I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Mongi Slim and Tunisia on his election as President of the General Assembly. Mr. Slim has had a distinguished record in the Organization. He has served on many committees and bodies of the Organization and I remember, in particular, the distinguished part he played when Tunisia was a member of the Security Council. He carried out a constructive and conciliatory role in connexion with a number of very difficult items of the agenda in periods of some tenseness. His election at this session Is a recognition of his own personal contribution to the United Nations, to his standing and that of his country, in the Organization.
76. This session of the General Assembly convenes at a time of more than usual tenseness. Many of us may feel that the world today is subjected to strains and pressures and risks, even of war, that are greater than at any time since the Organization came into existence. Many of us are perhaps conscious of certain parallels with the nineteen-thirties, when mankind felt itself rather impotently edging towards a catastrophe. And we all know that today the results of a catastrophe, the results of a world war, would be so much more terrible than they were in the late nineteen-thirties. It is a crisis that centres particularly over Berlin and, to some extent, over Germany as a whole. The outstanding thing about this crisis is that It Is largely a manufactured crisis. The problems of Berlin and of Germany are fundamental problems, they are persisting problems, and they are not problems that are going to be solved overnight. But the fact that these problems have been pushed to a point where today serious people are thinking that perhaps the world may be facing a war is the result of an attempt by the Soviet Union to force a settlement, the result of actions by the Soviet Union to create an atmosphere of crisis. Does anyone here today seriously think that if the Soviet Union had not been waving threats, forcing questions forward, demanding decisions, demanding action that is not acceptable to key parties, this session of the General Assembly would have met in an atmosphere of possible war?
77. We have attempts from the Soviet Union to create the impression that we are dealing with an irrational man, a man whom we must rush to pacify because his actions will otherwise be unpredictable. We hear from Moscow talk about patience being exhausted, we have threats to destroy other countries, threats to wipe a country off the face of the earth if it gives trouble. This is a series of acts of terrorism, and they are having exactly the opposite effect of what they might have been intended to create. Instead of frightening people and driving them into concessions, they are driving us together. I remind Members that the Charter of the United Nations refers not merely to the obligation on all of us to refrain from the use of force, it calls on us to refrain from the threat of force. I endorse the remarks in the Assembly by the President of the United States, Mr, Kennedy, earlier in this session when he said: "Let us call a truce to terror" [1013th meeting, para. 41].
78. I have said that the problems of Berlin and of Germany are persisting problems. Some of the elements in them are essential elements. One of them is the principle that international agreements must be observed. There are certain international agreements on Berlin. They provide, among other things, for access rights, and these must be observed. Another principle is that West Berlin cannot be allowed to go under. It is a city of over 2 million people, people who are going about their lives day by day in a normal manner like any other people in a free and independent country, and these people are entitled to continue to lead the sort of lives that they have chosen to lead.
79. We have been told a lot in recent years about competitive coexistence. We have heard the doctrine that communism and capitalism can live side by side-let them work together, compete together and see who comes out in front in the end. Now Germany and Berlin is surely a case where we have had some competitive coexistence. In Germany and in Berlin more than anywhere else in the world, we have had a certain degree of movement, backwards and forwards between the East and the West, Here we did have some competition, we did have the two regimes working side by side in peaceful conditions, competitive coexistence, if you like. And what has happened? There has of course been a steady stream of refugees, millions, moving from East Germany and East Berlin over to West Germany and West Berlin. This peaceful coexistence, this competitive coexistence, has reached such a stage that those in the East have felt themselves at such a disadvantage in comparison that they have had to call a stop to it, and a wall has been built dividing East Berlin from West Berlin. In past times cities have built walls in order to keep enemies out. East Berlin has built a wall in order to keep its own people in, and that wall is rather symbolic of the situation that exists in Berlin and in Germany today,
80. This is something that we need to bear in mind when we are told that the real objective is simply competitive coexistence so that we can see which side gets ahead in peaceful competition. So I would say that we must certainly seek a solution; we must cease threats from either side and the principle of self-determination must not be forgotten, as it has to lie at the basis of any lasting outcome in that region.
81. We must recognize that all parties have legitimate interests to be preserved. We do not want, in the
centre of Germany or in the centre of Europe, a situation to arise that threatens anybody. I 'am quite sure that on the side of the West—the United States, the United Kingdom and France—there is no intention to use Germany as a spearhead that will threaten the security of any of the countries of Europe.
