Cambodia

I wish first to say how deeply moved I am at the thought that our Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, is no more. On behalf of Cambodia and its people, I desire to pay a formal tribute to the illustrious man who has fallen in the service of justice and peace. He was the friend of the small countries that are fighting for survival in a world where the law of the stronger is asserting itself ever more forcefully. He was an invaluable conciliator, a mediator of consummate tact, always available to help in the settlement of international disputes. More than once has Cambodia had occasion to value his lofty understanding and his testing concern for impartiality. His memory will remain with us for all time. 38. As last year, and in my capacity as Head of State of Cambodia, I have ventured to take part in the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly at this sixteenth session; I am, however, fully aware of the delicate and difficult nature of the role which Cambodia, as a non-aligned country, has to play. We come to New York and the United Nations with a somewhat invidious reputation, owed in large measure to the recent Belgrade Conference. 39. Western observers and the Western Press have either condemned the meeting of the non-aligned countries out of hand or commented ironically with more or less success, on its results. Thus we have noted, in the most responsible newspapers and from the pens of the most objective of journalists, observations of this sort: "The Belgrade Conference endeavoured to confer upon those taking part in it a kind of mandate to act as arbiters of world policy"; "Twenty-four nations are trying to form a consortium for intervention in world affairs... They feel they have a call to teach • others... We see them falling victims to a superiority complex"; and so on and so forth. This illustrates well enough the feelings of the aligned towards the non-aligned countries. 40. In these circumstances, Cambodia feels compelled to state that it has not come here with the intention of setting itself up as an arbiter, censor or judge, or even as the "world's conscience". And, since it is fully conscious of its small size, there could be no question of its having a superiority complex. 41. That being so, it may well be asked what importance Cambodia attaches to its presence in the United Nations. 42. The fact is that the United Nations is our only refuge, our sole support, our only comfort, however insubstantial these may be in an epoch so prodigal of disappointment. In coming here, we have no desire to make propaganda, to give anyone lessons In ethics, or to communicate truths that have been revealed to us alone. 43. Our sole desire is to be in some sort a simple citizen of the world, called upon to sit in a quasi- universal parliament, and to do our duly scrupulously, assuming our responsibilities in a serious spirit but without any passion, hatred, prejudice, complex or excessive zeal. 44. All we want is to do our duty, so that we may give proof of our realization that we belong to mankind, and of our desire to continue a peaceful existence in a world which talks so much of war. Nothing morel 45. That we are neutral does not necessarily mean that we are abstentionist. Should we deem it right to support a proposal made by one or another bloc, it is our duty to do so, even though as a result our neutrality and non-alignment be impugned and we be classed as tools or playthings of imperialism, of the right or of the left as the case may be. When we are called upon in this Assembly to take a stand with regard to problems which affect each one of us and the fate of mankind as a whole, we must assume our responsibilities. We must state our views, opt, if necessary, for. what seems to us the right or least undesirable solution, or even put forward, ourselves, a solution that we consider possible and reasonable. 46. Is it logical that we should be censured for being conscious of our solidarity with all the peoples of the earth, for trying, on occasion, to make our feeble voice heard—particularly on matters of direct concern to us, as when we search for means of escaping involvement in a cold, lukewarm or hot war that is leading our neighbours to self-annihilation or prompting them to seek our own destruction? 47. Is it logical that we should be upbraided for venturing to speak on disarmament, on the ground that we are not rich enough—or mad enough—to make weapons ourselves? After all, one need not be a Japanese to realize the dangers presented by these nuclear tests which have been multiplying over the past few weeks I 48. Is it logical that our poverty, and the aid we receive from Powers of both blocs, should expose us to contemptuous reproach? The idea was recently put forward, in the Western Press, that we neutrals constituted the "bad conscience" of the great countries, and that it might be asked what would happen to us if the great Powers of the two blocs reached an agreement. 49. On this point I must say plainly that, although we are poor, we are not accustomed to beg. We are ready to dispense with all foreign aid, if that is necessary for the preservation of our dignity. Above all, we are prepared—and gladly prepared—to give up all foreign aid if that is the price to be paid for an honest and lasting understanding between our friends of both blocs. 50. Cambodia has been an organized State for fourteen centuries; its economy and finances have always been such as to enable it, not perhaps to modernize itself at an ultra-rapid rate, but at least to live in freedom and happiness. A cessation of all foreign aid would not spell the death of our country; it would simply mean that more time would have to elapse before we covered the distance that separates us from modern nations. 