): I should like to say at the outset what a pleasure it is for me and my delegation to sit here under the Presidency of Mr. Mongi Slim. He and his country have supported the United Nations through thick and thin. He, personally, has all the qualities of heart, mind and character to enable him to preside over the proceedings of this Assembly. I am afraid that I cannot say that the omens indicate that he is going to have a very smooth time. Nevertheless, I am quite sure that all the delegations here will help him to support the authority of the Chair, thus enabling him to see our work through in a businesslike and harmonious fashion.
68. Many representatives who have spoken in this hall have reminded us that in 1945 fifty-one Members of the United Nations, sick and disillusioned by the folly and waste of the second world conflict, met together to draw up a Charter, the purpose of which was to save humanity from the scourge of war. Today we in the Assembly are double that number. We are sixteen years older. But would anyone say that we are wiser? The fact is that we have not lifted the scourge of war from humanity. On the contrary, what we have done is to invent weapons incomparably greater in their destructive capacity than anything the world has seen before. And, what is more, wherever one looks in the world today there are quarrels, wars and rumours of war. There is a scarcely a part of the world today that is free from strife. Over the whole hang the hooded clouds of the nuclear bombs which have lately been exploded in Asia and the Arctic.
69. We stand here professing our desire for peace but in fact we are mocked and disgraced by our own performance.
70. The problem which faces us is exactly the same as the problem which faced the authors of the Charter. It is how to deal with an abuse of power by one country or by a combination of countries. The classic answer for keeping the peace is the balance of power. It is true, I believe, that since the last war it has been the balance of power which has in fact kept the peace. It is true, too, that in a nuclear age it is more important than at any other time that no one side should gain an advantage over the other which would tempt an aggressor to act. But the balance of power is not the complete safeguard of peace for which men have been searching. For rearmament, where one combination of countries feels bound to match the invention of the other, gains a kind of momentum of its own, and history has shown us how fatally easy it is for that to get out of hand. It is well to remind ourselves that the authors of the Charter saw only one answer to this problem and one remedy for it — namely, disarmament, and disarmament accompanied by collective machinery to keep the peace.
71. We are faced today with the stark choice of whether the civilized world is to live or die. I am bound to say that I see no other way in which we can live than to follow the principles and recommendations of the Charter.
72. I have studied the Charter time and time again -- as no doubt other representatives in this room have done — to see whether the fault lies in the Charter. But I doubt if the most skilful draftsmen could improve upon the principles of international living which it expounds or upon the machinery which it lays down for putting those principles into practice. The more I look at the Charter, the more 1 find it a clear and unequivocal guide to sanity, to law and to order. I have no doubt that we should meet together to expand the Security Council and the other Councils of the United Nations in order to reflect the modern composition of the Assembly. Of course we should do that. We all know the reasons why we cannot.
73. But, basically, there are three ways — and only three — in which we can have peaceful coexistence, The first is if we agree to settle all our disputes by negotiation. The second is if there is absolute respect for treaties and agreements, freely signed. The third is if we are willing to set up collective machinery to keep the peace if it is broken by deliberate intent.
74. Those plain statements ought to suffice. But I must take them further. It is necessary to say that negotiations must not be looked upon as a means for one side to gain victory over the other. Treaties must be kept not only in the spirit but in letter. And when there is an aggression, collective action must be supported by all the rest against the one who breaks the peace. The organization of collective security puts upon each nation an obligation to exercise a high degree of restraint. At the best of times that would not be easy. I am bound to confess that today it Is not possible to bring about complete collective security, Why is it impossible for the United Nations to keep the peace today?
75. The reason is that the world is divided by an ideological chasm which is far deeper-"-though the signs were there — than when the authors met to draw up the Charter. When one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of. the other one cannot have true collective security. You may try to establish collective security by majority vote and by action upon it, but immediately one- side speaks of such an intention collective action is condemned and frustrated by every trick in the political pack. I shall return to that theme in a moment, but would say at once that the United Nations reflects the political divisions in the world: that it is this, and not the Charter of the United Nations, that needs reform. So long as the world is divided the United Nations can be no more than a shadow of what it ought to be. The Soviet Foreign Minister said that we must face this position — must face what he called "realities" — and therefore be content to coexist. I am not. I regard the doctrine of coexistence as the most sterile and negative conception of international life in the twentieth century. What is needed today is not mere coexistence but work towards positive and constructive action between all nations.