82. I referred at the beginning of my speech to the deteriorating international situation and I mentioned Berlin and Germany as a major factor in this. There is another development that has threatened the peace of the world and international confidence. This new element is the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. We had hoped that there would b^ a permanent cessation of these tests. The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union had all stated that none of them would be the first to resume nuclear tests. The General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted resolutions [1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV)] on the subject. A permanent cessation of tests would have done a number of things. It would have prevented the continuance of fall-out from nuclear tests in various parts of the world. It would have helped to limit the spread of weapons to other countries and the emergence of new nuclear Powers. It would have imposed some limitation on the development and growth of new and terrible weapons. It could have been a sort of pilot project which would have lessons for wider disarmament arrangements. And so we had hoped, nevertheless knowing all the difficulties, knowing all the disadvantages and weaknesses of a voluntary arrangement, that the arrangement we had could persist, and that it would lead us into a situation that would give permanent assurance of an end to nuclear explosions. However, the tests have been resumed.
83. It has been said that a reason for the resumption of tests is the fact that France conducted tests. I do not regard that as an excuse nor, I am sure, does anyone else in this hall regard that as the real reason why the Soviet Union resumed tests. And on this I can speak on behalf of Australia, which has a good record, because Australia has always taken the view that no nuclear Power should emerge beyond the three that already existed. In fact, I said in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 12 November 1959:
"But we cannot think it right that a fourth country should be free to conduct a test while the nuclear Powers are under constraint".
In saying that, I was merely repeating things that had been said by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of External Affairs of Australia earlier. Australia has voted for resolutions calling on other countries not to resume tests while the three nuclear Powers were not testing; so that on this Australia can speak with a record of having protested in the past.
84. But let us look at the French tests with a proper sense of proportion. Our French colleagues, I am sure, will not take offence if I say that their four tests were of a very primitive nature. These were not tests by countries which over a period of years had built up large armouries and large experience; these were tests by a country that was just starting out. The total fall-out produced by all four of the French nuclear tests was very much less than the fall-out produced by any one of the nine announced megaton nuclear tests in the current Soviet series.
J/ This statement was made at the J0S3rd meeting of the First Committee, the official records of which were published only in summary form.
In the current series of tests being conducted by the Soviet Union there have been no fewer than nine megaton tests, every one of which had greater fall-out than all the French tests put together. We have had explosion after explosion in the Arctic and in Asia let off by the Soviet Union, there was another one last night. More than twenty tests have so far been identified, and the world is being showered by the Soviet Union, and by the Soviet Union alone, with nuclear fall-out.
85. We know that, with the present state of scientific knowledge and experience, it is possible to have an individual test, and so to control it that nuclear fallout is predictable and can be managed. Even so, a long series of tests in a very short space of time, conducted by one country and leading inevitably to the feeling in other countries that in order to preserve their own security they also may have to consider such tests, is not something that we can view with pleasure. We know that, justified or unjustified, there is in mankind a great disquiet at this continued showering of the world with nuclear fall-out. Remember that if the Soviet Union had not resumed tests there would be no nuclear tests being conducted in the atmosphere today; there would be no nuclear fall-out from tests falling on any country in the world today.
86. It might be said: "Why do you raise this now? This has happened, but we must look to the future." I agree, and I am going to say something about that in a few minutes. But it is important to record our condemnation of it, because there is a world-wide condemnation, not only in countries that like mine are associated with the United States and the United Kingdom, but all over the world in countries that are unaligned. It is important that we should declare that we do not like what has happened and it is important that the people of the Soviet Union and the rulers of the Soviet Union know that the whole world disapproves of what they have done. I am quite sure that the mass of the people in the Soviet Union do not approve of what their Government is doing, and I am sure there must be large numbers in the Soviet Communist Party itself who do not approve. If every morning in Moscow the citizens opened their newspapers and saw that the Soviet Government had let off one more explosion— perhaps a minor one somewhere in the Arctic or Asia, perhaps a megaton explosion—I am sure that when they saw what was going on there would be great disquiet there. One of the difficulties in operating a world organization is that there is a vast area of the world that is shut off from knowledge not only of opinion in the Assembly but of what its own Government is doing. There has of course been an announcement that tests will be resumed, but the details, that one can read in newspapers in other countries, have not so far been given on a regular basis.
