Nepal

It is my privilege and honour to bring to the President the salutations and greetings of the people and Government of Nepal, and the best wishes of our beloved leader and sovereign, H.M. King Mahendra, for the success of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. 78. At the very outset, let me congratulate Mr. Slim on his unanimous election to the high office of the President of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session. His long experience in the work of the United Nations, combined with his intrinsic merit and ability, amply qualifies him for the office he now holds. We have no doubt that under his wise and able guidance our labours and deliberations in the current session will come to successful conclusion. His unanimous choice as the President of the Assembly is proof of the high confidence and esteem in which the Member nations hold him. I am especially happy that, he has been the first President of the General Assembly from our sister continent of Africa, which is destined to play an increasingly more important role in world affairs in the years to come. 79. Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate his predecessor in office, Mr. Frederick Boland of Ireland, for the excellent manner in which he presided over the last session, which was unusual and, in a way, difficult. 80. Since my delegation did not take part earlier in paying tribute to the late Secretary-General, I should like to take this opportunity to express our deep sense of sorrow and loss at the sudden and untimely death of Dag Hammarskjold and the members of his party. In Mr. Hammarskjold, the world has lost a great servant of peace. He was a man of stature, dedicated to the service of mankind. It will no doubt be very hard to replace him,, If any man was indispensable in the world—and I believe no man is—it was Dag Hammarskjold, particularly at this time. He was devoted to the task of maintaining a modicum of order where conventional diplomacy had failed, a minimum of order without which there cannot be even the slightest hope for the survival of civilized society. His cause was our cause, yours and mine, and" in the years to come we shall realize all the more bow much we had depended on him. He died a soldier's death at the post of duty. The greatest tribute we can pay to the memory of this great man is to strengthen the grounds of agreement among nations, on which they can work together to give substance to mankind's hope for fulfilment in a more peaceful and a more tolerant future. 81. At the different stages of the unfolding of the Congo drama, Dag Hammarskjold unjustly received blame from one bloc or the other, and also at one time or another from all the different parties involved in the Congo conflict. He was not deterred-by criticism of himself or his actions from any source, and remained steadfast in his purpose to make the United Nations operations succeed in the Congo. That he gave up his life in the cause of peace in the Congo should now leave no one in doubt as to his sincerity of purpose in all that he did. If he had made any errors of judgement, they were but human, and those who have thought fit to emphasize their differences with him, even after his death, should realize that if placed in the same circumstances they would have fared no better, if not worse, than he himself had done. 82. The tragic death of Dag Hammarskjold has confronted us with the task of choosing a successor to fill the office of Secretary-General. It is apparent that the United Nations cannot be left without its highest executive officer, in whose name alone the Secretariat can act. However, we must not act in haste, because a hasty action at this time might affect the usefulness and effectiveness of the United Nations for ever in the future. It is a fact that the Charter does not provide for meeting a situation such as the one in which the United Nations now finds itself. Nothing would have been more ideal for our purposes than to have the big Powers agree on the choice of a suitable individual to fill the office of Secretary-General. The question is what is to be done if there is no agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council on the choice of a Secretary-General. Should the General Assembly take the initiative in electing a suitable person for this high office, or should it wait until such time as agreement is possible among the great Powers themselves? In our opinion, something must be done immediately to make some kind of interim arrangement for carrying out the functions of the Secretary-General pending the election of a rightful successor to Dag Hammarskjold. 83. We have expressed in clear terms our opposition to the troika plan for a three-man directorate. In his address at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held recently in Belgrade, His Majesty the King of Nepal remarked on this point: "... The interesting suggestion made by the Soviet Union that the office of the Secretary-General be replaced by a triumvirate composed of representatives of Western Powers, Communist Powers and neutral countries seems to us clearly unworkable .. ." 84. We are opposed to the troika plan for the following reasons. Firstly, it is based on the concept of the preservation of the division of the world into power blocs. Instead of furthering the idea of uniting the nations for a common goal, it stresses their differences. It would inject considerations of bloc interest into every question, even in the field of executive action. All decisions of such a body would be coloured and conditioned by political interests and prejudices of the blocs, and the respect for the aims set forth in the Charter would take only a secondary place. In our view, such a concept strikes at the very roots of the principles and beliefs on which the Organization is founded. 