76. I should like, taking one by one the points that the Soviet Foreign Minister made yesterday [1016th meeting], to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the organizing of collective security and, at once, the need to change coexistence into co-operation. My first illustration of the international anarchy that results from ignoring the precepts of the Charter is to be found in the negotiations on disarmament. Galvanized by the threat to humanity created by the exploding of nuclear bombs, and the resultant fall-out in the atmosphere, we at last looked like making a breakthrough in regard to disarmament, which we had been debating off and on for forty years. At last it seemed that we might find it possible to ban nuclear tests. I shall not recall the ingredients of the treaty which so nearly became fruitful in Geneva. Very few points remained unsettled and the British and United States Governments came forward with proposals to meet the Soviet criticisms, to meet what we thought were legitimate Soviet wishes. Those proposals were never
discussed. In place of discussion there came a string of sixteen nuclear explosions, with resultant fall-out all over the world. Those explosions took, of course, many months to prepare. In other words, while one side was negotiating in good faith the other was practising deception. How can there be confidence between nations, how can one hope for peaceful coexistence, under such conditions? I say quite straight to the Soviet Union this: that if this way of negotiating is not renounced by public example we are in for a very bad time — for the world simply cannot survive another example of such double dealing.
77. Happily, we have still a chance to do better. The President of the United States gave us,, in his address [1013th meeting], a stirring and practical lead in announcing his scheme for general and complete disarmament, the purpose of which was to desire the means of war. My Government fully supports and agrees with that scheme. We are glad, too, that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree upon the principles which should govern a disarmament treaty, I have compared those principles with the ones announced following the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth earlier this year and have found no substantial difference. It may be that, at long last, we can take the first halting steps along the road to sanity. But is no use hiding our heads
in the sand: when the ostrich does that he not merely looks foolish but is extremely vulnerable. Over the years the difficulty has always been to translate the principles of disarmament into practice, the greatest problem being that of inspection. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union asked whether we accepted the principle of general and complete disarmament. It is one of the objectives named in the Western plan, but there are of course these difficulties of inspection, which I should like to illustrate in two rather telling ways,
78. First, the Soviet Union says that there must be no inspection until all arms are destroyed; that any inspection meanwhile amounts to espionage. Anyone can see how difficult that makes a programme of staged disarmament, yet what else can there be? Let us suppose that each side puts 500 aeroplanes into a bonfire. One can inspect such a bonfire, but one cannot, as I understand the Soviet position, inspect what is coming off the supply lines in the factory. How is one to know that the very next day another 500, or even 1,000, aeroplanes will not be produced to replace those that have been burnt? That is one of the difficulties that must be resolved, but it cannot be done by a mere statement of principle — much as one welcomes agreement upon these, because any agreement is better than none.
79. We must face the fact that inspection and control are at the crux of the whole matter, not for their own sake but because, when distrust has been so deep between the communist and free worlds as it has in the past, confidence is the essence of the matter. Without confidence there will not be disarmament. Therefore, I hope that the United States plan will be most carefully considered by the Soviet Union: that it will understand that when we talk of inspection no element of espionage is either talked about or threatened. On the contrary, our purpose is to produce confidence so that physical disarmament may proceed.
80. I turn now to my second illustration, the sanctity of treaties and agreements freely signed, and to the pertinent and typical example provided by the new crisis in Berlin. I shall retrace the history of this matter no more than. I did that of the nuclear talks. I shall merely remind my colleagues in the Assembly that the Allies of the first war, Russia, France, the United States and the United Kingdom, assumed joint responsibility for the whole of Germany, including the whole city of Berlin, pending the signing of a treaty with a united Germany. That obligation was undertaken solemnly, finely and gladly between Allies.
81. It is certainly arguable that, after sixteen years, there may be a case for change. Bu twhen the contract has not run out — and this contract between us has not run out — then the change must be by consent.
82. Britain will spare no effort to find a basis for negotiation — I can pledge my country to that — and I think that, while we are seeking a basis for negotiation, probably the less said the better. But there are two aspects of this matter of Berlin which I think it is timely to bring to the notice of the Assembly.
83. The first involves a principle in which I would have thought that everybody in the Assembly has an
almost personal interest. It is the principle of self- determination for East Germans and West Germans, for East Berliners and West Berliners. I thought that Mr Gromyko said yesterday — and he will correct me if I am wrong — that the principle of self-determination should not apply in this case, in the case of East Germany. Why not? Is there to be one principle for Asia and Africa and another for Europe, one rule for the British Commonwealth and another for the Russian Empire? I thought that, if a principle was anything, it was universal,
84. And so, while I pledge my country to negotiation, there are two things that we must secure. One is that the people of West Berlin are free to live the life which they have chosen for themselves, and the other is that there are absolute guarantees for that freedom.
