems remain to be solved, and despite the time and effort expended on them no visible result has yet been forthcoming. At the top of the list there is the problem of disarmament and the halting of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. During the last few months, the world has been constantly marvelling at the prodigious advances made by science. Paradoxically, however, fear and misgiving rather than joy or gladness have been roused by the brilliant performance of the artificial satellites and the marvel of the moon-rockets. Since the opening of the fourteenth session, numerous disarmament proposals have been placed before the General Assembly. We have just added another item to our agenda, namely, on complete disarmament. Let us hope that these steps, together with the meeting of the Heads of Governments of the two main atomic Powers, will serve to clear and cleanse the present atmosphere of doubt so as to prepare the way for greater mutual understanding. Otherwise the prospects for the world will be sombre indeed, and that paradoxical situation to which I have referred will arise, an absurd situation where theories and methods resigned for the benefit of mankind will lead it to perdition.
124. A number of the Assembly's decisions have, moreover, remained ineffective because of the refusal of the nations concerned to co-operate. In this connexion, world public opinion and the conscience of all will continue to, be perturbed so long as Sir Leslie Munro is unable to accomplish the mission entrusted to him by the United Nations. More serious still, the violation of the political and individual rights of the Hungarian people, a violation which has gone without redress, has led to other breaches of respect for the human person and the spirit of our Charter, again on the part of a totalitarian Power. From the confines of Asia, from Tibet to be exact, come echoes of events which have cast a gloom over the rest of the world. Despite solemn agreements, the Tibetan people have been despoiled of all their rights; they have lost their identity; they are today helpless. The life of their leader was saved only because of certain providential circumstances.
125. Confronted by this flagrant crime perpetrated in violation of human rights and of the rights of peoples and prompted by an ideology which denies all the values which form the very basis of humanity, the United Nations has the sacred duty to intervene. And I trust that it will do so at a very early date for each day which passes increases the sufferings of the Tibetan people.
126. To end this list, I come now to the act of aggression to which, my country has fallen victim. This act was the result of a carefully laid plan the object of which was none other than to destroy my people and my country. In order that I may lay the problem before the Assembly with all due clarity, 1 would beg you to allow me to go back a few years.
127. In 1954, the Geneva Agreements put an end to the long Indo-China War which Laos did not instigate but whose heavy legacy it bore. As regards Laos, the provisions contained in the Agreements were of two kinds. There were military clauses and political clauses.
128. The military clauses provided for the evacuation of foreign armed forces, that is to say the French Expeditionary Force, on the one hand, and the forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on the other, and subsequently the regrouping of the Pathet Lao fighting units in the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua pending their integration.
129. As regards the political clauses, there was the re-establishment of the Royal Administration in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, where the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had assisted the fighting units of the Pathet Lao in organizing an administration of its own after taking advantage of the cease-fire to get rid of the government forces still there at the date of the signing of the Agreements.
130. Finally, there was the reintegration into the national community of the Lao citizens who were not on the side of the Royal forces during the hostilities and who were known as the fighting units of the Pathet Lao.
131. Those were the main aspects of the problem to be solved. For that purpose, six months Would have been enough between negotiators of good will. In fact, it took more than three years during which the Royal Government was pressed to the very limit of its patience and indulgence, accepting every demand and granting every concession, refusing right up to the end to treat the Pathet Lao forces as anything other than the country’s children, and cherishing to the last the hope that they might learn from their past mistakes and be ready to co-operate with the Royal Government in the work of rebuilding the country. The Vientiane Agreements signed on 12 November 1957 were the product of the patience, the goodwill and the tolerance of the Royal Government. They provided for the following: (a) The handing-over of the administration of the Provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua to the Royal Government, which took place in a solemn ceremony on 18 November 1957; (b) The inclusion in the Royal Government of two members of the Pathet Lao, which also took place on 18 November; (c) The holding of elections, which took place on 4 May 1958; (d) The integration into the national army of a contingent of l,500 men from the former Pathet Lao forces and the handing-over to the Royal Government of all war materials; (e) The fixing of 19 January. 1958 as the final date for the completion of these measures.