51. It must be clearly recognized that for us—as for most of the other small, so-called "under-developed" countries—honour and freedom are possessions which we prize and are determined to defend. 52. In this respect, the United Nations constitutes the small and medium-sized countries' last hope of safeguarding their dignity. All or nearly all the Powers which were represented at Belgrade gave resounding expression to this hope. 53. What of dignity? That word, for us, covers many things. We regard dignity as signifying a love for independence, justice, equality and peace, with mutual respect for sovereignty, national integrity, regimes and ideologies. Dignity, for us, is to be found in peaceful coexistence, which is not a mere slogan but a vital need. 54. I shall not tax the patience of representatives here with comments or opinions on all the problems that at present exercise the world. I simply wish to state our own views on certain key questions, in the hope—which some may find rash, but will doubtless forgive—of making a positive though modest contribution to their solution. 55. The problem of disarmament is on the agenda. The smallest countries in the world are kept informed, hour by hour, of the negotiations between the giant Powers of the two blocs—of their plans, of their frequent setbacks, of all the ups and downs that they experience. We might adopt a passive attitude with regard to these questions, which it is for the great Powers, and them alone, to solve. But these same great Powers never cease pestering us—calling on us to bear witness to their good faith, to praise their sincerity and to condemn the duplicity of their adversaries. Yet it is a fixed principle with us that we judge for ourselves and turn a deaf ear to all canvassing. Paradoxically enough, this attitude of ours brings down upon us criticism from both sides, as well as the accusation, from certain quarters, that we are meddling with matters which do not concern us. 56. Unfortunately, however, over-armament or disarmament, war or peace, are matters of concern to every single country in the world, whether it be large or small, rich or poor. The so-called nuclear "experiments" or "tests" are of concern to us no less than to Western Europe or Central Africa; for what country can hope to escape radioactive fall-out? Admittedly we are forced to submit to this man-made scourge, but let no one ask us to submit to it in silence. 57. Moreover, let no one ask us to applaud unreservedly the conquest of outer space when the purposes to which the super-Powers contemplate putting that conquest are all too clear. Whether it is a case of atomic energy or of the conquest of gravity, is not the first objective that of achieving world domination, if necessary by annihilating half or three-quarters of the world's population? The tragedy of Hiroshima, whereby tens of thousands of human beings were vaporized and tens of thousands of others were condemned to the torture of a slow death, is today no more than a vague memory of the first steps taken in the technique of mass destruction. And yet, how salutary it would be if those few persons who hold the fate of mankind in their hands were constantly to have before their eyes the picture of those bodies so horribly maimed, burned and tortured, 58. How could we ignore the consequences of the great Powers1 over-arming, when it is our immediate neighbours that are the victims thereof? In Laos, a peaceful people, certainly one of the most peaceful in the world, has been plied with deliveries of arms by the two blocs and urged, by means of every sort of propaganda, to make use of them. In South Vietnam, the civil war continues to spread and has reached our very gates. Refugees from the ethnic minorities in the mountains of central Vietnamare streaming into our country, and face us with very complex problems of reception and resettlement. Armed incursions into our territory occur from time to time, and it is not always possible to distinguish to what side these Vietnamese belong; only recently, we had to resort to bitter fighting, costing us eight in dead, to repel these people who were better armed than we were. 59. In Laos, the great Powers proclaimed their desire to see peace restored there. But each of them believes that the best way of achieving that purpose is to provide its supporters with superior military means which will ensure its victory. In South Vietnam, the situation is not very different. This concept of over-armament in the cause of peace is indeed a strange one 60. We have just learnt that, after a period of grave tension, the United States and the Soviet Union have apparently agreed to resume, on a new basis, their conversations on disarmament. We rejoice at these glad tidings, of course, and we should like to believe that these two great friends are clearly aware of what an atomic conflict would hold in store for both of them. But the very disappointing results of the Geneva meetings lead us to think that the mistrust which dominates their relations will make it difficult for them to accept reciprocal supervision of their nuclear and other weapons. The establishment of a general and complete system of supervision will doubtless require large resources and entail a great deal of trouble. But such supervision is indispensable. 