Ceylon

First and foremost, I should like to extend to Mr. Slim the cordial congratulations of the Government and people of Ceylon upon his unanimous election to the office of President of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session. 120. There is no single country in the world today that looks forward to the prospect of war without dismay. A world-wide referendum is not needed to establish that the millions of people in all countries do not want war. 121. We meet at a time of crisis, when there is a great danger of the whole world being laid waste by the ravages of nuclear war, and the whole future of the United Nations is at stake. The ultimate nature of the weapons available to the great Powers of the world is a compelling reason for the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to find practical ways and means to give effect to the ideals and objectives which prompted the formation of the United Nations at San Francisco. It is imperative to put an end to cold war concepts and to the arms race now in progress if mankind is to survive. 122. Year by year these same questions have arisen before the United Nations General Assembly, but our collective thinking has not resulted in the production of any conclusive answer. From time to time the United Nations has made a useful contribution towards the reduction of tensions and has thereby avoided the danger of an immediate outbreak of hostilities. The stage has been reached, I think, today whero we all agree that this is not enough. Countries all over the world are convinced that they cannot live with the cold war any longer. The time has come when it is worth taking a calculated risk to find permanent and general solutions as the only alternative to the appalling risks which are built-in features of the world in 'which we live. 123. The United Nations was founded with a sense of determination and purpose. The ideals for which the United Nations stand are enshrined in the Charter and must continue to inspire our thinking on all international problems. The spirit of idealism in the Charter has not, however, always found expression in tile realities of the current international situation. We must recognize, in particular, that national policies of the great Powers are not controlled and directed by principles of idealism alone. It is in the nature of international politics that national policies must take account of national interests, and sometimes there is a clash of competitive and conflicting interests. It would be unreal for us to believe that such conflicts of interests can be resolved by an appeal to principles alone. It would be equally unreal, I submit, and indeed positively dangerous to permit these conflicts to remain unresolved. 124. We believe that there is a very genuine desire on the part of the peoples of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union to maintain world peace. We are convinced that neither of these great countries wants war, in spite of the number of cold war speeches that we have heard in the Assembly during this session. But that does not mean, of course, that either of the great Powers would contemplate for a moment the possibility of negotiating settlements from a position of weakness or at any price. Of course not. 125. The will for peace, though genuine, would not prevent either of the two great Powers from resorting to the use of force in defence of what they cherish and seek to preserve as vital for the well being of their citizens. In the realities of the situation, the fact remains that the actions of one great Power, even if prompted by motives of defence and self-preservation, are open to interpretation by the other that there is an intention to have an aggression made upon it. 126. Each of the great Powers today follows its own way of life and the political ideology to which it is committed, and with good reason. For the people of the United States of America, a society conditioned toy private enterprise has spelt prosperity and progress and a high standard of living. For the people of the Soviet Union, likewise, a society conditioned by the public ownership of productive enterprise has meant a very high rate of growth and industrial expansion. The essential premise on which the cold war has been built is that these two ideologies of the great Powers must seek extra-territorial victories and that each requires an armoury of inter-continental missiles aimed permanently at the other to preserve its own security. 127. As a non-aligned country, we just cannot accept that premise. Both in the United Nations and there is where the concept of peaceful coexistence has developed as a means to weaken the logic underlying this assumption and to establish a modus vivendi to keep the peace. In our view, it would be an over-simplification for either of the great Powers to say of the other, "We are standing by the United Nations and the principles of the Charter, while you are not". Recriminations of that sort will not lead to positive results. So long as each of the great Powers regards its way of life as a kind of religion to be propagated or defended outside its territories with zeal and fanaticism, peaceful coexistence becomes reduced to a phrase that lacks meaning. 128. The cold war conflicts of the present day reflect implicitly the tendencies of the great Powers to carry their differences into areas that reject the idea of the cold war in all its forms. Self-determination is one of the governing principles of the United Nations, and if it is to be a reality and not just an ideal, it is essential that the great Powers should refrain from interfering with the processes by which each nation and people choose the kind of Government and the kind of economic arrangements that they like to have. 129. The battle for the minds of the uncommitted world has taken various new forms and has produced curious results. It has sometimes meant intervention — I am sorry to have to say it, but it has — in the internal affairs of those countries. There has been political subversion and attempts to influence forms of government, economic and social systems in one way or another and, in extreme instances, there have been attempts to intervene directly by military action. The examples of the Congo and of Laos reflect the degree of disruption which has been brought into the lives of those nations with further accentuation of world tensions. 130. Most of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America want to be free from cold war pressures. We would like to be left to work out our own destiny and our own forms of social, economic and political life according to the action and interaction of our own internal domestic forces. 