85. If we were ever to accept the thesis that no man . can be impartial in carrying out the orders and decisions of the Security Council, we would have to revise our views on the concept of an impartial international civil service as envisaged in the Charter, The Charter provides for a Secretariat whose actions will be guided solely by the principles set forth in the Charter, the decisions of the main organs and the interests of the Organization itself, no flatter what the background and views of its individual members are. Article 100 of the Charter, states in clear terms that "In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization." 86. Apart from the ideological considerations, we are opposed to the reorganization of the office of Secretary-General along the lines of the troika plan on practical grounds -as well. We can very well imagine what would have been the initiative of a three-man directorate, as envisaged in the troika plan, in the face of a crisis such as the one the United Nations had to face in Suez or in the Congo. The excessive use of the veto in the Security Council has made the convening of special or emergency special sessions a routine necessity to deal with concrete threats to, or breaches of, the peace. 87. In the case of the Security Council, there is some restraint on the use of the veto as a result of the fact that the deliberations in the Council are public and the reasons for the use of the veto are exposed to everybody's judgement. In the case of an executive triumvirate, discussions would be carried on behind closed doors, and there would be no restraint whatsoever on the use of the veto. Even the slightest suspicion on the part of one or the other of the big Power representatives that a certain action might harm their interests would completely paralyse the executive. Such an arrangement might develop a tendency on the part of members of the directorate themselves to bring out their differences in the open, and this would considerably undermine respect for the authority of the United Nations executive. My delegation has no doubt that the reorganization of the office of Secretary-General along such lines would greatly impair the United Nations as a whole, and especially its value to the smaller and weaker countries. 88. Let me clearly sum up our position on the question of the interim arrangements for carrying out the functions of the Secretary-General. We feel that any man on whose choice the East and the West are not ^agreed will find himself seriously hampered from the very beginning in the exercise of his duties and functions as Secretary-General. Hence- our insistence that in the first instance every attempt should be made to secure an agreement among the big Powers themselves on the interim arrangements. We ourselves are for a one-man executive within the terms of the Charter. Any arrangement whish implies any sort of limitation on the highest executive of the United Nations in carrying out the decisions and orders of the various organs of the United Nations will, in our opinion, hamper the effectiveness of the United Nations itself. To those who are inclined to advocate checks on the exercise of unlimited authority by the Secretary-General, our answer is that his authority has never been absolute, and each and every matter is limited within the framework of the decisions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the other main organs of the United Nations, However, we do not object to the arrangement of having a number of deputy Secretaries-General to assist him in his work, provided all those deputies are to be directly appointed, by whomsoever the Secretary-General may be, on the basis of the principle of geographical distribution which is enshrined in the Charter. 89. We want one man whom we can hold responsible for the discharge of the functions which the Charter of the United Nations entrusts to the Secretary-General We are opposed to any arrangement that may tend to impose the deputies on the Secretary-General, because such an arrangement would increase his dependence on the deputies to the extent of diffusing his responsibility, contrary to what is envisaged in the Charter. 90. In the introduction [A/4800/Add.l] to his annual report on the work of the Organization, the late Secretary-General made an extremely well-balanced and sensible examination of the problem that we are facing today. In his objective way, he talks about how the debates and events since the last regular session of the General Assembly have brought to the fore two different concepts of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization, its authority and its structure. Some Members are inclined to favour a rather static concept of the Organization as a traditional conference machinery, to quote the late Secretary-General's words, "...for resolving conflicts of interest and ideologies with a view to peaceful coexistence, within the Charter". 91. On the other hand, there are a great many others like us who, while regarding the above concept merely as a starting point, visualize the possibility of the continued growth of the Organization in terms of increasingly effective forms of active international co-operation adapted to the experience and suited to the growing needs and demands of time and the situation. 