61. There is, I believe, only one way of achieving effective supervision. It consists in having-recourse to inspection teams supplied try countries that do not manufacture arms and whose neutrality and good faith are recognized by both sides. I repeat that there is no question of the "non-aligned" countries attempting to impose their arbitration, or even their presence, in connexion with the settlement of the major world problems. But I do believe that the two blocs should understand that some countries are in a position to render them disinterested help, and that such help can be used or abused. These countries have no material power, but they have one very valuable thing—namely, willingness and good faith. That is a great deal. However, while patiently awaiting a disarmament agreement between the great Powers, we associate ourselves with the vast majority of peoples all the world over in hoping that the "atomic" nations will agree to halt once more, and without delay, their dangerous experiments. 62. In conclusion, on this question of disarmament, I wish to express our fears of seeing an atomic war "triggered off" by mistake. These fears are well founded and are shared by the leaders of the two blocs. Until the hopes of general and complete disarmament are realized, we would, therefore, urge them to increase the number of "safety-catches" in their arsenals. In particular, I wish to emphasize the danger inherent in supplying ultra-modern weapons, on an over-generous scale, to allies or satellites which are too impulsive or too irresponsible. 63. Finally, may I be permitted to protest against the attitude of certain Western circles which consider that the "non-aligned" countries are pressing for disarmament merely in the hope of persuading the great Powers to employ for their benefit the enormous appropriations thus saved. This contemptuous accusation is entirely unfounded. Cambodia, for example, although poor, is an exporter of agricultural produce and can live without aid from any quarter. All that our people, who are deeply imbued with the teachings of Buddha, desire is peace for its own sake and for all other peoples, not the financial or material assistance of the "tycoons" of this world. 64. There is another problem about which we are much concerned, namely the crisis—for why not call a spade a spade?—that our Organization is going through. This crisis is becoming more serious every year, and we must face up to it resolutely. I therefore believe that each of us, recognizing this fact, should express his views quite clearly, because a passive or sulky attitude, while possibly putting off the moment when the situation must be faced, would at the same time lead to bankruptcy, which we do not want at any price. 65. The United Nations represents a noble initiative on the part of the Powers that emerged victorious from the Second World War. Today, those selfsame Powers, for lack of ability to make use of the Organization, seem to be bent on destroying it. But, as His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia recently emphasized at Belgrade, we reject the proposition that the United Nations can experience the fate which overtook the league of Nations. 66. In our humble opinion, the main responsibility for the crisis in the United Nations lies with the Security Council, to which the Charter assigned, as it were, the task of acting as the secular arm of the world community, I can only repeat what the French newspaper Le Monde said on this subject: "If the Council is to play its essential part, it must first be reformed so as to consist of Powers that have authority in the world by reason of their military strength, material resources or moral standing." The absence of India and of the People's Republic of China Is- more than a shortcoming; it is a serious mistake. 67. The Security Council has failed entirely in its role, because it is composed of great Powers which have abandoned the attitude of serenity that the whole world expected of them and have imported into the Council their quarrels, rivalries and struggles, employing tactics and strategies which do them no honour. The veto is no longer used by these great Powers in order to defend justice, equity, law and the principles of liberty according to their conscience, but simply as a weapon directed against their adversaries. 68. In these circumstances, certain peoples, such as our own, are wondering whether the Security Council should not be abolished—if proposals for its thorough reform, or expansion, are turned down—and whether it would not be preferable to transfer its functions to the General Assembly itself. 69. We, the Cambodians, are prepared in all circumstances, to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council. But we are none the less determined to emphasize the incoherence and illogicality that are at present its main characteristics. How can we agree that Formosa, taking China's place, should be included among the five great Powers endowed with the veto? How can we tolerate that certain great Powers should formally and publicly advertise their contempt for the United Nations, while continuing to sit in the Security Council? Our Organization has been nicknamed the "Disorganization", the "Disunited Nations". Admittedly, such names are not unmerited. But who is to blame? No doubt we are all collectively responsible, but the lion's share of the responsibility is indubitably that of the great Powers which wield the veto. It was for them to set a good example, instead of symbolizing the spirit of blocs, intolerance, partiality, injustice and recourse to force and violence. In addition, certain Powers confer upon themselves special privileges within the United Nations. One such privilege consists in denying our Organization's right to any authority or competence in connexion with the settlement or even the discussion of a given problem if those Powers feel that the problem in any way affects them; another privilege is that of not sitting in the United Nations "for reasons of personal convenience", but of resuming their seats when other countries are to be judged or the fate of other peoples is to be decided; and finally there is the categorical refusal of certain countries to share in the financing of United Nations missions, on the grounds that they disagree with the dispatch of such and such a mission or regard it as inopportune. 