87. There are lessons for the future in this. One lesson is that the tests have demonstrated the limitations on the effectiveness of a voluntary moratorium without adequate provision for enforcement and inspection. We have had a voluntary moratorium. It was brought into existence partly by the statements made of their own accord, by the three nuclear Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. However, the United Nations General Assembly also gave some warrant to this moratorium. There is, for example, resolution 1577 (XV) of 20 December 1960, in paragraph 2 of which the Assembly urged the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations
"to continue their present voluntary suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons".
There was another one, resolution 1578 (XV), which went further: it repeated that injunction and also in paragraph 2, requested other States to refrain from undertaking such tests.
88. Now we have had a voluntary moratorium, and what his happened ? We know that it has been broken. It came to an end, and over twenty nuclear tests have been held since 1 September 1961, at least nine of them in the megaton range. What will be the fate of any other moratorium if we do not have provision for it to be enforced and inspected, if we do not have some assurance that one of the parties to it is not preparing for another series of tests and going to break the moratorium? We had a long series of tests by the Soviet Union; we had a moratorium; we have had another series of tests by the Soviet Union, which is still continuing. Are we to have another moratorium now, which will stop the other two nuclear Powers, while perhaps the Soviet Union merely gets its second wind and digests the results of its present tests and then, when the time is ripe, lets off another series of tests? We cannot face a situation where a moratorium is merely an arrangement whereby the Soviet Union periodically carries out tests whenever it wishes to do so and the other Powers are stopped from doing so.
89. Australia finds itself in agreement with what President Kennedy said; "We must now take those steps which prudent men find essential." The United States has been forced to resume tests. The comparatively low-yield nature of those tests is a demonstration of the extent to which the United States trusted in the fact that it was discussing with another great Power in good faith. The fact that it is taking it so long to mount a series of tests is some demonstration of the fact that it was showing good faith itself. The United States has been forced to act, and not the United States alone. This is not simply a question of our saying, "We understand the position of the United States; in order to look after its interests it has to resume tests." We all have an interest in it. In taking a decision which will keep itself strong in relation to the other great Power, the United States is taking a decision not only in its own interests but in the interests of all of us; and when I say "all of us" I do not mean only those of us who are associated in defence and other arrangements with the United States; I mean the whole world.
90. A further lesson from the resumption of these tests relates to disarmament generally. A lot of the essential requirements of a treaty for a definite arrangement on nuclear tests are also applicable to disarmament generally. Nuclear tests are a rather easier field in which to reach agreement, particularly nuclear tests in the atmosphere, because it is easier to detect nuclear explosions. Provided one can have sufficient observation sites, it is possible to tell whether an explosion in the atmosphere has taken place. Therefore, all the elaborate, detailed machinery that is necessary for general disarmament can be modified to some extent when we are attempting to inspect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere—provided, as I say, there are adequate facilities for making the observations.
91. But the provisions for inspection and control which are essential for nuclear tests are equally essential for disarmament generally, and they are
more difficult to apply. We have been given a lesson on that. By insisting on inspection and control we are not raising quibbles designed to prevent the conclusion of an agreement; they lie at the very heart of disarmament and are essential to it.
92. We have had put before us by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations [A/4879]. Nobody would say that it was not a good thing to have as wide an area of agreement as possible between the great Powers on disarmament, but we must not exaggerate the extent of that agreement or think that we have done any more than take the first step. Many elements in that agreement need to be worked out in practice before we can say that there has been a real meeting of minds. I am thinking, for example, of the provision for control. What is the control machinery? It takes us straight into all the problems that have been associated, for example, with some of the discussions on the "troika".
93. In the discussions, of course, there was a very important element on which the two great Powers did not reach agreement and which is set out in a later statement by the permanent representative of the United States and circulated in the Assembly; and that goes into the question of controlling armaments that are retained by the great Powers. We want to be able to check and to control arms that are destroyed in the course of disarmament, but it is equally essential to know how many arms a country is retaining, to be able to verify and to keep a watch on the arms that are retained. That very important element has not been agreed between the great Powers in that statement of principles that has been circulated. The United Nations has the responsibility under the Charter not merely for disarmament but for the regulation of armaments. It is laid down in Article 11 of the Charter—and I am indebted to the Secretary of State of Liberia, who drew our attention to this point in his statement in the general debate [1017th meeting]. Article 11 says that the General Assembly may consider the general principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. That aspect is not adequately covered in the joint statement of agreed principles of the United States and the Soviet Union. In saying this, I am not criticizing those Powers for reaching agreement; I am only pointing out that agreement does not solve everything and is no more than a first step.