92. If the United Nations is not conceived as a sort of world government or a super State, it is certainly not intended to be merely a debating society. Its usefulness lies in the field of multilateral diplomacy. Its institutions provide for a process of adjustment and conciliation often resulting in solutions that may not be entirely satisfying to the parties concerned, yet cause no embarrassment or loss of face to any one of them. Furthermore, it has yet to be perfected as an instrument of concerting action by governments in pursuance of the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter. In this connexion, it must not be forgotten that the functions and activities of the United Nations are necessarily confined within the framework of the decisions of the Member States. Any failure in the implementation of the decisions of the Organization within the terms of the Charter is often described as a failure of the Organization. In our opinion, it would be more correct to regard it as a failure of the world community as a whole. 93. The Charter took for granted co-operation among the five permanent Members of the Security Council as a condition for the successful working of the United Nations. As a matter of fact, the Charter, to a large extent, is based on the principle of great Power unanimity. But the experience of the last few years has shown that the original plan of collective security through the Security Council has almost failed to work because of the differences among the great Powers themselves. This has brought into vogue the method of referring to the General Assembly what the Council is unable to resolve. 94. The review of the then existing collective security machinery by the Members of the United Nations against the background of the developments in Korea led to the adoption of the famous "Uniting for Peace- resolution [377 (V)] in 1950. The effectiveness and potentiality of the action under this resolution has been proved in resolving the crises that have confronted the United Nations in the Middle East in recent years. It is now being seriously tested in the Congo. There are some who think Chat the action under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution is a departure from the path expressly laid down in the Charter, but to our mind there is nothing in the resolution itself that will interfere with the effectiveness of the action of the Security Council if only the Council shows itself capable of action. 95. As a result of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the General Assembly has been given a say. also in matters of using collective machinery for maintaining and restoring international peace. It is true that the Assembly decisions are not binding on the Member States in the same way as the decisions of the Security Council are, but the Assembly can make recommendations to Members, in the case of an armed attack, to rescue the victim, even by means of military assistance. The importance which even the Big Powers attach to this possibility is best demonstrated by the fact that when a resolution is vetoed in the Security Council, it has become customary for one or the other of the permanent members themselves to have the matter referred to the General Assembly. Despite the danger and limitations inherent in this practice, this may also be regarded as one of the few really encouraging features, because so far as the effectiveness of the United Nations as a world organization is concerned, it shows the increasing importance of moral factors. 96. It is true that it is a practice almost as old as mankind for those who break the peace to defend their actions on the grounds of alleged moral motives, but there is now an important difference. The United Nations is a forum where these motives are exposed in their true colours. The motives have to be clearly stated before the whole world, and they will be subjected to severe scrutiny in public. On some occasions, those who have been summoned to answer before this body have preferred to stay away, but that attitude has definitely not brought them any credit. The moral pressure has still been there, and I think there is no doubt that it has, on the whole, been very effective. 97. Let us not forget that the General Assembly is being compelled by force of circumstances to assume new roles and responsibilities for which it is not equipped with powers in the Charter itself. Therefore^ it can discharge those functions only in a pragmatic and ad hoc manner. The devolution of these new responsibilities upon the General Assembly hast also made the role and function of the Secretary-General more difficult and complicated, but all the same more important, in the structure and activity of the United Nations. The resolutions of the General Assembly, and for that matter of the Security Council as well, are usually results of a compromise and are, as a rule, vague and general in their implications. This has made the General Assembly rely increasingly on the executive not only for the implementation of its decisions, but also for the interpretation of the finer points and intentions of its recommendations. 