70. We for our part cannot but observe that such an attitude involves a major inconsistency; for either one is a Member of the United Nations, sitting permanently there, accepting all the attendant rights and duties and recognizing its authority on all occasions, or else one considers that it is in one's interest to be absent from the United Nations and withdraws from it altogether. 71. Another cause of our Assembly's malaise is still more glaring. It is the absence of the People's Republic of China, whose admission is each year resisted in certain quarters with unrealistic stubbornness. I venture to ask, as I did in 1958 and in 1960, that China be at last permitted to take its rightful seat among us. 72. We consider that it is equally unjust, and utterly inexplicable, to refuse to give the peaceful Mongolian People's Republic its legitimate place in our Organization. 73. I shall now pass, if I may, to the problem of the office of the Secretary-General, which with Mr. Dag Hammarskjold's passing has become particularly acute. I shall not attempt to hide our concern at the prospect of an inevitable crisis that has been foreshadowed in recent months. There is every reason to believe that our Western and our socialist friends will register their opposition to possible suggestions for changes with regard to the office of the Secretary-General. For our part, we can only hope that both sides will show moderation and have at heart, above all, the unity of our Organization. 74. Today, however, there seems to be emerging a ^majority opinion in favour, not of making the Secretariat three-headed, as the socialist Powers demand, but of attaching to the Secretary-General three Assistant Secretaries-General or an advisory council representing the three trends that symbolize the division of our world. 75. Cambodia will bow to the decisions of the majority of the Organization's Members, as it bowed to those of the majority at the Belgrade Conference. It will also support all resolutions submitted on behalf of that Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. 76. It does, nevertheless, make us feel rather uncomfortable to concur in the theory that there is now a third bloc—of non-aligned countries—claiming its place in all United Nations organs. We had always hoped that the United Nations would succeed in doing away with the "bloc" spirit, and even with the blocs themselves. Year after year, in this very place, we have expressed that desire. We had always hoped that the only criteria for selecting the heads of United Nations bodies would be competence, integrity, devotion to the general interest and to the Organization itself, and a sense of equity and impartiality. We had never thought that the colour of a man's skin, or adherence to a bloc, could be of more account than value as a human being. 77. In our view, it was the task of the United Nations to train men for realization of their solidarity and their unity, to cause them to rise to a "world" level and abandon outmoded considerations of narrow nationalism or stubborn sectarianism. Our hopes have been completely and utterly thwarted. Wrangling, intrigue, competitive bidding, discord and even violence have penetrated our Assembly and its subsidiary organs. All these things that today poison the atmosphere and that we should have liked to see abolished, at least within these precincts, are developing here like bacteria in a culture medium, and all too often rob our discussions of any vestige of world significance. 78. With your permission, I should now like to bring up a question which in our opinion is of the utmost importance, for it involves perpetuation of a wrong in regard to several peoples. I refer to the situation of the divided countries. 79. I am aware that to raise this subject is not considered by either bloc to be in good taste. Nevertheless, we take the liberty of raising it, and of asking the Assembly one question. Will the United Nations some day, frankly, directly and without evasion, venture to attack the problem of the reunification of the divided countries? 80. Several reasons impel us to refer to this problem. First, the tensions which are exacerbated in the divided countries constitute a threat to world peace. Secondly, we ourselves are neighbours of one country divided de jure since 1954, and of another country divided de facto for the last few months—a situation that accounts for several of our external difficulties. Finally, the Cambodian people is entitled to wonder whether the rivalry between the two blocs, extending to our own area, might not result in our own subjection to a similar division. Indeed, such attempts have already been made—one at Geneva in 1954, by the Eastern bloc, and another in 1959, through a secessionist plot for the benefit of the Western bloc. There is every reason to believe that the game has merely been postponed. ^ 81. Three countries are artificially divided: Germany, Vietnamand Korea, Three peoples are, amid general indifference, suffering from this situation, and awaiting from us the decisions that will restore to them their legitimate right to full participation in international life. 82. The ideal solution would undoubtedly be that each of these peoples should be reunified through a general referendum organized and supervised by the United Nations, without intervention from the Government of either part of the divided country, since each such Government is aligned with one of the blocs originally responsible for the division. In the present state of the world, however, such unification would be possible only if both blocs recognized and guaranteed the military neutralization of the reunified countries—which for the time being would seem to be out of the question. 