94. May I turn now to the question of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General. This is a matter which we all expected to have to discuss at this session and, in fact, to be a major element in the work of this session. It has been given a new form now by the death of Mr, Hammarskjold. Discussions are going on among various delegations on what is to emerge to fill the vacuum that has been left by Mr. Hammarskjold's death, and it would not serve a useful purpose in the general debate to discuss the various details that are under negotiation now among delegations. I do not want to discuss the day-by-day negotiations, but rather to take up one or two important points of a fundamental nature,
95. I would say first that no step which we take now to meet the vacancy in the office must prejudice the principles laid down by the Charter for the future. We know that one of the great Powers is opposed to the very principles laid down by the Charter on the appointment and conduct of the office of Secretary-General. I do not say that to the Soviet Union in an unfriendly spirit; the Soviet Union itself takes that position; it is its stated position that it believes that the arrangements laid down in the Charter should now be amended. But I think it is most important that, in trying to reach a settlement now under pressure of time—because we have to make some arrangements to carry on the work of the Secretariat—we must not prejudice the principles laid down by the Charter for the future. If the Charter is to be amended, then let it be amended in the proper way. The office of Secretary-General has very great importance, not only in the conduct of the Organization as it now is, but also in its implications for decisions on the future of the United Nations, on the execution of programmes of disarmament, and in the conduct of international relations generally.
96. There are two principles to which we attach great importance. One is that there shall be one man at the head of the Secretariat—not a "troika", but one man—and also that there be no veto built into the operations of the Secretariat. Above all, what we must have is a genuinely international civil service. One of the great developments of this century has been the emergence and gradual bringing to fruition of the ideal of genuinely independent international civil service. Great progress on this was made in the League of Nations, and in the first fifteen years of the life of this Organization further progress was made. All of us who have had dealings with the United Nations Secretariat over the years have observed how often we could talk to an individual member of the Secretariat and find that the view which he was expressing, the outlook which he was reflecting, was not that of the Government of the country from which he came; it was that of the wider international community. It will be tragic if that is destroyed.
97. There, are Articles of the Charter—Article 100 and Article 101—which speak of the genuinely international character of the civil service in its outlook and its conduct. They speak also of a proper geographical distribution, which is essential, not in order that members of the Secretariat can reflect policies of governments, but so that they can reflect the general outlook of the regions from which they come and can have some general understanding of the problems of the regions from which they come. In that sense, all countries should be represented in the Secretariat. But in the sense of having men in the Secretariat who will take orders from their own governments, who will see that the policies of their own governments are executed by the Secretariat, the proposals of the Soviet Union cut straight across the whole conception of the United Nations. If the Secretary-General wants to know what the position and the policy of an individual Member is on any question he can ask the Permanent Representative or otherwise approach the Government. It is the genuine impartial, international character of the civil service that is under strain at present and under attack.
98. I should like also to say a word about the importance of upholding the United Nations Charter—upholding it unless and until it is amended by correct processes. Of course, interpretation is inevitable, but fundamental Articles and Chapters cannot be amended by neglect or gloss. The United Nations came together in the form of a contract among the individual Members. Together we contracted to give up certain of our attributes of sovereignty, but it was all done as
part of one great conception, as part of one total document, and it all has equal validity.
99. It is important in this connexion for the General Assembly to be mindful of the responsible exercise of its functions. We know that the powers of the General Assembly laid down in the Charter are relatively limited. Its capacity for authorizing action is quite strictly limited by the Charter, but there is great moral weight attaching to recommendations of the General Assembly. Governments have sought to obey the behests of the Assembly, even if sometimes they have not been in agreement with its policies. They have felt that here was an opinion of the nations of the world gathered together in a responsible body. It is important to maintain that respect for the decisions of the Assembly, and it can be maintained only by the responsible exercise by the Assembly of its recommending power,
100. I should like to turn now to one of the questions that has occupied a great deal of our time during the past twelve months. It may occupy some of our time in future, but I hope in a less difficult and less tense way. I am referring to the Congo. We had great hopes until just before the session began that the problems of the Congo, which had so long preoccupied us in recent months, would cease to be at the centre of our attention. Our hopes have been clouded, first by the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, and also by the fact that the situation in Katanga is still not settled.