132. There is no doubt that the Vientiane Agreements brought some measure of relaxation. The International Commission for Supervision and Control, a body set up by the Geneva Conference of 1954, saw that there was no longer any need for its presence there and, deeming its task completed, withdrew from Laos in July 1958 With the return of calm and security, the people became reassured and returned to work.
133. This state of affairs was unfortunately not to last very long. Trouble broke out again in May 1959 when the second Pathet Lao battalion, instead of joining the national army as agreed, chose deliberately to rebel and flee. Supported in strength by Viet-Minh elements, that is to say, the forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, it subsequently returned to attack the national forces and so created a situation that my Government felt compelled to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations and to call upon it for help in putting a stop to this open aggression.
134. Charges have been made by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against the Government of Laos. They are entirely without foundation. At the very time when it was giving its support to the Pathet Lao, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was hurling at Laos accusations as violent as they were untrue. Naturally, that country's Communist friends and-allies hastened to follow its example. Using all the means with which their propaganda arsenal is packed, they accused Laos of violating the Geneva and Vientiane Agreements, of maltreating the former members of the Pathet Lao forces and of turning its territory into a spring-board for aggression,
135. I should like briefly, but in the most categorical manner, to deny these allegations here and now. First of all, allow me one observation. Does not the very fact that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has become the self-appointed spokesman of the Lao rebels, the fact that it presumes to tell the Royal Government what domestic decisions it should take and what international course it should follow, do not these facts themselves constitute sufficient proof of interference?
136. Laos did not violate the Geneva Agreements. On 11 February last, the Head of the Lao Government, H.E. Phoui Sananikone, stated that Laos had fulfilled its obligations under the Geneva Agreements. In fact, the military phase had been completed. As regards the political clauses, only some small details remained to be settled, and within a very short time they had been dealt with almost in their entirety. The International Commission for Supervision and Control recognized this by withdrawing. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam leapt upon that declaration as its war-horse. It maintained that the Lao Government had made the declaration in order to evade the clauses determining the size of its armed forces and prohibiting its participation in an agreement and its abandonment of neutrality. On behalf of the Royal Government, I deny these assertions.
137. The Geneva Agreements provided for the retention in Laos for its security and for the training of its army of French military personnel numbering 3,500 men and 1,500 instructors, to be stationed at two establishments. Today, despite the danger, the total number has been reduced to 300 men and 100 instructors. The second French military base has never been established.
138. The Geneva Agreements permit Laos to import a certain quantity of armaments and equipment specified as necessary for its defence and, security needs* At no time has this quantity exceeded reasonable limits. Laos has not received strategic weapons and can not constitute a danger to its neighbours.
139. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam also accused Laos of becoming a United States military base. In fact, there have for some months been 100 American instructors in Laos. They are working there within and under the supervision of the French Military Mission. Their introduction, which was based on practical reasons v had been the subject of negotiations between France, the United States and Laos. Since there are so few of them, there is no justification for the anxiety the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam claims to feel. Indeed, in its sincerity and honesty, Laos had announced the agreement with France and the United States some weeks in advance.
140. Finally, on 17 February, ill order to cut short all such accusations, the Royal Government published a communique — something which it had not considered called for the preceding week — confirming its position of neutrality and its intention to refrain from joining any military pact. This clarification did not, of course, diminish the aggressive ardour of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, for "none is So deaf as he who will not hear".
141. The Royal Government has not violated the Vientiane Agreements. The leader of the rebels wrote to the Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam that the Royal Government had shown discrimination against the members of the former Pathet Lao forces. That is not the case. Anyone can tell you that the former Pathet Lao members are at present occupying various posts and positions in the administrative and governmental offices on the same footing as other Lao citizens. The only condition for admission to regular government service was the passing of an examination which is also required of other civil servants in order to ascertain their educational and other qualifications. This is a normal procedure, and I do not think that it Is any different from what is done in other civilized countries.
142. As to the integration of military Unity, about which we have been subjected to the most violent attacks, here is the simple truth. The Agreements provided in the first place for the integration of 1,500 former members of Pathet Lao; in the second place, that rules for that integration should be those used in the national army; and, thirdly, that any difficulties arising in this process of integration should be settled by the Royal Government.