83. The second solution would be to recognize that the rivalries of the blocs make reunification impossible but that nevertheless the German, Vietnamese and Korean peoples should no longer be deprived of their seats and votes in the United Nations. There are today 75 million Germans, 30 million Koreans and 26 million Vietnamese who have been put quite arbitrarily in quarantine, not to speak of the exclusion—in defiance of all common sense—of 700 million Chinese. 84. The United Nations is of course, it will be said, neither a world Government nor a universal parliament. Its decisions have often only moral and platonic force. But we are at least entitled to expect that it will have the courage to defend certain sacred principles—such as the right of nations and peoples to unity—or to acknowledge that, so long as reunification remains impossible, it is only right to arrange for representatives of a divided people's two Governments to sit among us. The Bandung Conference acted in that way in the case of Viet-Nam, and the Geneva Conference even offered our Lao brothers three seats. It is worth while paying attention to these precedents. . 86. To give each Government of a divided country a seat would in no way upset the balance, for we know that each would faithfully follow the leader of its own bloc. But this solution would have the advantage of giving the divided countries smooth access to the Concert of Powers, and it might even hasten a return to normal conditions—namely, the necessary reunification. 87. Turning now to a different subject, I should like, on behalf of my countrymen, to express our profound grief at the events in Katanga which have brought about the tragic death of our Secretary-General. Together with most Members of the United Nations, we hope that it will be possible to bring the crisis in the Congo to a speedy end; it is essential that the Congo regain and preserve the territorial integrity which it enjoyed under Belgian rule. 88. The numerous and highly complex questions on the agenda of the General Assembly's sixteenth session include one that will certainly lead to polemics and discussions, probably with no productive result. I refer to the Algerian question. 89. I am impelled to state Cambodia's position on this problem, not because it is of direct concern to us, but because our French and our Algerian friends have for years been urging us from opposite standpoints, to do so. We have been forced to follow the development of the Algerian affair with particularly close attention, and to draw the necessary conclusions. This recently led us, at Belgrade, to grant de jure recognition to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, a step which ought in no way to be interpreted as an act unfriendly to France. 90. This act of recognition reflects no ill-considered or unexpected decision. Our Arab brothers (especially the Algerians and Tunisians) had since 1958 been pressing us to signify our support of them. With their assent, however, we preferred not to maintain official relations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, in order that we might try to serve as a "bridge" between that Government and France. But we omitted no occasion of attempting to persuade France that it could only profit from a bold gesture—that of granting independence to the Algerian people. 91. In 1958, we were met by the laconic reply "One does not negotiate with murderers", as though the adversary in every war were not a murderer. Yet in 1954 France had, at Geneva, U put its signature to the transfer of powers to the Viet-Minh, which it had also termed a "murderer". 92. In 196T> they told me: "Self-determination yes, but after the cease-fire". I then suggested intervention by the United Nations, acceptance of its arbitration, and supervision of the referendum on self- determination—which seemed to me to be the only logical way of achieving an unchallengeable result. The Algerian representatives—who are present in this very hall as observers—at once accepted this suggestion, but France took the view that it was a French domestic affair and that, in those circumstances, United Nations intervention could not be accepted. 93. In 1961 it was possible to consider that France had recognized the de facto existence of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic by holding conversations with it, first at Evian and, later, at Lugrin. It thus became normal that we should recognize the Algerian Government de jure. 94. France justifies its reserve in the matter of granting independence to the Algerian people by asserting that Algeria has never been a State. Even if this assertion were well-founded, there is a recent precedent which we take the liberty of recalling. 