98. That the concept of the Secretary-General's role also has undergone a change is clearly shown by the part he was called upon to play by the General Assembly and the Security Council in the middle East and in the Congo during the last few years. He no longer remained an administrator, charged merely with keeping the operational services of the Secretariat in a state of efficiency, but was called upon to supply initiative when the situation called for it. It was as a result of this that the late Secretary-General was unjustly criticized by some for lack of initiative at times, and by the same people for blowing initiative at other times. Let us hope that the lessons of the last few years will not be lost, and that Member States will not lightly dismiss the possibility of achieving something more concrete in the way of better equipping the United Nations to face crises in the future. 99. We must remember that the United Nations Emergency Force that is presently deployed on the borders between Israel and the United Arab Republic, and in the Congo, is different from the collective force of the United Nations as visualized in the Charter,, which never came into being because of the deadlock among the great Powers themselves in the Military Staff Committee as early as 1947. However, it will be admitted on all sides that these United Nations forces created for limited purposes and on an ad hoc basis have proved to be effective for the purposes for which they were created. While these forces are not entirely based on a new concept of United Nations supervisory action, they certainly imply at enlarged concept. 100. In this connexion, I am heartened to find President Kennedy suggesting the same kind of idea which I put forward in my address to the General Assembly from this rostrum on 2 October 1957. With the President's permission, I should like to quote from that speech. I said at that time: .. The creation of a permanent mechanism by which units of the armed forces of the Member nations can be endowed with the authority of the United Nations and made available at short notice will strengthen the hope and confidence of all peoples in the United Nations as an instrument for securing their rights and freedom". 101. Any arrangement or plan for better equipping the United Nations to fulfil its new tasks and responsibilities, in our view, requires in the first place agreement among the big Powers. It is not for nothing that so much weight and importance is attached to the principle of great-Power unanimity in the Security Council within the Charter itself. We can only hope that the great Powers will not fail to realize their sense of responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in the world, and they will come to an agreement on some concrete plans in this direction. If they fail to agree among themselves, then they certainly cannot blame the smaller nations of the General Assembly for taking initiatives on their own. 102. If there were unanimity among the "big five" there would be no crisis which the United Nations would not be able to meet Within the Charter itself, but unfortunately there has been no such unanimity among the big Powers and the differences between them seem to threaten the very existence of the United Nations at times. What are we to do—the small and uncommitted countries—who have looked upon the United Nations as the bulwark of our rights and freedom, as a forum where justice and protection can be obtained even against the mighty? We are now witnessing how the United Nations is being more and more changed into a battlefield for the two main power blocs. In the battle, we are under constant pressure to select sides according to the principle that "who is not my friend is my foe". Sometimes, one even feels that the very name of this Organization has an ironic connotation. 103. His Majesty's Government in Nepal believes that the small uncommitted nations will best serve the Organization and its purposes by supporting always such decisions and actions as reflect an objective implementation of the Charter, no matter whether these decisions or actions serve the purpose of one bloc or the other. I am not claiming any higher wisdom or superior judgement for the small uncommitted nations, but the very fact that they can stay away from the power interest makes it easier for them to judge questions objectively and in a detached manner. It will always be our endeavour to take an objective stand in controversial matters, in the full knowledge that the strict Implementation of the high principles of the Charter and the strengthening of the dignity of our Organization is of direct interest to small countries. 104. In the Assembly, the votes of the small nations have the same weight as the votes of the big Powers. However, this does not mean that every country has the same real influence on the work of the Organization. The total numerical strength of the small countries is- very great, but it does not directly reflect their operative influence. Apart from the fact that the right to veto _ of the big Powers in the Security Council gives them a decisive role in performing the primary function assigned to the United Nations, it is obvious that the great economic and military strength of these Powers gives them an influence which goes far beyond their individual votes. Be that as it may, the responsibility of the small nations is heavy. Their votes will be a deciding factor whenever a decision is taken in the Assembly. 105. My delegation believes that the main duty of the small and uncommitted nations is to stand up unceasingly in defence of the moral force in international relations. This makes it all the more important that we do not lose the sense of our own moral responsibility. The political experience of the small countries is, for natural reasons, often much more limited than that of the big Powers, and it may often be tempting to take a stand which is easier to defend from an egocentric point of view than on the basis of justice and morality. 