143. In the Royal Army 1,500 men means two battalions with a complement of forty-one officers, including two battalion commanders. The Pathet Lao forces asked for the integration of 112 officers equivalent to a staff of six battalions), including three colonels. Such claims naturally did not facilitate the operation. Nevertheless, in the interest of peace and reconciliation, the Royal Government acceded to all these demands. The officers' posts were to be designated by the High Command of the former Pathet Lao forces. Since the latter refused to do this, the Royal Government decided in December 1958 to reintegrate a former Pathet Lao member as a colonel and to make him responsible, in co-operation with the headquarters staff of the Royal Army, for designating the other officers from the former Pathet Lao forces. Colonel Singkapo was the person thus appointed, and the appointment was embodied in a Royal Order, After accepting the Government’s offer, he refused to take part in the ceremony confirming his reintegration, indicating the decision of his party.
144. Determined to settle the question once and for all, the Royal Government undertook to appoint the cadres itself and to set 11 May 1959 as the date for the integration. When that day came, the Second Pathet Lao Battalion, which was stationed at the Plaine des Jarres, refused to be integrated and took to the road in the direction of the North Viet-Nam borders.
145. The Royal Government is not guilty of illegal acts against the former members of the Pathet Lao. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam informs us through its Press and radio that, if the two former Pathet Lao Ministers were brought back into the Government Cabinet, the crisis in Laos would automatically come to an end. Strange words indeed from a country which claimed not to interfere in other countries’ affairs! Since August 1958, the Lao National Assembly had established in power a team which no longer included any Viet-Minh partisans. But all this has taken place in accordance with parliamentary and democratic rules. And I should add that we do not act like those self-styled democratic countries whose every action is a breach of democracy.
146. I have dwelt at length on the lack of substance in the accusations made against my country and my Government. The present situation in Laos, which led to the dispatch of a Security Council Sub-Committee, is actually the result of intervention and aggression by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. In the first place, there is collusion between the Pathet Lao and the Viet-Minh — collusion which has its roots in the distant past. The Pathet Lao grew out of the Lao- Issara movement, founded in 1945 — in the course of events in the Far East — to oppose the return of a protectorate or dependent regime. This objective having been achieved by the Government at Vientiane, the Lao-Issara party, which was in exile in Thailand, was dissolved in 1950 and its members rejoined the various groups which had stayed in Laos. Most of the present leaders and holders of responsible posts in Laos belonged to this movement. Only a handful of men whose purpose was not to fight for national independence refused to join it. Some of these were guilty of offences under the general law and were afraid, incidentally without good reason, that they would have to answer for them before the courts; they rejoined the Viet-Minh forces during the Indo-Chinese campaign, and returned in 1954 possessing all the influence which the Viet-Minh victory had given them. Their act made it perfectly clear to us that their ultimate objective was the communization of Laos.
147. In the light of this, it is easy to understand their various moves. It was not without reason that they sought to drag out indefinitely the negotiations for reunification and reintegration, since, when they withdrew to regroup at Sam Neua and Phong Saly, the Pathet Lao and the Viet-Minh had forcibly taken away with them the young men of the villages through which they had passed. They were awaiting the return of these young men, after their education at Hanoi and Peking under a system which I need hardly name, before embarking on their standard procedure for setting up communist cells and instigating subversion. It will thus be understood why the Pathet Lao was anxious to meet the representatives of the Royal Government at Rangoon; that was the slowest way of dealing with domestic issues.
148. It was not because it was dissatisfied with conditions under the Government that the Second Battalion chose to flee. The Pathet Lao had never wanted such integration, which would have deprived it of the military support it needed in order to carry out its Machiavellian plan. It was in pursuance of this plan that it had established stocks of arms in the forest and turned over to the Royal Government arms to a quantity less than had been expected, and for the most part in poor condition. Since November 1957, when equipment was to be transferred under the terms of the Vientiane Agreements, the Royal Government has recovered 4,000 concealed weapons, through the cooperation of the population which had been protected from the exactions of the Pathet Lao.
149. Some days ago, I quoted an example of obvious collusion between the Viet-Minh and the Pathet Lao. It was the case of a petition addressed by the leader of former members of the Pathet Lao to the Head of the Government. Before the Prime Minister could so much as take cognizance of this letter, which had been placed on his desk an hour previously, its contents had been broadcast by Radio Hanoi. The only possible conclusion is that the Pathet Lao receives its orders by signal from Hanoi and there have been many similar examples.