95. Cochin-China — today South Viet-Nam — was, when the French arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century, Cambodian territory partly occupied by Annam. France then simply annexed that territory, including the provinces in dispute between Cambodia and Annam, and turned it first into a colony and subsequently into a French department with elected deputies sitting in the French Parliament. 96. In 1946-1947 France, having to fight the Vietnamese insurrection which was particularly well entrenched in the North, set up a provisional government of South Viet-Nam. Later, in 1948-1949, it recalled Bao Dai, the ex-Emperor who had abdicated in 1945, proclaimed him Chief of State, and transferred to him Cochin-China, a French territory, with the assent of the French Parliament. The King of Cambodia protested officially against this transfer of territories over which our country continued to maintain its legal rights—but in vain. 97. The installation of Bao Dai, whom the people of Vietnam had apt recalled to power, and his de jure recognition by France and its allies were indisputably less legal and less justifiable than recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which enjoys the support and confidence of the Algerian people in its struggle for independence. Moreover, if it was constitutionally possible to transform the French department of Cochin-China into an independent territory, we find it to understand why this cannot be done in the case of the French departments in Algeria. 98. France also stresses its duties towards a million French citizens who live in Algeria. This concern is quite understandable and legitimate; but it leads me to mention the fate of the Khmer community of 600,000 persons, handed over with no guarantees at all, to the Government of South Viet-Nam. Moreover, these 600,000 compatriots of ours were the first occupants of the land—which is not exactly the case of the French in Algeria. I am convinced that the Algerian leaders will grant these French citizens guarantees which we dare not hope to see granted to our compatriots under the jurisdiction of Viet-Nam. 99. I have recalled these few facts only to show that France can still follow its own precedents in order to solve the tragic Algerian problem by a gesture of greatness, worthy of its past and consistent with its basic interests. Only by granting independence to Algeria without any mental reservations can France, casting off the heavy burden of a hopeless war, regain the friendship of the Arab and African peoples and recover its full international prestige. 100. Basing ourselves on the obvious fact that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic fully represents the Algerian people's aspiration to independence, we did not think, when we gave it official recognition, to hasten the end of a "sticky" war by selecting a priori a winner and a loser. Our intention was simply to contribute to the return of peace and to the establishment of a sincere friendship between France and an independent Algeria, by suggesting that France should venture to reconsider its Algerian policy. 101. We consider that the most realistic solution would be to recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic as the fully qualified representative of the Algerian people and to negotiate with it on the granting of independence. I am convinced that this solution would be not merely realistic but profitable to the French community in Algeria, which could very easily secure the maximum of guarantees* We have before us the example of the excellent relations between France and Cambodia and of a French community living and working in the best possible conditions in Cambodia itself. In this connexion, we were very happy when General de Gaulle removed another barrier by recognizing Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara, and when, a few days later, President Ben Yousef Ben Khedda most wisely expressed his hope that the independence of Algeria would mark the beginning of an era of "fruitful co-operation" between France and Algeria and between their two peoples. 102. There is another problem which I mentioned to you, last year and to which, with your pardon, I now revert. It concerns the advantage, with a view to maintaining peace, of recognising the existence of buffer zones in sensitive areas of the "cold war". 103. At the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, I saw fit to call attention to the dangerous development of the situation in Laos, and proposed that Cambodia and Laos should be declared neutral zones between the two blocs. That proposal was considered unrealistic and pointless. There then broke out in Laos a civil war which very nearly degenerated into an international conflict. With a return to reason it was realized, although a little late, that neutralization was in fact the only means of stamping out these new flames of war. 104. The next development was the Geneva Conference, & at which both blocs rivalled one another in enthusiasm for the recognition of a neutral Laos. That Conference still continues, despite a unanimity which in any case is far more apparent than real. In fact, each of the two blocs has its own idea of neutrality—a neutrality that must conform to the tactical plans of each, which are in no way disinterested. 105. We are still, therefore, very far from neutralization as we had envisaged it, and we may be moving towards a conflict still more dangerous than that which cast its shadow on the horizon early in this year of 1961, Moreover, we can only regret that certain Lao circles cannot see the facts of the problem clearly and reject the guarantee and control of their country's neutrality, on the pretext that these would impair the nation's sovereignty and independence. 