106. His Majesty's Government in Nepal believes that the collaboration between the African and Asian States which has taken place now for many years, and also the geographically widening collaboration which happily started at the Belgrade Conference a month ago and which showed a concord of opinion on the main questions troubling the world today, will greatly strengthen the moral attitude of the non-aligned States. Neither the African-Asian collaboration nor the collaboration started at the Belgrade Conference should be regarded as any attempt to form a bloc. As we consider the division of the world into blocs as the main menace to our generation, how could we believe that there could be anything good in creating a third one? 107. This leads me back to the starting point. Our guidance must be the truly international concepts of freedom and justice which are laid down in the Charter. Our aim must be to fortify the Organization, to maintain its dignity and to increase its influence. We should never allow the United Nations to become a pawn in the game between power blocs. It is against the background of this philosophy that my Government will examine all the proposals for reforms in the structure and working of the Organization and in the composition of its various organs. 108. I have been talking for a long time about my country's general views on the United Nations. If there is nothing new in what I have said, I have still thought that a renewed pledge to the idea of a strong universal organization is not out of order at a time when the very existence of the Organization is being threatened. 109. In line with our desire for strengthening the United Nations and for making it a truly international organization, falls our desire to see it become truly universal. We have had the pleasure of witnessing practically all the newly-independent States become Members. We were happy to see Sierra Leone join our ranks recently [1018th meeting], and we are looking forward to seeing Tanganyika become a Member of the Organization later this year. There are several other divided countries in the world which we would like to see united and take their place in this Organization. Although we are in principle against a package deal of any kind, we are in favour of the admission of Outer Mongolia. We want the United Nations to fulfil its goal of universality and reflect the situation as it really exists in the world so that it may become increasingly more effective as an instrument for conciliating and resolving the differences between nations. 110. In this connexion, however, one outstanding anomaly remains. China is still not properly represented in our circle. The Central People's Government of the Peopled Republic of China represents well over 650 million individuals, far more than the populations of the Soviet Union and the United States together. All the arguments in favour of having China represented by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China have been raised in this hall time and time again. My delegation has always followed the legal line of argumentation in this respect. It is a strong line. It not only bypasses power interests but it derives its strength from the over-all principle of justice to all, which is one of the cornerstones of the United Nations Charter. 111. It is a matter of national policy for individual States to decide whether they want to recognize a new Government or not. But, as a former Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, pointed out in a memorandum in 1950, the representation of a Government in an international organization is another matter. The classic rule of international law, as found in practically any textbook, teaches us that the testing point for recognition of a new Government is whether the Government has established itself in such a way as to exercise effective authority within its boundaries and to be obeyed by the large majority of the population. In fact, no other criterion can be found. Only a Government which is in that position is able to carry out the obligations of membership in an international organization. Those who oppose the recognition of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the lawful representative of China in the United Nations must fall back on the utterly untenable construction that almost one fifth of the world population is properly represented by a Government which is actually in control of a very small portion of Chinese territory with a population of about 9 million. I think not even the ablest lawyer would be happy to plead such a case were it pending before a court. My delegation holds that it shows a complete disregard for common sense or justice that the case has to be pleaded in the Assembly. 112. Apart from the legal point of view, there are other considerations which demand that China be properly represented in the United Nations. We feel that international relationships are being poisoned by means of the exclusion of China from this body. There are countries which recognize the People's Republic of China but who, in the United Nations itself, do not assist in the recognition of China. From the point of view of reaching an agreement on disarmament, and also from that of the settlement of international political problems in South-East Asia, China's proper representation here is essential. We ourselves hold the view that the internal form and structure of a government and its policies are not relevant to the purpose of the representation of a particular State in the United Nations. But even for ' those who seem to disapprove of the system of government in China and its policies, would it not be infinitely better to be able to hold China's representatives to account before a world council, in the case of situations endangering world peace? 