150. The aid given by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the rebels for the purpose of promoting disturbances in Laos cannot be questioned.
151. Radio Hanoi plays an important part in these machinations. It has never ceased to pour out against Laos a Hood of accusations, slanders and tendentious Statements, with the object of provoking unrest among the people and inciting them to break with the Government. For a longtime, the Government refrained from making any reply, so as to avoid futile arguments. Starting from last winter, in preparation for the armed attacks of July and August, Radio Hanoi tripled the time allotted to its broadcasts in the Lao language. I hope that the Security Council Sub-Committee will not fail to examine the monitorings of these broadcasts; it will see that their favourite theme is the claim that the Pathet Lao is engaged in a patriotic struggle to liberate the country, and that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has the duty of helping it to achieve final victory. Radio Hanoi has placed its broadcasting services at the disposal of the rebels, and ha s observed no limits in its campaign of subversion and sabotage; in order to make its broadcasts convincing, it quotes from a newspaper allegedly issued in the field by the fugitive battalion. No one has ever seen this newspaper. It is a product of Radio Hanoi’s fertile imagination. But there is something more serious. For some weeks, Radio Hanoi has been making a daily thirty-minute broadcast in the Lao language called "The Voice of the Pathet Lao Forces Command”.
152. Moreover, the supplying of arms to the Pathet Lao by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a fact which is quite obvious. The Pathet Lao turned over its own military equipment to the Royal Government on 12 November 1957, in accordance with the Vientiane Agreements. The equipment which it hid in the forest was afterwards recovered by the Royal Government. None of this equipment — whether turned over or hidden — has ever been a very important factor. It is known that, the day before the transfer of equipment to the Royal Government, fifty trucks from the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam arrived at the village of Hai Xuan, on the road between Sam Neua and Thanh Hoa, to collect arms lent to the Pathet Lao. Eyewitnesses who were with the Pathet Lao at the time, and who have now left it because of its anti-patriotic conduct, could provide confirmation of this for the Sub-Committee. Various weapons, particularly grenades, were seized during the recent fighting. The grenades were practically new, which rules out the theory that they could have been hidden in the forest.
153. Moreover, the outlying provinces of the North-East are among the poorest of all the provinces. Lack of communications and shortage of local supplies make it very difficult to station troops there. The province of Lam Neua generally lacks the means of subsistence between harvests, that is to say in the period before the rice harvest, and each year the Royal Government takes measures to remedy this deficiency. This is tantamount to saying that the province could only ensure the subsistence of the rebels and their Viet- Minh allies for, at the most, two weeks. Whence, then, could supplies for the aggressors originate save from the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam?
154. We know that mere subsistence is not the only requirement of an army in the field. It needs drugs, medical care, surgical services, etc. In monitoring radio broadcasts, we have intercepted messages, both in plain language and in code, concerning the dispatch to the Lao frontier of pharmaceutical products, doctors and aircraft to take the seriously wounded to hospitals in Hanoi, particularly after a major military engagement. The Royal Government has submitted to the Subcommittee, for examination, the most typical of these messages.
155. In assisting the rebels, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has not confined itself to the supply of weapons, munitions and stores. It has been training recruits as potential cadres, propagandists and political commissars. Two training centres have been operating, one at Moc Chau — eighty kilometres from Sam Neua — and the other at Thanh Hoa. As I said at the outset, it was a sinister plot which was being hatched against the life of Laos and its people.
156. The course of this plot and its execution reflect a perfected technique, well known to all of us. Force and subversion have in turn, with consummate skill, been employed. The main object has been to keep up harassing pressure, maintain tension, and avoid any truce or respite.
157. Thus, immediately after the Geneva Agreements, when the Pathet Lao — perhaps because it desired a short breathing-space — was curtailing its activities, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in its turn took up the cudgel. It occupied a border canton called Tasseng Chang, in the province of Xieng Khouang. The Royal Government endeavoured to settle the matter amicably. Delegations from the two countries met, on one occasion close to the scene of the incident, and on another at Hanoi. At these meetings, the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam made no reference whatever to the incident, but spoke about treaties of friendship, economic and cultural cooperation, and so forth. This endeavour ended in failure which only shows the futility of employing normal methods when dealing with a party who negotiates in bad faith.