101. Since the General Assembly last met at its resumed fifteenth session earlier this year, there have been many hopeful developments. The Adoula Government was formed, which gave us for the first time a government in the centre of the Congo that had a wide degree of acceptance not only internally but also internationally. There has been a steady extension of the administration of the Central Government and the effectiveness of that administration, and this has served to provide a basis for international and other aid programmes. So these are hopeful elements, I think that it would be worth while not merely to record our thanks to the Governments that have contributed in various ways to the successful outcome of the operation so far, including those Governments that provided troops, but also to make special mention of those that responded with further troops at a most difficult time earlier this year. I am thinking particularly of the Governments of India and Malaya which, at some sacrifice and at the cost of exposure to some difficulties of their own, made forces available and have played a very important part in the outcome.
102. Our aim in the Congo remains what it was. It has largely been achieved, but so long as Katanga remains separate it has not been achieved. The General Assembly has more than once declared that the unity of the Congo is the aim of the Organization. Any solution of the Congo crisis, of course, must be one mutually agreed among the Congolese themselves. It should not be imposed upon them from outside, and preferably not even imposed upon any substantial element by the remainder. The United Nations has been able to play a part, and it can continue to play a part, in bringing the various forces together.
103. There are in Katanga still certain foreign elements that are there contrary to resolutions of the
General Assembly—mercenaries, soldiers of fortune, persons who have played, and in some cases are continuing to play, a mischievous part, men who are there contrary to the express wishes of their own Governments, men who, in some cases, could almost be described as rebels against their own Governments. The activities of these persons can only be deplored by all of us.
104. The aim of the United Nations in the Congo, the aim to which the Australian Government subscribes, is a united and unaligned Congo, secure in its independence and stability.
105. So, despite the continuing problems in the Congo —and some of them, from time to time, give us increasing worry, and sometimes they seem to ebb—the total situation in that country nevertheless is, over recent months, one of progress. And there are other positive elements in the world situation. There is the continued economic co-operation, partly inside the United Nations, partly outside. The United Nations is gaining more and more experience in economic co-operation, technical assistance and economic aid to Member countries, and this becomes of increasing importance as new countries become independent and are on their own.
106. In the field of colonialism there have been advances. A new country has joined us within the last few weeks—Sierra Leone. Tanganyika will be independent early in December, and in many other parts of the world there are advances. In some parts perhaps, there is, unfortunately, stagnation or dispute.
107. In our Australian Territories, New Guinea and Papua, the Australian Government is continuing actively and as rapidly as possible to pursue the task of bringing them to self-government and self-determination. New Guinea, as I have said on another occasion in the Assembly [933rd meeting], is different from most other colonies in the world. As far as Australia is concerned, it is a Territory that is next door to us. It is not some far, remote country in whose welfare we have no interest other than the one of economic exploitation. So far from economic exploitation, our aim is to assist the country so that it can take Its place as an independent nation next door to us, in partnership with us and in partnership with the other countries of which it is a neighbour. It is a country which has long been remote from contact with other peoples. It is a country which, in terrain and in other ways, is difficult to penetrate.
108. The basic objectives of Australia in its Territories are those set forth in the Charter. Our objectives in both Territories are identical—self-determination and a recognition of the right of the people to choose their own form of government and their own associations. I shall not go into detail on the steps that we have taken over the past twelve months in pursuance of this obligation. They have been explained in detail in the Trusteeship Council and in the Fourth Committee. Ever since the Organization began, Australia has been discharging its function under the United Nations, reporting to the United Nations and going beyond the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement or its obligations under the Charter because it believes genuinely in the principle of self-determination. It was Australia and New
- Zealand that more than any other countries put these provisions into the Charter of the United Nations. This is not an obligation forced on us; it is an obligation which we ourselves took a lead in getting into the Charter.
109, There has been during the past twelve months important progress and participation by the indigenous inhabitants in government at all levels. There has been a steady expansion of education and of economic development. The expenditure by the Australian Government on the development and advancement of the Territory has risen to $39 million a year. We have this feeling of partnership, the feeling that we are neighbours, but a recognition at the same time that the people, by virtue of their past history and not because of their innate qualities, are not yet in a position to form a modern unified State. This will come. It will come as rapidly as we can bring it about. But it cannot come now and I am sure that nobody who hag been in New Guinea would say that the Territory is now ready for independence, and there have been large numbers of people from various delegations in the General Assembly who have been in New Guinea.