113. I should now like to turn the attention of the Assembly to the situation in the Congo, the greatest and most precarious issue the United Nations has had to face in the past year. In fact the Congo crisis was one of the most controversial questions the United Nations has ever had to deal with. As with many issues, its complexity was due largely to power politics and vested interests. The main goal of the United Nations operations in the Congo was to eliminate these power politics and vested interests and to fill the precarious vacuum thus created. Although our efforts in the Congo have continued longer than was originally anticipated, it seems more likely than ever that the United Nations will achieve a successful conclusion there too. 114. The most important and, we believe, lasting result of the United Nations operations in the Congo is the restoration of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a Central Government in and for the Congo. This was the primary concern of the Security Council when it was seized with the problem in February 1961. Recently the United Nations has extended its operations into Katanga province, where the role of Belgian and other European military and para-military personnel does not yet seem to have been eliminated. 115. We for our part cannot simply explain the situation in which the United Nations forces have found themselves helpless against Tshombe with his Fouga Magister, manned by a Belgian and a French mercenary. There must be something more in all this than meets the eye. We are glad that the Swedish and Ethiopian jets have reached the scene in the Congo, and all that we can do is express the hope that the United Nations forces will not be as defenceless in the future, Let us remember, however, that the United Nations operations in the Congo will not have succeeded until the authority of the Central Government; is fully restored and the territorial integrity of the Congo preserved, 116. The Congo will need economic and technical assistance for a long time to come, and in this area the United Nations shoulders a great responsibility. If economic stability and growth, prerequisite to continued political stability, can be achieved in the Congo, then we can look forward to the day when the United Nations operation in the Congo will be regarded as one of the finest achievements of the Organization. 117. The General Assembly has, in the last year or two, made considerable progress towards the solution of the problem of colonialism. The Assembly has resolved that the system of colonialism must be abolished and, while no date on the calendar has been set, the spirit and the intention of the resolution itself make it amply clear the whole regime of colonialism will be brought to an end quickly. The resolution of last year on the granting of independence to colonial countries [1514 (XV)] is a milestone in our progress towards the solution of the problem of colonialism. In Africa, however, no progress has been made towards the solution of the problem of South West Africa. The Government of South Africa persists in its policy of racial discrimination, known as "apartheid", and to disregard the repeated appeals and condemnation voiced by the Assembly year after year. 118. My Government, as well as most other African- Asian States, still considers the situation in Algeria deeply shocking. Recently, events in Tunisia further aggravated an already serious situation. Unfortunately, the French Government is still acting and thinking along colonial lines in Algeria, and their respect for the principles of self-determination and national independence stands in sharp contrast to the approach shown after the Second World War by many of the colonial Powers, especially the United Kingdom. The United Nations has continuously exerted pressure on the French Government to recognize the right of independence and self-determination in North Africa, and this pressure should not be slackened. We were disappointed to find that the French Government did not even consider it fit to attend the recent special session of the General Assembly called to discuss the situation in Bizerta. We were pleased that not one dissenting vote was cast in the Assembly against the resolution [1622 (S-IH)] passed on Bizerta, and that resolution cannot be considered anything less than a condemnation of the French attitude in North Africa. 119. Portuguese colonialism, as practised in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere, will be an increasing concern of the United Nations. However, it is heartening to note that those who prefer to take an ambiguous stand in matters of self-determination and the granting of independence to colonial peoples are becoming fewer in number each time we reconvene in this hall. 120. I have not yet mentioned the problem which, after all, is our main concern today: to save this generation and all succeeding generations from the scourge of war. We meet today under the shadow of resumed nuclear tests, a renewed arms race, and a crisis in Berlin and Germany. 