131. The reason for this attitude is not just a wish to be left in splendid isolation or to be removed from current world events. No, we Want to be in a position to make a direct contribution to the cause of world peace and to the building up of a world order for international security. We think this can only be ensured if the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America can be insulated from external ideological pressures and cold war tensions. These areas of the world do not want to be the cause of any accentuation of world conflict nor to become the battleground for it. 132. It seems to me, therefore, that an ideological truce covering Asia, Africa and Latin America is vital. The basic principle in the relations of the great Powers to these countries must be non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs. For instance, military assistance to countries which need it for their internal security purposes should be given only through the United Nations. The widening ideological conflict makes it all the more imperative to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)] formulated during the last session. 133. When actual arrangements are being made for the transfer of power to dependent countries, it is essential that metropolitan States should be placed under the obligation not to involve colonial territories in cold war arrangements by, for example, the retention of military bases. 134. We do appreciate that the success or failure of one ideology or another is a matter of paramount concern to one or other of the great Powers. But it must be realized, and the great Powers must act in the realization, that the conflict must take peaceful forms. If any country, by virtue of purely indigenous development, were to choose one ideological form of government in preference to another, the choice must rest with that country; and it is a choice which must be respected and with which all nations must learn tr live. 135. One thing that has struck me very sharply, as a newcomer to General Assembly sessions, has been the tendency, which very often arises in this chamber, for delegations representing countries already enmeshed in the cold war to express attitudes and to take up positions based on the rather unrealistic line that there is no other possible attitude except their own. We have seen examples of that in the course of some of the speeches which have preceded my assumption of the rostrum. 136. Let us take the case of some of the propositions put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, the Foreign Secretary, who spoke a moment ago. For instance, he quite rightly pointed out that the resumption of nuclear tests cannot be regarded by anybody — not by the non-aligned nations or by anybody else — as a step forward or as a step in the right direction. It is so obviously not in the right direction that I do not think much purpose is served by hammering home the point. The assumption that the non- aligned nations have, either out of a sense of fear or out of a sense of politeness, or out of a sense of anything else, refrained from making comments, is simply untrue. The non-aligned countries have, each of them, expressed their point of view very clearly and forcibly indeed: and, speaking for the Government of my country, I can only state that I was in Belgrade!^ before I came here, with my Prime Minister, and in the course of her statement my Prime Minister did deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, just as we deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States. It is a retrograde step. 137. But consider the reasoning that follows that. It is suggested that, inasmuch as these nuclear tests must have taken many months to prepare, there is an element of bad faith underlying the resumption of nuclear tests by the Government of the Soviet Union because, while negotiations were going on, the implicit assumption is that preparations must have been made. 138. I do not think that I know sufficient about what it takes to prepare for nuclear tests to express any opinion in regard to that. But supposing it does take many months to prepare for nuclear tests, then does it not follow that when the United States Government resumes nuclear tests in answer to the act of the Soviet Government, it too must have been preparing for many months? Can you have it only one way? In other words, is it fair to take an argument on the basis of bad faith and to present it in that way even though we do deplore the act of both the great countries concerned in the resumption of nuclear tests? 139. Then, again, the Foreign Secretary made the point — which I think is perfectly valid — that it will not do merely to satisfy yourselves by inspection in any scheme of disarmament that — shall we say? — 500 aircraft are going to be destroyed in a bonfire when you do not know the production lines and the assembly lines of the great countries that may or may not be preparing for war. There is a great deal of force in that and once can certainly appreciate it; but one must also appreciate, I think, that there is the opposite point of view. And the opposite point of view is that a lot depends upon the number of aircraft that are going to be thrown away and the number of weapons that are going to be placed on this bonfire. What would be the position, for instance, if the number were increased from 500 to — shall we say — 10,000? Would it not significantly affect the argument? And supposing one does not even taken figures in a relative sense. Let us carry the case one step further and suppose that there is an outbreak of war; does not the destruction of even those 500 aircraft mark a step forward and a step forward in the right direction? Those are matters that one cannot view in isolation, 140. I do agree that disarmament without controlled stages is a futile concept and a concept which cannot be accepted on mere statements of principle. But there is the point of view that a scheme of controls must not become a system of espionage; and so long as there is force in that argument, it will not do for either of the countries engaged in this conflict to adopt self-righteous tones or self-righteous attitudes and to refuse to face the realities that exist and on which a compromise must be found if the world is to move forward towards peace and prosperity in a real sense. 141. The Foreign Secretary again made the point that the sanctity of treaties must be respected if the United Nations is to mean anything. He is quite right. If treaties are going to be treated as scraps of paper, of course the world can have no security and we are all left in a state — a very parlous state — balanced between peace and war and wondering what the future is going to bring to us all. But, the Foreign Secretary says, our contract in regard to Germany has not run out — a contract made at a time when the victorious Powers, in a spirit of friendliness, sought to do what they thought at that time was the best possible thing to heal the ravages of war. It was not intended that a peace treaty should be signed until a reunified, demilitarized Germany could be established — no doubt with the consent and will of all the victorious Powers who had succeeded in the course of the conflicts of the Second World War. 142. One has to be realistic about these things. Is there any likelihood of the contract running out in the present situation? Is there any immediate prospect of a reunified Germany? Is there any likelihood that one can contemplate a situation in which the great Powers, who fought the Second World War to ultimate victory and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, will now agree to the setting up of a united Germany in the existing context? Supposing it never happens, the contract will never run out, And once left with the reality that the existing situation will continue,' that contract will have to remain merely because it is a contract. 