85. I must say that the picture painted by my colleague, Mr, Gromyko, of life in West Germany and Berlin was grotesque. Before the crisis was engineered, life was smooth. But look at the dislocation brought about by the division of the city. On each side of the frontier there are people of equal attainments, at equal stages of cultural, economic and industrial 4evelopment. But there were 60,000 workers in employment, earning good money, who came every day from East Berlin into West Berlin. Twenty-five per cent of the students who wanted to educate themselves came from East Berlin or East Germany into West Berlin or West Germany. Families that are on each side of the frontier are no longer able to meet. Between these people and the life of their choice the last section of the iron curtain has been dropped into place and the key has been turned. The wishes of these people ought to be ascertained by a free vote under international supervision.
86. The most persistent feature of United Nations activities has been the insistence on self-determination, and it is on that principle, in the end of the day, that the problem of Germany and Germany's future will have to be resolved. Meanwhile, there are two and one-half million free people with a passion to remain free. If there is to be negotiation — and I profoundly hope that there is — then uninterrupted access to the city and absolute guarantees for the free life of the people must be part ol the settlement.
87. My third illustration of the penalty of departing from the precepts of the Charter brings me closer to the functioning of the United Nations itself and to the organization of collective security and peace-keeping machinery — and let us always remember that the purpose of peace-keeping machinery is to substitute an international machinery so that individual nations do not find it necessary to assert their own rights by their own power. The original conception of the authors of the Charter was that, in the case of a deliberate breach of the peace, the rest would combine against the aggressor. And, unless wars are to continue which will involve many countries, what other solution is there than establishing some peace-keeping machinery which in defined oases would entail the use of force?
88. So far, our experiments have been halting. There is the United Nations police force on the frontier between the United Arab Republic and Israel. I think the majority of the Assembly would feel that that has contributed to the stability of the area and reduced the danger of war. But — and it is a very big "but" — this force is not supported or sustained by the communist countries. I am very glad that my colleague from Liberia has just mentioned this matter — I think this is the first time it has been done — because the refusal of one or more countries to pay for collective action which has been approved by two-thirds of the Assembly is a serious weakness here. Unless every Member is willing to pay its share, as we shall realize when we come to the budget, we may find it fatal to the existence of the United Nations.
89. The second example of the use of United Nations forces to restrain aggression and interference and to keep law and order is vivid in our minds, and that is the enterprise in the Congo — again, one for which the Communist bloc does not pay and has never paid.
90. I remind the Assembly that the reason for the original intervention of the United Nations in the Congo was to prevent external interference designed to exploit conditions of civil war. At this time last year, the Assembly judged overwhelmingly that such external intervention must be stopped for, if it was not stopped, it would bring the independent life of a united Congo to an -2nd. That was the view of the great majority in face of the most dogged communist opposition. I think the Assembly still feels that the original action was justified, and indeed, through a series of resolutions culminating in the resolution of 21 February 1961, it added to the powers of the Secretary-General, because it decided that, in addition to force being used to repel external aggression, in the last resort force might be used in order to prevent those inside the Congo who were attempting to disrupt law and order from doing so. It is these instructions — of the resolution of 21 February, in particular — that Mr. Hammarskjold was doing his best to interpret and to apply.
91. The United Kingdom, from the very start, has backed the United Nations operation in the Congo to the full, I would invite anybody who doubts it to study the speeches made again and again by our permanent representative to the United Nations. And we have paid out millions of dollars in support of this operation. Our troops were not detailed to take part, but, over and above the contribution which we paid toward the enterprise, we transported the troops that the United Nations wanted in our aircraft — constantly, over the months — which certainly ought not to have escaped the notice of the Foreign Minister of Ghana, because we carried a number of Commonwealth troops into the Congo to support the action of the United Nations.
92. We are strongly against mercenaries in the Congo. What did we do? We announced at once that if there were any British nationals in the Congo who attempted
. to take part in the fighting on either side, they would lose their British passports. Did any other country do anything comparable to that?
93. Our support of the resolution of 21 February, it is true, was conditional. We made it a condition that foroe should not be used to impose a particular political pattern upon the Congolese nation. Now what was the reason for that reservation? It was not made because we differed with the Assembly of the United Nations about the objective. Its objective was a united Congo, and so was ours. Any influence that we may have had over the months in the Congo has been used to influence the Government of President Kasa-Vubu and his Prime Ministers and Mr. Tshombe in Elisabethville to come together. Our reservation with respect to
the use of force was due to this: we foresaw that if the United Nations was to provide the slightest basis for the charge that it was intervening in the internal politics of a country and backing one side against another, irreparable damage would be done to the United Nations itself and to its ability in the future to keep the peace.