121. The banning of nuclear tests has been ardently championed by the small countries ever since an item concerning it was originally placed on the agenda of the Assembly. On occasion, our expectations have been high, but progress has been followed by setbacks with deplorable regularity. Today, the possibility of a solution based on mutual trust and goodwill seems to be more remote than ever.- To my delegation, the most horrifying aspect of this problem is the apparent cynicism with which it is approached from certain quarters. 122. We very much regret the decision of the Soviet Government to resume nuclear tests because it has given impetus to others also to follow the example with impunity. Among the reasons given by the Soviet Union for the resumption of nuclear tests, we consider only one reason valid—that of France's unwillingness to be a party to the voluntary moratorium. The resumption of nuclear tests constitutes a real danger to human life and welfare. In our opinion, the utmost priority must be given to the cessation of nuclear tests of all kinds. 123. Disarmament is the primary function "of the United Nations. The great Powers and the world community have so far failed to reach agreement on "disarmament and the regulation of armaments" as envisaged by Article 11 of the Charter. The threat of a nuclear war hangs over our heads; the armaments race continues unabated. However, we welcome the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations [A/4879] issued by the USSR and the United States. At the last session, some of us had ventured to put forward similar principles in the form of a. resolution.^ We are glad to find that there is agreement between the two parties principally involved in disarmament on many of these principles. We hope that discussions on the question of disarmament at this session will result in the creation of a suitable machinery with a wide geographical representation, and with provision for the participation of the non-aligned countries. It has been quite some time since this body as a whole adopted a resolution [1378 (XIV)] deciding on general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the goal, but unfortunately little or no progress has been made. In our opinion, this problem is a great challenge, especially to the leaders of the two great countries in the world, the United States and the USSR, because the future of the world will largely depend on how they decide to meet it. No doubt it will be counted as one of the greatest achievements in human history if, the leaders of these two countries can change the present situation in the world, fraught with the risks of a nuclear war and total annihilation, into a changed and lasting prospect for a new era of peace, prosperity, and progress in the world. 124. We wonder whether, under the circumstances, any positive results can be achieved by subjecting. the so-called question of Berlin to direct initiatives of the Organization. The solution of this crisis is completely in the hands of the big Powers, and it appears to us that the United Nations has almost no practical means of intervening in it. To us, the first essential of the German question is that existing agreements must be scrupulously honoured and any modification thereof must be sought through negotiations, consent and agreement. There might be a virtue even in the maintenance of the status quo until acceptable substitutes are found. It must be recognized, however, that in a dynamic world the maintenance of strict positions sometimes tends to hold up progress, and becomes a source of friction and conflict. In our view, where new factors have arisen they must be recognized and duly provided for. We do not see any reason why the great Powers, given understanding and goodwill on both sides, should not be able to reach a settlement of the Berlin question. 125. We, for our part, can merely try to exert moral pressure on the big Powers, to make them conscious of their responsibilities towards mankind, and to impress upon them that a breach of the peace at this time will go down in history as the worst of all crimes committed against humanity. 126. These are some of the problems that weigh heavily upon us at this time, but there is also a problem of another kind, the urgency of which cannot be minimized except at great peril to world peace. I have in mind the economic and social needs of a vast section of mankind. Somehow, we have the feeling that this problem of the struggle against poverty, disease and ignorance in the different parts of the world has not received as much attention As it should have received. When the nations of the world are spending more than $125 billion on armaments, it is found difficult even to get together a few hundred million dollars for expenditure on the development of the economies of backward countries. We cannot help feeling that the attitude of the big Powers towards these great problems has been one of complacency. In our view, the task of helping the development of the under-developed countries should be approached by the big Powers as a matter of obligation. It is true that the obligation involved is moral, as all international obligations are, but it is not for that reason less binding. The world cannot live half rich and half poor. Disparities in the standards of living of the people in different countries must be reduced. Prosperity, like peace, is becoming indivisible in the world. One way to strengthen the United Nations is to increase its capacity for rendering services to less developed countries which always turn to it hopefully for assistance. For their sake and for its own, the United Nations must not fail them.