143. We prefer to look at things not from the point of view of the Soviet Union; no, there are no two codes of behaviour in regard to the arguments which we present. We do not accept the philosophy of communism. We seek to move towards socialism according to our own indigenous form that it has taken in our country. But would be completely unrealistic to suggest that countries such as ours, which are non- aligned, are either being bullied or are being compelled to take lines which we do not want to take, or are adopting a set of double standards — one set of standards for the countries of the West and a different set of standards for communist countries which are here present in the Assembly. 144. The suggestion was made again by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, that one cannot have double standards with regard to countries, shall we say, of the British Empire and countries of what was described as the Russian Empire. There is implicit in that statement an assumption that existing governments in countries in different parts of the world are not really representative of their peoples. There is the assumption that there is not a communist country in the world which wants communism. There is the assumption that, inasmuch as one-party government does imply a greater degree of government controls, a degree of freedom is lacking. 145. We do not know enough to be able to test the correctness or incorrectness of that assumption. It may be that there are countries of which that can be said, but if we adopt it as a general principle, then we must go on the basis that the Government of the Soviet Union does not represent the will and desire of the peoples of that great country. We would have to build on the assumption that there is in force a regime that does not command the respect and confidence of its people. How realistic is that? Are we really to believe that the peoples of the Soviet Union, from 1917 to 1961, did not want the kind of government that they had established for themselves? Are we to assume that governments cannot command confidence merely because there have been no elections in the immediate past, or merely because a space of time has elapsed? 146. In other words, if we start on that kind of assumption we shall get into extremely deep water. Indeed, the Assembly has already got into very deep water by adopting that kind of argument. Is it not precisely on that assumption that the great People's Republic of China has been excluded from the Assembly? Is it not on that argument that we assume that a country whose form of government has been in existence for the last decade is incapable of deter- ^ mining its own destiny, and that the true peoples of China still want the restoration of a regime which, territorially has been now diminished to Taiwan? 147. In the face of realities one must not make assumptions of entering into debates which presuppose such a premise which none of us, as independent sovereign States, can possibly accept on the floor of the Assembly. If we start making assumptions of that sort and saying that such and such a representative in this chamber does not really represent the people of his country, and that he has no business to be here, then of course we find that underlying that assumption there would be a willingness to accept the fact that the principles of the Charter were going to be undermined by the adoption of that very same argument. 148. There is a matter of great importance which has arisen in the course of the last few days, particularly since the sad and tragic death of the late Secretary- General, Mr. Hammarskjold. We in our country have had compelling reason sometimes to disagree with some of the decisions made by the late Secretary- General, particularly with regard to the conduct of the situation in the Congo last year, and, as a member of the Security Council, we have expressed our views fairly and frankly in the only spirit in which one is capable of expressing one's views in an Assembly of this type, where one seeks to influence positively the thinking of nations. But that does not mean that we have no confidence in Mr. Hammarskjold or in the institution. When the issue was raised of our attitude with regard to the proposal formulated by the Government of the Soviet Union in relation to the creation of a "troika", which would require the amendment of the United Nations Charter, the Government of Ceylon expressed the view categorically — and it sees no reason to change it now — that it does not stand for any. principle of a "troika". We see in the principle of a "troika" a grave danger — a danger that the United Nations may lose its capacity for effective executive action, and executive action we must have if the United Nations General Assembly and its other institutions are to become a true vehicle to establish a world order and international peace. 149. With that firm conviction in mind we have expressed our view. By that view we stand to date, and we would earnestly appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to consider the question, within the realities of such divisions as exist in the world today, of making a choice of a person capable of interpreting correctly the collective views of the Assembly and of giving executive force to the decisions which we make here. 150. The realities are there. There is no doubt that the world is divided. The argument has been presented on the floor of the Assembly that the world is divided into two groups of nations — nations which want to preserve the United Nations and its Charter, and nations which want to destroy the United Nations and its Charter. The analysis does not seem to us to be quite so simple. It is not a question of saying, "We want to establish the Charter, while you do not". Both sides say just that. The truth of the matter is that there are three groups of nations. There is a group of nations that stand by the ideologies of the Western world — the free world, as it is sometimes called; there is a group of nations that stand solidly behind the ideology of communism; but there is a very significant group, a group of persons who constitute — although it is sometimes disregarded — the rest of the world, and we represent in that sense a small constituent element of that third group, the rest of the world. The rest of the world does not get together and establish itself as a bloc or say to itself, "We have a group of principles which we formulate and which we adopt on every occasion". We do not exist according to a code of rules; there exist merely because there are countries which are not concerned with these great Power conflicts and which wish to be left alone and to stand aside without involvement, and that is where we belong. 