158. Subsequently, when the flexible and cautious policy of the Royal Government had borne fruit, the situation in the Kingdom became relatively quiet. The provinces of the North once more experienced peace. This success could not, however, be to the taste of the Pathet Lao and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The latter saw its communization plans threatened with collapse. It was then that it instigated a further series of border incidents, so as to maintain the atmosphere of war at all costs. The occupation of a part of the province of Tchépone represents a very serious infringement of Lao sovereignty. It is atypical example of the skill of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in manufacturing a frontier incident out of a prefabricated argument. It claimed that the territory belonged to it. Nowhere will you find any frontier tracing that would leave Nam Travigne, Ban Tarua, Ban Kapai — villages of this area — in the territory of North Viet-Nam. Moreover, the most up-to-date proof that the territory belongs to Laos is provided by the reference map used at the Geneva Conference of 1954. According to this 1/100,000 scale map entitled "East Tchépone", the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam runs north and east of the villages which are now occupied. The Prime Minister of the Hanoi Government, who signed the Geneva Agreements on behalf of North Viet-Nam, accordingly, in 1954, accepted without reservations, by the first official international act to which the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was a party, the frontier drawn on that map.
159. Here I would make one incidental remark. The Royal Government of Laos, so far as it is concerned, has always stated that it would respect the frontiers of Viet-Nam, especially this particular region. An example is the military post of Lao-Bao which, in 1954, during the war operations, had been occupied by the Franco-Lao troops; it was subsequently held by units of the Lao army. This army, in the months following the signature of the Geneva Agreements, evacuated the village, which has since then been controlled by the authorities of Viet-Nam.
160. Once the occupation had been completed, the Hanoi authorities offered to negotiate. What could such negotiations be about? Their only possible subject would be the procedure for the evacuation of our national territory. But there is no point in that. A11 that Hanoi had to do was to give an order for the evacuation of its troops. The example of the occupation of Tasseng Chang is a sufficient lesson for us, and forbids us to attempt anything along those lines.
161. In any case, the Royal Government was anxious to prevent the tension from becoming more acute. The police forces in the zone were withdrawn, and the troops stationed in the vicinity were moved further away, in order to avoid any armed clashes. Faithful to its policy of peace and confident in the United Nations, the Royal Government requested the Secretary-General to intervene with a view to settling the problem. While the Secretary-General was seeking ways and means of dealing with the situation, an even more serious act was committed on 30 August 1959, which led the Security Council to take its first emergency measures.
162. In brief, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is guilty of aggression against Laos. In face of the Royal Government's determination to restore order and discipline, and because the population was cooperating increasingly with the Government and was gradually escaping from the clutches of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Pathet Lao, the two latter decided to make a decisive move for what they called liberation or final victory.
163. That is the correct explanation of the events which have occurred since 16 July 1959 and which reached their climax on 30 August last. There is therefore no truth in the argument, advanced by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, that the present conflict was due to the American hold on our country for imperialist purposes.
164. American aid to Laos is granted in the interests of peace. In this way, the United States is helping us to place our economy on firm foundations. The amounts of money we are receiving, and the use to which they are put, are well known. We have never concealed anything in that connexion. Some of the American funds are being used for the creation of an army which is needed for the defence of the Kingdom; and the numbers of that army constitute no secret. This small defensive force, which is simply a symbol of our independence, can inspire no alarm in any country. The Royal Government is receiving military aid from the United States and France — in the form of material, personnel and instructors — only for the defence of its territory, in accordance with its statement made at Geneva.
165. This aid, therefore, is supplied on a legal, international basis. The Royal Government has always insisted, that the forms which it takes should be officially made known. In any case, it amounts to very much less than that originally planned, as only one out of the two French bases authorized by the Geneva Agreements has been established and its strength is far below the 3,500 men authorized for the S6no base and the 1,500 instructors for the French Military Mission.