110. While I am on the subject of New Guinea, I should also mention Netherlands New Guinea on the other side of the island. This has been the subject of an important statement by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands during the general debate [1016th meet-ting] , I shall not comment in detail on that statement, because it will come before us later on when we consider the item on our agenda. But I would welcome the fact that the Netherlands Government, in discharge of its obligations under the Charter, is seeking to give effect to the principle of self-determination. The proposals which it has put forward are now no doubt being carefully studied by all delegations and they deserve careful study as an imaginative attempt to give effect to self-determination in this Territory.
111. I might also mention, because this is a subject in which the Australian Government has taken a great interest over a period of years, the consideration by the General Assembly in the past years of various aspects of international co-operation and activity in the field of science. Many Members here may remember the speeches that were made on this matter at the thirteenth session in the General Assembly [759th meeting] and in the Third Committee in 1958 by the then Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Casey. Australia is perhaps peculiarly conscious of the role that scientific development and the application that science can play in economic development generally, because our whole history in Australia has been one of battling against alien and hostile elements, wind, rain, drought and flood. We have been forced to try and transplant to Australia cattle and sheep and forms of vegetation, from Europe and other countries, that had to be introduced into our country. It has taken a long while. Sheep, which are the backbone of our economy, are an importation from other countries and had to be developed. We believe that in the continued and intensive application of science there is a great deal that all countries of the world can benefit from, either through direct contacts between scientists or through the activities of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.
112, The Economic and Social Council gave some consideration to this during the year, not perhaps as vigorous as Australia would have liked. There are proposals for a scientific conference U which Australia would welcome, though we hope that the terms of reference of the conference will be such that its attention will be concentrated, with the hope of getting a practical outcome, rather than diffused so that there will be nothing but discussion. I might mention also that we have had in Canberra in recent months a Conference under the Antarctic Treaty, in which progress was made by a large number of Governments in solving problems of co-operation there and building up bases for future co-operation in the Antarctic.
113. It is not possible In a speech in the general debate to cover all questions before the General Assembly or to cover all regions of the world or all elements of policy that are important to one's country. I have not, for example, referred to South East Asia, though that is pivotal in Australia's foreign policy and Australia's international relations. I shall say simply that the situation in Laos is one in which Australia takes great interest. We want Laos to be independent, genuinely neutral, and with its independence assured for the future. We also are concerned at developments in Viet-Nam. In Viet-Nam there are increasing internal disturbances fomented from outside, with foreign physical penetration from outside. Developments of that nature cannot but give concern to all countries in South East Asia and make us look to see what it holds for the future. I shall say no more on either of those situations or on South East Asia generally. But the briefness of my comment is not to he held to imply that we do not attach the greatest of importance to what is going on there.
114. That is the situation in the world as we see it today, Some elements are good; some of them are full of possibilities of disaster. I think at the moment of. the situation that confronted us all when the United Nations was being born and brought into existence. And I say this to the Soviet Union, because I do not want them to think that we are unmindful of what we have all gone through together in the past. The United Nations was born out of the Second World War, when the Soviet Union and the United States and the United Kingdom and France and the rest of us were fighting for our existence and fighting side by side in support of one another. We had units of the Royal Australian Air Force up in Murmansk helping to get convoys through to the Soviet Union. We had ships of the Royal Australian Navy convoying supplies to the Soviet Union. And there were ships and men and aircraft from all the other countries In the great alliance that were also helping. The Soviet Union for its part was also fighting and it suffered tremendous losses, civilian as well as military. We are not unmindful of that.
115. It was out of that common struggle that the United Nations was born. It was born out of the consciousness of the fact that we were all bound together. The things that united us were greater than the things that divided us. Surely that is true today. It is even more true today, when man has this tremendous nuclear potential that could destroy everything. The things that bind mankind, the things that bind the Soviet Union, and the United States, and the rest of us—the developed and the under-developed countries are much greater than the things that divide us, if only we can remember our common humanity, our
common stake in seeing that we survive and make the utmost use of the potentialities of the human race. We are not going to do that if we are subjected to threats. We are not going to be able to do that if countries fear that they may be the -victims of sudden attack.
116. There are differences; there are persisting and lasting differences of an international nature and we have to recognize that the United Nations is not going to solve everything overnight. Many problems are going to persist, but we must not make them a cause of war. We must not threaten war over them. And if we remember that we are bound together by common interests, we are brought back to the Charter of the United Nations, which was the product of our last struggle together side by side.