106. So far as we are concerned, we do not think that a small, weak and defenceless country, an arena in which the world's great Powers confront one another, is in a position to preserve or regain peace and independence, without an international guarantee. Cambodia, for its part, has insisted on the permanent retention in its territory of the International Commission for Supervision and Control U set up in 1954 by the Geneva Conference on the armistice in Indo- China. So far, we have only had reason to be thankful for the presence of this Commission. But, in any case, would it not have been more reasonable to have prevented the Laos bomb from being set so easily- reasonable both for the Lao people, which is the first victim, and for the two blocs, which now do not know how to escape from the dilemma without losing face? 107. What has happened in Laos can happen in any part of the world where the two contending blocs are in direct contact, and particularly in areas where one of them thinks, often wrongly, that it can gain an advantage at the expense of the other. We know the countries which experience, against their will, the effects of the rivalry between the blocs, and we also know that their peoples ardently desire to have no part in the quarrels of the great Power p. For this reason I venture once more to suggest to oar Organization, in the interests of peace and of the small nations, that it should study practical means for the neutralization of countries which wish to be neutralized, and of those whose geographical position would make this very desirable for world equilibrium. 108. If Members of this Assembly will excuse the length of this speech, I wish now to ask our Organization to consider a human problem which, I think, deserves its attention. It is the problem of ethnic minorities, and particularly of communities living in foreign countries. 109. This problem is of direct concern to us because 600,000 of our compatriots live in South Vietnam in the most difficult circumstances and have practically no remedy against; the extra-legal measures to which they are subject. The Cambodian community in South Vietnam consists of descendants of the land's first occupants who were submerged by Vietnamese invasions but who have maintained an underlying unity of religion, language, custom and tradition. By an arbitrary decision of the Government of South Vietnam, Vietnamese nationality has been imposed on these people and they have been refused the right to preserve their customs and language and even to practise their own form of Buddhism. Sermons in Cambodian, Cambodian religious texts, etc. are not permitted. These violations of the sacred rights of the human person have been supplemented, in recent months, by extra-legal measures of extreme brutality, resorted to not only by the ordinary authorities of South Vietnam but also by the rebels opposing the Saigon Government. Several hundreds of these unfortunate compatriots of ours have tried to flee from this oppression and to seek refuge on Cambodian national territory; they have been pursued, arrested, tortured or shot down with machine-guns. 110. Cambodia has its own Vietnamese minority, which lives freely among our people and has kept its nationality, language and customs. The status of these 400,000 Vietnamese is the same as that of all foreigners living in Cambodia, whether they are of Western, Asian or any other origin. 111. It was impossible for us to turn a deaf ear to the desperate appeals of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam. For that reason we tried "on several occasions to negotiate with the Saigon Government with a view to a regularization of their status, or at least an improvement of their condition. But we were met virtually with a blank refusal. We then turned to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Investigators came, interrogated representatives of refugees from this community, and made a report. Again, no results ensued. 112. The Saigon Government's refusal to join us in studying the problem raised by this minority of 600,000 persons has no parallel anywhere. We have before us the example of Austria and Italy, seeking together a solution for the question of the populations of the Alto Adige. But South Vietnam refuses to hold any talks, on the ground that it does not belong to the United Nations — which proves the disadvantage of keeping certain countries and peoples out of our Organization. This disadvantage is also reflected in the difficulties which would arise if it were suggested that the question of Laos should be laid before the United Nations, in which neither the Democratic Republic of Vietnam nor the People's Republic of China is represented. 113. The problem of the Cambodian minority in South Vietnam is not the only one of its kind. This is why I believe that the United Nations should make a greater effort to protect the rights of groups of people who are delivered up, tied and bound, to arbitrary rule. 114. In conclusion of this over-long speech, may I, on my own and Cambodia's behalf, most warmly congratulate Mr. Mongi Slim, the new President of the General Assembly, on his very auspicious election. May I also express to the delegates our most genuine good will towards the peoples they represent, and our hopes for success in their work at this sixteenth session. In the difficult circumstances through which our Organization is passing, it is still our hope that all countries will succeed in ending their rivalries and disputes and saving the world from the chaos which threatens it.