151. It is not sufficient for any country to say, "We stand by the United Nations Charter, the other side does not" and, by implication, to suggest, "Here, then, is a group of neutrals who also stand by the United Nations Charter, and therefore we are on their side". It just is not as simple as that. On every particular constructive question that arises for the decision of the Assembly we are compelled to take a position. We cannot stand aside and say that we are going to behave like the ostrich to which the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary referred a moment ago. We are vulnerable, and we know it. But, being vulnerable, we are not afraid to speak our mind, to take our head out of the sand, unlike the proverbial ostrich, and to face the realities. 152. During the last few days there has been a certain amount of discussion in the lobbies of the United Nations General Assembly to which, I must confess, I did not pay any particular attention. I did not pay any particular attention to it because, as the representative of, a country which is a member of the Security Council, I found that what was being discussed was a proposition which I did not think would ever see the light of day or emerge in the form of any concrete resolution. I did not intend to refer to it here at all, but in view of something that was said by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary I think that it is clearly my duty to make a statement with regard to it. 153. Owing to a fear that there will be a deadlock with regard to the finding of an executive arm to carry out the resolutions of this international body, because of the difficulty that the Security Council might become deadlocked over the proposition put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union for a "troika" and the equally firm decision on the part of other countries not to yield to it but to maintain a single person as Secretary-General — a view which I personally accept on behalf of the Government of Ceylon — there is a proposal now being talked about in a rather shadowy form with regard to the presentation of a draft resolution to the General Assembly whereby it would consider the appointment of some distinguished person, I suppose from one of the countries represented in the Assembly, who would function as a temporary Secretary-General, an interim officer, pending the resolution of the permanent dispute, a person who would be determined by the force of a majority vote. 154. I thought the suggestion was so fantastic that I did not even give it any serious consideration earlier. But, with regard to the statement by the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that where the Security Council is paralysed by the possibility of vetoes, it then becomes necessary for us to consider action by the General Assembly according to the wishes of the majority of the world — I consider that an extremely dangerous statement, though uttered no doubt in perfect good faith and without perhaps a realization of some of the dangerous consequences it can entail for the whole of the Assembly. We are here, all of us, whether we believe it or not, to carry- out the principles of the Charter. Now, the Charter did not provide for decisions by a ma jority rule. There are some things in regard to which the Assembly, however significant it is as an international body, is incapable of deciding by a majority rule. Visualize to yourselves that if all the representatives assembled here in this conference room were to get together and say, "We will determine the pattern of life for the United States of America and the Soviet Union to follow". Supposing all of us vote on this — barring, of course, the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States. Is it suggested that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States should be bound by that majority decision? I£ one accepts a principle of that sort, then one has got to go the whole way and accept it as a general principle of subordinating one's own decisions to resolutions determined by majority rule. To start with, there is the weakness that we are not completely represented here. The most significant omission perhaps is still the People's Republic of China. And so long as that stands we cannot set ourselves up in that way. Besides, in the Assembly we all stand as independent countries, whatever our size may be. We have only 10 million people, but we still count for one vote in the Assembly. I would still hesitate to take decisions which could influence the life of the people of the United States of America or of the Soviet Union, based on majorities here. 155. The proof of the matter is this; the Charter contemplated decisions to be taken by the Security Council in a spirit of compromise and co-operation. And that spirit of compromise and co-operation must be established between the United States and the Soviet Union if our decisions are really to mean anything. If we are not going to do that, and if we are going to look at this thing as a deadlock, a situation into which we have been forced where one country or the other is going to say, "We cannot solve the problem in the Security Council, therefore, let us take a decision based on majority votes" — all I can say is, that would be the first step towards the disintegration of the entire Organization and all that it stands for. The country which puts forward a proposal of that kind will be responsible for destroying the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter under cover of seeking to find a practical solution to a very real problem chat is there. 156. I do agree that the principle of the "troika" cannot be accepted. There is a very large body of opinion, I believe, represented in this hall which cannot agree with that point of view submitted by the Soviet Union. It certainly does not go to show that the non-aligned nations are adopting two codes of behaviour. But may I say this: the fact that they are opposed to a "troika", the fact that we realize that there is a need for some person to replace the late Mr. Hainmarskjold, that cannot mean that we are going to decide these things on a majority vote, on a railroaded decision taken before the Assembly, mainly because the majority of us are opposed to an idea set up by the Soviet Union. 157. The argument against the point of view I hold seems to be this: the Government of the Soviet Union, by presenting the argument of the "troika" has in effect negated the principles of the Charter by making impossible the election of a single person as Secretary- General. That is the argument. Therefore, if the Government of the Soviet Union is going against the principles of the Charter, we have to find a solution outside the principles of the Charter. In other words, we are getting back to the age-old argument; at some time somebody else does wrong, let us do wrong too, But I do not agree that the point of view expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union necessarily amounts to a rejection of the principles of the Charter. 