166. Contrary to what Hanoi and Peking assert, there are in Laos no new bases, no bombers, no heavy artillery, no new tanks, and no foreign units. The whole world can establish tills fact for itself, and I am not aware that the thirty journalists of various nationalities now travelling freely about our territory have attempted to controvert it. In any case, we invite all observers, whoever they may be, to come and verify our statements. We open our doors wide to all,
167. We knew that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was aiding and taking part in the raids against Lao army posts. That caused no surprise, for the attacks were always launched from places where that Republic usually maintains frontier guards and military forces.
168. For the attack on the posts of Muong Het and Xieng Khô on 30 August 1959, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam did not confine itself to providing assistance and support. It openly participated in it. Here is an account, by eyewitnesses, of what happened. The attack began at dawn, in two successive waves — the first constituted by former members of the Pathet Lao, and the second by troops that could not speak the language of Laos, but only Viet-Namese — along a three-kilometre front; it was supported by heavy mortar fire, which was so accurate that the command post and the communications equipment were wiped out at the fourth round. It was started by a red rocket signal and concluded by a green rocket signal. The attackers crossed the Nam Ma river, which ran alongside the posts, in rubber boats. At the same time, the posts of Sophao and Sopbao, within the perimeter, were attacked. This attack was prepared, co-ordinated and carried out with a refined technical skill of which only the Viet-Minh were capable.
169. In face of this flagrant aggression, the Royal Government approached the United Nations and requested its intervention. The Sub-Committee responsible for assembling all evidence and documents concerning the attack is now at work in the area.
170. Such is the whole origin of the present tension created in Laos by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. That Republic, together with certain other countries, tells us that, in order to normalize the situation, it would suffice to revive the former International Commission for Supervision and Control set up under the Geneva Agreements. Allow me to express the Royal Government's views on tills point.
171. The task of the International Commission for Supervision and Control was confined to the implementation of the military and political clauses of the Geneva Agreements. Today, the country has already been reunified and reintegrated. The Pathet Lao no longer exists, since its forces have been legally dissolved; there remain only rebels against the Government and traitors to their country. The aggression committed by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a circumstance of quite another kind, which, like the occupation of our national territory by the Republic, falls outside the competence of the International Commission.
172. The Kingdom of Laos is a sovereign country and a Member of the United Nations; who then, in this Assembly, would contest its legitimate preference for arbitration by the United Nations? Who would maintain that any other form of arbitration could be so universal in character as that of the United Nations?
173. But let us make no mistake. The proposal for the revival of the International Commission for Supervision and Control is a trap, and a very obvious one. By that manoeuvre, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam aims to restore the former Pathet Lao to life and to regroup its members in the two Northern provinces whence it, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, could resume its aggressive and subversive operations.
174. Thus the road to general harmony will always be rough and difficult so long as there are nations which, while constantly talking of peace, in fact dream solely of extending their proud sway beyond their frontiers, by armed force or other more tortuous but no less baneful methods. These nations are in fact perpetuating the old traditions of force which all of us want to abandon, because we know quite well that war has never led to a final settlement of any dispute or completely extinguished the hatred which it engendered.
175. Might is not always the servant of right, as we can see; and we for our part deeply regret that it should still be regarded as a necessary political instrument by certain countries which, though possessed of formidable power and satiated, as it were, in that respect, have not yet become reconciled to the idea that their forces should serve the cause of peace alone. There are still, in fact, aggressive nations, over-confident in their social philosophy, convinced that they hold the key to the future and the key to everything, deeply persuaded of their missionary vocation, and prepared to use any means, however brutal, to impose their ideology on others.
176. Is there any need to speak here of the peaceable nature' of our people? What country can say that throughout the centuries it has ever been threatened or attacked by Laos? The peoples of Laos are inspired by a religion which turns the spirit more towards withdrawal and meditation than towards violence. They are imbued with a sense of human values, with a love of joy and even, perhaps, of an easy life; tribute has often been paid to their Wisdom, a wisdom akin to that of peoples who are happy and have no history. And even if such, a people chose to brandish its weapons, who would tremble?
177. In reality, since its recent attainment of independence, Lacs has had one idea alone, one purpose only; to establish its fledgling State on a sound basis, by devoting itself, with its all too modest resources, to tasks of reconstruction and peace. How then, without complete disregard for truth, can it be accused of being a trouble-maker, a promoter of imperialism, or an instrument for the imperialism of its political friends, whoso only thought is to help it and safeguard its new and fragil independence.