94. I would ask any representative here to think of his own circumstances, and particularly the smell countries and also those countries where a lot of provincial autonomy is given and enjoyed. The United Nations cannot incur the charge, and must never incur the charge, of being able to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. The small countries would then come to fear the United Nations rather than to trust it. The situation is bad now, but it would be far worse if it were thought that the United Nations could dictate in matters of internal politics.
95. Certain charges have been made against my country of bad faith toward the United Nations. I reject them absolutely. There is not one shred of evidence on which they can be based or by which they can be sustained.
96. I cannot deny that the United Nations and the Assembly are put in a horrid dilemma. The Nations ought to be able to combine to keep the peace. Why have they failed? There are two answers: because one-third of the world is dedicated to the destruction of the way of life of the other third and because one- third of the world has elevated to the status of dogma the exploitation of civil strife as a means to that end. I did not invent that. It comes straight from the published documents of the eighty-one communist parties to the Moscow declaration of 1960. That is the threat to coexistence — the exploitation of civil strife wherever it is found, which is the advertised purpose of the Communist bloc. I am going to analyse the results upon the United Nations.
97. The Security Council is paralysed by the veto, which the Russians have now operated ninety-five times. The Assembly is therefore compelled to act by majority decision against the wishes of the Communist countries. The Communist countries riposte with new ideas to frustrate the will of the majority which they think is unjust or inimical to their interest, ideas such as the "troika". Therefore I come back to what I said before — where nations should be combining, they are in fact dividing. Action is blocked, tempers rise and the result at the end of the day is frustration in the Assembly, which is little if any less dangerous than the paralysis of the Security Council with which we began. I doubt whether anybody would seriously challenge the truth of this analysis. If ever there was a vicious circle, it is this. And what is the way out?
98. I have thought a great deal about this and whether there can be a compromise, but I come back to one solution and one only. K the Communist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, would be willing to convince the world of the excellence of their system by example and drop subversion backed by force, drop the exploitation of civil strife which was advertised in the communist doctrine, cease setting man against man, and co-operate with collective action instead of driving the coach and three horses through the whole fabric of co-operative efforts, then and only then would war really be able to fulfil the conditions and purposes of the Charter. So, as long as this doctrine persists, then even coexistence is made precarious and the United Nations itself is in danger.
99. I agree most profoundly with the President of the United States that the United Nations must be saved: whatever its faults, and heaven knows it has them, it is mankind's best hope of peace. Therefore, as far as my Government is concerned, its authority must be sustained. One thing we can do immediately to sustain it is this: to insist that there should be a chief executive supported by an international, civil service, none of whom takes his orders from individual Governments. That is essential and that is what the people of the world want, and that is what we ought to try to give them.
100. There is one other matter in this context of impartiality and justice which I feel I must raise now. The United Nations, and in particular the Assembly, must show itself to be impartial and must be seen to be impartial — I am only going to ask this question, I am not sure of the answer — is there growing up almost imperceptibly a code of behaviour where there is one rule for the Communist countries and another for the democracies, one rule for the bully who deals in fear and another for the democracies because their stock in trade is reason and compromise?
101. I think we want to search our consciences, I wonder, if it had been the United States and the United Kingdom which smothered the world with fall-out, whether the critics would have been so hushed? I think it is very understandable; they have my sympathy. The unaligned nations do not wish to be caught up in rival political ideologies. But if the United Nations is to be the body which we wish to see, which guards the weak and is jealous of the independence of small nations, then they must not yield to the temptation to put public pressures always upon the reasonable nations because they feel that, in the last resort, those nations will be decent and therefore will give way. That would be to deny the justice to others which they themselves wish to enjoy.
102. I trust, therefore, that the result of the sixteenth session Assembly will be that it will use its authority to assert the purposes of the Charter, that it will declare itself in favour of an international civil service, in favour of the sanctity of treaties and in favour of change and progress, but change by consent and true co-operation,
103. What contribution can we make, so that the United Nations may be seen as a body which can keep the peace and so that we may add to its authority?
104. The late Secretary-General posed the problem very simply in the introduction [A/4800/Add.l] to his report, and as my colleague from the Netherlands said yesterday [1016th meeting], this has, by reason of his death, become his political testament. He has asked whether the United Nations is to remain merely a debating society or whether it is going to be given, the peace-keeping machinery envisaged by the Charter. With all the risks — and, there are many — I would opt for the latter. But if that is the decision, then certain questions have to be answered with precision, and I hope that we shall do so.