158. The Government of the Soviet Union as it sees things within the realities of the existing situation takes the line — I think quite wrongly — that the Charter requires amendments, that the Charter requires change, at any rate in regard to the Constitution of the office of the Secretary-General. Now, they may be right or they may be wrong, but it must surely be open to any one of us in the Assembly to consider ways and means of improving the institutions of the Assembly as we think best. The best we can do is to put forward a proposal. Whether the proposal is going to find acceptance or not is a matter that must be decided by the entire body. 159. At the moment it does not seem to me that the "troika" proposal of the Soviet Union meets with any general acceptance. But here is the point: one cannot regard a suggestion made for amendment, prejudge it and decide that it is a clear attempt to sabotage the Organization itself. If you make that assumption and start with a position that you are going to meet with the veto even before a proposal is submitted, if you start with an assumption that one cannot arrive at a satisfactory settlement among the great Powers, then the United Nations has reached a very sorry stage indeed. In these circumstances I do submit that it would be completely wrong and contrary to the principles of the Charter to take the argument: "The Charter is silent in regard to acting appointments or temporary appointments. Let us create a procedure and let us use the technique of majority decisions before this Assembly to achieve that object." I do submit for the earnest consideration of a number of small countries like my own, the seriousness and the implications that any such proposal will have if it is seriously presented in the Assembly at any time. 160. The late Mr. Hammarskjold himself expressed a point of view once that the United Nations exists for the protection of the small nations. If the United Nations is to serve a useful purpose within that context and to serve the small countries of this world well, it is surely a matter of great importance that merely because there is a need to find some replacement for the late Mr. Hammarskjold, we should not allow the sanctity of the institutions established in the Charter, which we respect, to be set aside and brought to nought by the result of hasty thought. 161. The late Mr. Hammarskjold has now been dead, unfortunately, for some days, and yet we are here — the Assembly is functioning, the work of the United Nations has not been paralysed yet. We are able to carry on, at. least during these few days. Does it matter if this question is given a little further carefully considered thought? In other words, should we not endeavour to recall to our mind the lofty principles 'that inspired the United Nations in its thinking in San Francisco sixteen years ago — the principles of .Compromise, of trying to find solutions between the ^great Powers. That surely must be the standard which we must adopt in regard to our thinking. 162. The question of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) always comes up, I think, in the course of any discussion in regard to the General Assembly and its plenary sessions these days. One cannot avoid it. The situation in the Congo is there and it must be faced. We, in Ceylon, were one of the countries that were responsible for setting up the United Nations Command in the Congo. And having set up that command, we cannot help but feel a sense of disappointment in regard to the subsequent phases of that operation. The United Nations Forces there today have certainly not covered themselves with glory — and it is not their fault. 163. We are not proud that the forces of the United Nations, the forces of independent, neutral countries, which were deliberately sent to the Congo to preserve the objectives of the United Nations, to maintain peace and the territorial integrity of the Congo, have been held up for ransom by a lone jet fighter which, according to all reports, is piloted either by a Belgian pilot of SABENA Airlines or by someone from Northern Rhodesia. We are not proud of that fact. We are not proud of the fact that Mr. Hammarskjold had to fly at night, when he was seeking to arrive at some settlement in furtherance of the objectives of the United Nations. We are not proud of the fact that Mr. Hammarskjold had to have a number of airfields alerted because he could not have any definite plans about where he was going to land. These are not matters of which we can be proud. 164. We are glad to see the determination of the great Powers to support the operations of the United Nations. We are indeed glad to hear the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom expressing that view in no uncertain terms. I do not know whether or not it is true, but we did hear some time ago that a little difficulty had arisen in regard to the refuelling and landing rights of an aircraft from Ethiopia — it was, I believe, a fighter' aircraft which was on its way to the Congo through Uganda. We are glad that the declaration of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary has reassured us that all co-operation will be given to United Nations soldiers in the Congo in order that they may achieve their objectives and carry out the tasks which have been assigned to them by the United Nations. 165. Many complex problems arise out of cold war tensions. To my mind, the important thing now is to . get rid of them. It is most necessary that the great Powers should resolve that they are not going to make this a world forum in which to wage their battles extraterritorially. 166. Cold war tensions are most sharply reflected in the city of Berlin, where the situation has almost reached the breaking point. When one makes an assessment on Berlin, it is not sufficient to think only in terms of legal rights and technicalities arising from agreements concluded among the victorious Powers at the end of the last war. The situation has changed a good deal since then, and existing realities cannot be ignored. One of these realities happens to be the existence of two Germanies today, whether we like it or not. Equally we have to bear in mind that no solution in regard to Berlin can be accepted which does not accord with the wishes of the people of West Berlin to retain their way of life. I agree with the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that it is a most dangerous thing to express any views at all when negotiations are about to start on any subject under the sun. We do not wish to place any obstructions in the path of negotiations. We welcome the spirit in jvhich the recent negotiations have been viewed by the great Powers. We think that their attitudes have been far more realistic than in the past. I shall therefore refrain from making any further comments on this subject and shall merely express the hope that the negotiations undertaken will meet with success and lead ultimately to an over-all settlement of the problem of Germany. 167. Then, there is the question of disarmament. The hopes which we had that the Ten-Nation Committee would reach some affirmative decisions on disarmament have been disappointed. But it is heartening to feel that the great Powers do realize the need to persevere, for on the success of negotiations on disarmament depend all hopes of world peace. However much we may keep ideological conflicts within bounds and seek to minimize tensions in given areas of the world, world peace will remain insecure as long as the world is possessed of weapons and the armaments race continues. 168. Our consistent view has been that there should be general and complete disarmament, and that the objective of negotiations should be to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament. This is a radical and not a pragmatic or partial concept. The compelling argument for it is not just the negative fear of a future war, with all that it means for mankind, but the positive and affirmative need for a secure world basis for peace for the evolving international community of States. It is no more our purpose, on the old theory of the balance of power, to provide for the security of one group of Powers as against another. What we urgently require is an international order of security for our international community of States, an order which would enable all nations, large or small, to find security and resolve differences by peaceful means. 169. Disarmament is a compelling issue for all of us; it is not the concern of only the great Powers and of militarily significant States. As I have said before, disarmament must proceed side by side and step by step with the construction of a world order which would provide for security in a disarmed world. We, the small nations, have an abiding concern in the construction of this order and want to be associated from the outset with its formulation. 170 We are very happy indeed that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree on the general principles which are to form the basis of negotiations on disarmament [see A/4879]. We are particularly happy that the agreement was reached in consonance with the concept of general, and complete disarmament, and that in this the great Powers have heeded the General Assembly's resolution [1378 (XIV)] on this subject and the desire of peoples everywhere to be freed forever from the dread prospect of war and conflict. 171. But — and there is a "but" — we feel that these objectives will be realized only if the nations which reached that agreement are firmly and irrevocably committed to giving up cold war thinking. If one embarks on negotiations with the attitude that, if one makes a concession or tries to understand the other side's point of view, one is yielding territory or giving ground, then of course there can be no ultimate solution. If, on the other hand, these countries are prepared for a radical break with the suicidal conceptions of nuclear deterrents, massive retaliation, limited wars and positions of strength, an agreement on general and complete disarmament should not be an impossible achievement. The question of control should not prove to be an insuperable obstacle either, notwithstanding the undoubted complexity of the numerous problems connected with the setting up of a credible control and supervisory organization; the latter must not be allowed to become a final difficulty. 172. My Government, however, has grave doubts, fears and anxieties. We feel that this mutual adjustment has still not been made, that the cold war is still a lingering presence and that the negotiations which are shortly to begin will be dogged by the recurrent fate of many such negotiations in the past. We have had negotiations before, followed by breakdown and mutual recrimination. This has happened too often. It cannot happen again. We cannot afford to let it happen. We must therefore take precautions to prevent it from happening. 173. My Prime Minister has asked me to suggest to the Assembly that future negotiations between the great Powers should fee joined by representatives of non-aligned countries. Non-aligned countries do represent a significant point of view, although perhaps they lack the cohesion of a bloc of countries committed to a particular ideology. Fundamentally what we, the non-aligned countries, have in common is that we are outside the cold war and want to remain outside. The non-aligned countries reject the contradictions and assumptions of the cold war. They are committed by their very policies to an unfettered exercise of judgement on tho basic issues which confront the world within the framework of the realities. This should not be unacceptable to either side, since the non-aligned countries are pre-eminently in a position to exercise a salutary influence on the course of negotiations. We should therefore propose that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament be expanded io include a number of non-aligned States. We do not really think that the enlargement of that Committee should be on a population or geographical basis. The only merit in such a proposal would be the purely formal one of increasing the representation on the Committee. We, the non-aligned nations, Want to be able to affect the argument, and this can be done effectively only by associating non-aligned countries with the ten nations. 174. It is our firm conviction that atmospheric and underground nuclear tests should be immediately abandoned. We appreciate the fact that nuclear testing cannot be viewed in isolation from the many interrelated and complicating factors which are causing world tension, but the tests must cease, if only because they cause international tension, prejudice the health of mankind and affect even the kindliness of nur human environment. Such a situation cannot be allowed to continue, and no cold war argument, however inevitable the situation may appear within the framework of that war,, can justify its continuance. We do not think that a treaty on nuclear tests is of immediate importance. For three years man has been able to live free from these menacing blasts on the basis of a voluntary moratorium. Do we really need to wait for a treaty? It may even turn out to be unnecessary if there is agreement on total disarmament; but what we do need meanwhile is a moratorium. This must be immediately restored. 175. Recently we have often heard expressed the theory that colonialism has ceased to be a real problem as more and more dependent territories have advanced to the stage of independence. We are happy to be reassured by the British Foreign Secretary that the. United Kingdom is taking positive steps — steps which we know from our own experience it has always taken where colonial territories have been concerned — to that end: that it is even prepared voluntarily to place before the General Assembly the details of those positive processes. 176. We welcome the fact that Sierra Leone, a former British territory, has risen to its full stature and become a member of the Commonwealth. However, the theory that, because the percentage of people living under colonialism has continued to shrink, colonialism is no longer a real problem, is simply not true. Mr. Hammarskjold's death, in itself, is proof that colonialism is still not dead. Indeed, it has a knack of taking new shapes and forms in the face of evolving realities. Implementation of the resolution [1514 (XV)] containing the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which the General Assembly adopted with not a single dissentient vote at its last session, is a matter of urgency. I would invite Members to look at the recent happenings in Angola, the new developments in the Congo, the continuing bloodshed in Algeria and the peculiar problem of South West Africa. To take just one example, Angola: the whole world knows that the metropolitan State is waging a war of extermination, without precedent in recent times, in that country. The resolutions of the United Nations have been treated with contempt. In the face of this intransigence, this cynical and calculated indifference to world opinion, it is in our view a matter directly concerning the Organization that Portugal should not be permitted to continue its wilful policies in Angola with impunity. 