105. Is the Assembly prepared to set up and equip an international police force which is more than a scratch collection of national forces? Because that is necessary. An amateur force sent out into the blue these days is apt to get into great difficulty. A true international police force is needed,
106. Is each country in the Assembly willing to stand up and say that it will pay its share, and are all nations ready to face the consequences of United Nations intervention in a particular matter on the vote of a majority?
107. Until those questions are answered this Organization, which is young, can only act strictly within its strength and only undertake those police actions strictly within its compass.
108. As I have indicated, there is one matter which must be settled now. No action can be taken in the field of collective peace-making machinery if the Member countries feel that the executive and the administration are taking orders from national Governments. That is really the decisive answer' to the "troika" or any variant of the "troika", and we should decide now and show the world that we mean to have in this Organization a truly international civil service.
109. If ever we admit the proposition that no one man can be impartial, then the Members of the United Nations had better pack up their bags and go home, because the world will be morally bankrupt and the forces of reaction will have won the day.
11 The modern tendency is towards interdependence. In the opinion of my Government, an international civil service is a necessary part of progress on that road. And if that is the road which the Assembly chooses, then they will not find that the United Kingdom is lagging behind. On the contrary, we have worked for interdependence within our Commonwealth. We are working for greater interdependence within the Continent of Europe. In this matter we shall be the most ready collaborator.
111. I want to close by carrying a step further something which my Prime Minister said to the Assembly at its fifteenth session [877th meeting] last year on the matter of colonialism and the British Commonwealth. I noticed that the President of the United States in his speech said that the United States had been a colony and the victim of all the exploitation associated with that status. I could not help thinking that America looked pretty well on it. If in the course of time all our colonies are as prosperous and as happy as the United States, then there will be a queue of others lining up to be exploited a little further. And how happy we in the United Kingdom would be.
112. The truth of the matter is this; all but 5 per cent of the 660 million people who live in territories that were British are now living in independent territory. Last year our Prime Minister called the roll. Since he spoke Nigeria and Cyprus have come along. Sierra Leone happily comas to the Assembly this afternoon, and soon it will be the turn of Tanganyika. We have been faithful with the many, and equally we shall keep faith with the few who remain.
113. We have always believed and repeatedly shown that the best way to train people in responsibility is to give it to them. We have established courts of law with independent executive authority, giving impartial judgement and respected for their devotion to equal justice. We have trained career officials in the public services who give their loyalty not to a tribe or to a party but to their country. We have trained police forces who maintain law and order with public consent.
We have Established elected parliaments and taught them the principles and practices of free elections. We have raised standards of living, improving agriculture and industry, and extending technical aid. In pursuit of these main purposes of our policy, we have found that this does not delay independence. On the contrary, it hastens it and it makes the transition from dependence to independence faster and more smooth.
114. There are many difficult problems still to solve because in some of our territories we have different races whose interests have to be harmonized together, But so certain am I that this process of creating new nations in the British Commonwealth is right, that my Government is now ready to provide full information to the United Nations on the political and constitutional steps we are taking in the territories which remain under British administration.
115. The Assembly will recognize that this is a decision of the first importance. There is nothing in the Charter which requires us to submit political and constitutional information. Article 73 e puts a specific limit on information which has to be "information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions". But we have recognized the intense interest in these matters of constitutional and political progress every where, and particularly in the Assembly, and I am confident that we can enlist the understanding of the Assembly and of the United Nations when they see our policies and the steady way in which we are directing them to bring independence to the nations in our colonial empire. And we take this step confident in our record, that it will be a mark, and a major mark, of co-operation in this matter with the United Nations.
116. We cannot share our responsibility, we cannot shift our responsibility. But as the story is unfolded it will carry conviction and it will be found, I hope, to be in tune with the wishes of the Assembly and certainly in tune with the guiding principles set forth in the Charter.
117. So my purpose this morning has been to analyse the reasons why the United Nations is handicapped in its work for peace and the international aspects of this problem which we have to resolve.
118. There are many frustrations, but through them all the United Nations can count on the support of the United Kingdom to sustain the principles set forth in the Charter. Careful of the Organization and jealous of it because It is young, we want it to give confidence to all nations; prudent in its use of power in the meanwhile, because, until it is equipped with real peace-keeping machinery it would be fatal to exceed' its strength; but determined to build steadily toward the day when the principles set forth in the Charter can be accepted and operated by the vast majority of the nations here, and so arrive nearer the time when constructive interdependence between nations will be the order of the day.