177. Other countries have suggested that nations such as South Africa and Portugal, which follow such policies, should be excluded from membership of the Assembly. I cannot accept that view as correct, or regard it as a positive step in the light of present international thinking. We are not here as members of a common club — people with one way of thinking and no other. We are not here to act as a kind of superior body, a holy alliance, an "61ite" which alone is capable of enlightened thinking. That is not the position: we do disagree with one another. We do have differences of policy. It is surely no solution to say that because we disapprove radically of a policy followed by a country such as Portugal or South Africa, we should exclude it from membership of this community of nations. What would happen if we carried that argument to its logical conclusion? We might reach a position in which the policies followed by any one of us might not find general acceptance. To take an absurd example, the United States might actually disapprove of the policies followed by the Soviet Union, or vice versa! One would not suggest that those two great countries should leave the Assembly as a result. We are here in a spirit of compromise and understanding. We must seek other means of making world opinion felt by the Governments and peoples of Portugal and South Africa. 178. I have already spoken of the situation in the Congo and should like now to deal briefly with one or two aspects of the position in Katanga. Ceylon was one of the nations which offered support to the Government of Mr. Lumumba. It was also one of the many nations to ask the United Nations to give effective support to the lawful Prime Minister's desire to restore law and order and maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the Congolese Republic. When the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, died, the people of my country were deeply shocked. We deplored what had happened, and had no difficulty in identifying the forces responsible for the crime. Following Mr. Lumumba's death, our Government took up the position that it could not recognize any other person as Head of the Congolese Government unless the national Parliament, under the "Loi fondamentale", validated such appointment. In our view, the Congo has today a Government with parliamentary backing and we are prepared to give it all possible support in helping it maintain law and order, and the unity and integrity of the Congolese Republic. Its Government has asked for the support of the United Nations in achieving these objectives, and it our task to see that the resolutions of the Security Council are fully implemented. 179. There is strong evidence that insidious forces still remain in Katanga province — forces which would do everything in their power to resist the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. A cease-fire agreement has been concluded, but my Government does not consider it of any significance unless it leads to such implementation. The territorial integrity' of the Congo must be maintained. The dissidence in Katanga must be eliminated and the provincial government of Katanga brought within the framework of the Congolese Constitution. 180. I regret that I cannot accept the view propounded by the British Foreign Secretary that the situation is analogous to one of provincial autonomy in which the forces of the United Nations have become an external instrument for interfering in a nation's private affairs. Surely it is much more than that. Surely it must remain much more while foreign elements within Katanga province, receiving assistance from neighbouring territories, wage war — let us call a spade a spade — against the forces of the United Nations with, it seems, some degree of success. This is the country that we were told had only eleven or so university graduates when it assumed its independence. Are we to believe seriously that Katanga province is defying the authority of the Congolese Government unaided? Could it, standing alone, withstand with considerable effect the armies of the United Nations? The Government of Ceylon refuses to take up an attitude so naive as that. 181. I have already referred to the principles embodied in the "troika" and shall say nothing more concerning them. However, it is fitting that I should here express the grief of Ceylon at the death of the Secretary-General, Mr Dag Hammarskjold. We have, on occasion, had compelling reason to disagree with him, but we have never doubted his integrity or his single-minded dedication to the cause of world peace and the United Nations. He was particularly conscious that the Organization existed for the protection, of small nations. Whatever mistakes he may have made, we feel that people of his calibre, acting with such dedication in the cause of international peace, are very hard to replace. To find another person with the qualities of Mr. Hammarskjold will be difficult, and we should not confuse our attitude to that question with our attitude to the separate one is whether we should retain one single individual as Secretary-General or amend the Charter to establish "troikas". 182. Many of these ideological problems and questions of amendment would cease to exist if we could agree upon a person in whom all the countries of this world could have confidence, and i am certain that I am not being unrealistic when I express the hope, on behalf of the Government and people of Ceylon, that there are still such people left in the world. 183. The structure of the United Nations, apart from the specific question of the Secretary-General, is a matter of increasing importance to the Organization. The membership of the United Nations today is almost double what it was at its inception. The change has not been merely a numerical change, for the addition of countries from Asia and Africa has; no doubt had its very strong impact upon the character of the Organization. The time has therefore come to move the structure of the Organization itself into line with these changes, so that, the Organization may become a body representative the significant changes in world opinion brought about by the accession of Asian and African countries to the United Nations. I think it is a matter of general agreement that the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, as they are constituted today, are under-representative. The important thing, however, is not the mere under-representation, but the fact that, as a result of it, the capacity of these Councils to play their full role as organs of the United Nations has been drastically limited. It is in the interests of the United Nations that these bodies should be expanded to express within themselves at any time the broad spectrum of world opinion. 184. In the case of the Secretariat there has been continuing agitation, particularly on the part of African-Asian countries, that it should reflect in their due proportion the increased membership of Asian and African countries. We fully appreciate that this is a matter solely within the discretion of whoever becomes the Secretary "General and that it can be only one of many considerations to be borne in mind in the selection of personnel for the Secretariat. We would, however, commend, for the consideration of whoever is chosen, without in any way prejudicing the independent character of the Secretariat itself, the suggestion that every endeavour be made to give the Secretariat a more balanced representation Of Member countries in the United Nations. 185. No address by a representative of an economically developing country is ever complete with >ut some reference, I think, to the needs for economic assistance and technical co-operation. Being the Finance Minister of my country, in addition to the other functions I perform in foreign affairs, I think my address would not be complete, at least for home consumption, if I did not refer to it. 186. There is the emphatic and urgent need to realize that under-developed countries must have an accelerated rate of growth to keep pace with growing populations and their growing demands, and for this purpose massive foreign aid is essential. It is necessary also to realize that the problems of sufficient aid will be with us until self-sustained growth is realized, and, while that day is near for some countries, it is very far away indeed for others. We belong to the latter group. 187. Development programmes must not therefore be retarded by shortages of external finance. It is clear that in future years, with the growing development plans of all newly developed countries, the shortage of external finance will assume an increasingly greater significance in the world payments picture, Even a minimum rate of economic growth may be jeopardized by the inadequacy of external finance. 188. In the last decade, the terms of trade of primary producing countries vis-a-vis industrial countries have deteriorated almost continuously. And, what is more, there is a growing awareness on the part of these under-developed countries that the losses we sustain in the falling prices, the change of the terms of trade, are in excess of the benefits which we have received from foreign aid. 189. There is therefore an urgent weed for United Nations financial agencies, either existing or proposed, to find a process to help offset the unavoidable balance of payment crises of the underdeveloped countries in so far as they stem from development programmes, commodity price fluctuations and short-term capital outflows. There is a very grave need for urgent consideration by the Assembly of some form of automatic access to reserves and some form of insurance against commodity price fluctuations. 190. Before I conclude, I should like once again to appeal to the rest of the world, if not to the great Powers: let us not try to enter into recriminations and into argument. Let us avoid making the mistake of analysing the arguments, or trying to say who is right and who is wrong. Let us not try to enter into arguments on this question. 191. For example, we heard a few moments ago from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that, as things appear to his Government, there is an overt declaration on the part of communist countries that they mean to subvert Governments from outside and that they mean to go on with that process in furtherance of their ideology. But we must also be realistic and look at the other side of the picture if we are going to enter into that kind of argument. We like to imagine, for example, that there is no crusade against communism. But the facts of history are there. One cannot expect the Russians to forget, for instance, that in 1917 their country was actually invaded, that battles were fought own their territory against communism, that they have been hemmed in from time to time, that attempts have been made to contain their own particular ideology, so that they might themselves perhaps have a very real feeling of fear that they are going to be the victims of aggression. We sincerely hope that that is not going to happen, and we sincerely hope that they are not going to subvert any other countries which do not want to be subverted. The argument goes both ways. 192* We do not want to enter into this pattern of argument. We do not wish to divide ourselves into groups trying to find alignments. We stand with the rest of the world and we think it is a complete mistake to try to either into arguments for or against, to try to arrive at solutions in that way. That is not the answer. Recriminations will get us nowhere. It is no good trying to pretend that the fault is entirely on the other side, that one particular country has distinguished itself by its clean record in foreign affairs. We in the non-aligned nations, certainly we in Ceylon, do not propose to enter into that argument, and we shall maintain our independence and strive for what we believe to be the true principles set forth in the Charter. We are not going to enter into arguments as to who is the best defender of the Charter, whether it is the countries of the Western world or of the communist world. We want the Charter to exist and we want both those great groups of countries to stay clear of our affairs and of the affairs of the rest of. the world. They should let the rest of the world develop in peace towards the form of government, the forms of social and economic development, that our countries require. 193. I find that it is ten minutes to two, and I must thank all my colleagues who have had the patience to forgo some part of their luncheon interval to give thought to some of the considerations that the Government of Ceylon would like to present for careful consideration in this forthcoming session. We urge all Governments to act with a realization that whatever decisions the Assembly makes now are probably going to affect the future course of world events to such an extent that we must take the right decisions here and now. There is no postponing the issue. There is no question of avoiding an issue. It has to be faced, and it has to be faced correctly. 194. In conclusion, may I appeal once again to the great Powers of the world, and particularly the United States of America and the Soviet Union: do not forget the principles that inspired you in San Francisco, when you were concerned with arriving at compromise solutions and co-operating with one another for the peace of the world. We need that co-operation now. The real challenge is not so much a challenge to countries like ours, which cannot affect events, which are merely the victims of events. The challenge faces you, and we, the rest of the world, look up to you and look forward to constructive and positive action on the part of the two Governments.